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In his [[Kuhn (1962a)|''The Structure of Scientific Revolutions'']], [[Thomas Kuhn]] argued that science is conducted under paradigms, which can be defined as a set of related theories forming the ‘worldview’ of the scientific community. The '''paradigms ''' were distinguished using ‘normal science’ and ‘scientific revolutions.’ Science conducted within a paradigm constituted normal science, while a scientific revolution characterized the transition from one paradigm to another. Most importantly, Kuhn believed that there is an accumulation of anomalies that theories often fail to explain. When there is a critical mass of anomalies that the theories within a given paradigm fail to explicate, a scientific revolution takes place that ushers in the era of a new paradigm whose theories provide sufficient explanations of anomalies. Crucially, the theories of the previous paradigm are rejected and replaced by those of the new paradigm. Hence, there is a whole-scale rejection of theories of one paradigm, which are replaced by those of the new one.[[CiteRef::Kuhn (1962a)]] Interestingly, Kuhn differs from logical positivist positivists and Popper, because the former takes theory evaluation as a ‘holistic’ process, while the latter two thought that individual theories can be tested and, therefore, rejected. Another important difference between Kuhn and the earlier philosophers is his emphasis on the contingent contingency of scientific community communities as opposed to focusing on the tendencies explication of explicating the universal method of science.

Arguing in his [[Lakatos (1978a)|''Methodology of Scientific Research Programs'']], [[Imre Lakatos]] viewed theories not in isolation, but as part of an interrelated set that he named research programmes. A '''research programme''' is composed of the ‘hard core’ and the ‘protective belt.’ The former contains the central and fundamental theories of the programme, whereas the latter included include subsidiary and secondary theories or assumptions. In light of the emergence of experimental anomalies or new data, Lakatos argued that the protective belt was modified to explain the new phenomenon, so that the hard core could be retained. Hence, it was theories in the protective belt that could be rejected and modified. Theories in the hard core were immune to rejection.[[CiteRef::Lakatos (1978a)]] Lakatos was influenced by Popper as he used his notions of theory falsification. However, like Kuhn, he utilized the '''Quine-Duhem thesis''', especially the idea that theories are not tested in isolation, but as part of a web of beliefs. Accordingly, his views on theory rejection reflected the notion that, contrary to the views of most philosophers of early and mid 20th century, theories can only be evaluated as part of a system of beliefs.

Building on the ideas such of his predecessors, the later [[Larry Laudan]] proposed the reticulated model in his book [[Laudan (1984a)|''Science and Values'']]. '''Reticulated model''' posits that the values, methodologies, and theories of a given scientific community at a particular time mutually influence each other. It is through the interaction of epistemic values and scientific methodologies that theories are changed, modified or rejected. Therefore, for Laudan, the expectations of the contingent, historical scientific community and its methodologies lead to the rejection of theories.[[CiteRef::Laudan (1984a)]] Laudan’s ideas are arguably significant preludes to the foundations of scientonomy.