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M
Overgaard and Loiselle illustrate the relationship of mutual authority delegation by a number of examples. For one, physicists acknowledge that biologists are the experts on questions concerning life, and likewise biologists acknowledge that physicists are the experts on questions concerning physical processes. Similar relationships can be found within individual scientific disciplines. Consider, for instance, the relationship between theoretical and applied physicists, where despite the differences in their methods and overall objectives, the two communities customarily delegate authority to each other on a wide array of topics. +
The definition tweaks the [[Mutual Authority Delegation (Overgaard-Loiselle-2016)|original definition]] of the term by [[Nicholas Overgaard|Overgaard]] and [[Mirka Loiselle|Loiselle]] to ensure that the relationship of multiple authority delegation can obtain between [[Epistemic Agent|epistemic agents]] of all types. It also substitutes [[Question|''question'']] for ''topic'', as the former is the proper scientonomic term that should be used. +
N
According to the [[Non-Empty Mosaic theorem (Barseghyan-2015)|non-empty mosaic theorem]], there must be at least one element present in a mosaic. The Necessary Method theorem specifies that this element must be a method. That is, "one method is a must for the whole enterprise of scientific change to take off the ground".[[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)|p. 228]] +
Necessary [[Scientific Mosaic|mosaic]] split is a form of mosaic split that must happen if it is ever the case that two incompatible [[Theory|theories]] both become accepted under the employed [[Method|method]] of the time. Since the theories are incompatible, under the [[The Zeroth Law|zeroth law]], they cannot be accepted into the same mosaic, and a mosaic split must then occur, as a matter of logical necessity.[[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)|pp. 204-207]] +
The non-empty [[Scientific Mosaic|mosaic]] theorem asserts that in order for a process of [[Scientific Change|scientific change]] to be possible, the mosaic must necessarily contain at least one element. Scientific change is impossible in an empty mosaic. It can be deduced from the [[The Second Law (Barseghyan-2015)|second law]], which asserts that in order to become accepted into the mosaic, a [[Theory|theory]] is assessed by the [[Method|method]] actually employed at the time, and the [[The Third Law (Barseghyan-2015)|third law]], which asserts that a method becomes employed only when it is deducible from other employed methods and accepted theories of the time.[[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)|p. 226]] +
This definition is meant to highlight the key difference between [[Epistemic Community|epistemic]] and non-epistemic communities. The former are said to have a collective intentionality to know the world, while the latter lack such an intentionality. A typical example of a non-epistemic community, according to [[Nicholas Overgaard|Overgaard]], is an orchestra that has a collective intentionality to play music but lack the intentionality of knowing the world.[[CiteRef::Overgaard (2017)|p. 59]] Another example of a non-epistemic community, according to Overgaard, is a political party. While a political party might have some accepted theories, such as ideas concerning, for instance, effective governance, "a political party would be considered a non-epistemic community because it lacks a collective intentionality to know the world".[[CiteRef::Overgaard (2017)|p. 59]] +
Non-hierarchical authority delegation is a sub-type of multiple authority delegation. It describes a situation in which a community delegates authority over some topic to multiple communities, and treat each community as being at the same level of authority. Consider a case of multiple authority delegation in which either expert A OR expert B might be consulted. If the word of expert A is valued as equally as the word of expert B, we have a case of non-hierarchical authority delegation. +
The definition tweaks the [[Non-hierarchical Authority Delegation (Loiselle-2017)|original definition]] of the term by [[Mirka Loiselle|Loiselle]] to ensure that the relationship of non-hierarchical authority delegation can obtain between [[Epistemic Agent|epistemic agents]] of all types. It also substitutes [[Question|''question'']] for ''topic'', as the former is the proper scientonomic term that should be used. +
This definition is meant to ensure that the notion of employment is applicable not only to methods but to norms of all types, as is the case in the ontology of epistemic elements suggested by [[Hakob Barseghyan|Barseghyan]] in 2018. According to that ontology, the capacity of being employed can be ascribed not only to norms of theory evaluation (i.e. methods), but to [[Epistemic Stances Towards Normative Theories - Norm Employment (Barseghyan-2018)|norms of all types]], including ethical norm and aesthetic norms.[[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2018)]] +
