Search by property

This page provides a simple browsing interface for finding entities described by a property and a named value. Other available search interfaces include the page property search, and the ask query builder.

List of results

• Giere (2002)  + (After introducing several different approa … After introducing several different approaches to distributed cognition, I consider the application of these ideas to modern science, especially the role of instrumentation and visual representations in science. I then examine several apparent difficulties with taking distributed cognition seriously. After arguing that these difficulties are only apparent, I note the ease with which distributed cognition accommodates normative concerns. I also present an example showing that understanding cognition as</br>distributed bridges the often perceived gap between cognitive and social theories of science. The paper concludes by suggesting some implications for the history of science and for the cognitive study of science in general.the cognitive study of science in general.)
• Baigrie (2007)  + (All students of physics need to understand … All students of physics need to understand the basic concepts of electricity and magnetism. E&M is central to the study of physics, and central to understanding the developments of the last two hundred years of not just science, but technology and society in general. But the core of electricity and magnetism can be difficult to understand - many of the ideas are counterintuitive and difficult to appreciate. This volume in the Greenwood Guides to Great Ideas in Science series traces the central concepts of electricity and magnetism from the ancient past to the present day, enabling students to develop a deeper understanding of how the science arose as it has.erstanding of how the science arose as it has.)
• Frangsmyr (1974)  + (Although Sweden is a small country, in the eighteenth century it enjoyed notable scientific prosperity, with a number of internationally esteemed figures. This paper attempts to reconstruct Swedish science during that period.)
• Des Chene (2001)  + (Although the basis of modern biology is Ca … Although the basis of modern biology is Cartesian, Descartes's theories of biology have been more often ridiculed than studied. Yet, Dennis Des Chene demonstrates, the themes, arguments, and vocabulary of his mechanistic biology pervade the writings of many seventeenth-century authors. In his illuminating account of Cartesian physiology in its historical context, Des Chene focuses on the philosopher's innovative reworking of that field, including the nature of life, the problem of generation, and the concepts of health and illness. Des Chene begins by surveying works that Descartes would likely have encountered, from late Aristotelian theories of the soul to medical literature and treatises on machines. The Cartesian theory of vital operations is examined with particular attention to the generation of animals. Des Chene also considers the role of the machine-model in furnishing a method in physiology, the ambiguities of the notion of machine, and of Descartes's problem of simulation. Finally, he looks at the various kinds of unity of the body, both in itself and in its union with the soul. Spirits and Clocks continues Des Chene's highly regarded exploration―begun in his previous book, Life's Form―of the scholastic and Cartesian sciences as well as the dialogue between these two worldviews.the dialogue between these two worldviews.)
• Overgaard (2017)  + (Although we accept that a scientific mosai … Although we accept that a scientific mosaic is a set of theories and methods accepted and employed by a scientific community, ''scientific community'' currently lacks a proper definition in scientonomy. In this paper, I will outline a basic taxonomy for the bearers of a mosaic, i.e. the social agents of scientific change. I begin by differentiating between ''accidental group'' and ''community'' through the respective absence and presence of a collective intentionality. I then identify two subtypes of community: the ''epistemic community'' that has a collective intentionality to know the world, and the ''non-epistemic community'' that does not have such a collective intentionality. I note that both epistemic and non-epistemic communities might bear mosaics, but that epistemic communities are the intended social agents of scientific change because their main collective intentionality is to know the world and, in effect, to change their mosaics. I conclude my paper by arguing we are not currently in a position to properly define ''scientific community'' per se because of the risk of confusing ''pseudoscientific communities'' with scientific communities. However, I propose that we can for now rely on the definition of epistemic community as the proper social agent of scientific change. proper social agent of scientific change.)
• Giere and Moffatt (2003)  + (Among the many contested boundaries in sci … Among the many contested boundaries in science studies is that between</br>the cognitive and the social. Here, we are concerned to question this boundary from a perspective within the cognitive sciences based on the notion of distributed cognition. We first present two of many contemporary sources of the notion of distributed cognition, one from the study of artificial neural networks and one from cognitive anthropology. We then proceed to reinterpret two well-known essays by Bruno Latour, ‘Visualization and Cognition: Thinking with Eyes and Hands’ and ‘Circulating Reference: Sampling the Soil in the Amazon Forest’. In both cases we find the cognitive and the social merged in a system of distributed cognition without any appeal to agonistic encounters. For us, results do not come to be regarded as veridical because they are widely accepted; they come to be widely accepted because, in the context of an appropriate distributed cognitive system, their apparent veracity can be made evident to anyone with the capacity to understand the workings of the system. to understand the workings of the system.)
