Search by property

Jump to navigation Jump to search

This page provides a simple browsing interface for finding entities described by a property and a named value. Other available search interfaces include the page property search, and the ask query builder.

Search by property

A list of all pages that have property "Description" with value "A [[Group|group]] that has a collective intentionality.". Since there have been only a few results, also nearby values are displayed.

Showing below up to 40 results starting with #1.

View (previous 50 | next 50) (20 | 50 | 100 | 250 | 500)


    

List of results

    • Static Procedural Methods theorem (Barseghyan-2015)  + (A [[Procedural Method|procedural method]]A [[Procedural Method|procedural method]] is a method which doesn't presuppose any contingent propositions; it can only presuppose necessary truths such as those of mathematics or logic. Given the nature of necessary truths, it is impossible for one such truth to contradict another necessary truth since it must be true in all possible worlds. Therefore, it follows from the '''Method Rejection''' theorem that, since there can be no elements at odds with a necessary truth, any procedural method is, in principle, static.rocedural method is, in principle, static.)
    • Subquestion (Patton-Al-Zayadi-2021)  + (A [[Question| question]]A [[Question| question]] is a topic of inquiry. [[CITE_Rawleigh (2018)]] Questions can constitute hierarchies where more specific questions are subquestions of broader questions. For example, 'Was Peter the Great an emperor of Russia?' is a subquestion of 'Who were the emperors of Russia?' since by answering the former, we are also providing a partial answer to the latter. The latter is, in turn, a subquestion of the broader question 'Who were the rulers of European countries?'. [[CITE_Patton and Al-Zayadi (2021)]] A partial answer to a question is a complete, or direct, answer to one of its subquestions.[[CITE_Beck and Sharvit (2002)]][[CITE_Sharvit and Beck (2001)]][[CITE_Eckardt (2007)]][[CITE_Eckardt (2007)]])
    • Core Theory (Patton-Al-Zayadi-2021)  + (A core theory of a [[Discipline| discipline]]A core theory of a [[Discipline| discipline]] is a [[Theory| theory]] presupposed by the discipline's [[Core Question| core questions]].[[CITE_Patton and Al-Zayadi (2021)]] The [[Scientific Mosaic| scientific mosaic]] consists of [[Theory| theories]] and [[Question| questions]].[[CITE_Barseghyan (2015)]][[CITE_Barseghyan (2018)]][[CITE_Rawleigh (2018)]][[CITE_Sebastien (2016)]] Questions constitute hierarchies where more specific questions are [[Subquestion| subquestions]] of broader questions. Within this hierarchy, certain general questions play a special role as core questions. These questions are essential to a discipline, and have the power to identify it and determine its boundaries. For example, a core question of evolutionary biology would be 'how did living species originate as a result of evolution?'. Questions always presuppose theories, which endow them with semantic content. Those presupposed by a discipline's core questions, are that discipline's core theories. For our example, the theory in question would be The neo-Darwinian theory of evolution by natural selection. theory of evolution by natural selection.)
    • Discipline (Patton-Al-Zayadi-2021)  + (A discipline ''A'' is characterized by a nA discipline ''A'' is characterized by a non-empty set of [[Core Question| core questions]] ''Q<sub>CA</sub>'' and a [[Delineating Theory| delineating theory]] stating that ''Q<sub>CA</sub>'' are the core questions of the discipline.[[CITE_Patton and Al-Zayadi (2021)]] </br></br>The [[Scientific Mosaic|scientific mosaic]] consists of [[Theory|theories]] and [[Question|questions]].[[CITE_Barseghyan (2015)]][[CITE_Barseghyan (2018)]][[CITE_Rawleigh (2018)]][[CITE_Sebastien (2016)]] As a whole, a discipline ''A'' consists of a set of accepted questions ''Q<sub>A</sub>'', and the theories which provide answers to those questions, or which those questions presuppose. [[CITE_Patton and Al-Zayadi (2021)]] Questions form hierarchies, with more specific questions being [[Subquestion| subquestions]] of more general questions. Theories find a place in these hierarchies, since each theory is an attempt to answer a certain question, and each question presupposes certain theories. Because of such hierarchical relations, it is possible to characterize a discipline by identifying a set of [[Core Question| core questions]], ''Q<sub>CA</sub>''. These core questions are judged by some [[Epistemic Agent| agent]] to be related to one another, essential to a discipline, and definitive of its boundaries. The other questions of a discipline are subquestions of its core questions.</br></br>A set, as such, can't be part of a scientific mosaic consisting of theories and questions. We, therefore, take a discipline to be defined by a [[Delineating Theory| delineating theory]] that identifies the set of core questions ''Q<sub>CA</sub>'' characterizing that discipline.at identifies the set of core questions ''Q<sub>CA</sub>'' characterizing that discipline.)
