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• Longino (1990)  + (Conventional wisdom has it that the scienc … Conventional wisdom has it that the sciences, properly pursued, constitute a pure, value-free method of obtaining knowledge about the natural world. In light of the social and normative dimensions of many scientific debates, Helen Longino finds that general accounts of scientific methodology cannot support this common belief. Focusing on the notion of evidence, the author argues that a methodology powerful enough to account for theories of any scope and depth is incapable of ruling out the influence of social and cultural values in the very structuring of knowledge. The objectivity of scientific inquiry can nevertheless be maintained, she proposes, by understanding scientific inquiry as a social rather than an individual process. Seeking to open a dialogue between methodologists and social critics of the sciences, Longino develops this concept of "contextual empiricism" in an analysis of research programs that have drawn criticism from feminists. Examining theories of human evolution and of prenatal hormonal determination of "gender-role" behavior, of sex differences in cognition, and of sexual orientation, the author shows how assumptions laden with social values affect the description, presentation, and interpretation of data. In particular, Longino argues that research on the hormonal basis of "sex-differentiated behavior" involves assumptions not only about gender relations but also about human action and agency. She concludes with a discussion of the relation between science, values, and ideology, based on the work of Habermas, Foucault, Keller, and Haraway.f Habermas, Foucault, Keller, and Haraway.)
• Baigrie (Ed.) (2003)  + (Covering physics, astronomy, chemistry, th … Covering physics, astronomy, chemistry, the various branches of biology, and geology, this book is the perfect introduction to the history of science. A compilation of interesting readings, Scientific Revolutions reflects the richness and diversity of scientific culture and practice. Its primary focus is on the extraordinary bursts of scientific activity that propel science in new and different directions. Useful as a reference work for readers interested in the sciences.rk for readers interested in the sciences.)
• Berryman (2016c)  + (Democritus, known in antiquity as the ‘lau … Democritus, known in antiquity as the ‘laughing philosopher’ because of</br>his emphasis on the value of ‘cheerfulness,’ was one of the two founders</br>of ancient atomist theory. He elaborated a system originated by his teacher Leucippus into a materialist account of the natural world. The atomists held that there are smallest indivisible bodies from which everything else is composed, and that these move about in an infinite void. Of the ancient materialist accounts of the natural world which did not rely on some kind of teleology or purpose to account for the apparent order and regularity found in the world, atomism was the most influential. Even its chief critic, Aristotle, praised Democritus for arguing from sound considerations appropriate to natural philosophy.rations appropriate to natural philosophy.)
• Peirce (1958)  + (Descartes is the father of modern philosop … Descartes is the father of modern philosophy, and the spirit of Cartesianism that which principally distinguishes it from the scholasticism, which it displaced may be compendiously stated as follows: 1. It teaches that philosophy must begin with universal doubt; whereas scholasticism had never questioned fundamentals. 2. It teaches that the ultimate test of certainty is to be found in the individual consciousness; whereas scholasticism had rest ed on the testimony of sages and of the Catholic Church. 3. The multiform argumentation of the middle ages is replaced by a single thread of inference depending often upon inconspicuous premises. 4. Scholasticism had its mysteries of faith, but undertook to explain all created things. But there are many facts which Cartesianism not only does not explain, but renders absolutely inexplicable, unless to say that 'God makes them so' is to be regarded as an explanation. In some, or all of these respects, most modern philosophers have been, in effect, Cartesians. Now without wishing to return to scholasticism, it seems to me that modern science and modern logic require us to stand upon a very different platform from this. upon a very different platform from this.)
• Hatfield (1992)  + (Descartes understood the subject matter of … Descartes understood the subject matter of physics to encompass the whole of nature, including living things. It therefore comprised not only nonvital phenomena, including those we would now denominate as physical, chemical, minerological, magnetic, and atmospheric; it also extended to the world of plants and animals, including the human animal (with the exception of those aspects of human psychology that Descartes assigned solely to thinking substance). In the 1630s and 1640s Descartes formulated extensive accounts of the principal manifestations of animal life, including reproduction, growth, nutrition, the circulation of the blood, and especially sense-induced motion. In connection with the latter he discussed at length the bodily conditions for psychological phenomena, including sense perception, imagination, memory, and the passions. He also examined the mental aspects of these phenomena, sometimes by way of complementing his physiological discussions and sometimes as part of his investigation into the grounds of human knowledge.ation into the grounds of human knowledge.)
• Popper (2002a)  + (Described by the philosopher A.J. Ayer as … Described by the philosopher A.J. Ayer as a work of 'great originality and power', this book revolutionized contemporary thinking on science and knowledge. Ideas such as the now legendary doctrine of 'falsificationism' electrified the scientific community, influencing even working scientists, as well as post-war philosophy. This astonishing work ranks alongside ''The Open Society and Its Enemies'' as one of Popper's most enduring books and contains insights and arguments that demand to be read to this day.uments that demand to be read to this day.)
