Difference between revisions of "Status of Disciplinary Boundaries"

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|Prehistory=Until very recently the status of disciplinary boundaries was fundamentally ignored questions. Static methodologists simply showed very little interests in the subject. Perhaps the earliest comparison that can be drawn to a similar subject would have been the question of demarcation in dividing pseudo-scientific theories from scientific theories. Through demarcation criteria, while not sufficiently establishing the status of disciplinary boundaries, philosophers of science like [[Karl Popper]] and [[Rudolf Carnap]] were able to effectively establish scientific disciplines from non-scientific disciplines.
 
|Prehistory=Until very recently the status of disciplinary boundaries was fundamentally ignored questions. Static methodologists simply showed very little interests in the subject. Perhaps the earliest comparison that can be drawn to a similar subject would have been the question of demarcation in dividing pseudo-scientific theories from scientific theories. Through demarcation criteria, while not sufficiently establishing the status of disciplinary boundaries, philosophers of science like [[Karl Popper]] and [[Rudolf Carnap]] were able to effectively establish scientific disciplines from non-scientific disciplines.
  
Carnap’s demarcation criteria is commonly known as Verificationism [[CiteRef::Godfrey-Smith (2003)|pp. 27]]. Heavily based on probability, Carnap believed a theory could only be scientific if it was testable. Carnap believed a theory should be tested on its occurrences and given a probability. Popper, very similarly, had criteria known as Falsificationism but whereas for Carnap a theory could be refuted multiple times, for Popper, once a theory was proved wrong it was permanently refuted. [[CiteRef::Godfrey-Smith (2003)|pp. 58]]
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Carnap’s demarcation criteria is commonly known as Verificationism.[[CiteRef::Godfrey-Smith (2003)|pp. 27]] Heavily based on probability, Carnap believed a theory could only be scientific if it was testable. Carnap believed a theory should be tested on its occurrences and given a probability. Popper, very similarly, had criteria known as Falsificationism but whereas for Carnap a theory could be refuted multiple times, for Popper, once a theory was proved wrong it was permanently refuted.[[CiteRef::Godfrey-Smith (2003)|pp. 58]]
  
 
A more interesting comparison to be drawn between history and the status of disciplinary boundaries lies in the opinion of dynamic methodologists such as that of [[Imre Lakatos]] and [[Thomas Kuhn]]. Lakatos, while never outright stating his opinion on disciplinary boundaries seems to have formed a strong implicit foundation for disciplinary boundaries. For Lakatos, periods of stability in science involve research programs. What is interesting is that one of the main criteria for a theory to become accepted into a research program is to be in unity with the rest of the program[[CiteRef::Lakatos (1970)|pp. 32-34]]. Herein it is evident, while there were no absolute criteria by which to determine disciplinary boundaries, Lakatos at least regarded them in some sort of simple terms in that they had to work with each other. In essence, for Lakatos disciplinary boundaries were still ambiguous but more defined than his static methodologist predecessors.
 
A more interesting comparison to be drawn between history and the status of disciplinary boundaries lies in the opinion of dynamic methodologists such as that of [[Imre Lakatos]] and [[Thomas Kuhn]]. Lakatos, while never outright stating his opinion on disciplinary boundaries seems to have formed a strong implicit foundation for disciplinary boundaries. For Lakatos, periods of stability in science involve research programs. What is interesting is that one of the main criteria for a theory to become accepted into a research program is to be in unity with the rest of the program[[CiteRef::Lakatos (1970)|pp. 32-34]]. Herein it is evident, while there were no absolute criteria by which to determine disciplinary boundaries, Lakatos at least regarded them in some sort of simple terms in that they had to work with each other. In essence, for Lakatos disciplinary boundaries were still ambiguous but more defined than his static methodologist predecessors.
  
Kuhn, like Lakatos, never took an explicit stance on disciplinary boundaries. Kuhn had a very interesting system of five shared values which theories progress through. Ignoring his future contradictions and deconstructions of these values, one of the five values which shows his recognition of disciplinary boundaries is consistency. Consistency as a value entailed that a theory be internally consistent but also consistent with other theories of the paradigm. Like in the case for Lakatos, disciplinary boundaries are seen as ambiguous but at least recognized by Kuhn. [[CiteRef::Kuhn (1973)]]
+
Kuhn, like Lakatos, never took an explicit stance on disciplinary boundaries. Kuhn had a very interesting system of five shared values which theories progress through. Ignoring his future contradictions and deconstructions of these values, one of the five values which shows his recognition of disciplinary boundaries is consistency. Consistency as a value entailed that a theory be internally consistent but also consistent with other theories of the paradigm. Like in the case for Lakatos, disciplinary boundaries are seen as ambiguous but at least recognized by Kuhn. [[CiteRef::Kuhn (1973)|pp. 320-339]]
 
|Related Topics=Status of Questions,
 
|Related Topics=Status of Questions,
 
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Revision as of 18:26, 16 March 2017

How do disciplinary boundaries exist within the scientific mosaic?