• Hume (2008)  + (An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding … An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding is a book by the Scottish empiricist philosopher David Hume, published in English in 1748.[1] It was a revision of an earlier effort, Hume's A Treatise of Human Nature, published anonymously in London in 1739–40. Hume was disappointed with the reception of the Treatise, which "fell dead-born from the press,"[2] as he put it, and so tried again to disseminate his more developed ideas to the public by writing a shorter and more polemical work. The end product of his labours was the Enquiry. The Enquiry dispensed with much of the material from the Treatise, in favor of clarifying and emphasizing its most important aspects. For example, Hume's views on personal identity do not appear. However, more vital propositions, such as Hume's argument for the role of habit in a theory of knowledge, are retained.it in a theory of knowledge, are retained.)

• Adamson (2015)  + (An account of Al-Kindi's life and philosophy.)

• Bird (2000)  + (An analysis of the work and legacy of Thomas Kuhn.)
• Coady (1994)  + (An argument for the central importance of testimony in establishing, and transmitting, scientific knowledge.)
• Franklin (1993)  + (An article in the January 8, 1986 issue of … An article in the January 8, 1986 issue of The New York Times dramatically announced, "Hints of Fifth Force in Nature Challenge Galileo's Findings". Just four years later, many of those who had worked on the concept concluded that "the Fifth Force is dead". Reading like a detective story, The Rise and Fall of the Fifth Force discloses the curious history of the quick advance and swift demise of the "Fifth Force" - a proposed modification of Newton's Law of Universal Gravitation and one of the most publicized physics hypotheses in recent memory. While discussing the origin and fate of this short-lived concept, The Rise and Fall of the Fifth Force delivers a fascinating analysis of the ways in which scientific hypotheses in general are promulgated and pursued. What leads to the formulation of a hypothesis? How and why does a hypothesis become considered worthy of further investigation? These are some of the questions that The Rise and Fall of the Fifth Force pursues while unraveling the dynamics of this scientific search. Taking aim at the "social constructivist" view of science, which posits social and professional interests as the primary engine behind hypothesis-making, Allan Franklin proposes an "evidence model" of science. He emphasizes the crucial role that experimental evidence plays in the discovery, pursuit, and justification of scientific proposals and suggests a distinction between the reasons for scientific pursuit and the reasons used to justify hypotheses. Buttressing Franklin's model, The Rise and Fall of the Fifth Force provides a unique comparison of the published record and the private e-mail correspondence of the three major authors of the Fifth Force hypothesis during the first six months following the publication of their proposal. A fascinating inquiry into a scientific hypothesis and the forces that first advanced and then rejected it, The Rise and Fall of the Fifth Force is an outstanding account for physicists, historians and philosophers of science, and all readers interested in what makes science tick.ers interested in what makes science tick.)
• Bacon (1920)  + (An authoritative critical edition, based o … An authoritative critical edition, based on fresh collation of the seventeenth century texts and documented in an extensive textual apparatus, of Francis Bacon's The Advancement of Learning, the principal philosophical work in English announcing his comprehensive programme to restore and advance learning programme to restore and advance learning)
• Williams (2002)  + (An examination of the ethics of knowing.)
• Porter (1995)  + (An examination of the use of numbers to create trust in expert testimony.)