• Barseghyan (2022a)  + (Despite a growing body of literature that … Despite a growing body of literature that attempts to draw a line between legitimate and illegitimate forms of presentism in academic history, ‘avoid presentism’ is still often preached as the first rule of historiography. Distinct from other forms of presentism is ''selective presentism'' – the practice of taking some present-day activity, event, idea, or problem as a starting point in our selection of historical facts. Throughout the paper I examine the relation of some of the most popular selection criteria – ''selection by actor intentionality'', ''selection by later effect'', and ''selection by problem'' – to presentist practices and draw three conclusions. First, each of these selection criteria can produce presentist or non-presentist histories depending on the past of which specific activity, idea, or problem the historian is interested in. Second, the historiographic legitimacy of these selection criteria is independent from their presentist or non-presentist applications; importantly, selective presentism is not among the ‘bad’ forms of presentism and is not to be avoided. Finally, various selection criteria are best understood as complementary; pluralist history invites a variety of selection criteria that help shed light on different aspects of the past, and thus – collectively – enrich our understanding of it.ectively – enrich our understanding of it.)
• Hume (2007)  + (Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion is a … Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion is a philosophical work by the Scottish philosopher David Hume. Through dialogue, three philosophers named Demea, Philo, and Cleanthes debate the nature of God's existence. Whether or not these names reference specific philosophers, ancient or otherwise, remains a topic of scholarly dispute. While all three agree that a god exists, they differ sharply in opinion on God's nature or attributes and how, or if, humankind can come to knowledge of a deity. In the Dialogues, Hume's characters debate a number of arguments for the existence of God, and arguments whose proponents believe through which we may come to know the nature of God. Such topics debated include the argument from design—for which Hume uses a house—and whether there is more suffering or good in the world (argument from evil). Hume started writing the Dialogues in 1750 but did not complete them until 1776, shortly before his death. They are based partly on Cicero's De Natura Deorum. The Dialogues were published posthumously in 1779, originally with neither the author's nor the publisher's name.[1] the author's nor the publisher's name.[1])
• Kitcher (1993)  + (During the last three decades, reflections … During the last three decades, reflections on the growth of scientific knowledge have inspired historians, sociologists, and some philosophers to contend that scientific objectivity is a myth. In this book, Kitcher attempts to resurrect the notions of objectivity and progress in science by identifying both the limitations of idealized treatments of growth of knowledge and the overreactions to philosophical idealizations. Recognizing that science is done not by logically omniscient subjects working in isolation, but by people with a variety of personal and social interests, who</br>cooperate and compete with one another, he argues that, nonetheless, we may conceive the growth of science as a process in which both our vision of nature and our ways of learning more about nature improve. Offering a detailed picture of the advancement of science, he sets a new agenda for the philosophy of science and for other "science studies" disciplines.d for other "science studies" disciplines.)
• Wykstra (1980)  + (During the past two decades, much philosop … During the past two decades, much philosophy of science has been focused on issues about the norms and methods by which scientific theories are rationally appraised; and increasingly, philosophers have turned to history of science as a touchstone for assessing normative methodologies purporting to elucidate scientific rationality. But even among such historical methodologists, there is much disagreement and unclarity about how historical study of science can arbitrate between rival methodological theories; and until progress is made at this meta-methodological level, the very legitimacy of this role for history will remain controversial. (Keynotes in the controversy are</br>sounded in Kuhn (1970b, pp. 235-41); Lakatos (1971); Giere (1973); McMullin (1976); Burian (1977); and Laudan (1977, pp. 158-63).) This paper begins by arguing that the meta-method implicit in much historical methodology is different from the explicit meta-methodology most often touted. This implicit meta-method - involving the rationability principle - appears to lead almost inevitably to the methodological anarchism of Feyerabend, and (in mitigated forms) of Lakatos and Kuhn. Hence the main aim of this paper: to redeem the rationability principle by arguing that this specter of anarchism can be exorcized from it, provided that we avoid several misconceptions about the nature of rational norms. ?he most serious of these is a Robinson Crusoe fallacy which, having originally misled Kuhn to anarchistic conclusions, has more recently confounded a dispute between Gruünbaum and Worrall.d a dispute between Gruünbaum and Worrall.)