Pandey makes a case that the first law and all of its corollaries are tautological.[[CiteRef::Pandey (2023)]] +
Whereas [[Implication (Palider-2019)]] is an analytic relation between theories, inferences are taken to be the "movements of thought" that lead to belief revision. As argued for by Palider (2019) inferences, unlike implications, necessarily involve a normative component.[[CiteRef::Palider (2019)|p. 22]] An implication alone is insufficient for an agent to revise their beliefs, or accepted theories, what is needed is that the agent take the normative stance that they should accept the theory. A '''normative inference''' is what leads an agent to taking such a normative stance. +
While not explicitly stated, the definition assumes that normative propositions involve evaluation, i.e. they "say how something ''ought'' to be, what's good or bad, what's right or wrong".[[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)|p. 12]] In contrast with [[Descriptive Theory|''descriptive propositions'']], normative propositions do not aim to tell how things are, were, or will be, but rather what is good or bad, desirable or undesirable, permissible or impermissible. +
According to Sebastien, "normative propositions are relevant to the process of scientific change", i.e. "they "can be part of the scientific mosaic".[[CiteRef::Sebastien (2016)|p. 2]] +
According to Sebastien, norms, such as those of ethics, aesthetics, or methodology, are normative theories.[[CiteRef::Sebastien (2016)]] +
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One-sided authority delegation is a sub-type of authority delegation. It describes a situation where one community delegates authority over some topic to another community, but the other community does not delegate any authority back. +
The definition tweaks the [[Mutual Authority Delegation (Overgaard-Loiselle-2016)|original definition]] of the term by [[Nicholas Overgaard|Overgaard]] and [[Mirka Loiselle|Loiselle]] to ensure that the relationship of one-sided authority delegation can obtain between [[Epistemic Agent|epistemic agents]] of all types. It also substitutes [[Question|''question'']] for ''topic'', as the former is the proper scientonomic term that should be used. +
To say that the theory acceptance outcome ''accept'' obtained as a result of a theory's assessment by a method is the same as to say that it is prescribed that the theory must be accepted. +
To say that the theory acceptance outcome ''inconclusive'' obtained as a result of a theory's assessment by a method is the same as to say that the theory ''can'' but ''shouldn't necessarily'' be accepted. +
To say that a theory's assessment by a method produced the outcome "inconclusive" is the same as to say that the community itself couldn't tell whether the requirements of the method were conclusively met. +
To say that the theory acceptance outcome ''not accept'' obtained as a result of a theory's assessment by a method is the same as to say that it is prescribed that the theory must not be accepted. +
To say that a theory's assessment by a method produced the outcome "not satisfied" is the same as to say that the theory conclusively failed to meet the requirements of the method. +
To say that a theory's assessment by a method produced the outcome "satisfied" is the same as to say that the theory conclusively met the requirements of the method. +
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Possible [[Scientific Mosaic|mosaic]] split is a form of mosaic split that can happen if it is ever the case that [[Theory|theory]] assessment reaches an inconclusive result. In this case, a mosaic split can, but need not necessarily, result.[[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)|pp. 208-213]] That is, "the sufficient condition for this second variety of mosaic split is an element of inconclusiveness in the assessment outcome of at least one of the contender theories".[[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)|p. 208]] +
The definition assumes that it is possible to conceive of methods that do not presuppose any substantive knowledge about the world. If a method doesn't presuppose any accepted theories other than definitions, the method is procedural.[[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)|p. 219]] As a possible example of a procedural method, [[Hakob Barseghyan|Barseghyan]] mentions what he calls the ''deductive acceptance method'', according to which "if a proposition is deductively inferred from other accepted propositions, it is to be accepted".[[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)|p. 221]] This method, according to Barseghyan presupposes only some definition of ''deductive inference'' as well as some very abstract method such as "only accept the best available theories".[[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)|p. 220-221]] The latter is another possible instance of a procedural method, as it too doesn't seem to presuppose any substantive knowledge of the world. +
