John Stuart Mill

John Stuart Mill (20 May 1806 – 8 May 1873) was a 19th century British philosopher, political economist, and civil servant. His writings on scientific change cover topics ranging from the nature of scientific reasoning to theory-ladenness and scientific progress.

Historical Context

John Stuart Mill, like his predecessor William Whewell, thought that one of the essential tasks of the philosophy of science was to formulate a method of evaluation for scientific theories. Unlike most philosophers before them, both Whewell and Mill were cognizant that history of science and philosophy of science are intimately connected. Yet, they differed in their approaches for what provides, or is the source of justification for the evaluative criteria for scientific theories and laws. On one hand, Whewell took what could appropriately be termed as the ‘historicist’ approach: he thought that the study of history of science will provides us with the evaluative criteria. Specifically, Whewell’s survey of the history of science led him to conclude that the evaluative criteria are ‘distilled from’ and derive their justification out of the historical record. Hence, Whewell’s somewhat unqualified historicist approach not only ‘finds’ the scientific criteria by studying history of science, but also provides its justification based on scientific history. Mill disagreed in principle that history of science can provide us with a justification for an evaluative criteria for scientific theories. For him, all history of science could provide us is information that certain regularities have held in the past. Mill made the descriptive claim that scientific inquiry is a search for causal connections---correlations that are invariable and unconditional. He maintained that all history of science can provide evidence for is that certain correlations have been invariable. However, because he lived in a post-Humean context, he not only inherited the problem of induction, but also held that induction is, in principle, fallible. Consequently, he argued that just because certain scientific theories have thus far not been refuted (i.e., they have so far been invariable), it does not follow that they will continue to be invariable. As induction is fallible and because scientific theories are nothing more than ‘refined induction,’ the theories themselves are fallible---there is no guarantee that they will remain invariable in the future as well. Relatedly, he differed with Whewell on a further point: because scientific theories cannot be said to be invariable due to induction (and as historical record is an inadequate justification), it follows that historical record of science does not equip the theories with unconditionality. Unconditionality of scientific theories could roughly be interpreted as theories that are ‘true’ or not in need of any qualification whatsoever. Mill argued that as the history of science cannot provide justification even for the invariability of scientific theories, by extension it cannot justify unconditionality either. Having showed that history of science does not provide the criteria of evaluation and justification for it, Mill argued for a logicist position. He thought that both the formulation of the criteria and its justification should be restricted to the domain of the philosophy of science. Accordingly, the appropriate role for the history of science would be to provide illustrative examples of the criteria. In other words, history of science was nothing more than a repository of examples with no bearing on the logic of scientific justification.1

Major Contributions

Mill is an empiricist who believes that all our ideas are gained through sense perception. His empiricism is thoroughgoing: There is no source other than experience and observation that provides us with our ideas (SEP, Mill, 2.1). His empiricism is quite radical; in fact, it is phenomenalistic. For him, reality is simply observer-relative sensory phenomenon (Godfrey-Smith, 2003, p.20), which means that all that exists is in the sensations. That is, there is nothing other than sensation that the mind has access to. Mill thinks that external objects (if any) are not perceivable. The only thing we can perceive is “a set of appearances” (System, VIII: 783). Mill’s position that we cannot know anything about how things are in-themselves, but only know how they appear to us is called the “Relativity of Human Knowledge” (Examination, IX: 4). Believing that experience and observation provide us with all knowledge, Mill rejects all forms of a priori knowledge: the doctrine that we can have knowledge that is independent of experience (SEP, Mill, 2.1). Not only does he reject that knowledge of extension, substance and place as a priori, he instead argues that this type of seemingly a priori knowledge is “put together out of ideas of sensation” (Examination, IX: 9). In essence, all of our knowledge, including knowledge that is traditionally thought of as a priori, originates from and is dependent on experience. Mill provides an additional reason for rejecting a priori knowledge. To gain a priori knowledge, according to Mill, the universe of thought and the universe of reality “must have been framed [in] correspondence with one another” (Examination, IX: 68). In other words, if we were to have any a priori knowledge, we must know prior to and independent of experience that whatever is capable of existing is also capable of being conceived. However, Mill argues that the proposition that we can or do have a priori knowledge of the perfect correspondence between thought and reality lacks evidence (SEP, Mill, 2.1). Because there is no evidence whatsoever for this proposition (which is a prerequisite for allowing us to have a priori knowledge), we should not accept the proposition.