• Barseghyan et al. (Eds.) (2022)  + (During the so-called ‘historical turn’ in … During the so-called ‘historical turn’ in the philosophy of science, philosophers and historians boldly argued for general patterns throughout the history of science. From Kuhn’s landmark ''Structure of Scientific Revolutions'' until the ''Scrutinizing Science'' project led by Larry Laudan, there was optimism that there could be a general theoretical approach to understanding the process of scientific change. This optimism gradually faded as historians and philosophers began to focus on the details of specific case studies located within idiosyncratic historical, cultural, and political contexts, and abandoned attempts to uncover general patterns of how scientific theories and methods change through time. Recent research has suggested that while we have learned a great deal about the diversity and complexity of scientific practices across history, the push to abandon hope for a broader understanding of scientific change was premature. Because of this, philosophers, historians, and social scientists have become interested in reviving the project of understanding the mechanism of scientific change while respecting the diversity and complexity that has been unveiled by careful historical research over the past few decades.</br></br>The chapters in this volume consider a particular proposal for a general theory of how scientific theories and methods change over time, first articulated by Hakob Barseghyan in ''The Laws of Scientific Change'' and since developed in a series of papers by a variety of members of the scientonomy community. The chapters consider a wide range of issues, from conceptual and historical challenges to the posited intellectual patterns in the history of science, to the possibility of constructing a general theory of scientific change, to begin with. Offering a new take on the project of constructing a theory of scientific change and integrating historical, philosophical, and social studies of science, this volume will be of interest to historians, philosophers, and sociologists of science.philosophers, and sociologists of science.)
• Norton and Taylor (Eds.) (2009)  + (Each Cambridge Companion to a philosophica … Each Cambridge Companion to a philosophical figure is made up of specially commissioned essays by an international team of scholars, providing students and nonspecialists with an introduction</br>to a major philosopher. The series aims to dispel the intimidation that readers may feel when faced with the work of a challenging thinker. David Hume is now considered one of the most important philosophers of the Western world. Although best known for his contributions to the theory of knowledge, metaphysics, and philosophy of religion, Hume also influenced developments in the philosophy of mind, psychology, ethics, political and economic theory, political and social history, and aesthetic theory. The fifteen essays in this volume address all aspects of Hume’s thought. The picture of him that emerges is that of a thinker who, though often critical to the point of skepticism, was nonetheless able to build on that skepticism a constructive, viable, and profoundly important view of the world. Also included in this volume are Hume’s two brief autobiographies and a bibliography suited to those beginning their study of Hume. This second edition of one of our most popular Companions</br>includes six new essays and a new introduction; the remaining essays have all been revised and updated. essays have all been revised and updated.)
• Berkeley (1957)  + (Edited by Colin Murray Turbayne in 1957. Originally published 1710. In this book, Berkeley defends idealism by attacking the materialist alternative.)
• Locke (2015b)  + (Edited by Jonathan Bennett in 2015. Originally published in 1689. A presentation of the ideas and arguments in the second book of Locke's ''An Essay Concerning Human Understanding'', where he offers a new method of humans' information acquisition.)
• Locke (2015a)  + (Edited by Jonathan Bennett in 2015. Originally published in 1689. A presentation of the ideas and arguments of the first book in Locke's ''Essay Concerning Human Understanding'', where he rejects the concept of innate notions.)
• O'Connor and Yu Wong (2015)  + (Emergence is a notorious philosophical ter … Emergence is a notorious philosophical term of art. A variety of theorists have appropriated it for their purposes ever since George Henry Lewes gave it a philosophical sense in his 1875 Problems of Life and Mind. We might roughly characterize the shared meaning thus: emergent entities (properties or substances) ‘arise’ out of more fundamental entities and yet are ‘novel’ or ‘irreducible’ with respect to them. (For example, it is sometimes said that consciousness is an emergent property of the brain.) Each of the quoted terms is slippery in its own right, and their specifications yield the varied notions of emergence that we discuss below. There has been renewed interest in emergence within discussions of the behavior of complex systems and debates over the reconcilability of mental causation, intentionality, or consciousness with physicalism.nality, or consciousness with physicalism.)
• Encyclopedia Britannica (2016)  + (Encyclopaedia Britannica is the oldest English language encyclopedia still in production.)
• Rescher (2000a)  + (Epistemology is more than the theory of kn … Epistemology is more than the theory of knowledge. Its range of concern includes not only knowledge proper but also rational belief, probability, plausibility, evidentiation, and not least, erotetics, the business of raising and resolving questions. Aristotle indicated that human inquiry is grounded in wonder; when matters are so out of the ordinary we puzzle about the reason why and seek for an explanation. With increasing sophistication, the ordinary as well as the extraordinary excites the intellect, so that questions gain an increasing prominence within epistemology. Inquiry Dynamics focuses on the phenomena and theory of rational inquiry, focusing on its concern for questions and their management.</br></br>An introductory chapter lays the groundwork of the book's deliberations, followed by chapter 2, explaining the basic concepts involved in the abstract logic of questions and answers and sets out the generic fundamentals of the domain. Chapters 3 and 4 expound the theoretical principles that characterize the field of question epistemology in general, clarifying the fundamental themes and theses of the subject. Chapters 5 through 9 then explore the landscape of question epistemology within science. Rescher seeks to show that there are limits-restrictions of basic principle-to our ability to resolve scientific questions. The concluding chapter argues in particular that the grand goal of an ultimate theory, one resolving all explanatory questions, has to be approached with great caution.</br></br>Throughout Rescher emphasizes that a question-oriented approach to the process of inquiry serves to highlight the inherent limitations of the cognitive project. Rescher's question-oriented treatment of epistemology proceeds in the tradition of Kant and stands in decided contrast to the dominant knowledge-oriented approach originating with Descartes. He demonstrates that a concern for the issue of plausible question resolution is a necessary component of the epistemological enterprise. Inquiry Dynamics will be of interest to philosophers, scientists, and social scientists.ophers, scientists, and social scientists.)
