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On September 14, 2015 at 09:50:45 UTC the two detectors of the Laser Interferometer Gravitational-Wave Observatory simultaneously observed a transient gravitational-wave signal. The signal sweeps upwards in frequency from 35 to 250 Hz with a peak gravitational-wave strain of 1.0 × 10−21. It matches the waveform predicted by general relativity for the inspiral and merger of a pair of black holes and the ringdown of the resulting single black hole. These observations demonstrate the existence of binary stellar-mass black hole systems. This is the first direct detection of gravitational waves and the first observation of a binary black hole merger. +
An account of Al-Kindi's life and philosophy. +
The paper discusses Descartes vortex theory of planetary motion, and how it fared among subsequent thinkers. +
How do scientists know—and justify—that they have erred? The question virtually
bristles with paradox. Error seems the very antithesis of knowledge. How could one justify such a "negative" discovery? Oddly perhaps, to know that a claim deemed right in one context is wrong requires justification. I focus here on this dimension of the scientific enterprise, the ascertaining of error, and its relation to the general problem of characterizing reliable knowledge. +
Scientists, philosophers and theologians have wrestled repeatedly with the question of whether knowledge is similar or different in their various understandings of the world and God. Although agreement is still elusive, the epistemology of critical realism, associated with Ian Barbour, John Polkinghorne and Arthur Peacocke, remains widely credible. Relying on the lifetime work of philosopher Ernan McMullin, this book expands our understanding of critical realism beyond a permanent stand-off between the subjective and objective, whether in science or theology. Critical realism illuminates the subject and the objectively known simultaneously. Responding to criticisms made against it, this book defends critical realism in science and theology with a specific role to play in our understanding of God. +
In a series of publications, [[Hasok Chang]] makes the case that activities carried out by epistemic agents form the basis of the scientific enterprise. This paper provides an action-based scientonomic perspective of scientific practice. I define ''epistemic action'' as an action of an epistemic agent that involves an epistemic element and highlight the difference between global and local actions. The availability of a local action to an epistemic agent amounts to the agent employing the norm that the local action is permissible/desirable. To unearth the mechanism by which local actions become available to epistemic agents, I derive ''the local action availability theorem'', according to which, a local epistemic action becomes available to an agent only when its permissibility is derivable from a non-empty subset of other elements of the agent’s mosaic, i.e., from that agent’s employed norms and accepted theories. This framework is then applied to the emergence of the local action of determining the composition of chemical substances by weighing as practiced by Lavoisier and his followers; it is shown that the respective norm became employed in accord with the local action availability theorem. +
This paper argues that the traditional scientonomic portrayal of theories of classical physics (e.g. Newtonian mechanics, thermodynamics) as merely ''used'' but no longer ''accepted'' is too simplistic. To that end, I consider the current status of the meteorological theory, which is accepted as the best available description of atmospheric phenomenon despite the fact that it is founded on the principles of classical physics, including those of Newtonian mechanics. This apparent paradox is resolved if the distinction between a theory’s ''ontology'' and its ''phenomenological'' laws is properly appreciated. The phenomenological laws of meteorology are accepted by the scientific community as the best available description of atmospheric phenomena. Yet, this acceptance does not imply that the classical ''ontology'' implicit in the current meteorological theory is also accepted. Thus, the modern meteorological theory (as well as many tenets of classical physics) can be said to be accepted as the best available description of the observable atmospheric phenomena even though its classical ontology is no longer accepted. +
To many, Aristotle is the last great fi gure in the distinguished philosophical tradition
of Greece that is thought to begin with Thales (ca. 600 BCE). Of course, Greek philosophy
did not end with Aristotle; it continued for several centuries in the various schools –
those of the Epicureans, Skeptics, and Stoics as well as Plato’s Academy and Aristotle’s
own Peripatetic School – that fl ourished in Athens and elsewhere up to the early centuries
of the Byzantine Empire. Yet there is considerable truth in the opinion of the
many, if viewed as a claim about great individual fi gures in the Greek philosophical
tradition. For Aristotle was the last great individual philosopher of ancient times, one
of the three thinkers – the others being Socrates (470–399 BCE) and Plato (427–347
BCE) – that comprise what many consider to be the greatest philosophical trio of all time.