In the scientonomic workflow, the discussions concerning suggested modifications should be published once a communal consensus is reached and the respective verdict is recorded in the encyclopedia. The discussions are to be published in the journal as special commentary articles co-authored by all participants of the discussion or in special edited collections. While it might be tempting to only publish those discussions that caused significant disagreement in the community, such an approach alternative solution may inadvertently incentivize dissent and disagreement for the sake of getting published. In contrast, by publishing ''all'' discussions, we incentivize all commenting without skewing the incentive towards disagreement. +
As a distinct epistemic stance, [[Theory Pursuit|theory pursuit]] is not reducible to [[Theory Acceptance|acceptance]]. +
Q
A ''question'' is a subject or area of inquiry into which epistemic communities can investigate. They are usually given in the form of an interrogative. Questions vary in their specificity and scope, from very wide (what are the properties of the universe?) to very narrow (why are there no instances of CP-violation observed in quantum chromodynamics?). +
''Question Acceptance'' refers to one of the two stances that [[Epistemic Community|epistemic communities]] can take towards [[Question (Rawleigh-2018)|questions]], with the opposite stance being ''unacceptance''. A question is said to be accepted by an epistemic community if and only if said epistemic community takes the question to be a legitimate topic of inquiry. +
Rawleigh emphasized that the process of scientific change involves not only theories and methods but also questions.[[CiteRef::Rawleigh (2018)]] +
A question can be a subquestion of another question. A question ''Q'' is a subquestion of another question ''P'', if a direct answer to ''Q'' is also a partial answer to ''P''. +
Rawleigh argued that questions are an integral part of the process of scientific change.[[CiteRef::Rawleigh (2018)]] +
A study of the process of scientific change reveals many cases when a question that was considered legitimate in a certain time-period became illegitimate in another period. For example, the questions such as “what is the weight of phlogiston?” or “why does some matter gain mass as it loses phlogiston?” were accepted as legitimate topics of inquiry for the most part of the 18th century. Yet, once the phlogiston theory was rejected, these questions became illegitimate. Another examples is the question “what is the distance from the earth to the sphere of stars?” that was once considered legitimate by astronomers, but is no longer accepted.[[CiteRef::Rawleigh (2018)|p. 4]] +
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Pandey makes a case that the first law and all of its corollaries are tautological.[[CiteRef::Pandey (2023)]] +
Pandey makes a case that the first law and all of its corollaries are tautological.[[CiteRef::Pandey (2023)]] +
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A '''Reason''' is a theory that is potentially hypothetical, i.e. not accepted, that may serve serve, if accepted, as a [[Sufficient Reason (Palider-2019)]] for accepting another theory. For example, one may say that a double-blind trial will constitute a reason for accepting a drug's efficacy, even if the double-blind trial has not yet been done. +
The paradox of normative propositions arises from the following three premises: +
Although both the theories and methods of science have changed over history and differ across disciplines, the nothing permanent thesis is denied. Instead, the fixed and stable features of science can take the form of dynamics or laws that govern changes in science through a piecemeal approach. A theory of scientific change is possible by positing laws that describe transitions in science and its constituent elements. +
In The Laws of Scientific Change (2015), Hakob Barseghyan argues that none of the social constructivist theses preclude the possibility of a general theory of scientific change. He provides different reasons to invalidate each of the respective social constructivist theses. The general theory is that the argument from social construction does not undermine the possibility of the theory of scientific change (TSC). Barseghyan shows that each of the theses lead to bizarre implications that form threats not only to the scientonomic project but to all other disciplines that constitute descriptive propositions. +
S