    • Employed Method (Barseghyan-2015)  + (A method is said to be ''employed'' at timA method is said to be ''employed'' at time ''t'' if, at time ''t,'' theories became accepted only when their acceptance is permitted by the method. [[CITE_Barseghyan (2015)|p. 53]] ''The second law'' of theory acceptance is a direct consequence of ''employed method'' as it is defined.e of ''employed method'' as it is defined.)
    • Methodology Can Shape Method theorem (Barseghyan-2015)  + (A methodology can affect an employed methoA methodology can affect an employed method when it implements one or more abstract requirements of another employed method. Thus, the role normative methodology plays in the process of scientific change is a creative role, in which methods are changed through the implementation of other abstract requirements from some other employed method.</br></br>This theorem follows from [[The Third Law (Barseghyan-2015)|former description of the third law]], which states that a method becomes employed only when it is deducible from other employed methods and accepted theories of the time. </br>[[File:Methodology-shapes-method.jpg|607px|center||]]</br></br>This description of the third law leaves room for methodologies’ to play an active role in scientific change in cases when a ''concrete'' method fulfills the requirements of an employed ''abstract'' method. The same abstract requirements can usually be implemented in a wide range of different ways. For instance, if there is a whole array of concrete cell counting methods all implementing the same abstract requirement that when counting the number of cells, the resulting value is acceptable only if it is obtained with an "aided" eye.[[CITE_Barseghyan (2015)|pp. 151-152]] In such cases, methodology can play a decisive role in method employment; what later becomes the requirements of the employed method can be first suggested as a methodology. Thus, the double-blind trial method was first devised as a methodology, as a set of explicitly stated rules, and only after that did it become actually employed as a method of drug testing.[[CITE_Barseghyan (2015)|pp. 240-243]]</br></br>[[Sebastien (2016)]]'s new definition of [[Methodology (Sebastien-2016)|methodology]] offers an alternate means for methodologies to shape methods, although this is not stated in the existing formulation of the theory. Because methodology is understood as a subkind of [[Normative Theory]], it should be possible for the [[Third Law]] to deduce an abstract method from a set of theories including some of the normative methodologies a community holds about their method. In this way, it would be necessary for this method to take into account how the community believes its method works, in any concrete implementation of said method, just as a community takes into account descriptive theories (e.g. the placebo effect and experimenter's bias) when [[Mechanism of Method Employment|employing a new method]].Mechanism of Method Employment|employing a new method]].)