• Machado-Marques and Patton (2021)  + (Error is a common part of scientific pract … Error is a common part of scientific practice, which must be accounted for by scientonomy. A scientific error occurs when an agent accepts a theory that should not have been accepted given that agent’s employed method. One might suspect that the handling of scientific error seems to violate the ''theory rejection theorem'' according to which a theory becomes rejected only when other theories that are incompatible with the theory become accepted, because it appears as though a theory is replaced in the mosaic with nothing. Here, we analyze several instances of scientific error and show that scientific error handling, when properly analyzed, is fully consistent with the theory rejection theorem. We show that instances of scientific error typically involve the rejection of one or more of the premises of the argument that leads to the erroneous conclusion as well as the conclusion itself. In most cases, first-order propositions of the original erroneously accepted theory are replaced by other first-order propositions incompatible with them. In some cases, however, first-order propositions are replaced by second-order propositions asserting the lack of sufficient reason for accepting these first-order propositions. In both cases, such a replacement is fully consistent with the theory rejection theorem.sistent with the theory rejection theorem.)
• Knorr Cetina (1999)  + (Ethnographic study of two scientific communities - high energy physics and molecular biology.)
• Kanschik (2009)  + (Explains Newton's entire experiment to prove it is possible to induct a general hypothesis without evidence.)
• Nelson and Nelson (1996)  + (Feminism, Science, and the Philosophy of S … Feminism, Science, and the Philosophy of Science brings together original essays by both feminist and mainstream philosophers of science that examine issues at the intersections of feminism, science, and the philosophy of science. Contributors explore parallels and tensions between feminist approaches to science and other approaches in the philosophy of science and more general science studies. In so doing, they explore notions at the heart of the philosophy of science, including the nature of objectivity, truth, evidence, cognitive agency, scientific method, and the relationship between science and values.e relationship between science and values.)
• Feyerabend (1973)  + (Feyerabend formulated these theses in roug … Feyerabend formulated these theses in rough draft for a conference planned for 20 March 1973, where he was to criticize Lakatos's defense of "Law and Order" from an anarchist point of view. The theses were enclosed with a letter to Lakatos dated February 1973. A slightly revised form of these theses has appeared as [[Feyerabend (1975d)]], pp. 176-81.[[Feyerabend (1975d)]], pp. 176-81.)
• Biro (2009)  + (For Hume, understanding the workings of th … For Hume, understanding the workings of the mind is the key to understanding everything else. There is a sense, therefore, in which to write about Hume’s philosophy of mind is to write about all of his philosophy. With that said, I shall nonetheless focus here on those specific doctrines that belong to what we today call the philosophy of mind, given our somewhat narrower conception of that subject. It should also be remembered that Hume describes his inquiry into the nature and workings of the mind as a science. This is an important clue to understanding both the goals and the results of that inquiry, as well as the methods Hume uses in pursuing it. As we will see, there is a thread running from Hume’s project of founding a science of the mind to that of the so-called cognitive sciences of the late twentieth century. For both, the study of the mind is in important respects just like the study of any other natural phenomenon. While it would be an overstatement to say that Hume’s entire interest lies in the construction of a science in this sense – he has other, more traditionally “philosophical,” concerns – recognizing the centrality of this scientific aim is essential for understanding him.ic aim is essential for understanding him.)
• Lakatos (1970)  + (For centuries knowledge meant proven knowl … For centuries knowledge meant proven knowledge - proven either by the power of the intellect or by the evidence of the senses. Wisdom and intellectual integrity demanded that one must desist from unproven utterances and minimize, even in thought, the gap between speculation and established knowledge. The proving power of the intellect or the senses was questioned by the sceptics more than two thousand years ago; but they were browbeaten into confusion by the glory of Newtonian physics. Einstein’s results again turned the tables and now very few philosophers or scientists still think that scientific knowledge is, or can be, proven knowledge. But few realize that with this the whole classical structure of intellectual values falls in ruins and has to be replaced: one cannot simply water down the ideal of proven truth - as some logical empiricists do - to the ideal of ''probable truth'' or - as some sociologists of knowledge do - to ''truth by (changing) consensus''.do - to ''truth by (changing) consensus''.)