The [[Scientific Mosaic|scientific mosaic]] is in a process of perpetual change. Most of the theories that we accept nowadays didn’t even exist two or three hundred years ago. Similarly, at least some of the methods that we employ in theory assessment nowadays have nothing to do with the methods employed in the 17th century. Thus, it is safe to say that the process of scientific change involves both theories and methods.[[CiteRef::Barseghyan(2015)|p.9]] Changes in the scientific mosaic can be viewed as a series of successive frames, where each frame represents a state of that mosaic at a given point of time. Obviously, such a frame would include all accepted theories and all employed methods of the time. [[CiteRef::Barseghyan(2015)|p. 9]] +
According to this definition, scientific mosaic encompasses all [[Theory Acceptance|accepted]] theories and [[Employed Method|employed]] methods.[[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)|p. 5]] The definition assumes that theories and methods are the only two fundamental entities that undergo scientific change.[[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)|pp. 5-7]] The reason the set of theories and methods is called a “mosaic” and not, say, “system” is that the elements of the mosaic may or may not be tightly adjusted; there may be considerable gaps between the elements of the mosaic. For instance, nowadays we realize that there is a considerable gap between general relativity and quantum mechanics and, yet, we do not hesitate to accept both. [[CiteRef::Barseghyan(2015)|p. 5]] +
According to this definition, scientific mosaic encompasses all accepted and employed epistemic elements. The definition is compatible with the ontology of epistemic elements that considers [[Question Is a Subtype of Epistemic Element (Rawleigh-2018)|questions]] and [[Theory Is a Subtype of Epistemic Element (Barseghyan-2015)|theories]] (including [[Method Is a Subtype of Normative Theory (Barseghyan-2018)|methods as a sub-type of normative theories]]) as the only two fundamental [[Subtypes of Epistemic Element|types of epistemic elements]]. In addition, by not referring to any epistemic element explicitly, the definition also purports to be compatible with any future ontology of epistemic elements insofar as that ontology assumes that elements can be accepted and employed. +
Rather than conceiving a scientific mosaic as a simple set-theoretic unity of epistemic elements, this definition is model-theoretic: it replaces the explicitly set-theoretic wording “set of all epistemic elements” with a semantic “model of all accepted elements”.[[CiteRef::Rawleigh (2022)|p. 91]] The definition considers a scientific mosaic to be a model for interpreting all natural language sentences, whether those be observational, theoretical, or simply ordinary conversational sentences. +
Scientific underdetermination is the thesis that the process of [[Scientific Change|scientific change]] is not deterministic, and science could have evolved differently than it did. Hypothetically, two [[Scientific Community|scientific communities]] developing separately could experience an entirely different sequence of successive states of their respective [[Scientific Mosaic|scientific mosaics.]] Even without the TSC, the implausibility of scientific determinism can be seen by considering the process of [[Theory|theory]] construction, which is outside the present scope of the TSC. Theory construction requires creative imagination, and the formulation of a given theory is therefore not inevitable. Still, underdetermination can also be inferred as a theorem from the axioms of the TSC.[[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)|pp. 196-198]] +
Sarwar and Fraser argued that in addition to other epistemic stances, there is also the stance of scientificity. Thus, epistemic agents can consider a theory scientific or unscientific regardless of whether they accept, use, or pursue it. As such, they argue, scientificity is a distinct epistemic stance.[[CiteRef::Sarwar and Fraser (2018)]] +
The key stages of the workflow are: +
'''Scientonomy''' is defined as an academic discipline that aims to describe and explain the process of [[Scientific Change|scientific change]]. While still very much in the process of inception, it is conceived to have two major branches - ''theoretical scientonomy'' and ''observational scientonomy''. Theoretical scientonomy attempts to shed light on the ontology and dynamics of the process of scientific change. Observational scientonomy attempts to trace and explain historical and contemporary instances of scientific change. +
