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|Description=In the process of [[Mechanism of Scientific Change|scientific change]], we are dealing with different epistemic ''agents'', taking different epistemic ''stances'' towards different epistemic ''elements''. For instance, we can say that the Paris community of 1720 [[Theory Acceptance|accepted]] [[René Descartes|Cartesian natural philosophy]]. In this example, Paris community is the epistemic ''agent'', acceptance is their epistemic ''stance'', and Cartesian natural philosophy is the epistemic element. There are a number of important ontological questions that arise here:
* What types of [[Epistemic Agent|epistemic agents]] can there be? I.e. can epistemic agents be communal, individual and/or artificial (instruments, AI)?
* What types of [[Epistemic Element|epistemic elements]] can there be in the process of scientific change? I.e. are there theories, method, values, research programmes, paradigms, etc.?
* What are the different [[Epistemic Stance|epistemic stances]] that an agent can take towards an element? I.e. do these include acceptance, use, pursuit, employment, commitment, neglect, rejection, etc.?
Addressing these questions is the main task of the ontology of scientific change.
|Prehistory=Historically, theories of scientific change differed not only in their explanations of how science changes through time, but also in their views on what exactly underwent change in science. Thus, a range of different ontologies of scientific change have been suggested over the years.
In the early twentieth century, logical positivists formulated an ontology of scientific change. While they individually held varying views, we can summarize their ontology by generalizing from the overlap between authors. The positivists generally supposed that there was a single scientific [[Method|method]] that did not change through history or across disciplines so that the only epistemic elements capable of change in their ontology were [[Theory|scientific theories]].[[CiteRef::Schlick (1931)|pp.145-162]] A similar ontology was championed by many non-positivist authors, including [[Karl Popper]].[[CiteRef::Popper (1963)|pp. 62-63]]
Despite its inherent vagueness, Kuhn’s [[Kuhn (1962a)|''Structure of Scientific Revolutions'']] can be interpreted as suggesting a number of new ontological elements, including ''methods'', ''values'', ''questions'', ''standards'', and ''problems''. It is not quite clear whether these are all meant to be independent epistemic elements in their own right. Kuhn also famously used a whole range of words denoting epistemic stances, such as ''embraced'', ''universally received'', ''acknowledged'', and ''committed'' among many others.[[CiteRef::Kuhn (1970c)|pp. 10-13]] It remains to be seen whether he meant them as synonyms, or whether he ascribed different meanings to at least some of them.[[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)|p. 30]]
Imre Lakatos generated a holistic account of scientific change slightly regressive to previous ontologies. Lakatos kept Kuhn’s view of the fluidity of paradigms within scientific communities however, with two small modifications. Firstly, Lakatos saw paradigms as research programmes, of which many simultaneously existed, and secondly Lakatos believed they followed a more rational model of change, i.e. modifications were judged as regressive or progressive based on certain conditions.[[CiteRef::Lakatos (1970)|pp. 31-34]] With regards to regression, Paul Feyerabend criticized Lakatos for once again suggesting that theories can only be pursued. The whole system Lakatos built was a high functioning competition between research programmes.[[CiteRef::Feyerabend (1970a)]] As such, per Lakatos, theories could never really be accepted, and thus they carried the potential to threaten science with a potentially infinite number of theories all of which are rational to pursue.
Finally, Larry Laudan paints the closest picture to the ontology scientonomy posits today. Laudan recognized values, theories, and methodologies as epistemic elements with relations to scientists as epistemic agents. Theories could be accepted under his view and methodologies could be employed. Each epistemic element under Laudan’s reticulated model could be modified. Laudan did not recognize the potential of theories to be used but not accepted but he did recognize pursued and accepted theories in contrast to Lakatos and the logical positivists.[[CiteRef::Laudan (1984a)]]
Only [[Descriptive Theory|descriptive theories]] were included in Barseghyan's original ontology, while the status of [[Normative Theory|normative theories]] was left indeterminate due to the [[The Paradox of Normative Propositions|the paradox of normative propositions]]. Once the paradox of normative propositions was [[Resolution to the Paradox of Normative Propositions (Sebastien-2016)|resolved]], the original ontology was extended by [[Zoe Sebastien|Sebastien]] to also include [[Normative Theory Is a Subtype of Theory (Sebastien-2016)|normative theories]].[[CiteRef::Sebastien (2016)]]
In 2018, [[William Rawleigh|Rawleigh]] suggested that [[Question|questions]] are to be accepted as a separate [[Question Is a Subtype of Epistemic Element (Rawleigh-2018)|type of epistemic element]]; the suggestion became accepted later that year and the ontology was modified to include theories, methods, and questions.[[CiteRef::Rawleigh (2018)]]
The ontology was further modified by Barseghyan in 2018. In his [[Barseghyan (2018)|redrafted ontology]], he suggested that methods are a subtype of normative theory. He also suggested including [[Definition|definitions]] as a subtype of theory.[[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2018)]] As a result of the acceptance of [[Modification:Sciento-2018-0006|that modification]], theories and questions became the two basic subtypes of epistemic elements, with definitions, normative, and descriptive theories being subtypes of [[Theory|theory]].
In 2019, [[Paul Patton]] suggested that epistemic agents can be of two main types - [[Epistemic Community|communal]] and [[Individual Epistemic Agent|individual]].[[CiteRef::Patton (2019)]] The [[Modification:Sciento-2019-0015|modification]] became accepted in 2022.
The first scientonomic account of disciplines was suggested by Patton and [[Cyrus Al-Zayadi|Al-Zayadi]] in 2021.[[CiteRef::Patton and Al-Zayadi (2021)]] The [[Modification:Sciento-2021-0006|respective modification]] became accepted in early 2024, introducing the notions of [[Discipline|discipline]], [[Delineating Theory|delineating theory]], [[Core Question|core question]], and [[Core Theory|core theory]] into the scientonomic ontology.
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|Accepted From Day=1
|Accepted From Approximate=No
|Acceptance Indicators=The question was tacitly accepted even before its explicit formulation in 2017. Thus, it has the same acceptance date as the rest of the original TSC.
|Still Accepted=Yes
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