Nicholas Overgaard explains the topic

A community's mosaic consists of the set of all accepted theories and employed methods by the community at some particular time. How do disciplinary boundaries exist within the mosaic: are they expressible as theories and/or methods?

In the scientonomic context, this term was first used by Hakob Barseghyan in 2016. The term is currently accepted by Scientonomy community.

Broader History

Until very recently the status of disciplinary boundaries was fundamentally ignored questions. Static methodologists simply showed very little interests in the subject. Perhaps the earliest comparison that can be drawn to a similar subject would have been the question of demarcation in dividing pseudo-scientific theories from scientific theories. Through demarcation criteria, while not sufficiently establishing the status of disciplinary boundaries, philosophers of science like Karl Popper and Rudolf Carnap were able to effectively establish scientific disciplines from non-scientific disciplines.

Carnap’s demarcation criteria is commonly known as Verificationism.1pp. 27 Heavily based on probability, Carnap believed a theory could only be scientific if it was testable. Carnap believed a theory should be tested on its occurrences and given a probability. Popper, very similarly, had criteria known as Falsificationism but whereas for Carnap a theory could be refuted multiple times, for Popper, once a theory was proved wrong it was permanently refuted.1pp. 58

A more interesting comparison to be drawn between history and the status of disciplinary boundaries lies in the opinion of dynamic methodologists such as that of Imre Lakatos and Thomas Kuhn. Lakatos, while never outright stating his opinion on disciplinary boundaries seems to have formed a strong implicit foundation for disciplinary boundaries. For Lakatos, periods of stability in science involve research programs. What is interesting is that one of the main criteria for a theory to become accepted into a research program is to be in unity with the rest of the program2pp. 32-34. Herein it is evident, while there were no absolute criteria by which to determine disciplinary boundaries, Lakatos at least regarded them in some sort of simple terms in that they had to work with each other. In essence, for Lakatos disciplinary boundaries were still ambiguous but more defined than his static methodologist predecessors.

Kuhn, like Lakatos, never took an explicit stance on disciplinary boundaries. Kuhn had a very interesting system of five shared values which theories progress through. Ignoring his future contradictions and deconstructions of these values, one of the five values which shows his recognition of disciplinary boundaries is consistency. Consistency as a value entailed that a theory be internally consistent but also consistent with other theories of the paradigm. Like in the case for Lakatos, disciplinary boundaries are seen as ambiguous but at least recognized by Kuhn. 3pp. 320-339

Scientonomic History

Acceptance Record

Here is the complete acceptance record of this question (it includes all the instances when the question was accepted as a legitimate topic for discussion by a community):
CommunityAccepted FromAcceptance IndicatorsStill AcceptedAccepted UntilRejection Indicators
Scientonomy1 April 2016It was acknowledged as an open question by the Scientonomy Seminar 2016.Yes

All Theories

The following theories have attempted to answer this question:
TheoryFormulationFormulated In
Discipline (Patton-Al-Zayadi-2021)A discipline is characterized by (1) a non-empty set of core questions Q and (2) the delineating theory stating that Q are the core questions of the discipline.2021

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Accepted Theories

According to our records, no theory on this topic has ever been accepted.

Suggested Modifications

Here is a list of modifications concerning this topic:
Modification Community Date Suggested Summary Verdict Verdict Rationale Date Assessed
Sciento-2021-0006 Scientonomy 1 August 2021 Accept new definitions of subquestion, core question, core theory, discipline, delineating theory, subdiscipline, and discipline acceptance. Open

Current View

There is currently no accepted answer to this question.


Related Topics

This question is a subquestion of Ontology of Scientific Change.

This topic is also related to the following topic(s):

References

  1. a b  Godfrey-Smith, Peter. (2003) Theory and Reality. University of Chicago Press.
  2. ^  Lakatos, Imre. (1970) Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes. In Lakatos (1978a), 8-101.
  3. ^ Kuhn (1973)