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The distinction between methodology and methods might be traced first to Popper’s views on falsificationism. Popper acknowledged that while falsificationism may be an effective criterion of demarcation, and a methodological goal for scientists, they rarely will actually reject a theory in the face of a falsifying instance.[[CiteRef::Thornton (2016)]] Nonetheless, static method theorists like Popper or Lakatos typically suggest that the explicit static methodology they propose is the normative goal for scientists, and that “good” science ought to strive towards such methodologies. Lakatos said that “methodological standards act like teachers: they give marks to theories” and that theories which propose ad hoc modifications ought to be refused,[[CiteRef::Motterlini (Ed.) (1999)]] demonstrating the belief of static method theorists that methods of appraisal ought to be taken from explicit methodologies. That being said, the distinction between explicit methodology and implicit method is ephemeral at best amongst Popperians.
Laudan perhaps comes the closest to acknowledging the distinction between method and methodology, but ultimately confuses them when explaining their respective roles.[[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)]] Laudan’s reticulated model criticizes accepted views of the time by recognizing that the explicit methodologies scientists hold are often in opposition to actually employed methods. However, in explaining how methods are “constrained” (i.e. underdetermined) by theories and “justified” by axiological aims, Laudan seems to conflate methodologies of argumentation and the actual method that theories are evaluated by.[[CiteRef::Laudan (19841984a)]] Barseghyan notes that other authors from Laudan’s period also conflated the terms, including Zahar and Leplin.[[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)]].
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