    • Subdiscipline (Patton-Al-Zayadi-2021)  + (A more specialized [[Discipline| discipline]]A more specialized [[Discipline| discipline]] ''A'' is a subdiscipline of another, more general discipline ''B'', if and only if the set of [[Question| questions]] ''Q<sub>A</sub>'' of ''A'' is a proper subset of the questions ''Q<sub>B</sub>''of ''B'' [[CITE_Patton and Al-Zayadi (2021)]]. For example, cellular neurobiology, the discipline which deals with the cellular properties of nerve cells, is a subdiscipline of neuroscience, which deals with the properties and functions of nervous systems.</br></br>The [[Scientific Mosaic|scientific mosaic]] consists of [[Theory|theories]] and [[Question|questions]].[[CITE_Barseghyan (2015)]][[CITE_Barseghyan (2018)]][[CITE_Rawleigh (2018)]][[CITE_Sebastien (2016)]] As a whole, a discipline ''A'' consists of a set of accepted questions ''Q<sub>A</sub>'' and the theories which provide answers to those questions, or which those questions presuppose.[[CITE_Patton and Al-Zayadi (2021)]] Questions form hierarchies, with more specific questions being [[Subquestion| subquestions]] of more general questions. Theories find a place in these heirarchies, since each theory is an attempt to answer a certain question, and each question presupposes certain theories. It is sometimes the case that the questions ''Q<sub>B</sub>''of a broader discipline ''B'' can include all of the questions, ''Q<sub>A</sub>'', of ''A'' as subquestions, with the questions of ''A'', formimg a proper subset of the questions of ''B''. In this situation, ''A'' is then said to be a subdiscipline of ''B''.bset of the questions of ''B''. In this situation, ''A'' is then said to be a subdiscipline of ''B''.)
    • Epistemic Tool (Patton-2019)  + (A physical object or system is an epistemiA physical object or system is an epistemic tool for an [[Epistemic Agent|epistemic agent]] ''iff'' there is a procedure by which the tool can provide an acceptable source of knowledge for answering some [[Question|question]] under the employed [[Method|method]] of that agent. Examples of epistemic tools include rulers, thermometers, the Large Hadron Collider, the Hubble Space Telescope, a written text, a computer, a blackboard and chalk, a crystal ball, etc.blackboard and chalk, a crystal ball, etc.)
    • Question Can Have Subquestions (Rawleigh-2018)  + (A question can be a subquestion of another question. A question ''Q'' is a subquestion of another question ''P'', if a direct answer to ''Q'' is also a partial answer to ''P''.)
    • Mosaic Split (Barseghyan-2015)  + (A quick example of ''mosaic split'' is forA quick example of ''mosaic split'' is formulated by Barseghyan (2015) as follows.</br></br><blockquote>Take for instance the famous early 18th century case of Newtonianism in Britain vs. Cartesianism in France. If we were to go back to the 1730s we would spot at least two distinct scientific communities, with their distinct mosaics. While the curricula of the British universities included the Newtonian natural philosophy, the French universities taught the Cartesian natural philosophy among other things. In short, there is an instance of mosaic split if and only if there are two or more parties that take different theories to be accepted.[[CITE_Barseghyan (2015)|p.203]]</blockquote> </br></br>Therefore, mosaic split is not synonymous with regular scientific disagreement.s not synonymous with regular scientific disagreement.)
    • Question Is a Subtype of Epistemic Element (Rawleigh-2018)  + (A study of the process of scientific changA study of the process of scientific change reveals many cases when a question that was considered legitimate in a certain time-period became illegitimate in another period. For example, the questions such as “what is the weight of phlogiston?” or “why does some matter gain mass as it loses phlogiston?” were accepted as legitimate topics of inquiry for the most part of the 18th century. Yet, once the phlogiston theory was rejected, these questions became illegitimate. Another examples is the question “what is the distance from the earth to the sphere of stars?” that was once considered legitimate by astronomers, but is no longer accepted.[[CITE_Rawleigh (2018)|p. 4]]</br></br>Similarly, there are questions which are considered legitimate these days but weren't accepted even a few centuries ago. An example of this is the question “what’s the underlying mechanics of the evolution of species?” - a perfectly legitimate topic of biological research nowadays that would have been deemed illegitimate three hundred years ago.[[CITE_Rawleigh (2018)|p. 4]] </br></br>These examples suggest that questions are part of the process of scientific changes. More specifically, they are a subtype of [[Epistemic Element|epistemic element]].t|epistemic element]].)