• Wimsatt (2007)  + (Analytic philosophers once pantomimed phys … Analytic philosophers once pantomimed physics: they tried to understand the world by breaking it down into the smallest possible bits. Thinkers from the Darwinian sciences now pose alternatives to this simplistic reductionism.</br></br>In this intellectual tour--essays spanning thirty years--William Wimsatt argues that scientists seek to atomize phenomena only when necessary in the search to understand how entities, events, and processes articulate at different levels. Evolution forms the natural world not as Laplace's all-seeing demon but as a backwoods mechanic fixing and re-fashioning machines out of whatever is at hand. W. V. Quine's lost search for a "desert ontology" leads instead to Wimsatt's walk through a tropical rain forest.</br></br>This book offers a philosophy for error-prone humans trying to understand messy systems in the real world. Against eliminative reductionism, Wimsatt pits new perspectives to deal with emerging natural and social complexities. He argues that our philosophy should be rooted in heuristics and models that work in practice, not only in principle. He demonstrates how to do this with an analysis of the strengths, the limits, and a recalibration of our reductionistic and analytic methodologies. Our aims are changed and our philosophy is transfigured in the process.philosophy is transfigured in the process.)
• Chang (2022)  + (Any database project needs to be based on … Any database project needs to be based on an ontology that is suitable for its subject matter. For the scientonomy project, it is important to conceive a good ontology of the human actions that constitute scientific practice, which allows rigorously conceived activity-based analyses of science. Mainstream philosophers of science have offered very precise analyses of scientific knowledge, but only in terms of beliefs and their assessments. Recent historians of science have been more attentive to the activities undertaken by scientists, but only offered imprecise analyses of them. Scientonomers have a chance to get the ontology right from this early stage of their enterprise. In this paper I make some programmatic proposals on the ontology of scientific work, in terms of epistemic activities and systems of practice. I also offer a framework for conceptualizing epistemic agents, and some clues on the ontology of the processes of inquiry. Scientonomy as the general “science of science” should not have an overly limited ontology. In particular, I suggest that the “scientific mosaic” should include a diverse array of elements and consider other aspects of methodology in addition to theory-assessment.hodology in addition to theory-assessment.)
• Popper (1959)  + (Arguing the shortcomings of inductive reasoning and verification, Popper instead argues for a hypothetico-deductive methodology for science based on falsifiability.)
• Shields (2016b)  + (Aristotle (384–322 BC) was born in Macedon … Aristotle (384–322 BC) was born in Macedon, in what is now northern Greece, but spent most of his adult life in Athens. His life in Athens divides into two periods, first as a member of Plato’s Academy (367–347) and later as director of his own school, the Lyceum (334–323). The intervening years were spent mainly in Assos and Lesbos, and briefly back in Macedon. His years away from Athens were predominantly taken up with biological research and writing. Judged on the basis of their content, Aristotle’s most important psychological writings probably belong to his second residence in Athens, and so to his most mature period. His principal work in psychology, De Anima, reflects in different ways his pervasive interest in biological taxonomy and his most sophisticated physical and metaphysical theory.sticated physical and metaphysical theory.)
• Miller (2013)  + (Aristotle is “the master of them that know … Aristotle is “the master of them that know” in Dante’s ''Divine Comedy'' (I.4.31). His ''Metaphysics'' begins with the stirring declaration that “All men by nature desire to know” (A.1 980a21). As Werner Jaeger ( 1962, p. 68) observes, “Knowledge has never been understood more purely, more earnestly, or more sublimely.” Aristotle agrees with Plato that knowledge is superior to belief: “He who has beliefs is, in comparison with the man who knows, not in a healthy state as far as the truth is concerned” (Met Γ.4 1008b27-31; cf. Plato Rep. VI 508d4-9). Aristotle’s remarks concerning belief are scattered throughout his works, none of which contains a systematic discussion of this topic. Not surprisingly, commentators have tended to give his account of belief short shrift.o give his account of belief short shrift.)
• McMullin (2001)  + (As the seventeenth century progressed, the … As the seventeenth century progressed, there was a growing realization among those who reflected on the kind of knowledge the new sciences could afford (among them Kepler, Bacon, Descartes, Boyle, Huygens) that hypothesis would have to be conceded a much more significant place in natural philosophy than the earlier ideal of demon- stration allowed. Then came the mechanics of Newton's Principia, which seemed to manage quite well without appealing to hypothesis (though much would depend on how exactly terms like "force" and "attraction" were construed). If the science of motion could dispense with causal hypothesis and the attendant uncertainty, why should this not serve as the goal of natural philosophy generally? The apparent absence of causal hypothesis from the highly successful new science of motion went far towards shaping, in different ways, the account of scientific knowledge given by many of the philosophers of the century following, notable among them Berkeley, Hume, Reid, and Kant. This "Newtonian" interlude in the history of the philosophy of science would today be accounted on the whole a byway. The Principia, despite its enormous achievement in shaping subsequent work in mechanics, was from the beginning too idiosyncratic from an epistemic standpoint to serve as model for the natural sciences generally. model for the natural sciences generally.)