Inductive Reasoning: Mill claims that deductive reasoning is “empty”: it says nothing new about the world. Everything established in the conclusion of a deductive argument must already be present in the premises (SEP, Mill, 3.1). Therefore, deductive reasoning does not lead to any new knowledge. Furthermore, Mill is, perhaps, radical in his view that mathematics and geometry---areas that lead to acquisition of genuine knowledge---do not employ deductive reasoning. According to Mill, it only appears that mathematics and geometry use deductive reasoning, but on a deeper level, they are using nothing more than inductive reasoning (SEP, Mill, 3.1). This idea that mathematics and geometry employ de facto inductive reasoning allows him to deny the existence of even this form of a priori knowledge. Mill holds that “there is in every step of arithmetical and algebraically calculation a real induction, a real inference of facts from facts” (System, VII: 254). He contends that mathematical propositions are not true by definition (System, VII: 253); these propositions are not analytic. For example, he thinks that the number two is one plus one not because two is defined as one plus one. On the contrary, he thinks that two is one plus one, because of induction. We observe, for instance, that one rock and another rock lead to two rocks; similarly, we observe that one swan and another swan lead to two swans, and so on in a multitude of cases. According to Mill, the pattern that one and one lead to two in specific singular instances allow us to generalize that one and one equal two in all cases. Hence, all mathematical and geometric propositions are arrived at and justified through induction (SEP, Mill, 3.4) As explained above, Mill is a champion of empiricism who thinks that we solely engage with inductive reasoning: the notion that we can have general propositions based on a number of singular observational propositions. Like Hume, Mill believes that we are predisposed to reasoning inductively (SEP, Mill, 3.2). But he takes this claim further: not only are we predisposed to reason inductively, but we are also justified in doing so (SEP, Mill, 3.2). Mill thinks that induction is justified for two reasons: iterative validation of induction, and initiating validation of induction. Iterative induction claims that induction is valid, because similar initial conditions produce similar outcomes (SEP, Mill, 3.2). In other terms, the universe follows the principle of uniformity of nature: whatever is true in one case is also true in all relevantly similar cases (System, VII: 306). As explained earlier, Mill rejects all forms of a priori knowledge, including the knowledge of the principle of universal induction. How, then, do we know this principle? Through meta-induction: we know by induction that inductive generalizations have been true, and therefore, they will continue to be true (SEP, Mill, 3.2). In other words, inductions in the past have shown themselves to be true; that is, all cases involving induction have been true. Therefore, we can know through induction that all future cases of induction will also be true. Clearly, this is a circular argument as induction is justified using second order (or meta-) induction (SEP, Mill, 3.2), and no independent justification for induction is provided. This leads Mill to his second justification: initiating validation of induction. We are naturally inclined to reason inductively (i.e., we spontaneously initiate induction). He thinks that it’s perfectly reasonable to use induction; indeed, unhindered critical self-reflection reveals that induction is “deserving of reliance” (System, VII: 319). This second justification is not independent, but is “anthropological” in nature: “[t]he laws of our rational faculty, like those of every other natural agency, are only learnt by seeing the agent at work” (System, VII: 833). After we accept the descriptive, initiating validation for induction, we can refer back to iterative validation, which will help us improve induction. In other words, accepting initiating validation as a baseline justification for induction would allow us to engage in iterative inductions such that we would be critically aware of how we use induction (SEP, Mill, 3.2). Therefore, argues Mill, we will sharpen our reasoning abilities by being more precise in pointing out the circumstances in which inductions properly work, allowing us to refine our inductive abilities. In summary, Mill thinks that all of our knowledge originates in sense perception, observation and experience (System, VII: 7). Second, the only type of reasoning we engage in is induction (System, VII: 283). As it will become clearer, Mill’s ideas about empiricism and reasoning greatly influence his notions about science and scientific change.