• Boole (2003)  + (Formal logic descriptions and application.)

• Hutchins (1995)  + (Formulation of distributed cognition based on a study of navigation of a US Navy ship.)
• Bacon (2007)  + (Francis Bacon (1561-1626) was a genuine mi … Francis Bacon (1561-1626) was a genuine midwife of modernity. He was one of the first thinkers to visualise a future which would be guided by a cooperative science-based vision of bettering human welfare. In this the first critical edition of his greatest philosophical work since the nineteenth-century, we find facing-page Latin translations and a thorough and detailed Introduction to the text. The text includes the original Latin with a facing-page translation, and has been edited in accordance with the highest standards of modern textual-critical principles, with a detailed and thorough introduction.with a detailed and thorough introduction.)
• Christianson (1984)  + (From dust jacket notes: "...In the first m … From dust jacket notes: "...In the first major popular biography of Sir Isaac Newton in 50 years, historian Gale E. Christianson paints a compelling portrait of this seminal thinker -- a towering genius who, in the words of Albert Einstein, 'stands before us, strong, certain, and alone.' Drawing on the full body of Newton papers (nearly four million words), this majestic work details Newton's life in its entirety: from an introspective boyhood in rural Lincolnshire, to Cambridge, where he came to question the very order of things, to the heretical religious ideas that would ultimately absorb him more than science itself, to celebrity as leonine Master of the Mint and President of the Royal Society. Throughout, Newton emerges as a passionate recluse, given to sleepless nights working alone with little more nourishment than bread and wine. As the legend unfolds, so , too, do Newton's epoch-making discoveries in mathematics, physics, optics, and astronomy. At 23 he had already established the elements of differential calculus. Soon after he created the reflecting telescope and described the properties of light. At 45 Newton secured his reputation by publishing the Principia Mathematica, a treatise on universal gravitation that would alter forever man's vision of the cosmos...."er forever man's vision of the cosmos....")
• Zalta (Ed.) (2016)  + (From its inception, the SEP was designed s … From its inception, the SEP was designed so that each entry is maintained and kept up-to-date by an expert or group of experts in the field. All entries and substantive updates are refereed by the members of a distinguished Editorial Board before they are made public. Consequently, our dynamic reference work maintains academic standards while evolving and adapting in response to new research. You can cite fixed editions that are created on a quarterly basis and stored in our Archives (every entry contains a link to its complete archival history, identifying the fixed edition the reader should cite). The Table of Contents lists entries that are published or assigned. The Projected Table of Contents also lists entries which are currently unassigned but nevertheless projected.tly unassigned but nevertheless projected.)
• Zalta (Ed.) (2017)  + (From its inception, the SEP was designed s … From its inception, the SEP was designed so that each entry is maintained and kept up-to-date by an expert or group of experts in the field. All entries and substantive updates are refereed by the members of a distinguished Editorial Board before they are made public. Consequently, our dynamic reference work maintains academic standards while evolving and adapting in response to new research. You can cite fixed editions that are created on a quarterly basis and stored in our Archives (every entry contains a link to its complete archival history, identifying the fixed edition the reader should cite). The Table of Contents lists entries that are published or assigned. The Projected Table of Contents also lists entries which are currently unassigned but nevertheless projected.tly unassigned but nevertheless projected.)
• Garber (1993)  + (Garber discusses the role of experimentati … Garber discusses the role of experimentation in the wider context of Descartes' philosophical system; the epistemic justification for propositions discovered by experimentation, the methodology of experimentation, and the role of empiricism within Cartesian apriorism. of empiricism within Cartesian apriorism.)
• Morris and Brown (2016)  + (Generally regarded as one of the most impo … Generally regarded as one of the most important philosophers to write in</br>English, David Hume (b. 1711, d. 1776) was also well known in his own</br>time as an historian and essayist. A master stylist in any genre, his major</br>philosophical works—A Treatise of Human Nature (1739–1740), the</br>Enquiries concerning Human Understanding (1748) and concerning the</br>Principles of Morals (1751), as well as his posthumously published</br>Dialogues concerning Natural Religion (1779)—remain widely and</br>deeply influential.779)—remain widely and deeply influential.)
• Downing (2013)  + (George Berkeley, Bishop of Cloyne, was one … George Berkeley, Bishop of Cloyne, was one of the great philosophers of</br>the early modern period. He was a brilliant critic of his predecessors,</br>particularly Descartes, Malebranche, and Locke. He was a talented</br>metaphysician famous for defending idealism, that is, the view that reality</br>consists exclusively of minds and their ideas. Berkeley's system, while it</br>strikes many as counter-intuitive, is strong and flexible enough to counter most objections. His most-studied works, the Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge (Principles, for short) and Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous (Dialogues), are beautifully written and dense with the sort of arguments that delight contemporary</br>philosophers. He was also a wide-ranging thinker with interests in religion (which were fundamental to his philosophical motivations), the psychology of vision, mathematics, physics, morals, economics, and medicine. Although many of Berkeley's first readers greeted him with incomprehension, he influenced both Hume and Kant, and is much read (if little followed) in our own day. read (if little followed) in our own day.)