    • Theory Pursuit (Barseghyan-2015)  + (A theory is said to be pursued if it is coA theory is said to be pursued if it is considered worthy of further development. [[CITE_Barseghyan (2015)|pp. 30-42]] An example is provided by mid-seventeenth century science. Throughout this period, the Aristotelian natural philosophy, with its geocentric cosmology, four elements, and four causes remained [[Theory Acceptance|accepted]] by the scientific community of Europe as evidenced, for example, by its central place in university curricula. The theories from this period that we are most familiar with from modern popular and professional literature, like Copernicus's heliocentric cosmology, and Galileo's theories of motion, were not accepted, but pursued theories. More generally these included the mechanical natural philosophy championed by a community which included [[Rene Descartes|Descartes]], Huygens, Boyle, and many others, and the magnetical natural philosophy, espoused by Gilbert, Kepler, Stevin, Wilkins and others. In our modern world, the major accepted physical theories include Einstein's relativity theory, quantum mechanics, and the standard model of particle physics. A variety of other theories are not accepted but are being pursued. These include various versions of string theory, and attempts to quantize general relativity, to create a quantum theory of gravity.[[CITE_Barseghyan (2015)|p. 40]]</br></br>While a variety of unaccepted theories are typically pursued, accepted theories also typically continue to be pursued. General relativity has been the accepted theory of gravitation since roughly 1918. [[CITE_Barseghyan (2015)|p. 203]] The theory and its implications for astrophysics and cosmology continue to be pursued in a variety of ways. For example, in 2016, researchers at the Laser Interferometer Gravitational-Wave Observatory in the United States announced the first-ever direct detection of gravitational waves, thereby verifying a major prediction of the theory. [[CITE_Castelvecchi and Witze (2016)]][[CITE_Abbott et al. (2016)]][[CITE_Abbott et al. (2016)]])
    • Theory Rejection theorem (Barseghyan-2015)  + (According to '''the theory rejection theorAccording to '''the theory rejection theorem''', a [[Theory|theory]] becomes '''rejected''' only when other theories that are incompatible with the theory become accepted. </br></br>Implicit in the theorem is the idea that each theory is assessed on an "individual basis by its compatibility with the propositions of the newly accepted theory".[[CITE_Barseghyan (2015)|p. 168]] If it turns out that a previously accepted theory is compatible with the newly accepted theory, it remain in the agent's mosaic.</br></br>Barseghyan notes that, although we normally expect a theory to be replaced by another theory in the same "field" of inquiry, this is not necessarily the case. For example, he writes, "HSC knows several cases where an accepted theory became rejected simply because it wasn’t compatible with new accepted theories of some other fields".[[CITE_Barseghyan (2015)|p. 171]]</br></br>Barseghyan summarizes '''the theory rejection theorem''' as such:</br><blockquote>In short, when the axioms of a theory are replaced by another theory, some of the theorems may nevertheless manage to stay in the mosaic, provided that they are compatible with the newly accepted theory. This is essentially what the ''theory rejection theorem'' tells us. Thus, if someday our currently accepted general relativity gets replaced by some new theory, the theories that followed from general relativity, such as the theory of black holes, may nevertheless manage to remain in the mosaic. [[CITE_Barseghyan (2015)|p. 171]] </blockquote>CITE_Barseghyan (2015)|p. 171]] </blockquote>)
    • Method Rejection theorem (Barseghyan-2015)  + (According to ''the method rejection theorem'', a [[Method|method]] ceases to be employed only when other methods that are incompatible with it become employed.)
    • Epistemic Action Exists  + (According to Allen, epistemic actions are a key part of everyday epistemic practice.)
