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Just as is the case for [[The First Law for Theories (Barseghyan-2015)|the first law for theories]], this law does not impose limitations on the sort of methods that can replace employed methods.[[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)|p. 125]] However, as Barseghyan notes:
<blockqupteblockquote>the community never remains with no expectations whatsoever. When facing a new theory, the community always has some implicit expectations concerning such theories. These expectations may be very specific or they may be very abstract and vague, but some expectations are always present, for otherwise no theory assessment would be possible.[[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)|p. 126]]</blockqupteblockquote>
|Resource=Barseghyan (2015)
|Prehistory=This idea is not new to philosophers of science. For example, it is expressed in [[Kuhn (1970a)]]: "scientists behave in the following ways; those modes of behaviour have… the following essential functions; in the absence of an alternative mode that would serve similar functions, scientists should behave essentially as they do if their concern is to improve scientific knowledge."[[CiteRef::Kuhn (1970a)|p. 237]] This is similar to our formulation of [[The First Law for Methods (Barseghyan-2015)]], disregarding the normative piece ("scientists should behave").

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