Their philosophical careers span more than a hundred years, and all three were major
fi gures in the lively philosophical scene of fi fth- and fourth-century Athens. It was a
unique moment in the history of philosophy, one that saw Socrates engaging in discussions
with Plato – by far the most distinguished of his followers – and Plato instructing
and debating with Aristotle – by far the most eminent student to graduate from and do
research in his own school, the Academy. +
The present volume does not provide a survey of all of Aristotle’s thought, and it was
not intended to do so. Its aim is to treat some central topics of his philosophy in as much
depth as is possible within the space of a short chapter. Ancient and later biographers
and historians of philosophy attribute to Aristotle a large number of works, two-thirds
of which have not survived. Even what has survived is an astounding achievement,
both in its size and scope. Aristotle’s extant works add up to more than two thousand
printed pages and range over an astonishingly large number of topics – from the highly
abstract problems of being, substance, essence, form, and matter to those relating solely
to the natural world, and especially to living things (e.g., nutrition and the other
faculties of the soul, generation, sleep, memory, dreaming, movement, and so on),
the human good and excellences, the political association and types of constitutions,
rhetoric, tragedy, and so on.
Clearly, not all the topics Aristotle examines in his works could be discussed in a
single volume, and choices had to be made as to which ones to include. The choices
were guided by an intuitive consideration – e.g., the centrality a topic has in the totality
of the Aristotelian corpus (e.g., substance, essence, cause, teleology) or in a single,
major work (e.g., the categories, the soul, and the generation of animals are the central
topics in three different Aristotelian treatises). These considerations produced a first list.
Still, the list was too long for a single volume, and had to be shortened. The topics that
made the final list seemed to the editor to be the ones that any volume with the objectives
of this one has to include. Others might have come up with different lists, but they
would not be radically different from this. The overwhelming majority of the topics
discussed below would be on every list that was aiming to achieve the objectives of this
volume. Individually, each one of these topics receives an extensive treatment in
Aristotle’s works, and the views he articulates on them, when put together, give a good
sense of the kinds of problems that exercised Aristotle’s mind and the immense and
lasting contributions he made in his investigations of them.
The contents of the volume are divided into five parts, with part I covering Aristotle’s
life and certain issues about the number, edition, and chronology of his works. The
division of the remaining chapters is based on the way Aristotle frequently characterizes
groups of inquiries in terms of their goals. Thus, part II consists of a number of
chapters discussing topics from the treatises that have been traditionally called Organon,i.e., those studying the instruments or tools for reasoning, demonstrating and, in
general, attaining knowledge and truth. Aristotle does not label these works (Categories,
On Interpretation, Prior Analytics, Posterior Analytics, Topics, On Sophistical Refutations)
Organon, but in several passages in his extant works he indicates that he views them
as the instruments of inquiry and knowledge. The division of the remaining chapters
into three parts – Theoretical, Practical, and Productive Knowledge – is, of course,
based on the way Aristotle himself frequently divides the various inquiries on the basis
of their ultimate goals – knowledge, action, and production. The chapters included in
each one of these parts are further subdivided into groups on the basis of the subfield
of Aristotelian philosophy to which a topic or the work(s) treating it belong – Metaphysics
(seven chapters), Physics (three), Psychology (three), Biology (three) in part III (theoretical
knowledge); Ethics (eight) and Politics (five) in part IV (practical knowledge);
and Rhetoric (two) and Art (two) in part V (productive knowledge). Of course, several
topics (e.g., cause, teleology, substance) are discussed in many different Aristotelian
treatises, with some of them falling into different groups with respect to their ultimate
goals – e.g., substance is explored in both the Categories (Organon) and the Metaphysics
(theoretical knowledge).
The contributors to the volume are many, and no attempt was made to impose a
uniform style with respect to writing, presentation, or argumentation. Each contributor
was left free to use her/his favoured approach, except in the way references to Aristotle’s
works or citations of specific passages in them are made – a uniform system has been
adopted. Although in some instances the whole title of a work (e.g., Politics) is given,
most frequently an abbreviation is used (e.g., Pol: see list of abbreviations). Citations of
passages in the Aristotelian corpus are made by giving: (1) the title of the specific work,
(e.g., Pol or An for de Anima); (2) the Book for those Aristotelian treatises that are divided
into Books in Roman numerals (e.g., I, II) – except for Met where Books are identified
by uppercase Greek letters (e.g., Γ, Θ) and lowercase alpha (α) for the second Book; (3)
the chapter within the Book or treatise in Arabic numerals; (4) and the Bekker page
and line number – e.g., An II.1 412a3, or Met Γ.4 1008b15. Each chapter includes a
short bibliography listing the sources cited in it and in some cases additional works on
the topic discussed that might be of interest to the reader. Space limitations did not
permit the inclusion of a comprehensive bibliography on Aristotle.
