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| + | #REDIRECT [[Discipline]] |
| − | |Question=How do disciplinary boundaries exist within the scientific mosaic?
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| − | |Topic Type=Descriptive
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| − | |Description=A community's [[Scientific Mosaic|mosaic]] consists of the set of all accepted [[Theory|theories]] and employed [[Method|methods]] by the community at some particular time. How do disciplinary boundaries exist within the mosaic: are they expressible as theories and/or methods? Is the statement of disciplinary boundaries a mere definition of a discipline, a description of what a discipline has been doing, or a normative prescription of what a discipline ought to do. For example, when physicists say "Physics is the study of physical processes", it's not quite clear whether this is meant as a definition, description or prescription. It can have three different meanings:
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| − | * '''definition''': physics, ''by definition'', is the study of physical processes;
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| − | * '''description''': physics ''has been'' studying physical processes;
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| − | * '''prescription''': physics ''ought to'' study physical processes.
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| − | Is it possible that actual disciplinary boundaries are some kind of a combination of the three? If that is so, then how are the definition of a discipline, its description and its prescription interrelated? The task is to clarify the exact nature of disciplinary boundaries.
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| − | |Parent Topic=Ontology of Scientific Change
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| − | |Authors List=Hakob Barseghyan,
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| − | |Formulated Year=2016
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| − | |Academic Events=Scientonomy Seminar 2016,
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| − | |Prehistory=Until very recently the status of disciplinary boundaries was fundamentally ignored questions. Static methodologists simply showed very little interests in the subject. Perhaps the earliest comparison that can be drawn to a similar subject would have been the question of demarcation in dividing pseudo-scientific theories from scientific theories. Through demarcation criteria, while not sufficiently establishing the status of disciplinary boundaries, philosophers of science like [[Karl Popper]] and [[Rudolf Carnap]] were able to effectively establish scientific disciplines from non-scientific disciplines.
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| − | Carnap’s demarcation criteria is commonly known as Verificationism.[[CiteRef::Godfrey-Smith (2003)|pp. 27]] Heavily based on probability, Carnap believed a theory could only be scientific if it was testable. Carnap believed a theory should be tested on its occurrences and given a probability. Popper, very similarly, had criteria known as Falsificationism but whereas for Carnap a theory could be refuted multiple times, for Popper, once a theory was proved wrong it was permanently refuted.[[CiteRef::Godfrey-Smith (2003)|pp. 58]]
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| − | A more interesting comparison to be drawn between history and the status of disciplinary boundaries lies in the opinion of dynamic methodologists such as that of [[Imre Lakatos]] and [[Thomas Kuhn]]. Lakatos, while never outright stating his opinion on disciplinary boundaries seems to have formed a strong implicit foundation for disciplinary boundaries. For Lakatos, periods of stability in science involve research programs. What is interesting is that one of the main criteria for a theory to become accepted into a research program is to be in unity with the rest of the program.[[CiteRef::Lakatos (1970)|pp. 32-34]] Herein it is evident, while there were no absolute criteria by which to determine disciplinary boundaries, Lakatos at least regarded them in some sort of simple terms in that they had to work with each other. In essence, for Lakatos disciplinary boundaries were still ambiguous but more defined than his static methodologist predecessors.
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| − | Kuhn, like Lakatos, never took an explicit stance on disciplinary boundaries. Kuhn had a very interesting system of five shared values which theories progress through. Ignoring his future contradictions and deconstructions of these values, one of the five values which shows his recognition of disciplinary boundaries is consistency. Consistency as a value entailed that a theory be internally consistent but also consistent with other theories of the paradigm. Like in the case for Lakatos, disciplinary boundaries are seen as ambiguous but at least recognized by Kuhn.[[CiteRef::Kuhn (1973)|pp. 320-339]]
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| − | |Related Topics=Status of Questions,
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| − | }}
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| − | {{Acceptance Record
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| − | |Community=Community:Scientonomy
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| − | |Accepted From Era=CE
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| − | |Accepted From Year=2016
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| − | |Accepted From Month=April
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| − | |Accepted From Day=1
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| − | |Accepted From Approximate=No
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| − | |Acceptance Indicators=It was acknowledged as an open question by the [[Scientonomy Seminar 2016]].
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| − | |Still Accepted=Yes
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| − | |Accepted Until Approximate=No
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| − | }}
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