    • Mosaic Merge (Barseghyan-2015)  + (According to Barseghyan (2015), "the accepAccording to Barseghyan (2015), "the acceptance of the Newtonian theory led to a mosaic merge". Specifically, "it led to the merging of the Dutch and Swedish mosaics into a unified mosaic with the Newtonian natural philosophy and Protestant theology":[[CITE_Barseghyan (2015)|p. 215]]</br></br><blockquote>It is well known that, on most of the Continent, the Newtonian theory (together with its 18th century modifications) became accepted only after the confirmation of one of its novel predictions. Although, according to popular narratives, the theory was confirmed only in 1758 after the return of Halley’s comet, it is safe to say that it was actually confirmed in the period between 1735 and 1740 during the observations of the Earth’s shape.</br></br>The story goes like this. In 1735, the accepted natural philosophy on most of the continent was the updated version of the Cartesian theory, which assumed that the Earth must be slightly elongated at the poles. The assumption that the Earth is a pro-late spheroid was also in accord with the results of the geodesic measurements of Giovanni Domenico Cassini and his son Jacques Cassini announced in 1718. Initially, however, the Earth’s prolateness wasn’t a consequence of the Cartesian natural philosophy. When Jacques Cassini announced his results, the accepted theory of gravity was a version of Descartes’s vortex theory modified by Huygens. According to Huygens’s theory, the equilibrium state of any homogenous fluid mass, subject to aethereal pressure, was not prolate but oblate spheroid. Thus, in 1718, the prolateness of the Earth announced by Cassini was an anomaly for the accepted Cartesian natural philosophy. In the period between 1720 and 1734 several attempts were made to reconcile the results of Cassinis’ measurements with the accepted theory of Huygens. There is no unanimity among the historians as to which reconciliation became actually accepted. On Barseghyan's reckoning, it was the very first reconciliation provided by Mairan in 1720, which absorbed the anomaly by stipulating the Earth’s primitive prolateness.[[CITE_Terrall (1992)|p. 212]] In any case, we know for sure that by 1735 the prolate-spheroid Earth was already part of the accepted version of the Cartesian natural philosophy. As for the Newtonian theory (which was a contender at that time), it was predicting that the Earth is slightly flattened at the poles, i.e. that the Earth is an oblate spheroid.</br></br>In order to end the controversy, the French Académie des Sciences organized two expeditions to Peru (1735-1740) and to Lapland (1736-1737). The latter expedition led by Maupertuis who was accompanied, among others, by Swedish astronomer Anders Celsius, returned to Paris in the summer of 1737. Its results showed that the prediction of Newton’s theory was correct.[[CITE_Terrall (2003)]] This conclusion was also confirmed by Jacques Cassini’s son César-François Cassini de Thury who re-measured the Paris-Perpignan meridian in 1740.[[CITE_Terrall (1992)|p. 234]] As a result, the Newtonian theory replaced the Cartesian theory in all the mosaics where the latter was accepted. In particular, this resulted in the merging of all protestant mosaics where the Newtonian theory became accepted.[[CITE_Barseghyan (2015)|pp. 215-216]]</blockquote>)|pp. 215-216]]</blockquote>)
    • Mosaic Merge (Barseghyan-2015)  + (According to Barseghyan (2015), for mosaicAccording to Barseghyan (2015), for mosaics to merge, that is, to "turn into one united mosaic," there must first exist (at least) two distinct mosaics. This necessarily means that there are elements which are present in one mosaic but absent in the other. "To use the language of set theory," Barseghyan writes, "these are the elements that constitute the so-called ''symmetric difference'' of two mosaics [...] Therefore, in order for the two mosaics to merge into one, these elements should either be rejected in both or accepted in both, so that the differences between the two are resolved".[[CITE_Barseghyan (2015)|p. 214]]</br></br>[[File:Symmetric_Difference.png|527px|center||]][[File:Symmetric_Difference.png|527px|center||]])
    • Logical Presupposition Exists  + (According to Barseghyan and Levesley, question can have logical presuppositions.)
    • Epistemic Presupposition Exists  + (According to Barseghyan and Levesley, questions can have epistemic presuppositions.)