Reasoning in Science: Mill believes that our reasoning improves due to self-examination of our reasoning. As was mentioned previously, this self-examination is meta-induction: induction of induction that allows us to refine our use of induction. Reasoning in science, including both formal and empirical science, is nothing more than highly improved induction. Thus, scientific reasoning is similar to ‘common sense reasoning’ in that both are inductive; the difference between everyday reasoning and the scientific one is that the latter has been improved due to critical self-examination through meta-induction (SEP, Mill, 3.3). In addition to meta-induction, Mill appeals to the history of scientific knowledge to justify his position that scientific reasoning is refined induction. According to Mill, history of the growth of our knowledge reveals that reasoning in the past was inductive reasoning; moreover, there was also a growth of inductive reasoning. That is, history of science reveals, says Mill, that our knowledge has not only grown because of induction, but also that our knowledge of induction itself has improved, allowing us to use it effectively. Bolstering his views on the effective use of induction, he argues that while it is possible that we “may discover, by mere observation without experiment, a real uniformity in nature” (System, VII: 386), using experiments in science is the best way of uncovering the causal mechanism between events. Using experiments in science enables us to “meet with some of the antecedents apart from the rest, and observe what follows from them; or some of the consequents, and observe by what they are preceded” (System, VII: 381). In other words, controlled variables in experiments allow us to unearth the causal mechanism between two event. For example, we can either see how, given A, we can reach its effect B, or, if we were given the effect B, we could infer the cause A. Hence, this form of refined induction is possible in a controlled experimental setting, a feature that Mill thinks is unique to and indispensable for science. Because of how scientific knowledge has grown throughout history, four methods (or experiments) have proved successful in uncovering the causal mechanism of observed phenomenon. NOTE: I have copied the paragraph from the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy as I do not fully understand it (I have changed the font): Firstly, the Method of Agreement: where instances of phenomenon A are always accompanied with phenomenon a, even when other circumstances accompanying A are varied, we have reason to believe that A and a are causally related. Secondly, the Method of Difference: where the only distinguishing feature marking situations in which phenomenon a occurs or does not occur is the presence or absence of phenomenon A, there is reason to think that A is an indispensable part of the cause of a. (If we have noted, via the Method of Agreement, that in all instances of A, a is present, we can, where possible, systematically withdraw A, to determine whether A is a cause of a by the Method of Difference. Mill terms this the Joint Method of Agreement and Difference.) Thirdly, the Method of Residues: against the knowledge that A is the cause of a, and B the cause of b, where ABC causes abc, and AB causes merely ab, we can (by ruling out that c is the joint effect of AB) regard C as the cause of c. Fourthly, the Method of Concomitant Variations: whenever a varies when A varies in some particular manner, a may be thought to be causally connected to A.” Using the four aforementioned methods, Mill thinks that we can isolate the causes of natural phenomenon. The causal mechanism of individual observations are described using general laws, which are arrived at by means of induction. Similarly, inductions continue and we may find that the law that explained the individual observations’ causal mechanism is, itself, part of a larger law. Of course, this larger, or overarching law is also uncovered using induction (System, VII: 464). This process of scientific reasoning continues, and we discover more and more laws through induction. The laws of nature that induction reveals are, according to Mill, “nothing but the uniformities which exist among natural phenomena” (System, VII: 318). Mill insists that the purpose of scientific inquiry is to uncover how things are in themselves. When we engage in scientific reasoning, we try and uncover the underlying truth, or the deep structure of the world. Mill remarks that a conception is “a conception of something which really is in the facts, some property which they actually possess, and which they would manifest to our senses” (System, VII: 295; System, VII: 651). Mill views science as trying to uncover the structure of the world that already exists. As he views that “kinds have a real existence in nature” (System, VII: 122), the purpose of scientific inquiry is to uncover a “radical distinction in the things themselves” (System, VII: 123). It must be noted, however, that even though Mill thinks that science does and ought to uncover the nature of things as they are in-themselves, he denies the use of hypothesis as a valid method for doing so. Because Mill is an empiricist who believes that experience provides us with all our knowledge, he rejects the use of hypothesis as invalid, because hypotheses posit the existence of unobserved entities---something that we do not have access to given that we are restricted to the world of phenomenon.

