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Mechanism of Theory Acceptance (view source)
Revision as of 01:56, 15 June 2017
, 01:56, 15 June 2017no edit summary
|Description=The question of theory acceptance is one of the central problems of theoretical [[Scientonomy|scientonomy]]. Any scientonomic theory should explain how theories become part of a mosaic. Initially, when philosophy had a static conception of science, this question did not exist. However, as science progressed, it soon became clear that science replaces its theories with theories that it considers superior, and it does this on a continuous basis. At this point, how science accepts theories became a central question for the philosophy of science. Answering this question is not trivial, because all of the obvious answers, such as verisimilitude and best fit to the data, all come with philosophical problems. The difficulty of solving the problem was compounded when it was realized that the methods by which theories are accepted changes over time.
One historical example of theory acceptance was the acceptance of Copernican heliocentrism, which involved the rejection of Aristotelian-Ptolemaic astronomy. Another example was when Einstein's general theory of relativity replaced [[Issac Isaac Newton| Newton]]'s]] theory of universal gravitation.
|Parent Topic=Mechanism of Scientific Change
|Authors List=Hakob Barseghyan,
|Formulated Year=2015
|Prehistory=This question has been one of the central questions of the philosophy of science. Initially, philosophy held a static conception of science. [[Immanuel Kant]] believed that the axioms of Newtonian mechanics were ''a priori '' synthetic propositions. [[CiteRef::Kant (1781)]] Philosophers believed in a static conception of science because no scientific revolution had been experienced since the advent of modern science. While Scientonomy recognizes the transition from the Aristotelian-Medieval method to the Newtonian world view as a scientific revolution, this was not the case historically.
The scientific revolutions in the early twentieth century caused philosophers of science to wonder how science accepts its theories. In his [[Popper (1959)|''Logic of Scientific Discovery'']], [[Karl Popper]] argued that old theories are replaced by new theories when an old theory is falsified and a new theory is corroborated in by experimental evidence. This occurs when an experiment successfully tests a bold conjecture made by the new theory.[[CiteRef::Popper (1959)]]
A major development occurred when [[Thomas Kuhn]] presented his groundbreaking analysis of scientific change in [[Kuhn_Kuhn (1962)| ''The Structure of Scientific Revolutions'']] According to Kuhn, periods of 'normal science' are interrupted by 'scientific revolutions' that involve paradigm shifts. In a paradigm shift involves a fundamental change in world view for the relevant scientific communities. In his conception of theory change, the old and new theories are incommensurable.[[CiteRef::Kuhn (1962)]] While Kuhn's ideas stirred much controversy, they were generally recognized as highly important.
In his [[Lakatos (1978a)|''Methodology of Scientific Research Programs'']],[[Imre Lakatos]] advocated a less cataclysmic view of scientific change. In a refinement of Popper's views, he believed that theories are not necessarily falsified by failed predictions. Rather, a theory's fate depends on its centrality in an overarching research program. The more central a theory is to its research program, the more effort will be extended towards saving it by modifying the research program's auxiliary hypotheses. [[CiteRef::Lakatos (1978a)]]
[[Paul Feyerabend]] argued in [[Feyerabend_Feyerabend (1975a)| ''Against Method'']] that the methods of theory acceptance change over time in science, and that these changes are largely arbitrary. [[Dudley Shapere]] agreed that scientific methods change over time. In [[Shapere_Shapere (1980)| ''The Character of Scientific Change'']], Shapere argued that the scientific methods used at the time are affected by the beliefs that the scientific community holds.[[CiteRef::Feyerabend (1975a)]][[CiteRef::Shapere (1980)]]
[[Larry Laudan]] agreed. In [[Laudan_Laudan (19841984a)| ''Science and Values'']], Laudan argues that the methods that scientific theories are accepted depend on the epistemic values that scientists hold. He recounted how knowledge of experimenters bias and the placebo effect led to the development of the double blind method in drug testing. Laudan's ideas are important precursors to Scientonomy.[[CiteRef::Laudan (19841984a)]][[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)]]
In contrast, the strong program of the Sociology of Scientific Knowledge (SSK) research program, including sociologists like [[Barry Barnes]] and [[David Bloor]] seek to explain science as a sociological phenomenon and sometimes stress the role played by non-empirical social values in scientific change.
|History=Patton, Overgaard and Barseghyan have proposed a reformulation of the Second Law of Theory Acceptance. The reformulated Second Law allows for the possibility an inconclusive outcome to theory assessment. With an inconclusive outcome, theory acceptance, unacceptance or mosaic split are all possible. [[CiteRef::Patton, Overgaard, and Barseghyan (2017)]]
|Related Topics=Mechanism of Method Employment,
