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E
This definition attempts to capture what is arguably the key feature of epistemic communities - their collective intentionality to study/know the world. This feature, according to the definition, distinguishes epistemic communities from [[Non-Epistemic Community|non-epistemic communities]], such as political, economic, or familial communities. To use [[Nicholas Overgaard|Overgaard]]'s own example, "it is clear that an orchestra is a community: the various musicians can be said to have a collective intentionality to play a piece of music" and yet its collective intentionality is different from that of knowing the world.[[CiteRef::Overgaard (2017)|p. 59]] +
According to [[Nicholas Overgaard|Overgaard]], communities that do not have a collective intentionality to know the world can still have sub-communities that do have such an intentionality. Overgaard illustrates this with the example of Google, a company that can be considered a [[Non-Epistemic Community|non-epistemic community]] as its collective intentionality is that to make profit. Yet, as an innovative company, Google has many sub-communities which do have a collective intentionality to know the world, such as "a research and development team trying to better know Internet technologies, or a marketing team trying to better know how to reach consumers".[[CiteRef::Overgaard (2017)|p. 59]] By [[Epistemic Community (Overgaard-2017)|definition]], these sub-communities are [[Epistemic Community|epistemic]]. Thus, argues Overgaard, it is possible for an epistemic community to be the sub-community of a non-epistemic community. +
The claim of the existence of epistemic communities can be traced back to Overgaard, who presented the distinction between epistemic and non-epistemic communities in his [[Overgaard (2017)|''A Taxonomy for the Social Agents of Scientific Change'']].[[CiteRef::Overgaard (2017)]] +
According to Barseghyan, epistemic community is an epistemic agent, i.e. it is capable of taking [[Epistemic Stance|epistemic stances]] towards [[Epistemic Element|epistemic elements]].[[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2018)]] +
TODO: Nikki add a description +
According to Barseghyan and Levesley, questions can have epistemic presuppositions. +
Fraser and Sarwar argued that, as an epistemic stance, compatibility can be taken towards epistemic elements of all types.[[CiteRef::Fraser and Sarwar (2018)|p. 70]] +
The only stance that an epistemic agent can take towards a method is [[Employed Method|''employment'']], i.e. a method is either employed or unemployed by an agent in theory evaluation. +
In his [[Barseghyan (2018)|"Redrafting the Ontology of Scientific Change"]], Barseghyan argued that since [[Normative Theory|norms]] are a subtype of [[Theory|theory]], all the epistemic stances that can in principle be taken by an epistemic agent towards theories of all types can also be taken towards norms. In addition to these more universal stances, norms can also be [[Norm Employment|employed]], i.e. they have the capacity of constituting the actual expectations of the epistemic agent. This applies to norms of all types.[[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2018)]] +
Rawleigh argued that, just like theories, [[Question|questions]] too can be [[Question Acceptance|accepted]] or unaccepted. A question can be accepted by an agent at one period at not accepted by another. +
It is argued by Sarwar and Fraser that, in addition to the already accepted epistemic stances, the stance of ''scientificity'' can be taken towards theories.[[CiteRef::Sarwar and Fraser (2018)]] +
According to Barseghyan, acceptance as an epistemic stance can be taken towards theories.[[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)|pp. 30-32]] +
According to Barseghyan, the epistemic stance of pursuit can be taken towards theories, i.e. an epistemic agent can find a theory pursuitworthy.[[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)|pp. 30-40]] +
According to Barseghyan, the epistemic stance of use can be taken towards theories, i.e. an epistemic agent can find a theory useful.[[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)|pp. 30-40]] +
A physical object or system is an epistemic tool for an [[Epistemic Agent|epistemic agent]] ''iff'' there is a procedure by which the tool can provide an acceptable source of knowledge for answering some [[Question|question]] under the employed [[Method|method]] of that agent. Examples of epistemic tools include rulers, thermometers, the Large Hadron Collider, the Hubble Space Telescope, a written text, a computer, a blackboard and chalk, a crystal ball, etc. +
There are several different senses in which one might take the concept of scientific error. One is the absolute sense. From our modern perspective, we might judge the geocentric [[Aristotle| Aristotelean-Ptolemaic cosmology's]] claim that the earth is stationary at the center of the universe as an error [[CiteRef:: Allchin (2001)]]. +
The analysis of several several instances of scientific error by [[Sarah Machado-Marques|Machado-Marques]] and [[Paul Patton|Patton]] suggest that the handling of these instances by scientists is in accord with the theory rejection theorem. Handling of error involves, according to this view, not only a rejection of some of the propositions that are considered to be accepted erroneously but also an acceptance of some new propositions. In some cases, an erroneously accepted ''first-order'' proposition is replaced by another ''first-order'' proposition incompatible with it. In other cases, an erroneously accepted ''first-order'' proposition is replaced by a ''second-order'' proposition stating the lack of sufficient reason for accepting the first-order proposition. According to this view, the handling of erroneously accepted theories involves their replacement with other theories; the handling of scientific error is therefore in full accord with the theory rejection theorem. +
This category encompasses that knowledge which hasn't been openly formulated by the agent but can, in principle, be open formulated. As such the category is agent-relative. The definition was first suggested by [[Hakob Barseghyan]] and [[Maxim Mirkin]] in their ''[[Barseghyan and Mirkin (2019)|The Role of Technological Knowledge in Scientific Change]]''[[CiteRef::Barseghyan and Mirkin (2019)]] and was restated by Mirkin in his ''[[Mirkin (2018)|The Status of Technological Knowledge in the Scientific Mosaic]]''. +
According to this definition, knowledge is said to be ''explicit'' if it has been openly formulated by the agent in question. As such the notion of ''explicit'' is agent-relative. The definition was first suggested by [[Hakob Barseghyan]] and [[Maxim Mirkin]] in their ''[[Barseghyan and Mirkin (2019)|The Role of Technological Knowledge in Scientific Change]]''[[CiteRef::Barseghyan and Mirkin (2019)]] and was restated by Mirkin in his ''[[Mirkin (2018)|The Status of Technological Knowledge in the Scientific Mosaic]]''. +
G
Allen makes a case that while many types of epistemic actions are local, i.e. available to only ''some'' agents at ''some'' periods, there are also global epistemic actions. According to Allen, "taking a stance of acceptance (i.e., accepting) seems to be a global action, as without this epistemic action no process of scientific change seems possible". [[CiteRef::Allen (2023)|p. 79]] +