• Faye (2014)  + (As the theory of the atom, quantum mechani … As the theory of the atom, quantum mechanics is perhaps the most successful theory in the history of science. It enables physicists, chemists, and technicians to calculate and predict the outcome of a vast number of experiments and to create new and advanced technology based on the insight into the behavior of atomic objects. But it is also a theory that challenges our imagination. It seems to violate some fundamental principles of classical physics, principles that eventually have become a part of western common sense since the rise of the modern worldview in the Renaissance. The aim of any metaphysical interpretation of quantum mechanics is to account for these violations.</br>The Copenhagen interpretation was the first general attempt to understand the world of atoms as this is represented by quantum mechanics. The founding father was mainly the Danish physicist Niels Bohr, but also Werner Heisenberg, Max Born and other physicists made important contributions to the overall understanding of the atomic world that is associated with the name of the capital of Denmark.</br>In fact Bohr and Heisenberg never totally agreed on how to understand the mathematical formalism of quantum mechanics, and neither of them ever used the term “the Copenhagen interpretation” as a joint name for their ideas. In fact, Bohr once distanced himself from what he considered to be Heisenberg's more subjective interpretation (APHK, p.51). The term is rather a label introduced by people opposing Bohr's idea of complementarity, to identify what they saw as the common features behind the Bohr-Heisenberg interpretation as it emerged in the late 1920s. Today the Copenhagen interpretation is mostly regarded as synonymous with indeterminism, Bohr's correspondence principle, Born's statistical interpretation of the wave function, and Bohr's complementarity interpretation of certain atomic phenomena.nterpretation of certain atomic phenomena.)
• Bacon (2000d)  + (Bacon’s essays reflect the experience and … Bacon’s essays reflect the experience and wide reading of a Renaissance man – philosopher, historian, judge, politician, adviser to the Prince – above all, astute observer of human nature. With uncompromising candour, he exposes man as he is, not as he ought to be, examining such givens of Renaissance power as negotiating for position, expediting a personal suit, speaking effectively, and the role of dissimulation in social and political situations. He scrutinizes judicial prerogatives and probes the causes and dangers of atheism and superstition. Even such topics as boldness or love or deformity have a practical bent. In Bacon’s own phrase, these essays ‘come home to Mens Businesse and Bosomes.’ It is especially through their matchless style that they come home–with imaginative vigour, concrete language, and the colloquial force of individual sentences. An introduction places the essays in their original context, examines their evolution over Bacon’s lifetime, and elucidates their form and prose style; a commentary examines his sources and relates essays to his other writings; a glossary and index are also included.s; a glossary and index are also included.)
• Latour (2009)  + (Belief is not a state of mind, but a resul … Belief is not a state of mind, but a result of the relationships between peoples; this has been known since Montaigne. The visitor knows, the visited believes; or quite the opposite, the visitor knew, the visited makes him understand that he only thought he knew. Let us apply this principle to the case of the Moderns. Everywhere they drop anchor they soon put up fetishes, that is to say that in all the peoples they encounter, they see worshippers of objects that are nothing. Since of course the Moderns have to explain away the strangeness of a worship that cannot be justified objectively, they endow the savages with a mental state that has internal instead of external references. As the wave of colonization advances, so does the world fill with believers. He who is modern believes what others believe. On the contrary, the agnostic does not ask himself whether to believe or not, but why the Moderns need belief so much before they can have a relationship with others. they can have a relationship with others.)
