Changes

In the early twentieth century, logical positivists formulated an ontology of scientific change. While they individually held varying views, we can summarize their ontology by generalizing from the overlap between authors. The positivists generally supposed that there was a single scientific [[Method|method]] that did not change through history or across disciplines so that the only epistemic elements capable of change in their ontology were [[Theory|scientific theories]].[[CiteRef::Schlick (1931)|pp.145-162]] A similar ontology was championed by many non-positivist authors, including [[Karl Popper]].[[CiteRef::Popper (1963)|pp. 62-63]]

Despite its inherent vagueness, Kuhn’s [[Kuhn (1962a)|''Structure of Scientific Revolutions'']] can be interpreted as suggesting a number of new ontological elements, including ''methods'', ''values'', ''questions'', ''standards'', and ''problems''. It is not quite clear whether these are all meant to be independent epistemic elements in their own right. Kuhn also famously used a whole range of words denoting epistemic stances, such as ''embraced'', ''universally received'', ''acknowledged'', and ''committed'' among many others.[[CiteRef::Kuhn (1970c)|pp. 10-13]] It remains to be seen whether he meant them as synonyms, or whether he ascribed different meanings to at least some of them.[[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)|p. 30]]