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- Ariew (1986) + (Some philosophers of science suggest that … Some philosophers of science suggest that philosophical assumptions must</br>influence historical scholarship, because history (like science) has no neutral data and</br>because the treatment of any particular historical episode is going to be influenced to</br>some degree by one's prior philosophical conceptions of what is important in science.</br>However, if the history of science must be laden with philosophical assumptions, then how</br>can the history of science be evidence for the philosophy of science? Would not an</br>inductivist history of science confirm an inductivist philosophy of science and a</br>conventionalist history of science confirm a conventionalist philosophy of science? I</br>attempt to resolve this problem; essentially, I deny the claim that the history of science</br>must be influenced by one's conception of what is important in science - one's general</br>philosophy of science. To accomplish the task I look at a specific historical episode,</br>together with its history, and draw some metamethodological conclusions from it. The</br>specific historical episode I examine is Descartes' critique of Galileo's scientific methodology.tique of Galileo's scientific methodology.)