• Clark (2017)  + (Biological brains are increasingly cast as … Biological brains are increasingly cast as ‘prediction machines’: evolved organs</br>whose core operating principle is to learn about the world by trying to predict their</br>own patterns of sensory stimulation. This, some argue, should lead us to embrace</br>a brain-bound ‘neurocentric’ vision of the mind. The mind, such views suggest,</br>consists entirely in the skull-bound activity of the predictive brain. In this paper I</br>reject the inference from predictive brains to skull-bound minds. Predictive brains,</br>I hope to show, can be apt participants in larger cognitive circuits. The path is</br>thus cleared for a new synthesis in which predictive brains act as entry-points for</br>‘extended minds’, and embodiment and action contribute constitutively to knowing</br>contact with the world.utively to knowing contact with the world.)
• Arabatzis (2006)  + (Both a history and a metahistory, Represen … Both a history and a metahistory, Representing Electrons focuses on the development of various theoretical representations of electrons from the late 1890s to 1925 and the methodological problems associated with writing about unobservable scientific entities.</br></br>Using the electron - or rather its representation - as a historical actor, Theodore Arabatzis illustrates the emergence and gradual consolidation of its representation in physics, its career throughout old quantum theory, and its appropriation and reinterpretation by chemists. As Arabatzis develops this novel biographical approach, he portrays scientific representations as partly autonomous agents with lives of their own. Furthermore, he argues that the considerable variance in the representation of the electron does not undermine its stable identity or existence.</br></br>Raising philosophical issues of contentious debate in the history and philosophy of science -</br> namely, scientific realism and meaning change - Arabatzis addresses the history of the electron across disciplines, integrating historical narrative with philosophical analysis in a book that will be a touchstone for historians and philosophers of science and scientists alike.losophers of science and scientists alike.)
• Bloor (1999)  + (Bruno Latour is a vehement critic of the s … Bruno Latour is a vehement critic of the sociology of knowledge in general, and the Strong Program in particular. For those who are familiar with his books Science in Action (Latour, 1987), The Pasteurization of France (Latour, 1988) and We Have Never Been Modern (Latour, 1993) the pivotal role played by these criticisms in Latour's writing will be evident. To those who only know his work by repute, or who have only read the first edition of Latour and Woolgar's Laboratory Life (Latour and Woolgar, 1979), presenting him as a critic of the sociology of knowledge may seem surprising. Latour's work and the Strong Program in the sociology of knowledge are frequently classed together under the label of ‘social constructivism', and this creates the impression that the two enterprises must be fundamentally similar. This is reinforced by the fact that Latour wants to go further than sociologists of knowledge, whose work is said to represent something of a half-way house. He thinks sociologists are insufficiently radical in their critique of science (Latour, 1992, p. 273). Nevertheless, in reality, the two approaches are deeply opposed. In Latour's eyes the sociology of knowledge has been a failure, and it will continue to fail unless it adopts an entirely new approach which will qualitatively change its characterch will qualitatively change its character)
• Owen (2009)  + (By the time Hume started to work on his Tr … By the time Hume started to work on his Treatise, the notion of an idea as the primary, most general sort of mental item dominated European philosophy. Although Descartes noted that, strictly speaking, only those “thoughts that are as it were images of things” were appropriately described as ideas, in practice he used “the word ‘idea’ to refer to whatever is immediately perceived by the mind.” Not only do we have ideas of trees and the sun, but we also have ideas of our own activities of thinking and willing. Locke characterizes “idea” as “being that Term, which, I think, serves best to stand for whatsoever is the Object of the Understanding when a Man thinks.” Locke also thinks that we not only have ideas that derive from things or objects in the world (ideas of sensation), but also of the activities and operations of our own minds (ideas of reflection). Ideas of sensation are acquired through the operation of external objects on our sense organs, while ideas of reflection come from introspection, from thinking about what happens within our own minds. He also thinks that these ideas of reflection are of two basic sorts of mental activity, perception and willing, that correspond to two faculties of mind: the understanding (or the power of thinking) and the will (or the power of volition).) and the will (or the power of volition).)