    • Method Is a Subtype of Normative Theory (Barseghyan-2018)  + (According to Barseghyan's 2018 redrafted ontology, methods are a species of normative theories.[[CITE_Barseghyan (2018)]])
    • The Second Law (Barseghyan-2015) is Tautological (Barseghyan-2015)  + (According to Barseghyan's initial positionAccording to Barseghyan's initial position, "the second law is not a law in the traditional sense, for normally a law is supposed to have some empirical content, i.e. its opposite should be conceivable at least in principle. Obviously, the second law is a ''tautology'', since it follows from the definition of ''employed method''".[[CITE_Barseghyan (2015)|p. 129, footnote]][[CITE_Barseghyan (2015)|p. 129, footnote]])
    • The Second Law (Barseghyan-2015)  + (According to Barseghyan's original formulaAccording to Barseghyan's original formulation of the second law, "theories become accepted only when they satisfy the requirements of the methods actually employed at the time. In other words there is only one way for a theory to become accepted – it must meet the implicit expectations of the scientific community".[[CITE_Barseghyan (2015)|p. 129]]</br></br>According to the law, in order to become accepted, a theory is assessed by the [[Method|method]] employed at the time by the [[Scientific Community|scientific community]] in question.[[CITE_Barseghyan (2015)|p. 129]] The key idea behind the second law is that theories are evaluated by the criteria employed by the community at the time of the evaluation. Thus, different communities employing different method of evaluation can end up producing different assessment outcomes.</br></br>Barseghyan notes an important consequence of the law: </br><blockquote>So the question that the historian must ask here is: what were the expectations of the respective scientific communities that allowed for the acceptance of the respective natural philosophies? The second law suggests that, in order to reconstruct the actual method employed at a particular time, we must study the actual transitions in theories that took place at that time.[[CITE_Barseghyan (2015)|p. 130]]</blockquote></br></br>A further important consequence of the law has to do with the famous, long-standing debate on the status of novel predictions. Some authors (including Popper, Lakatos, and Musgrave) argue for a special status of novel predictions, where others (like Hempel, Carnap, and Laudan) argue that novel predictions do not substantially differ from post factum explanations or "retro-dictions". But by the second law, as Barseghyan writes, "the whole debate in its current shape is ill-founded".[[CITE_Barseghyan (2015)|p. 131]] Whether novel predictions have a special status, in that "a new theory is expected to have confirmed novel predictions in order to become accepted", is, by the ''second law'', dependent on a community's employed method at the time. Instead of being concerned with all theories in all contexts, we must ask whether theories in specific communities at specific time periods were required to have confirmed novel predictions.ods were required to have confirmed novel predictions.)
    • Epistemic Stances Towards Theories - Theory Acceptance (Barseghyan-2015)  + (According to Barseghyan, acceptance as an epistemic stance can be taken towards theories.[[CITE_Barseghyan (2015)|pp. 30-32]])
    • Definition Is a Subtype of Theory (Barseghyan-2018)  + (According to Barseghyan, definitions are essentially a species of theories.)
    • Definition Exists  + (According to Barseghyan, definitions are an integral part of the process of scientific change.[[CITE_Barseghyan (2018)]])
    • Epistemic Agent Exists  + (According to Barseghyan, epistemic agents are an essential part of the process of scientific change, as they take stances towards epistemic elements.)