Scientonomy currently recognizes several different [[Epistemic Stances Towards Theories|stances]] that an [[Epistemic Community|epistemic community]] might take towards a theory. The community might [[Theory Acceptance|accept]] the theory as the best currently available description of the world, it might regard a theory as worthy of [[Theory Pursuit|pursuit]] and further development, or it might regard the theory as adequate for [[Theory Use|use]] for some practical purpose, while not the best description of the world. [[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)|pp. 30-42]] These stances, and their opposites (i.e. that a theory is unaccepted, neglected, or unused)together constitute the range of stances that a community might take towards a theory. The concept of a [[Scientific Mosaic|scientific mosaic]] consisting of the set of all theories accepted, and all methods employed by the community [[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)|pp.1-11]] is central to scientonomy, as is the goal of explaining all changes… +
It is a task of scientonomy to trace and explain all changes in a mosaic, regardless of which field (discipline) the change concerns. This applies to all fields of inquiry considered scientific by the respective community. For instance, if theology or astrology were parts of the mosaic under study, then a transition from one accepted theological or astrological theory to another during that time period should be explained by scientonomy. +
Any change in a mosaic is within the scope of scientonomy. Scientonomy should explain not only ''major'' transitions in the mosaic such as those from the Aristotelian-Medieval set of theories to those of Descartes and his followers, but also relatively ''minor'' transitions, such as a transition from "the Solar system has 7 planets" to "the Solar system has 8 planets". +
Scientonomy ought not to limit its applicability to a restricted time period. If a scientific mosaic can be identified at a certain period in time, then it is a task of scientonomy to explain any and all changes in that mosaic at that time period. Similarly, an observational scientonomists ought not exclude any time period from their domain. +
The goal of [[scientonomy]] is to give a descriptive account of the process of [[Scientific Change|scientific change]]. Given this goal, it is obvious that it must describe and explain how changes in the [[Scientific Mosaic|mosaic]] of accepted scientific [[Theory|theories]] and employed [[Method|methods]] take place. Any actual instance of scientific change is the result of an appraisal. Therefore, a theory of scientific change ''must'' provide an account of how theories are actually appraised and thereby explain how changes in the mosaic occur. On the other hand, it ''can'' but is ''not required'' to account for the process of theory construction.[[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)|p. 29]] +
There are at least three sorts of questions that we might ask about the process of [[Scientific Change|scientific change]]; Historical questions having to do with what theories and methods were accepted by a particular community at a particular point in time, theoretical questions about the mechanisms of scientific change, and methodological questions about how scientific change ought to happen and what theories and methods ought to be accepted. The first two questions are descriptive in nature, and the third is normative. [[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)|pp. 12-13]] +
The [[Method|methods]] employed in [[Theory Assessment Outcomes|theory assessment]] do not always correspond to the professed scientific [[Methodology|methodology]], and may be purely implicit. Thus, a scientonomic theory ought to distinguish between accepted methodologies and employed methods. Because of their role in theory assessment, and thus in determining the contents of the [[Scientific Mosaic|scientific mosaic]], a scientonomic theory ought to include employed methods, whether they are explicit or implicit. [[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015) |pp. 52-61]] +
Scientonomy focuses on the [[Scientific Mosaic|scientific mosaic]] of accepted [[Theory|theories]] and employed [[Method|methods]]. In their daily work, individual scientists rely on and formulate theories about the object of their research, and use methods to appraise their theories. Both the theories they believe and the criteria they use to assess them may change over time. Although historians of science have often focused on individual scientists, often those deemed great, like Galileo or Einstein, and the changes in their beliefs as they constructed and assessed theories, [[Scientific Change|changes to the scientific mosaic itself]] happen at the level of the community. Scientonomy thus seeks to focus efforts on the social level of the scientific community rather than on the individual. +
Singular authority delegation is a sub-type of authority delegation. It describes a situation in which a community delegates authority over some topic to a single community. +
The definition tweaks the [[Singular Authority Delegation (Loiselle-2017)|original definition]] of the term by [[Mirka Loiselle|Loiselle]] to ensure that the relationship of singular authority delegation can obtain between [[Epistemic Agent|epistemic agents]] of all types. It also substitutes [[Question|''question'']] for ''topic'', as the former is the proper scientonomic term that should be used. +