• List and Pettit (2006)  + (Can groups be rationa’l agents over and ab … Can groups be rationa’l agents over and above their individual</br>members? We argue that group agents are distinguished by their</br>capacity to mimic the way in which individual agents act and that this</br>capacity must “supervene” on the group members’ contributions. But</br>what is the nature of this supervenience relation? Focusing on group</br>judgments, we argue that, for a group to be rational, its judgment on a</br>particular proposition cannot generally be a function of the members’</br>individual judgments on that proposition. Rather, it must be a function</br>of their individual sets of judgments across many propositions. So</br>knowing what the group members individually think about some</br>proposition does not generally tell us how the group collectively</br>adjudicates that proposition: the supervenience relation must be “setwise,”</br>not “proposition-wise.” Our account preserves the individualistic</br>view that group agency is nothing mysterious but also suggests that a</br>group agent may hold judgments that are not directly continuous with</br>its members’ corresponding individual judgments.mbers’ corresponding individual judgments.)
• Barseghyan (2022b)  + (Canonical discussions in the philosophy of … Canonical discussions in the philosophy of science distinguish between acceptance and pursuit as epistemic stances that are customarily taken towards theories by epistemic agents (Laudan 1977; Wykstra 1980; Whitt 1990; Achinstein 1993; Barseghyan & Shaw 2017). Since a theory can be conceived as an attempt to answer a question (Jardine 2000; Rescher 2000; Rawleigh 2018) it is reasonable to inquire into the types of stances that epistemic agents can take towards questions. This paper explores the notion of ''question pursuit'' by differentiating it from related epistemic stances of ''theory pursuit'' and ''question acceptance''. The analysis of the extant academic literature reveals that in most cases the phrase ‘question pursuit’ and its cognates refer to a search for an answer to a question. The paper provides a definition of the term that reflects this common usage and draws five conclusions. First, question pursuit is different from question acceptance, for it is possible for an epistemic agent to accept a question without finding it pursuitworthy. Second, question pursuit and question acceptance are related semi-orthogonally: in order to be considered pursuitworthy a question must, at minimum, be accepted, but not all accepted questions are pursuitworthy. Third, question pursuit is irreducible to theory pursuit; finding a question pursuitworthy is not expressible in terms of finding some theory pursuitworthy. Fourth, a pursuit of a theory cannot be expressed as a pursuit of a same-order question, but only as a pursuit of a question about that theory, i.e. a higher-level question. Fifth, to have a chance to be considered pursuitworthy by an agent, a question must meet some minimal necessary preconditions: it should be accepted by that agent and the agent should either lack an accepted answer to the question or have reasons to suspect that the accepted answer might be improved upon.at the accepted answer might be improved upon.)
• Sagan (1979)  + (Carl Sagan, writer and scientist, returns … Carl Sagan, writer and scientist, returns from the frontier to tell us about how the world works. In his delightfully down-to-earth style, he explores and explains a mind-boggling future of intelligent robots, extraterrestrial life and its consquences, and other provocative, fascinating quandries of the future that we want to see today.s of the future that we want to see today.)
• Bloor (1984)  + (Comprehensive perspective on scientific change from a sociological perspective.)
• Popper (1963)  + (Conjectures and Refutations is one of Karl … Conjectures and Refutations is one of Karl Popper's most wide-ranging and popular works, notable not only for its acute insight into the way scientific knowledge grows, but also for applying those insights to politics and to history. It provides one of the clearest and most accessible statements of the fundamental idea that guided his work: not only our knowledge, but our aims and our standards, grow through an unending process of trial and error.gh an unending process of trial and error.)
• Ritson (2016)  + (Controversies over string theory (collecti … Controversies over string theory (collectively termed the ‘string wars’) intensified in 2005. Also in that year, the open-access preprint publisher arXiv instituted a new feature called a ‘trackback’. This new feature enabled authors of blog posts discussing a paper on arXiv to leave a trackback (a link) to the post on the paper’s abstract page on arXiv. The determination of which specific bloggers would have access to the feature generated a public controversy that was played out in the blogosphere. Although the community was in almost unanimous agreement that so-called ‘crackpots’ should not have access to the trackback feature, it was unable to reach a consensus as to how to define a ‘crackpot’ or an ‘active researcher’. Blogs may provide a window into science in the making, yet this study shows that blogs confound categorization as permanent or ephemeral scholarly communication. The trackback feature was originally conceived to develop certain blog discourse as an alternative or complementary form of peer review. However, the high-energy physics community as a whole questions the ongoing function of the blog.uestions the ongoing function of the blog.)