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Possibility of Scientonomy - The Argument from Nothing Permanent (view source)
Revision as of 20:55, 5 December 2018
, 20:55, 5 December 2018no edit summary
|Question=How can scientonomy be possible if there are no permanent features of science?
|Topic Type=Descriptive
|Description=The Argument from Nothing Permanent can be summarized as follows: (1) In order for there to be a general theory of scientific change, science should at least have some permanent (fixed, static, unchangeable, transhistorical) features. (2) The Nothing Permanent thesis: Science doesn't have any permanent features. (Conclusion) Particularism: There can be no general theory of scientific change.
[[File:Argument from Nothing Permanent.png|600px]]
If science does not have any permanent features, it seems that any general theory of scientific change will be impossible as there will be no transhistorical regularities of science. So, if the Argument from Nothing Permanent is correct, then the study of scientific change reduces to particularism with no overarching order and science will only be able to be studied in episodes rather than as a whole.
It is important to distinguish between the Argument of Nothing Permanent, [[Possibility of Scientonomy - Argument from Changeability of Scientific Method|The Argument of Changeability of Scientific Method]], and [[Possibility of Scientonomy - The Argument from Social Construction|The Argument from Social Construction]]. The Argument of Changeability of Scientific Method argues against the possibility of a general theory of scientific change on the basis that methods are non-permanent, however the Argument from Nothing Permanent not only encompasses methods being transient, but all features of science being transient. What the Argument from Social Construction attempts to say is that there is a certain sociological relativism in science and any permanent features of science are in the social mechanisms that govern the scientific process; i.e. any general theory of scientific change is sociological in nature. The Argument from Nothing Permanent on the other hand excludes there being permanent sociological features in science as well and thus the Argument from Social Construction is a possible response to the Argument from Nothing Permanent.
|Parent Topic=Possibility of Scientonomy
|Authors List=Hakob Barseghyan,
|Formulated Year=2015
|Prehistory=The permanent feature of science was thought to be its method. From Whewell and Herschel up until 1970, it was accepted that the transhistorical feature of science was its method—the scientific method.[[CiteRef::Laudan (1996)|pp. 212-214]] Laudan notes that even in the great shift from infallibilism to fallibilism, scientists and philosophers of science did believe in a universal scientific method. This was implicit in the methodologies of many philosophers of science such as the logical positivists, Popper and Lakatos. However, the plausibility of a transhistorical method was questioned by Kuhn and Feyerabend. See for instance ''Against Method''.[[CiteRef::Feyerabend (1975a)]] For more on this topic see the page for [[Possibility of Scientonomy - Argument from Changeability of Scientific Method]].
Authors like Galison take the Argument from Nothing Permanent for granted. Galison goes as far as saying that studying the generality of science is vacuous and science needs to be addressed in its specific local formations. "The theory of scientific change no longer grabs philosophers of science as a plausible enterprise. Science seems far too heterogeneous for that: too diverse at a given time (especially now); even within the same discipline too much has changed".[[CiteRef::Galison (2008)|p. 111]]
Barnes and Bloor advocate against any internal purely rational construction of science and instead say that external factors (social, psychological, etc.) explain scientific change better.[[CiteRef::Barnes and Bloor (1982)]] This is otherwise known as Edinburgh relativism. Sociologists say that for there to be a general theory of scientific change there needs to be similar goals, desires and criteria of theory appraisal, but clearly individuals differ. For more details, see the page on [[Possibility of Scientonomy - The Argument from Social Construction]].
Bunge argues that despite their being no regularities at the individual level, there may be regularities that emerge at a higher level of generality, perhaps the community level.[[CiteRef::Bunge (1999)|pp. 24, 33]]
Weinberg notes that in some instances science is culture-free and has some permanence to it that sociological factors do not.[[CiteRef::Weinberg (2003)|pp. 135-137]]
|Related Topics=Possibility of Scientonomy - Argument from Changeability of Scientific Method, Possibility of Scientonomy - The Argument from Social Construction, Possibility of Scientonomy - Argument from Bad Track Record,
}}
{{Acceptance Record
|Accepted From Day=1
|Accepted From Approximate=No
|Acceptance Indicators=This is when the community accepted its first answer to the question, [[Response to the Argument from Nothing Permanent (Barseghyan-2015)]], which indicates that the question is itself legitimate.
|Still Accepted=Yes
|Accepted Until Approximate=No
}}