• Giere (2012)  + (Giere argues for a reconciliation between … Giere argues for a reconciliation between history of science and philosophy of science on the grounds that philosophy of science must become theory of science, that is, a naturalized theory of how science works. Normative claims about how science should work can flow from a descriptive understanding of how it does work. Giere believes that such a theory of science can emerge from melding cognitive science with sociology of science.gnitive science with sociology of science.)
• Golinski (1998)  + (Golinski argues for a social constructivis … Golinski argues for a social constructivist view of scientific knowledge. Thomas Kuhn's landmark ''The Structure of Scientific Revolutions'' made science more approachable to sociological methods and naturalistic explanation. The social institutions responsible for the production of scientific knowledge, such as the professionalization of science, the research laboratory, and the scientific use of language and persuasion.scientific use of language and persuasion.)
• Cook (2013)  + (Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716) was … Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716) was one of the great thinkers of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and is known as the last “universal genius”. He made deep and important contributions to the fields of metaphysics, epistemology, logic, philosophy of religion, as well as mathematics, physics, geology, jurisprudence, and history. The aim of this entry is primarily to introduce Leibniz's life and summarize and explicate his views in the realms of metaphysics, epistemology, and philosophical theology. epistemology, and philosophical theology.)
• Look (2017)  + (Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716) was … Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716) was one of the great thinkers of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and is known as the last “universal genius”. He made deep and important contributions to the fields of metaphysics, epistemology, logic, philosophy of religion, as well as mathematics, physics, geology, jurisprudence, and history. Even the eighteenth-century French atheist and materialist Denis Diderot, whose views were very often at odds with those of Leibniz, could not help being awed by his achievement, writing in his entry on Leibniz in the Encyclopedia, “Perhaps never has a man read as much, studied as much, meditated more, and written more than Leibniz… What he has composed on the world, God, nature, and the soul is of the most sublime eloquence. If his ideas had been expressed with the flair of Plato, the philosopher of Leipzig would cede nothing to the philosopher of Athens.” (Oeuvres complètes, vol. 7, p. 709) Indeed, Diderot was almost moved to despair in</br>this piece: “When one compares the talents one has with those of a Leibniz, one is tempted to throw away one's books and go die quietly in the dark of some forgotten corner.” (Oeuvres complètes, vol. 7, p. 678) More than a century later, Gottlob Frege, who fortunately did not cast his books away in despair, expressed similar admiration, declaring that “in his writings, Leibniz threw out such a profusion of seeds of ideas that in this respect he is virtually in a class of his own.” (“Boole's logical Calculus and the Concept-script” in Posthumous Writings, p. 9) The aim of this entry is primarily to introduce Leibniz's life and summarize and explicate</br>his views in the realms of metaphysics, epistemology, and philosophical theology. epistemology, and philosophical theology.)
• Russell (1945)  + (Hailed as “lucid and magisterial” by The O … Hailed as “lucid and magisterial” by The Observer, this book is universally acclaimed as the outstanding one-volume work on the subject of Western philosophy.</br></br>Considered to be one of the most important philosophical works of all time, the History of Western Philosophy is a dazzlingly unique exploration of the ideologies of significant philosophers throughout the ages—from Plato and Aristotle through to Spinoza, Kant and the twentieth century. Written by a man who changed the history of philosophy himself, this is an account that has never been rivaled since its first publication over sixty years ago.</br></br>Since its first publication in 1945, Lord Russell’s A History of Western Philosophy is still unparalleled in its comprehensiveness, its clarity, its erudition, its grace, and its wit. In seventy-six chapters he traces philosophy from the rise of Greek civilization to the emergence of logical analysis in the twentieth century.</br></br>Among the philosophers considered are: Pythagoras, Heraclitus, Parmenides, Empedocles, Anaxagoras, the Atomists, Protagoras, Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, the Cynics, the Sceptics, the Epicureans, the Stoics, Plotinus, Ambrose, Jerome, Augustine, Benedict, Gregory the Great, John the Scot, Aquinas, Duns Scotus, William of Occam, Machiavelli, Erasmus, More, Bacon, Hobbes, Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, Locke, Berkeley, Hume, Rousseau, Kant, Hegel, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, the Utilitarians, Marx, Bergson, James, Dewey, and lastly the philosophers with whom Lord Russell himself is most closely associated—Cantor, Frege, and Whitehead, coauthor with Russell of the monumental Principia Mathematica.l of the monumental Principia Mathematica.)
