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Barseghyan and Shaw (2017) + (In this paper, we demonstrate how a system … In this paper, we demonstrate how a systematic ''taxonomy of stances'' can help elucidate two classic debates of the historical turn—the Lakatos–Feyerabend debate concerning theory rejection and the Feyerabend–Kuhn debate about pluralism during normal science. We contend that Kuhn, Feyerabend, and Lakatos were often talking at cross-purposes due to the lack of an agreed upon taxonomy of stances. Specifically, we provide three distinct stances that scientists take towards theories: ''acceptance'' of a theory as the best available description of its domain, ''use'' of a theory in practical applications, and ''pursuit'' (elaboration) of a theory. We argue that in the Lakatos–Feyerabend debate, Lakatos was concerned with ''acceptance'' whereas Feyerabend was mainly concerned with ''pursuit''. Additionally, we show how Feyerabend and Kuhn’s debate on the role of pluralism/monism in normal science involved a crucial conflation of all three stances. Finally, we outline a few general lessons concerning the process of scientific change.ncerning the process of scientific change.)
Overgaard and Loiselle (2016) + (In this paper, we introduce a new concept … In this paper, we introduce a new concept to the field of scientonomy, that of ''authority delegation''. ''Authority delegation'' is, in essence, a type of relation between distinct scientific communities whereby one community both recognizes another as an expert on a particular topic and will accept the theories it is told by the expert community over the same topic. Importantly, authority delegation is not a new fundamental ontological category along with ''theory'' and ''method''. We show that authority delegation is ''reducible'' to the more basic concepts of ''theory'' and ''method''. Furthermore, we suggest that authority delegation comes in two forms: ''one-sided'' authority delegation and ''mutual'' authority delegation.ation and ''mutual'' authority delegation.)
Haldane (1905) + (In this volume Elizabeth Haldane gives a detailed account of Descartes' life, works, and historical context.)
Palermos and Pritchard (2016) + (In this volume, Sanford Goldberg (chapter … In this volume, Sanford Goldberg (chapter 1) defines his socio-epistemologicalresearch programme by noting that “social epistemology is thesystematic study of the epistemic significance of other minds” (section3).1 But what can those minds be and how do they differ from the worldaround us?Goldberg elaborates by noting that relying on others is not quite thesame as relying on the natural world for evidence—as we do, for instance,when we come to know that it’s cold outside by seeing someonereaching for their parka or when we discover that we have a mouseproblem by finding the droppings under the sink. The difference, explainsGoldberg, is that others manifest “the very results of their own epistemicsensibility” (chapter 1, section 1).temic sensibility” (chapter 1, section 1).)
Hanson (1958) + (In this work, Hanson used insights from or … In this work, Hanson used insights from ordinary language philosophy, history of science, and psychology to argue that scientific thinking and observation is always theory-laden. He maintained that science would not be as rich and versatile as it is if it were not loaded with theory and expectation. He sought to elucidate the 'open' structure of scientific frameworks, as opposed to the rigid and closed definitional networks of geometry, formal logic, and mathematics. Hanson thought to challenge the logical positivist view of observation and to illuminate the process through which new conceptual frameworks in science are constructed. He is now regarded as an important forerunner of Thomas Kuhn's 'Structure of Scientific Revolutions'.n's 'Structure of Scientific Revolutions'.)
