Difference between revisions of "Longino (2008)"
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|Abstract=Miriam Solomon's social empiricism is marked by emphasis on community level rationality in science and the refusal to impose a distinction between the epistemic and the non-epistemic character of factors (“decision vectors”) that incline scientists for or against a theory. While she attempts to derive some norms from the analysis of cases, her insistent naturalism undermines her effort to articulate norms for the (appropriate) distribution of decision vectors. | |Abstract=Miriam Solomon's social empiricism is marked by emphasis on community level rationality in science and the refusal to impose a distinction between the epistemic and the non-epistemic character of factors (“decision vectors”) that incline scientists for or against a theory. While she attempts to derive some norms from the analysis of cases, her insistent naturalism undermines her effort to articulate norms for the (appropriate) distribution of decision vectors. | ||
| − | |Journal= | + | |Journal=Perspectives on Science |
| + | |Volume=16 | ||
| + | |Number=3 | ||
| + | |Pages=241-245 | ||
}} | }} | ||
Latest revision as of 04:10, 7 October 2017
Longino, Helen. (2008) Norms and Naturalism: Comments on Miriam Solomon's Social Empiricism. Perspectives on Science 16 (3), 241-245.
| Title | Norms and Naturalism: Comments on Miriam Solomon's Social Empiricism |
|---|---|
| Resource Type | journal article |
| Author(s) | Helen Longino |
| Year | 2008 |
| Journal | Perspectives on Science |
| Volume | 16 |
| Number | 3 |
| Pages | 241-245 |
Abstract
Miriam Solomon's social empiricism is marked by emphasis on community level rationality in science and the refusal to impose a distinction between the epistemic and the non-epistemic character of factors (“decision vectors”) that incline scientists for or against a theory. While she attempts to derive some norms from the analysis of cases, her insistent naturalism undermines her effort to articulate norms for the (appropriate) distribution of decision vectors.
