Difference between revisions of "John Herschel"

From Encyclopedia of Scientonomy
Jump to navigation Jump to search
m
m
Line 15: Line 15:
 
|Historical Context=In the 17th century, the “method of hypothesis” (i.e. the hypothetico-deductive method) was popular, but it “fell into disfavor by the 1720s and 1730s”. It was replaced by the “gradual accumulation of general laws by slow and cautious inductive methods”, influenced by the success of Newton’s Principia. This view remains apparent in influencing Herschel’s work, but he deviates from it in notable ways. Herschel was part of the movement which revived the method of hypothesis, influenced partly by scientific theories developed in the mid-late 18th century like the wave theory of light, the theory of phlogiston, and Franklin’s fluid theory of electricity which “hypothesized unobservable entities in order to explain observable processes.” In other words, these hypotheses decidedly did not come from the aforementioned slow and cautious inductive methods. Given the apparent success of at least the wave theory of light, they had to be given some consideration as good, accurate scientific theories. And this is where the method of hypothesis, aided by Herschel and his contemporaries/immediate predecessors (such as Whewell, LeSage, Senebier, and Stewart), came back to become the dominant scientific method.
 
|Historical Context=In the 17th century, the “method of hypothesis” (i.e. the hypothetico-deductive method) was popular, but it “fell into disfavor by the 1720s and 1730s”. It was replaced by the “gradual accumulation of general laws by slow and cautious inductive methods”, influenced by the success of Newton’s Principia. This view remains apparent in influencing Herschel’s work, but he deviates from it in notable ways. Herschel was part of the movement which revived the method of hypothesis, influenced partly by scientific theories developed in the mid-late 18th century like the wave theory of light, the theory of phlogiston, and Franklin’s fluid theory of electricity which “hypothesized unobservable entities in order to explain observable processes.” In other words, these hypotheses decidedly did not come from the aforementioned slow and cautious inductive methods. Given the apparent success of at least the wave theory of light, they had to be given some consideration as good, accurate scientific theories. And this is where the method of hypothesis, aided by Herschel and his contemporaries/immediate predecessors (such as Whewell, LeSage, Senebier, and Stewart), came back to become the dominant scientific method.
 
|Major Contributions=John Herschel was born in a preeminent English scientific family, his father William being a prominent astronomer who is credited with discovering Uranus. John became one of the most respected scientists of his time, and in 1830s England, “one answer to the question of how to be scientific might be, ‘Be as much like Herschel as possible.’” He excelled in pure mathematics, optics (he was a pioneer in the technology leading to photography), astronomy and botany (among others). In 1831, he wrote his Preliminary Discourse on the Study of Natural Philosophy (PD), his most prominent work in a brief foray into the philosophy of science. Due to his breadth of study, his contribution to this field was mostly limited to his PD, a compact description of his views on the goal of science, theory construction and theory appraisal. Some authors have also compared the methods outlined therein to Herschel’s actual conduct in his scientific endeavors to ascertain his true beliefs on the scientific method as opposed to the idealized version presented in PD. The sections of PD most relevant to scientific change are parts II and III in which Herschel shares his views on the general concept of a “cause”, on the origin of hypotheses and theories (between which he rarely distinguishes), and on the importance of the deductive appraisal of these theories.
 
|Major Contributions=John Herschel was born in a preeminent English scientific family, his father William being a prominent astronomer who is credited with discovering Uranus. John became one of the most respected scientists of his time, and in 1830s England, “one answer to the question of how to be scientific might be, ‘Be as much like Herschel as possible.’” He excelled in pure mathematics, optics (he was a pioneer in the technology leading to photography), astronomy and botany (among others). In 1831, he wrote his Preliminary Discourse on the Study of Natural Philosophy (PD), his most prominent work in a brief foray into the philosophy of science. Due to his breadth of study, his contribution to this field was mostly limited to his PD, a compact description of his views on the goal of science, theory construction and theory appraisal. Some authors have also compared the methods outlined therein to Herschel’s actual conduct in his scientific endeavors to ascertain his true beliefs on the scientific method as opposed to the idealized version presented in PD. The sections of PD most relevant to scientific change are parts II and III in which Herschel shares his views on the general concept of a “cause”, on the origin of hypotheses and theories (between which he rarely distinguishes), and on the importance of the deductive appraisal of these theories.
===== On Theory Construction
+
 
=====
+
===== On Theory Construction =====
 +
 
 
Herschel outlines two methods of science in his Preliminary Discourse - the inductivist method towards the beginning, and the method of hypotheses in later parts. In the inductivist method he follows the Baconian tradition and advocates for a “safe and secure path of induction” in which a scientist must reject a method of hypothesis in which a proposed theory is not “properly tethered” to the phenomena in question. In developing a hypothesis/theory, one must consider the results of the earlier inductive stages of inquiry, and cannot simply use “unrestrained [...] imagination”. After a hypothesis is arrived at in an appropriate fashion, one can go on to the important deductive stage of an investigation in order to “verify the provisional conclusions they have derived”.
 
