editor, Administrators
2,020
edits
Changes
Jump to navigation
Jump to search
no edit summary
=== Hume and The Science of Human Nature ===
The basic goal of the first three of these works is indicated by the subtitle of the ''Treatise''; "an attempt to introduce the experimental method into moral subjects". [[CiteRef::Morris and Brown (2016)|p.7]] Hume sought to extend Newton's experimental philosophy from natural philosophy into what was then called '''moral philosophy''', which he defined as the "science of human nature". [[CiteRef::Morris and Brown (2016)|p.8]] The field of moral philosophy was much broader then than today, and included topics that we might classify as psychology or cognitive science, as well as epistemology. To Hume, an understanding of the workings of the mind was the key to establishing the foundations of all other knowledge, including "Mathematics, Natural Philosophy, and Natural Religion". [[CiteRef:: Norton (2009)|p. 34]] Natural philosophers, like Newton and Boyle, he maintains, had cured themselves of their "passion for hypotheses and systems". [[CiteRef:: Morris and Brown (2016)|p. 8-9]] Hume sought to work the same cure for moral philosophy, which he saw as full of speculative metaphysical hypotheses and constant dispute. [[CiteRef::Morris and Brown (2016)]] He proposed an empiricist alternative to ''a priori'' metaphysics based on pure reason and the speculative belief systems to which it led. [[CiteRef::Norton (2009)]] He was a naturalist who rejected any appeal to the supernatural in explanations of human nature. For such beliefs, and because he argued that we cannot justify many of our beliefs, he is noted as a skeptic. But he also observed that we have non-rational faculties which compel certain sorts of beliefs (such as the belief that there is a world external to my mind of which my senses provide knowledge), and it is these faculties of which he wishes to give a positive descriptive account. [[CiteRef::Biro (2009)]][[CiteRef::Wright (2012)]]
Hume sought to found an empirical science of the mind, based on experience and observation. He noted that the application of the experimental method to "moral subjects" necessarily differed from its use in natural philosophy, because it was impossible to conduct experiments "purposely, with premeditation". Instead, knowledge would be gained "from cautious observation of human life...by men's behaviour in company, in affairs, and in pleasures". [[CiteRef::Biro (2009)|p. 42]] Experimental psychology in the modern sense, with controlled experiments in the laboratory, would not make its appearance until the late 19th century. [[CiteRef::Leary (1979)]]
Hume's most ambitious skeptical attack on the possibility of theological knowledge was his ''Dialogues concerning Natural Religion'', which he arranged to have published posthumously because of its inflammatory nature. In it, Hume raised devastating objections to the claim that the universe showed evidence of purposeful design by an Intelligent Creator. This claim was then widely popular among natural philosophers associated with the Royal Society [[CiteRef::Morris and Brown (2016)]] The ''Dialogues'' is written as a conversation between three characters; ''Cleanthes'', a proponent of the design argument, ''Demea'', a mystic, and ''Philo'', a religious skeptic generally supposed to be Hume's spokesperson. Philo argues that the analogy between the universe and a designed artifact is weak. For example, we experience only one universe and have nothing to compare it to. We recognize human artifacts by contrast with non-artifacts such as rocks. He also notes that we have no experience of the origin of the universe, and that causal inference requires a basis in experienced constant conjunction between two things. For the origin of the universe we have nothing of the sort. ''Demea'' deems ''Cleanthes'' concept of God as cosmic designer to be anthropomorphic and limiting. In a discussion of the human condition, ''Philo'' asks why an infinitely wise, powerful, and good God would permit human suffering. By the end, Hume's characters arguments lead the reader to the conclude, with ''Philo'', that God's nature seems inconceivable, incomprehensible, and indefinable and therefore the question of God's existence is rendered meaningless. [[CiteRef::Hume (2007)]][[CiteRef::Oppy (1996)]][[CiteRef::Morris and Brown (2016)]]
|Criticism=Hume's skeptical arguments were troubling to many, and received a good deal of criticism. He was criticized, notably, by a fellow Scottish philosopher of his times; Thomas Reid (1710-1796) [[CiteRef::Fieser (2017)]][[CiteRef::Nichols and Yaffe (2016)]] Reid rejected Hume's theories of perception and causation. Hume supposed that our perceptual experience was of impressions in our minds. He also maintained that causal relations do not exist in the world, but are simply posited in our minds when two events are constantly conjoined in experience. Such a view made it impossible to claim that our perceptual impressions are caused by objects in an external world, because we have no independent experience of such objects. It was thus open to a devastating skepticism about the external world. Hume accepted that his belief in an external world was merely a matter of habit, custom, or instinct, and could not be justified. Reid found this unacceptable and supposed that our perceptual experience was directly of objects in the world. He noted that this was consistent with everyday common sense, and no more of a mystery that Hume's claim that we were directly aware of impressions in our mind. Reid likewise rejected Hume's view of causality. He noted that it could not account for the causality of unique events. Suppose, he posited, that an earthquake struck Mexico City for the first time in its history, resulting in the destruction of the city. Under Hume's definition, we could not claim that the earthquake caused the destruction of the city, since the two events, being unique, are not constantly conjoined in experience. He further noted that night following day and day following night are constantly conjoined in experience, but we generally do not claim that day causes night and night causes day, but rather that both are caused by Earth's rotation. and James Beattie (1735-1802)Reid supposed that our perceptual experience was the direct experience of objects in an external world the theory of perception espoused by Hume, along with Descartes and Locke. Reid supposed that our perceptual experience was of objects in the world rather than Hume's impressions in the mind and that this direct perceptual contact was no less mysterious than perceptual contact with impressions or ideas in the mind, and more in accord with ordinary common sense. He sees this as the only way to avoid a devastating skepticism about the external world. For Hume, causal relations are simply posited in our minds when two events are constantly conjoined in experience. Reid noted instances where this notion of causality would break down. ''An Essay on the Nature and Immutability of Truth In Opposition to Sophistry and Scepticism'' (1770) was a sustained criticism of Hume's ''Enquiry'', and was a smash bestseller in its day. Beattie adhered to the Scottish common sense approach to philosophy pioneered by Thomas Reid (1710-1796) , and Hume lamented that the work fell "deadborn from the press". [[CiteRef::Morris and Brown (2016)|p. 4]] It is however, today regarded as a major and important work.