Preparing this homage to David Keyt has been a labor of love for the editors and contributors alike. The volume contains fifteen essays by sixteen scholars including students, colleagues, and friends (the latter category being all inclusive!). All of the authors make important original contributions to the study of ancient Greek philosophy, and we wish to thank them all for agreeing to participate in this project, for their cooperation with the editing, and for the high quality of their essays. We are also grateful for their patience and good cheer throughout an unexpectedly protracted publication process. T he papers by Gerasimos Santas, Nils Rauhut, Mark McPherran, Charles Young, and Fred D. Miller, Jr. were delivered originally at a conference (aka “the Keytfest”) held at the University of Washington in Seattle in 2007 commemorating David Keyt’s fi ftieth year as a professor of philosophy. Kenneth Clatterbaugh, Chair of the Department of Philosophy at the University of Washington, was very supportive of the program, and Bev Wessel provided valuable administrative assistance. Daniel Fisher, a student of David Keyt, offered generous fi nancial support. Richard Parker, another former student, served as quipster and consummate master of ceremonies. W e are pleased to thank a number of people who have been very helpful with the editing and publication of this volume including Professor Stephen Hetherington, the editor of Springer’s Philosophical Studies Series; Ingrid van Laarhoven; Christi Lue; Ties Nijssen; Hendrikje Tuerlings; Professor Nicholas D. Smith, who helped to fi nd a suitable publisher for the volume; and an anonymous reviewer who provided helpful comments. James Dabgotra ably assisted with the fi rst round of editing, and Pamela Phillips did an excellent job copyediting the entire typescript and preparing it for the publisher. We also gratefully acknowledge financial support from the Social Philosophy and Policy Foundation for the original conference and for the editing of the volume. Finally, we thank David Keyt for his assistance throughout the planning and preparation of the volume and especially for his willingness to contribute a fascinating memoir of his academic career which, in addition to delightful anecdotes about his encounters with notable scholars, offers illuminating insights into his own work and also into the recent history of the subdiscipline of ancient philosophy. With affection and admiration, we the editors and all the contributors dedicate this volume to David Keyt, in recognition of his major contributions to the study of ancient philosophy, and on behalf of the many students, colleagues, and friends whose lives he has touched and enriched over the past half century.
This Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy article provides an historical overview of philosophical conceptions of the methods of science. The first section covers scientific methods, focusing on avowed methodologies prior to the twentieth century, from Plato and Aristotle to William Whewell and John Stuart Mill Mostly avowed methodologies are discussed. The logical positivists and their critics are then covered, including Popper's falsificationism. +
The Modes of Scepticism is one of the most important and influential of all ancient philosophical texts. The texts made an enormous impact on Western thought when they were rediscovered in the 16th century and they have shaped the whole future course of Western philosophy. Despite their importance, the Modes have been little discussed in recent times. This book translates the texts and supplies them with a discursive commentary, concentrating on philosophical issues but also including historical material. The book will be of interest to professional scholars and philosophers but its clear and non-technical style makes it intelligible to beginners and the interested layman. +
Peter Anstey presents a thorough and innovative study of John Locke's views on the method and content of natural philosophy. Focusing on Locke's Essay concerning Human Understanding, but also drawing extensively from his other writings and manuscript remains, Anstey argues that Locke was an advocate of the Experimental Philosophy: the new approach to natural philosophy championed by Robert Boyle and the early Royal Society who were opposed to speculative philosophy. On the question of method, Anstey shows how Locke's pessimism about the prospects for a demonstrative science of nature led him, in the Essay, to promote Francis Bacon's method of natural history, and to downplay the value of hypotheses and analogical reasoning in science. But, according to Anstey, Locke never abandoned the ideal of a demonstrative natural philosophy, for he believed that if we could discover the primary qualities of the tiny corpuscles that constitute material bodies, we could then establish a kind of corpuscular metric that would allow us a genuine science of nature. It was only after the publication of the Essay, however, that Locke came to realize that Newton's Principia provided a model for the role of demonstrative reasoning in science based on principles established upon observation, and this led him to make significant revisions to his views in the 1690s. On the content of Locke's natural philosophy, it is argued that even though Locke adhered to the Experimental Philosophy, he was not averse to speculation about the corpuscular nature of matter. Anstey takes us into new terrain and new interpretations of Locke's thought in his explorations of his mercurialist transmutational chymistry, his theory of generation by seminal principles, and his conventionalism about species. +
Both a history and a metahistory, Representing Electrons focuses on the development of various theoretical representations of electrons from the late 1890s to 1925 and the methodological problems associated with writing about unobservable scientific entities.