Herschel outlines two methods of science in his Preliminary Discourse - the inductivist method towards the beginning, and the method of hypotheses in later parts. In the inductivist method he follows the Baconian tradition and advocates for a “safe and secure path of induction” in which a scientist must reject a method of hypothesis in which a proposed theory is not “properly tethered” to the phenomena in question. In developing a hypothesis/theory, one must consider the results of the earlier inductive stages of inquiry, and cannot simply use “unrestrained [...] imagination”. After a hypothesis is arrived at in an appropriate fashion, one can go on to the important deductive stage of an investigation in order to “verify the provisional conclusions they have derived”.
  
Line 27: Line 28:
 
The third point regards the deductive process of rigorously testing proposed hypotheses, which he regarded as the “essential vehicle of scientific advance”.
 
The third point regards the deductive process of rigorously testing proposed hypotheses, which he regarded as the “essential vehicle of scientific advance”.
  
===== On Theory Appraisal
+
===== On Theory Appraisal =====
=====
+
 
 
Herschel’s views on theory appraisal closely mirror the “deductive” part of the hypothetico-deductive method. When considering a scientific theory, he states that “it is the verification of [the inductions in question] which constitutes theory in its largest sense”. The method of verification is described by means of an example - Herschel describes the process as follows:
 
Herschel’s views on theory appraisal closely mirror the “deductive” part of the hypothetico-deductive method. When considering a scientific theory, he states that “it is the verification of [the inductions in question] which constitutes theory in its largest sense”. The method of verification is described by means of an example - Herschel describes the process as follows:
 
1. The construction of the theory: “Inductions drawn from the motions of the several planets about the sun [lead] us to the general conception of an attractive force exerted by every particle of matter in the universe on every other”.
 
1. The construction of the theory: “Inductions drawn from the motions of the several planets about the sun [lead] us to the general conception of an attractive force exerted by every particle of matter in the universe on every other”.

Revision as of 21:53, 30 November 2017

John Herschel (7 March 1792 – 11 May 1871) was an English polymath, mathematician, astronomer, chemist, inventor, experimental photographer, and philosopher of science.

Historical Context

In the 17th century, the “method of hypothesis” (i.e. the hypothetico-deductive method) was popular, but it “fell into disfavor by the 1720s and 1730s”. It was replaced by the “gradual accumulation of general laws by slow and cautious inductive methods”, influenced by the success of Newton’s Principia. This view remains apparent in influencing Herschel’s work, but he deviates from it in notable ways. Herschel was part of the movement which revived the method of hypothesis, influenced partly by scientific theories developed in the mid-late 18th century like the wave theory of light, the theory of phlogiston, and Franklin’s fluid theory of electricity which “hypothesized unobservable entities in order to explain observable processes.” In other words, these hypotheses decidedly did not come from the aforementioned slow and cautious inductive methods. Given the apparent success of at least the wave theory of light, they had to be given some consideration as good, accurate scientific theories. And this is where the method of hypothesis, aided by Herschel and his contemporaries/immediate predecessors (such as Whewell, LeSage, Senebier, and Stewart), came back to become the dominant scientific method.

Major Contributions

John Herschel was born in a preeminent English scientific family, his father William being a prominent astronomer who is credited with discovering Uranus. John became one of the most respected scientists of his time, and in 1830s England, “one answer to the question of how to be scientific might be, ‘Be as much like Herschel as possible.’” He excelled in pure mathematics, optics (he was a pioneer in the technology leading to photography), astronomy and botany (among others). In 1831, he wrote his Preliminary Discourse on the Study of Natural Philosophy (PD), his most prominent work in a brief foray into the philosophy of science. Due to his breadth of study, his contribution to this field was mostly limited to his PD, a compact description of his views on the goal of science, theory construction and theory appraisal. Some authors have also compared the methods outlined therein to Herschel’s actual conduct in his scientific endeavors to ascertain his true beliefs on the scientific method as opposed to the idealized version presented in PD. The sections of PD most relevant to scientific change are parts II and III in which Herschel shares his views on the general concept of a “cause”, on the origin of hypotheses and theories (between which he rarely distinguishes), and on the importance of the deductive appraisal of these theories.

On Theory Construction

Herschel outlines two methods of science in his Preliminary Discourse - the inductivist method towards the beginning, and the method of hypotheses in later parts. In the inductivist method he follows the Baconian tradition and advocates for a “safe and secure path of induction” in which a scientist must reject a method of hypothesis in which a proposed theory is not “properly tethered” to the phenomena in question. In developing a hypothesis/theory, one must consider the results of the earlier inductive stages of inquiry, and cannot simply use “unrestrained [...] imagination”. After a hypothesis is arrived at in an appropriate fashion, one can go on to the important deductive stage of an investigation in order to “verify the provisional conclusions they have derived”.