Theory-Ladenness: Arguing in the same vein as British empiricists, Mill adheres to the notion of tabula rasa---the idea that human mind does not come with preconceived ideas, and is a clean slate. Nevertheless, Mill thinks that human mind is malleable in two different respects. First, Mill thinks that experiences and observations make their mark on the mind, thus molding it accordingly. Second, background conditions, which vary between different cultures, also play a cardinal role in shaping one’s mind. Mill thinks that the tremendous amount of “pliability” (Civilization, XVIII: 145) exhibited by the human mind has implications for our observations. Living in a particular culture or society, and the specific experiences tend to merge the observations and inferences that one has. Therefore, when we make observations, they tend to be a mixture, wherein “observation and inferences are intimately blended” (System, VIII: 641–2). As hinted above, this blending of observation and inference occurs due to human predisposition for induction; more importantly, it’s repeated induction in the similar cultural or societal context that compounds our observations and inferences. Thus, whenever a person makes an observation, she will have, through association, a certain inference depending on the cultural context in which she was raised (SEP, Mill, 3.5). Clearly, then, observations are laden with theories that depend on the cultural and social context of the observer. By extension, because societies are composed of individuals who have theory-laden observations, the phenomenon of theory-ladenness in observations also manifests itself at the social level.

Scientific Progress

Mill believes that a society makes scientific (and other types of) progress when it allows the free flow of ideas by everyone. The ability to express oneself freely is not restricted to social and economic elite. Rather, Mill contends that people from all types of diverse backgrounds should have the right to fearlessly express themselves (On Liberty citation). Therefore, the ideas proposed by people from diverse vantage points lead to a plethora of novel and unique ideas or theories (Godfrey-Smith, 2003, p.142). This constant emergence of novel theories allows for the exploration of hitherto unexplored notions, and after evaluation, the best ones are retained (Godfrey-Smith, 2003, p.116). This process continues: new, radical ideas are continuously (and without hindrance) proposed, they are explored, they may challenge orthodox scientific beliefs, and if they become accepted, the best ideas then become the scientific belief. Thus, for Mill, this “marketplace of ideas” is a necessary condition that allows science to progress (Godfrey-Smith, 2003, p.116, 142).

Criticism

Mill believes in a refined and self-critical use of induction. He uses the history of the growth of science as evidence to substantiate his claims. However, Mill himself was not an historian of science. As a matter of fact, his knowledge of the subject was based mostly on secondary sources (SEP, Mill, 3.3). In particular, Mill drew heavily on William Whewell’s History of Inductive Science, John Herschel’s Discourse on the Study of Natural Philosophy and August Comte’s Cours de Positive Philosophie. Likewise, Mill’s appeal to the history of science for his claims in support of induction was made possible due to the work done by Alexander Bain (Autobiography, I: 215–7, 255). According to Christopher Macleod, Mill most likely would not have viewed induction as being exhaustive of reasoning in science had he conducted primary research in the history of science (SEP, Mill, 3.3). In other words, if Mill himself had engaged with primary research material on the history of scientific practice, it is unlike that he would have viewed scientific growth as being a result of progressively refined induction (SEP, Mill, 3.3). Macleod contends that the history of successful scientific practice reveals that, instead of mere refined induction, creative use of hypothesis-making has also played a critical role (SEP, Mill, 3.3). Therefore, Mill cannot, on one hand, declare imaginative hypothesis-making as invalid and, on the other hand, claim use history of science is indicative of proper reasoning, as history reveals that hypothesis-making has, contrary to Mill’s ideas, contributed enormously to the growth of scientific knowledge. The contradiction between us not having access to how things are in-themselves, and the apparent role of science as uncovering the underlying structure of the universe will be explored here.