Sociocultural factors can impact the process of a theory's acceptance when the employed method of the community allows for such factors to affect the process. This is derived by the Second Law alone. For example, a community which ascribes infallible power to a leader or a group of leaders is in a position to accept a theory in virtue of the leaders. Furthermore, such factors can guide a scientific community to reject a theory based on the acceptance of another social theory with which it is at odds. +
Split due to inconclusiveness can occur when two mutually incompatible theories are accepted simultaneously by the same community. +
A [[Procedural Method|procedural method]] is a method which doesn't presuppose any contingent propositions; it can only presuppose necessary truths such as those of mathematics or logic. Given the nature of necessary truths, it is impossible for one such truth to contradict another necessary truth since it must be true in all possible worlds. Therefore, it follows from the '''Method Rejection''' theorem that, since there can be no elements at odds with a necessary truth, any procedural method is, in principle, static. +
A more specialized [[Discipline| discipline]] ''A'' is a subdiscipline of another, more general discipline ''B'', if and only if the set of [[Question| questions]] ''Q<sub>A</sub>'' of ''A'' is a proper subset of the questions ''Q<sub>B</sub>''of ''B'' [[CiteRef::Patton and Al-Zayadi (2021)]]. For example, cellular neurobiology, the discipline which deals with the cellular properties of nerve cells, is a subdiscipline of neuroscience, which deals with the properties and functions of nervous systems. +
A [[Question| question]] is a topic of inquiry. [[CiteRef::Rawleigh (2018)]] Questions can constitute hierarchies where more specific questions are subquestions of broader questions. For example, 'Was Peter the Great an emperor of Russia?' is a subquestion of 'Who were the emperors of Russia?' since by answering the former, we are also providing a partial answer to the latter. The latter is, in turn, a subquestion of the broader question 'Who were the rulers of European countries?'. [[CiteRef::Patton and Al-Zayadi (2021)]] A partial answer to a question is a complete, or direct, answer to one of its subquestions.[[CiteRef::Beck and Sharvit (2002)]][[CiteRef::Sharvit and Beck (2001)]][[CiteRef::Eckardt (2007)]] +
A '''Sufficient Reason''' is an agent's ''actual'' reason for accepting a theory. It is sufficient as it guarantees, by the [[Sufficient Reason theorem (Palider-2019)]], that an agent accept the theory for which there is a sufficient reason. A sufficient reason aims to separate the components by which an agent accepts a theory: into acceptance of the theory that serves as a reason, the acceptance of [[Implication (Palider-2019)]], the employment of a method, and the acceptance of [[Normative Inference (Palider-2019)]]. A sufficient reason is to be contrasted with a [[Reason (Palider-2019)]] as it further involves the acceptance of the reason. Some questions surrounding acceptance without a sufficient reason remain to be explored ([[Theory Acceptance without Sufficient Reason]]). +
The '''Sufficient Reason theorem''' shows how a sufficient reason leads to acceptance. This theorem follows from the definition of a [[Sufficient Reason (Palider-2019)]] and from [[The Second Law (Patton-Overgaard-Barseghyan-2017)]]. By the second law, if a theory satisfies the acceptance criteria of the method employed at the time, it becomes accepted. The claim of this theorem is that if there is a sufficient reason for a theory, then that theory satisfies the acceptance criteria of the time. This claim is justified as follows. +
When one theory is said to follow from another, then that theory is supported by the other theory. This notion of support relies on that of [[Implication (Palider-2019)]], where support requires that one theory ''implies'' the other. Support, just like implication, is not equated to logical deduction, but just means that there is some rule-governed (or logical) connection between the supported theory and its support for the agent. As such, generally, if an agent considers one theory as evidence for another theory, then that evidence is said to support the theory, regardless of how (in)conclusive the evidence is. +
