Changes

|Description=There are at least three sorts of questions that we might ask about the process of [[Scientific Change|scientific change]]; Historical questions having to do with what theories and methods were accepted by a particular community at a particular point in time, Theoretical questions about the mechanisms of how scientific change happens, and methodological questions about how scientific change ought to happen and what theories and methods ought to be accepted. The first two questions are descriptive in nature, and the third is normative.

Normative and descriptive concerns have often been conflated in discussions As the "science of scientific change. For example, science" [[Thomas Kuhnscientonomy]] wrote that his theory "should be read seeks a purely descriptive account of processes of change in both ways at once" the [[CiteRef:: Kuhn (1970a)scientific mosaic]]and therefore encompasses only historical and theoretical questions. The traditional belief in a fixed an unchanging method Keeping descriptive scientific questions distinct from questions of science contributed to this conflationnormative methodology avoids numerous pitfalls. For example, since those who conflate the problem two sometimes argue that because some method is known to have flaws of identifying logical consistency or soundness, it cannot possibly have been the true method of science one that was seen as both , in fact, used by scientists. However, there is a descriptive great deal historical and a normative methodological question. By the 1980's most authors agreed evidence that the scientists actually have used logically flawed methods . Inductive reasoning is a ubiquitous part of science had changed over time, and that a theory of scientific change needed to account for both theory change and method changedespite its [https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/induction-problem/ well known flaws]. As the "science The intrusion of science" normative concerns would also undermine scientonomy seeks a descriptive account of processes of change in the 's aspirations to scientific mosaic, and sets normative concerns aside as the concerns of methodologistsstatus [[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)|pp. 19-20]]. To do otherwise runs the risk of rendering If any laws of scientific change discoveredwere accorded normative force they would become tautological truths incapable being called into question by empirical inquiry.