Publications

Here are the works of Mill included in the bibliographic records of this encyclopedia:

• Mill (2003): Mill, John Stuart. (2003) On Liberty. Yale University Press.
• Mill (1991): Mill, John Stuart. (1991) The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, Volume XXXII - Additional Letters of John Stuart Mill. University of Toronto Press, Routledge and Kegan Paul. Retrieved from http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/239.
• Mill (1990): Mill, John Stuart. (1990) The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, XXX - Writings on India. University of Toronto Press, Routledge and Kegan Paul. Retrieved from http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/264.
• Mill (1989): Mill, John Stuart. (1989) The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, Volume XXXI - Miscellaneous Writings. University of Toronto Press, Routledge and Kegan Paul. Retrieved from http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/238.
• Mill (1988b): Mill, John Stuart. (1988) The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, Volume XXVI - Journals and Debating Speeches Part I. University of Toronto Press, Routledge and Kegan Paul. Retrieved from http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/260.
• Mill (1988c): Mill, John Stuart. (1988) The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, Volume XXVIII - Public and Parliamentary Speeches Part I November 1850 - November 1868. University of Toronto Press, Routledge and Kegan Paul. Retrieved from http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/262.
• Mill (1988d): Mill, John Stuart. (1988) The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, Volume XXIX - Public and Parliamentary Speeches Part II July 1869 - March 1873. University of Toronto Press, Routledge and Kegan Paul. Retrieved from http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/263.
• Mill (1988a): Mill, John Stuart. (1988) The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, Volume XXVII - Journals and Debating Speeches Part II. University of Toronto Press, Routledge and Kegan Paul. Retrieved from http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/261.
• Mill (1986b): Mill, John Stuart. (1986) The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, Volume XXIII - Newspaper Writings August 1831 - October 1834 Part II. University of Toronto Press, Routledge and Kegan Paul. Retrieved from http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/257.
• Mill (1986c): Mill, John Stuart. (1986) The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, Volume XXIV - Newspaper Writings January 1835 - June 1847 Part III. University of Toronto Press, Routledge and Kegan Paul. Retrieved from http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/258.
• Mill (1986d): Mill, John Stuart. (1986) The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, XXV - Newspaper Writings December 1847 - July 1873 Part IV. University of Toronto Press, Routledge and Kegan Paul. Retrieved from http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/259.
• Mill (1986a): Mill, John Stuart. (1986) The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, Volume XXII - Newspaper Writings December 1822 - July 1831 Part I. University of Toronto Press, Routledge and Kegan Paul. Retrieved from http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/256.
• Mill (1985b): Mill, John Stuart. (1985) The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, Volume XX - Essays on French History and Historians. University of Toronto Press, Routledge and Kegan Paul. Retrieved from http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/235.
• Mill (1985a): Mill, John Stuart. (1985) The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, Volume X - Essays on Ethics, Religion, and Society. University of Toronto Press, Routledge and Kegan Paul. Retrieved from http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/241.
• Mill (1984): Mill, John Stuart. (1984) The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, Volume XXI - Essays on Equality, Law, and Education. University of Toronto Press, Routledge and Kegan Paul. Retrieved from http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/255.
• Mill (1982): Mill, John Stuart. (1982) The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, Volume VI - Essays on England, Ireland, and the Empire. University of Toronto Press, Routledge and Kegan Paul. Retrieved from http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/245.
• Mill (1981): Mill, John Stuart. (1981) The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, Volume I - Autobiography and Literary Essays. University of Toronto Press, Routledge and Kegan Paul. Retrieved from http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/242.