• Hardwig (1991)  + (Hardwig argues for the central importance of testimony in the acquisition of scientific knowledge.)
• Siegel (2011)  + (Harvey Siegel discusses the question of wh … Harvey Siegel discusses the question of whether epistemological</br>relativism is an incoherent position. After rehearsing Plato’s case for incoherence he examines the position of the proponents of the Strong Programme in the sociology of scientific knowledge. Siegel distinguishes between innocuous and more contentious claims to be found in their writings and examines their arguments for the latter. He focuses on the‘no transcendence, therefore relativism’-argument; arguing that from acceptance of the impossibility to achieve a ‘perspectiveless perspective’relativism does not follow. Despite such an impossibility, so Siegel claims,there is a sense in which we can transcend our own, actual perspective. Furthermore, drawing on the possibility of sociological accounts of the causes of the credibility of belief that conflict with the account favoured by Strong Programmers, he concludes that the Programme’s relativism is at odds with its avowed scientific status and finally falls prey to the charge of incoherence.y falls prey to the charge of incoherence.)
• Baigrie (1988)  + (Harvey Siegel's (1985) attempts to revive … Harvey Siegel's (1985) attempts to revive the traditional epistemological formulation of the rationality of science. Contending that "a general commitment to evidence" is constitutive of method and rationality in science, Siegel advances its compatibility with specific, historically attuned formulations of principles of evidential support as a virtue of his aprioristic candidate for science's rationality. In point of fact, this account is compatible with virtually any formulation of evidential support, which runs afoul of Siegel's claim that scientific beliefs must be evaluated with respect to their rationality. The unwelcome consequence of Siegel's view is that most any belief, scientific or pseudoscientific, can be defended as rational. Indeed, if we want to furnish a warrant for rational choice, we must turn to the very historically informed principles of evidential support that are dismissed by Siegel as providing a misleading portrait of science's rationality.leading portrait of science's rationality.)
• Longino (2002)  + (Helen Longino seeks to break the current d … Helen Longino seeks to break the current deadlock in the ongoing wars between philosophers of science and sociologists of science--academic battles founded on disagreement about the role of social forces in constructing scientific knowledge. While many philosophers of science downplay social forces, claiming that scientific knowledge is best considered as a product of cognitive processes, sociologists tend to argue that numerous noncognitive factors influence what scientists learn, how they package it, and how readily it is accepted. Underlying this disagreement, however, is a common assumption that social forces are a source of bias and irrationality. Longino challenges this assumption, arguing that social interaction actually assists us in securing firm, rationally based knowledge. This important insight allows her to develop a durable and novel account of scientific knowledge that integrates the social and cognitive.</br></br></br>Longino begins with a detailed discussion of a wide range of contemporary thinkers who write on scientific knowledge, clarifying the philosophical points at issue. She then critically analyzes the dichotomous understanding of the rational and the social that characterizes both sides of the science studies stalemate and the social account that she sees as necessary for an epistemology of science that includes the full spectrum of cognitive processes. Throughout, her account is responsive both to the normative uses of the term knowledge and to the social conditions in which scientific knowledge is produced.</br></br></br>Building on ideas first advanced in her influential book Science as Social Knowledge, Longino brings her account into dialogue with current work in social epistemology and science studies and shows how her critical social approach can help solve a variety of stubborn problems. While the book focuses on epistemological concerns related to the sociality of inquiry, Longino also takes up its implications for scientific pluralism. The social approach, she concludes, best allows us to retain a meaningful concept of knowledge in the face of theoretical plurality and uncertainty. of theoretical plurality and uncertainty.)
• Kuhn (1996)  + (History, if viewed as a repository for mor … History, if viewed as a repository for more than anecdote or chronology, could produce a decisive transformation in the image of science by which we are now possessed. That image has previously been drawn, even by scientists themselves, mainly from the study of finished scientific achievements as these are recorded in the classics and, more recently, in the textbooks from which each new scientific generation learns to practice its trade. Inevitably, however, the aim of such books is persuasive and pedagogic; a concept of science drawn from them is no more likely to fit the enterprise that produced them than an image of a national culture drawn from a tourist brochure or a language text. This essay attempts to show that we have been misled by them in fundamental ways. Its aim is a sketch of the quite different concept of science that can emerge from the historical record of the research activity itself.al record of the research activity itself.)
• Osler (1970)  + (How John Locke's views on scientific knowledge was shaped by theorists who came before him, specifically Boyle and Newton.)
• Allchin (2001)  + (How do scientists know—and justify—that th … How do scientists know—and justify—that they have erred? The question virtually</br>bristles with paradox. Error seems the very antithesis of knowledge. How could one justify such a "negative" discovery? Oddly perhaps, to know that a claim deemed right in one context is wrong requires justification. I focus here on this dimension of the scientific enterprise, the ascertaining of error, and its relation to the general problem of characterizing reliable knowledge.blem of characterizing reliable knowledge.)