The principle of this theorem is first introduced in [[Barseghyan (2015)]]. We recall that "there are two somewhat distinct scenarios of method employment. In the first scenario, a method becomes employed when it strictly follows from newly accepted theories. In the second scenario, a method becomes employed when it implements the abstract requirements of some other employed method by means of other accepted theories. It can be shown that method rejection is only possible in the first scenario; no method can be rejected in the second scenario. Namely, it can be shown that method rejection can only take place when some other method becomes employed by strictly following from a new accepted theory; the employment of a method that is not a result of the acceptance of a new theory and is merely a new implementation of some already employed method cannot possibly lead to a method rejection."[[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)|p. 174]] +
T
There is accepted propositional technological knowledge which appears to exhibit the same patterns of change as questions, theories, and methods in the natural, social, and formal sciences. Technological theories attempting to describe the construction and operation of artifacts as well as to prescribe their correct mode of operation are not merely used, but also often accepted by epistemic agents. Since technology often involves methods different from those found in science and produces normative propositions, many of which remain tacit, one may be tempted to think that changes in technological knowledge should be somehow exempt from the laws of scientific change. Yet, the discussion of the historical cases of sorting algorithms, telescopes, crop rotation, and colorectal cancer surgeries show that technological theories and methods are often an integral part of an epistemic agent’s mosaic and seem to exhibit the same scientonomic patterns of change typical of accepted theories ther… +
The following passage from [[Barseghyan (2015)|''The Laws of Scientific Change'']] summarizes the gist of the law: +
Pandey provides the following summary of the argument: +
Formulated for [[method]]s, the first law states that the implicit expectations employed in theory assessment will continue to be employed until they are replaced by some alternate expectations. +
Pandey makes a case that the first law and all of its corollaries are tautological.[[CiteRef::Pandey (2023)]] +
Pandey makes a case that the first law and all of its corollaries are tautological.[[CiteRef::Pandey (2023)]] +
Pandey makes a case that the first law and all of its corollaries are tautological.[[CiteRef::Pandey (2023)]] +
According to this formulation of the first law for theories, an accepted [[theory]] remains accepted unless replaced by other theories, even though sometimes that replacement may simply be the negation of the theory. That is, "if for some reason scientists of a particular field stop pursuing new theories, the last accepted theory will safely continue to maintain its position in the mosaic," with no further confirmation of the theory required.[[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)|p. 122]] There is no specification of what sort of theory might replace an accepted theory. Barseghyan notes that, in the most minimal case, a theory may simply be replaced by its own negation.[[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)|p. 122]] +
Pandey makes a case that the first law and all of its corollaries are tautological.[[CiteRef::Pandey (2023)]] +
Pandey makes a case that the first law and all of its corollaries are tautological.[[CiteRef::Pandey (2023)]] +
The law of compatibility links the compatibility criteria with various assessment outcomes. If [[Compatibility|compatibility]] is defined as the ability of a pair of elements to co-exist in the same mosaic, then the assessment for compatibility is essentially the process by which the epistemic agent decides whether any given pair of elements (i.e. theories, questions, methods) can be simultaneously part of their mosaic. Such an assessment can yield three possible outcomes - ''satisfied'', ''not satisfied'', and ''inconclusive''.[[CiteRef::Fraser and Sarwar (2018)|p. 73]] Accordingly, the law of compatibility states that if a pair of elements does satisfy the compatibility criteria of the time, then it is deemed as compatible. If, however, an element is taken to be incompatible with the other one, then the pair is deemed as incompatible. Finally, the assessment of compatibility may be inconclusive. In this case, the pair may be deemed compatible, incompatible, or its status may remai… +
According to Fraser and Sarwar, their formulation of the law of compatibility "is non-tautological, as it prohibits certain logical possibilities."[[CiteRef::Fraser and Sarwar (2018)|p. 73]] +
This law of method employment is a corollary of [[The Law of Norm Employment (Rawleigh-2022)|Rawleigh's law of norm employment]]. It implies that, just like the norms of all other types, methods become employed when they are derivable from other elements of the agent's mosaic (such as other theories, other methods, and perhaps even questions). As such, the law preserves most of the content of [[The Third Law (Sebastien-2016)|Sebastien's third law]] by solving some of the issues inherent in it. +