    • Epistemic Community Is a Subtype of Epistemic Agent (Barseghyan-2018)  + (According to Barseghyan, epistemic community is an epistemic agent, i.e. it is capable of taking [[Epistemic Stance|epistemic stances]] towards [[Epistemic Element|epistemic elements]].[[CITE_Barseghyan (2018)]])
    • Descriptive Theory Exists  + (According to Barseghyan, many theories attempt to describe something. Thus, there are descriptive theories.[[CITE_Barseghyan (2015)|p. 5]])
    • Epistemic Stances Towards Theories - Theory Pursuit (Barseghyan-2015)  + (According to Barseghyan, the epistemic stance of pursuit can be taken towards theories, i.e. an epistemic agent can find a theory pursuitworthy.[[CITE_Barseghyan (2015)|pp. 30-40]])
    • Epistemic Stances Towards Theories - Theory Use (Barseghyan-2015)  + (According to Barseghyan, the epistemic stance of use can be taken towards theories, i.e. an epistemic agent can find a theory useful.[[CITE_Barseghyan (2015)|pp. 30-40]])
    • The Zeroth Law (Harder-2015) is Tautological (Fraser-Sarwar-2018)  + (According to Fraser and Sarwar, [[The Zeroth Law (Harder-2015)|Harder's formulation of the zeroth law]] "does not have any empirical content, because it follows directly from the notion of compatibility".[[CITE_Fraser and Sarwar (2018)|p. 69]])
    • The Law of Compatibility (Fraser-Sarwar-2018) is Not Tautological (Fraser-Sarwar-2018)  + (According to Fraser and Sarwar, their formulation of the law of compatibility "is non-tautological, as it prohibits certain logical possibilities."[[CITE_Fraser and Sarwar (2018)|p. 73]])
    • Theory Decay Exists  + (According to Oh, there is some historical evidence for theory decay.[[CITE_Oh (2021)]])
    • Element Decay Exists  + (According to Oh, there is such a thing as element decay.[[CITE_Oh (2021)]])
    • Theory Rejection theorem (Barseghyan-Pandey-2023)  + (According to Pandey's new formulation of 'According to Pandey's new formulation of '''the theory rejection theorem''', a [[Theory|theory]] becomes '''rejected''' only when other [[Epistemic Element|epistemic elements]] that are incompatible with the theory become accepted. This formulation differs from Barseghyan's [[Theory Rejection theorem (Barseghyan-2015)|original formulation]] in that it allows a theory to be replaced by an epistemic element of ''any'' type, not just by other theories. In other respects, Pandey's formulation is similar to Barseghyan's.</br></br>Implicit in both theorems is the idea that each theory is assessed on an "individual basis by its compatibility with the propositions of the newly accepted theory".[[CITE_Barseghyan (2015)|p. 168]] If it turns out that a previously accepted theory is compatible with the newly accepted theory, it remain in the agent's mosaic.</br></br>Although we normally expect a theory to be replaced by another theory in the same "field" of inquiry, Barseghyan and Pandey both agree that this is not necessarily the case. For example, Barseghyan writes, "HSC knows several cases where an accepted theory became rejected simply because it wasn’t compatible with new accepted theories of some other fields".[[CITE_Barseghyan (2015)|p. 171]] Similarly, Pandey provides several examples of this phenomenon in ''Dilemma of The First Law''.[[CITE_Pandey (2023)]] </br></br>Barseghyan summarizes '''the theory rejection theorem''' as such:</br><blockquote>In short, when the axioms of a theory are replaced by another theory, some of the theorems may nevertheless manage to stay in the mosaic, provided that they are compatible with the newly accepted theory. This is essentially what the ''theory rejection theorem'' tells us. Thus, if someday our currently accepted general relativity gets replaced by some new theory, the theories that followed from general relativity, such as the theory of black holes, may nevertheless manage to remain in the mosaic. [[CITE_Barseghyan (2015)|p. 171]] </blockquote>CITE_Barseghyan (2015)|p. 171]] </blockquote>)
    • Individual Epistemic Agent Is a Subtype of Epistemic Agent (Patton-2019)  + (According to Patton, individuals are "capaAccording to Patton, individuals are "capable of taking epistemic stances towards epistemic elements, with reason, based on a semantic understanding of the elements and their available alternatives, and with the goal of producing knowledge".[[CITE_Patton (2019)|p. 82]][[CITE_Patton (2019)|p. 82]])
    • Individual Epistemic Agent Exists  + (According to Patton, there is such a things as an individual epistemic agents, capable of taking [[Epistemic Stance|epistemic stances]] towards [[Epistemic Element|epistemic elements]].[[CITE_Patton (2019)]])
    • Normative Theory Exists  + (According to Sebastien, "normative propositions are relevant to the process of scientific change", i.e. "they "can be part of the scientific mosaic".[[CITE_Sebastien (2016)|p. 2]])
    • Normative Theory Is a Subtype of Theory (Sebastien-2016)  + (According to Sebastien, norms, such as those of ethics, aesthetics, or methodology, are normative theories.[[CITE_Sebastien (2016)]])