Using the electron - or rather its representation - as a historical actor, Theodore Arabatzis illustrates the emergence and gradual consolidation of its representation in physics, its career throughout old quantum theory, and its appropriation and reinterpretation by chemists. As Arabatzis develops this novel biographical approach, he portrays scientific representations as partly autonomous agents with lives of their own. Furthermore, he argues that the considerable variance in the representation of the electron does not undermine its stable identity or existence.
Raising philosophical issues of contentious debate in the history and philosophy of science -
namely, scientific realism and meaning change - Arabatzis addresses the history of the electron across disciplines, integrating historical narrative with philosophical analysis in a book that will be a touchstone for historians and philosophers of science and scientists alike. +
This special issue presents selected contributions to the conference “Integrated History and Philosophy of Science” (&HPS3) held at Indiana University in September 2010. The introduction revisits a previous special issue on History and Philosophy of Science, published in Perspectives on Science (2002), and reflects on the recent development of HPS as a field. Ten years ago, scholars expressed concern about the growing distance between mainstream history of science and mainstream philosophy of science. Today, we have good reason to be optimistic. The papers assembled in this special issue demonstrate that we now have a whole spectrum of combinations of historical, philosophical, and other perspectives to study science, ranging from augmenting historical studies by philosophical perspectives and vice versa to historicist reflection on methodological, epistemological, or scientific concepts and practices. This plurality of approaches to combining the historical and the philosophical perspectives on science is a hopeful sign that integrated HPS is here to stay. +
Some philosophers of science suggest that philosophical assumptions must
influence historical scholarship, because history (like science) has no neutral data and
because the treatment of any particular historical episode is going to be influenced to
some degree by one's prior philosophical conceptions of what is important in science.
However, if the history of science must be laden with philosophical assumptions, then how
can the history of science be evidence for the philosophy of science? Would not an
inductivist history of science confirm an inductivist philosophy of science and a
conventionalist history of science confirm a conventionalist philosophy of science? I
attempt to resolve this problem; essentially, I deny the claim that the history of science
must be influenced by one's conception of what is important in science - one's general
philosophy of science. To accomplish the task I look at a specific historical episode,
together with its history, and draw some metamethodological conclusions from it. The
specific historical episode I examine is Descartes' critique of Galileo's scientific methodology. +
The Oxford Translation of Aristotle was originally published in 12 volumes between 1912 and 1954. It is universally recognized as the standard English version of Aristotle. This revised edition contains the substance of the original Translation, slightly emended in light of recent scholarship; three of the original versions have been replaced by new translations; and a new and enlarged selection of Fragments has been added. The aim of the translation remains the same: to make the surviving works of Aristotle readily accessible to English speaking readers. +
William Paley (Natural Theology, 1802) developed the argument-from-design. The complex structure of the human eye evinces that it was designed by an intelligent Creator. The argument is based on the irreducible complexity (“relation”) of multiple interacting parts, all necessary for function. Paley adduces a wealth of biological examples leading to the same conclusion; his knowledge of the biology of his time was profound and extensive. Charles Darwin’s ''Origin of Species'' is an extended argument demonstrating that the “design” of organisms can be explained by natural selection. Moreover, the dysfunctions, defects, waste, and cruelty that prevail in the living world are incompatible with a benevolent and omnipotent Creator. They come about by a process that incorporates chance and necessity, mutation and natural selection. In addition to science, there are other ways of knowing, such as art, literature, philosophy, and religion. Matters of value, meaning, and purpose transcend science. +
B
This article argues that the limited influence of Ludwik Fleck's ideas on philosophy of science is due not only to their indirect dissemination by way of Thomas Kuhn, but also to an incommensurability between the standard conceptual framework of history and philosophy of science and Fleck's own more integratedly historico-social and praxis-oriented approach to understanding the evolution of scientific discovery. What Kuhn named "paradigm" offers a periphrastic rendering or oblique translation of Fleck's Denkstil/Denkkollektiv , a derivation that may also account for the lability of the term "paradigm". This was due not to Kuhn's unwillingness to credit Fleck but rather to the cold war political circumstances surrounding the writing of The Structure of Scientific Revolutions . Following a discussion of Fleck's anatomical allusions, I include a brief discussion of Aristotle (on menstruation and darkened mirrors) and conclude with a reference to the productivity of error in Mach and Nietzsche. +
An authoritative critical edition, based on fresh collation of the seventeenth century texts and documented in an extensive textual apparatus, of Francis Bacon's The Advancement of Learning, the principal philosophical work in English announcing his comprehensive programme to restore and advance learning +