• Mill (1979): Mill, John Stuart. (1979) The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, Volume IX - An Examination of William Hamilton’s Philosophy and of The Principal Philosophical Questions Discussed in his Writings. University of Toronto Press, Routledge and Kegan Paul. Retrieved from http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/240.
• Mill (1978): Mill, John Stuart. (1978) The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, Volume XI - Essays on Philosophy and the Classics. University of Toronto Press, Routledge and Kegan Paul. Retrieved from http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/248.
• Mill (1977a): Mill, John Stuart. (1977) The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, Volume XVIII - Essays on Politics and Society Part I. University of Toronto Press, Routledge and Kegan Paul. Retrieved from http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/233.
• Mill (1977b): Mill, John Stuart. (1977) The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, Volume XIX - Essays on Politics and Society Part II. University of Toronto Press, Routledge and Kegan Paul. Retrieved from http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/234.
• Mill (1974a): Mill, John Stuart. (1974) The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, Volume VII - A System of Logic Ratiocinative and Inductive, Being a Connected View of the Principles of Evidence and the Methods of Scientific Investigation (Books I-III). University of Toronto Press, Routledge and Kegan Paul. Retrieved from http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/246.
• Mill (1974b): Mill, John Stuart. (1974) The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, Volume VIII - A System of Logic Ratiocinative and Inductive, Being a Connected View of the Principles of Evidence and the Methods of Scientific Investigation (Books IV-VI and Appendices). University of Toronto Press, Routledge and Kegan Paul. Retrieved from http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/247.
• Mill (1972b): Mill, John Stuart. (1972) The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, Volume XV - The Later Letters of John Stuart Mill 1849-1873 Part II. University of Toronto Press, Routledge and Kegan Paul. Retrieved from http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/252.
• Mill (1972c): Mill, John Stuart. (1972) The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, Volume XVI - The Later Letters of John Stuart Mill 1849-1873 Part III. University of Toronto Press, Routledge and Kegan Paul. Retrieved from http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/253.
• Mill (1972d): Mill, John Stuart. (1972) The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, Volume XVII - The Later Letters of John Stuart Mill 1849-1873 Part IV. University of Toronto Press, Routledge and Kegan Paul. Retrieved from http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/254.
• Mill (1972a): Mill, John Stuart. (1972) The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, Volume XIV - The Later Letters of John Stuart Mill 1849-1873 Part I. University of Toronto Press, Routledge and Kegan Paul. Retrieved from http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/251.
• Mill (1967b): Mill, John Stuart. (1967) The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, Volume V - Essays on Economics and Society Part II. University of Toronto Press, Routledge and Kegan Paul. Retrieved from http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/232.
• Mill (1967a): Mill, John Stuart. (1967) The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, Volume IV - Essays on Economics and Society Part I. University of Toronto Press, Routledge and Kegan Paul. Retrieved from http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/244.
• Mill (1965a): Mill, John Stuart. (1965) The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, Volume II - The Principles of Political Economy with Some of Their Applications to Social Philosophy (Books I-II). University of Toronto Press, Routledge and Kegan Paul. Retrieved from http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/102.
• Mill (1965b): Mill, John Stuart. (1965) The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, Volume III - The Principles of Political Economy with Some of Their Applications to Social Philosophy. University of Toronto Press, Routledge and Kegan Paul. Retrieved from http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/243.
• Mill (1963a): Mill, John Stuart. (1963) The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, Volume XII - The Earlier Letters of John Stuart Mill 1812-1848 Part I. University of Toronto Press, Routledge and Kegan Paul. Retrieved from http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/249.
• Mill (1963b): Mill, John Stuart. (1963) The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, Volume XIII - The Earlier Letters of John Stuart Mill 1812-1848 Part II. University of Toronto Press, Routledge and Kegan Paul. Retrieved from http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/250.

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