It is valid, however, to question Herschel’s commitment to this “novice” method (as some authors have labeled it) - he seems to allow for wilder speculation in his method of hypotheses (i.e. his “expert” method), and some have said that the novice method was outlined mainly for rhetorical purposes and that Herschel’s true views were more closely aligned with a more liberal, less restrictive set of guidelines. Bolt claims that Herschel “explicitly encourages and defends the use of hypothetical reasoning” in PD and in related essays, meaning that he did not feel bound to the naive inductivist view outlined above. This was influenced in part by the great success of the wave theory of light, which was a prime example of a theory which could not have come from purely inductive generalizations (whereas Newton’s theory of gravity is an example of one which could have). In this sense, Herschel contributed to the rise of the hypothetico-deductive method in the 19th-century.

Herschel’s view on theory construction and the ways in which he related to the two conflicting views of his time are nicely outlined by the first and second points of the following passage from PD.

We have next to consider the laws which regulate the action of these our primary agents; and these we can only arrive at in three ways : 1st, By inductive reasoning; that is, by examining all the cases in which we know them to be exercised, inferring, as well as circumstances will permit, its amount or intensity in each particular case, and then piecing together, as it were, these disjecta membra, generalizing from them, and so arriving at the laws desired ; 2dly, By forming at once a bold hypothesis, particularizing the law, and trying the truth of it by following out its consequences and comparing them with facts; or, 3dly, By a process partaking of both these, and combining the advantages of both without their defects, viz. by assuming indeed the laws we would discover, but so generally expressed, that they shall include an unlimited variety of particular laws ; following out the consequences of this assumption, by the application of such general principles as the case admits; comparing them in succession with all the particular cases within our knowledge ; and, lastly, on this comparison, so modifying and restricting the general enunciation of our laws as to make the results agree.

The third point regards the deductive process of rigorously testing proposed hypotheses, which he regarded as the “essential vehicle of scientific advance”.

On Theory Appraisal

Herschel’s views on theory appraisal closely mirror the “deductive” part of the hypothetico-deductive method. When considering a scientific theory, he states that “it is the verification of [the inductions in question] which constitutes theory in its largest sense”. The method of verification is described by means of an example - Herschel describes the process as follows: 1. The construction of the theory: “Inductions drawn from the motions of the several planets about the sun [lead] us to the general conception of an attractive force exerted by every particle of matter in the universe on every other”. 2. The verification of the theory: “When we would verify this induction, we must set out with assuming this law, considering the whole [solar] system as subjected to its influence and implicitly obeying it, and nothing interfering with its action;” and when observing what formerly qualified as exceptions to the accepted theory, we find that these deviations are “neither exceptions nor residual facts, but fulfilments of general rules, and essential features of the statement of the case, without which our induction would be invalid, and the law of gravitation positively untrue.”

In other words, a scientist must assume a proposed law, and test for deviations in an isolated environment. What we can glean from this description is that Herschel thinks a theory is “good” if it has new empirical content, and that if a theory has exceptions in a given domain, it is “positively untrue”, which is consistent with his view on the attainability of ultimate causes.

Publications

Here are the works of Herschel included in the bibliographic records of this encyclopedia:

To add a bibliographic record by this author, enter the citation key below:

 

Citation keys normally include author names followed by the publication year in brackets. E.g. Aristotle (1984), Einstein, Podolsky, Rosen (1935), Musgrave and Pigden (2016), Kuhn (1970a), Lakatos and Musgrave (Eds.) (1970). If a record with that citation key already exists, you will be sent to a form to edit that page.


References

  1. a b c d e f g  Laudan, Larry. (1981) Science and Hypothesis. Historical Essays on Scientific Methodology. D. Reidel Publishing Company.
  2. a b c d  Cannon, Susan Faye. (1961) John Herschel and the Idea of Science. Journal of the History of Ideas 22 (2), 215-239.
  3. ^  Ducasse, Curt John. (1960) John F. W. Herschel's Methods of Experimental Inquiry. In Madden (Ed.) (1960), 153-182.
  4. a b c d e f g  Herschel, John. (1831) A Preliminary Discourse on the Study of Natural Philosophy. A. & R. Spottiswoode, New-Street-Square. Retrieved from https://archive.org/details/preliminarydisco00hers_0.
  5. a b  Cobb, Aaron D. (2012) Inductivism in Practice: Experiment in John F. W. Herschel's Philosophy of Science. International Journal for the History of the Philosophy of Science 2 (1), 21-54.
  6. ^  Bolt, Marvin P. (1998) John Herschel's Natural Philosophy: On the Knowing of Nature and the Nature of Knowing in Early-Nineteenth-Century Britain. University of Notre Dame.
  7. ^  Whewell, William. (1831) Review of J. Herschel's 'Preliminary discourse on the study of Natural Philosophy'. The Quarterly Review 45 (90), 374-407.