• Shapin (1994)  + (How do we come to trust our knowledge of t … How do we come to trust our knowledge of the world? What are the means by which we distinguish true from false accounts? Why do we credit one observational statement over another?</br></br>In ''A Social History of Truth'', Shapin engages these universal questions through an elegant recreation of a crucial period in the history of early modern science: the social world of gentlemen-philosophers in seventeenth-century England. Steven Shapin paints a vivid picture of the relations between gentlemanly culture and scientific practice. He argues that problems of credibility in science were practically solved through the codes and conventions of genteel conduct: trust, civility, honor, and integrity. These codes formed, and arguably still form, an important basis for securing reliable knowledge about the natural world.</br></br>Shapin uses detailed historical narrative to argue about the establishment of factual knowledge both in science and in everyday practice. Accounts of the mores and manners of gentlemen-philosophers are used to illustrate Shapin's broad claim that trust is imperative for constituting every kind of knowledge. Knowledge-making is always a collective enterprise: people have to know whom to trust in order to know something about the natural world.to know something about the natural world.)
• Thompson (2007)  + (How is life related to the mind? The quest … How is life related to the mind? The question has long confounded philosophers and scientists, and it is this so-called explanatory gap between biological life and consciousness that Evan Thompson explores in Mind in Life.</br></br>Thompson draws upon sources as diverse as molecular biology, evolutionary theory, artificial life, complex systems theory, neuroscience, psychology, Continental Phenomenology, and analytic philosophy to argue that mind and life are more continuous than has previously been accepted, and that current explanations do not adequately address the myriad facets of the biology and phenomenology of mind. Where there is life, Thompson argues, there is mind: life and mind share common principles of self-organization, and the self-organizing features of mind are an enriched version of the self-organizing features of life. Rather than trying to close the explanatory gap, Thompson marshals philosophical and scientific analyses to bring unprecedented insight to the nature of life and consciousness. This synthesis of phenomenology and biology helps make Mind in Life a vital and long-awaited addition to his landmark volume The Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science and Human Experience (coauthored with Eleanor Rosch and Francisco Varela). with Eleanor Rosch and Francisco Varela).)
• De Pierris (2006)  + (Hume follows Newton in replacing the mecha … Hume follows Newton in replacing the mechanical philosophy's demonstrative ideal of science by the Principia's ideal of inductive proof(especially as formulated in Newton's Rule Ill); in this respect, Hume differs sharply from Locke. Hume is also guided by Newton's own criticisms of the mechanical philosophers' hypotheses. The first stage of Hume's skeptical argument concerning causation targets central tenets of the mechanical philosophers' (in particular, Locke's) conception of causation, all of which</br>rely on the a priori postulation of a hidden configuration of primary qualities. The skeptical argument concerning the causal inductive inference (with its implicit principle that nature is, in Newton's words, "ever consonant with itself") then raises doubts about what Hume himself regards as our very best inductive method. Hume's own "Rules" (T 1.3.15) further substantiate his reliance on Newton. Finally, Locke's distinction between "Knowledge" and "Probability" ("Opinion") does not leave room for Hume's Newtonian notion of inductive proof.ume's Newtonian notion of inductive proof.)
• Bell (2009)  + (Hume’s theory of causation is one of the m … Hume’s theory of causation is one of the most famous and influential parts of his philosophy. When compared with the accounts provided by earlier philosophers whom Hume studied, such as Rene Descartes (1596–1650), John Locke (1632–1704), and Nicolas Malebranche(1638–1715), his theory is revolutionary. It is also controversial, and has been interpreted in a number of different ways. This is not surprising, because Hume’s ideas about causation are not only challenging in themselves, but also lie at the heart of much of the rest of his thought. As a result, interpretations of Hume on causation influence, and are influenced by, interpretations of his general philosophical aims, methods, and purposes.philosophical aims, methods, and purposes.)
• Lakatos (1978b)  + (Imre Lakatos' philosophical and scientific … Imre Lakatos' philosophical and scientific papers are published here in two volumes. Volume II presents his work on the philosophy of mathematics (much of it unpublished), together with some critical essays on contemporary philosophers of science and some famous polemical writings on political and educational issues. </br></br>Imre Lakatos had an influence out of all proportion to the length of his philosophical career. This collection exhibits and confirms the originality, range and the essential unity of his work. It demonstrates too the force and spirit he brought to every issue with which he engaged, from his most abstract mathematical work to his passionate 'Letter to the director of the LSE'. Lakatos' ideas are now the focus of widespread and increasing interest, and these volumes should make possible for the first time their study as a whole and their proper assessment.dy as a whole and their proper assessment.)