[[The Third Law (Sebastien-2016)|Sebastien's law of method employment]] faces several problems. Foremost among these is that it is based on an outdated ontology that assumes that methods of theory evaluation are a fundamental epistemic element. After the acceptance of [[Modification:Sciento-2018-0006|Barseghyan’s proposal]] that methods be subsumed under the category of normative theories, the third law no longer exhaustively covers all situations cases of employment. In its present form it is limited to methods, though there is no reason to think that the mechanism by which a method is employed is any different than the mechanism by which any other norm is employed. +
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The ''law of theory demarcation'' tries to provide a mechanism of how the scientific status of theories changes overtime. The assessment outcomes of the law (satisfied, unsatisfied, and inconclusive) are ''logically'' separated from their consequences. In particular, the assessment outcome of conclusively satisfying the demarcation criteria leads to a theory being scientific, the assessment outcome of consclusively not satisfying the criteria lead to the theory being unscientific, and the final inconclusive outcome can lead to the theory being scientific, unscientific, or uncertain.[[CiteRef::Sarwar and Fraser (2018)]] +
[[The Law of Theory Demarcation (Sarwar-Fraser-2018)|The law of theory demarcation]] tries to provide a mechanism of how the scientific status of theories changes overtime. The assessment outcomes of the law (satisfied, unsatisfied, and inconclusive) are ''logically'' separated from their consequences. In particular, the assessment outcome of conclusively satisfying the demarcation criteria leads to a theory being scientific, the assessment outcome of conclusively not satisfying the criteria lead to the theory being unscientific, and the final inconclusive outcome can lead to the theory being scientific, unscientific, or uncertain.[[CiteRef::Sarwar and Fraser (2018)]] +
According to Barseghyan's original formulation of the second law, "theories become accepted only when they satisfy the requirements of the methods actually employed at the time. In other words there is only one way for a theory to become accepted – it must meet the implicit expectations of the scientific community".[[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)|p. 129]] +
According to Barseghyan's initial position, "the second law is not a law in the traditional sense, for normally a law is supposed to have some empirical content, i.e. its opposite should be conceivable at least in principle. Obviously, the second law is a ''tautology'', since it follows from the definition of ''employed method''".[[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)|p. 129, footnote]] +
According to this formulation of the second law, if a theory satisfies the acceptance criteria of the method actually employed at the time, then it becomes accepted into the mosaic; if it does not, it remains unaccepted; if it is inconclusive whether the theory satisfies the method, the theory can be accepted or not accepted. +
The Second Law (Patton-Overgaard-Barseghyan-2017) is Not Tautological (Patton-Overgaard-Barseghyan-2017) +
[[The Second Law (Patton-Overgaard-Barseghyan-2017)|The reformulation of the second law]] by Patton, Overgaard, and Barseghyan makes it explicit that the law is ''not'' a tautology as it clearly forbids certain logically conceivable courses of events.[[CiteRef::Patton, Overgaard, and Barseghyan (2017)|pp. 33-34]] +
Barseghyan's formulation of the third law states that a [[Method|method]] becomes [[Employed Method|employed]] only when it is deducible from other employed methods and accepted [[Theory|theories]] of the time. "Essentially," Barseghyan writes, "the third law stipulates that our accepted theories shape our employed methods".[[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)|p. 132]] +
The [[The Third Law (Barseghyan-2015)|initial formulation]] of the law, proposed by Barseghyan in [[Barseghyan (2015)|''The Laws of Scientific Change'']], stated that a [[Method|method]] becomes [[Employed Method|employed]] only when it is deducible from other employed methods and accepted theories of the time.[[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)|p.132]] In that formulation, it wasn't clear whether employed methods follow from ''all'' or only ''some'' of the accepted theories and employed methods of the time. This led to a logical paradox which this reformulation attempts to solve.[[CiteRef::Sebastien (2016)]] +
Harder's reformulation of the Zeroth Law states that “at any moment of time, the elements of the mosaic are compatible with each other”. ''Compatibility'' is a broader concept than strict logical ''consistency'', and is determined by the compatibility criteria of each mosaic. +