Schlosser (2015) + (In very general terms, an agent is a being … In very general terms, an agent is a being with the capacity to act, and‘agency’ denotes the exercise or manifestation of this capacity. Thephilosophy of action provides us with a standard conception and astandard theory of action. The former construes action in terms ofintentionality, the latter explains the intentionality of action in terms of causation by the agent’s mental states and events. From this, we obtain a standard conception and a standard theory of agency. There are alternative conceptions of agency, and it has been argued that the standard theory fails to capture agency (or distinctively human agency). Further, it seems that genuine agency can be exhibited by beings that are not capable of intentional action, and it has been argued that agency can and should be explained without reference to causally efficacious mental states and events. Debates about the nature of agency have flourished over the past few decades in philosophy and in other areas of research (including psychology, cognitive neuroscience, social science, and anthropology). In philosophy, the nature of agency is an important issue in the philosophy of mind, the philosophy of psychology, the debates on free will and moral responsibility, in ethics, meta-ethics, and in the debates on the nature of reasons and practical rationality. For the most part, this entry focuses on conceptual and metaphysical questions concerning the nature of agency. In the final sections, it provides an overview of empirically informed accounts of the sense of agency and of various empirical challenges to the commonsense assumption that our reasons and our conscious intentions make a real difference to how we act.ions make a real difference to how we act.)
Barseghyan (2021b) + (Incomplete and imprecise temporal data is … Incomplete and imprecise temporal data is abundant in various branches of science and technology as well as everyday life (e.g., “''A'' began after 1066 but before 1069 and ended after 1245”, “''B'' took place no later than 156 BC”). While point-circles and lines/bars have been traditionally used to depict precise temporal points and intervals, it is unclear how imprecise and incomplete temporal data can be effectively visualized or even represented. This paper suggests an intuitive diagrammatic notation for visualizing both imprecise and incomplete temporal information. It suggests using traditional whiskers with edges to depict temporal imprecision and whiskers without edges to depict incomplete temporal entities. This notation can be easily incorporated into linear temporal visualizations, such as historical timelines, Gantt charts, and timetables, to identify gaps in temporal information. The paper lays down the diagrammatic elements of the notation and illustrates their applicability to all standard relations between temporal entities. It also shows how these elements can be combined to produce complex timelines. Some possible future directions are also outlined.sible future directions are also outlined.)
Herring et al. (Eds.) (2019) + (Integrated History and Philosophy of Scien … Integrated History and Philosophy of Science (iHPS) is commonly understood as the study of science from a combined historical and philosophical perspective. Yet, since its gradual formation as a research field, the question of how to suitably integrate both perspectives remains open. This volume presents cutting edge research from junior iHPS scholars, and in doing so provides a snapshot of current developments within the field, explores the connection between iHPS and other academic disciplines, and demonstrates some of the topics that are attracting the attention of scholars who will help define the future of iHPS.s who will help define the future of iHPS.)
Barnes (1977) + (Intriguingly different in approach from co … Intriguingly different in approach from conventional works in the same area of inquiry, this study deals with the central problems and concerns of the sociology of knowledge as it has traditionally been conceived of. In other words, it is concerned with the relationship of knowledge, social interests and social structure, and with the various attempts which have been made to analyse the relationship.Barry Barnes takes the classic writings in the sociology of knowledge – by Marx, Lukács, Weber, Mannheim, Goldmann, Habermas and others – and uses them as resources in coming to grips with what he regards as the currently most interesting and significant questions in this area. This approach reflects one of the principal themes of the book itself. Knowledge, it is argued, is best treated as a resource available to those possessing it. This is the best perspective from which to understand its relationship to action and its historical significance; it is a perspective which avoids the problems of holding that knowledge is derivative, as well as those generated by the view that knowledge is a strong determinant of consciousness. the result is an unusual textbook, particularly valuable when read in conjunction with the original works it discusses.tion with the original works it discusses.)
Newton (1999) + (Isaac Newton; a new translation by I. Bernard Cohen and Anne Whitman, assisted by Julia Budenz; preceded by a guide to Newton's Principia by I. Bernard Cohen.)
Mandelbrote (2004) + (Isaac Newton’s Observations upon the Proph … Isaac Newton’s Observations upon the Prophecies of Daniel, and the Apocalypse of St. John, prepared for the press from his manuscripts by his nephew Benjamin Smith, was published in two editions in London and Dublin in 1733. According to Richard S. Westfall, Newton’s finest twentieth-century biographer, the author “had cleansed his Observations” and his heirs “could publish the manuscript without concern.”3 Yet one might be permitted to wonder whether either the actual or the intended reception of Newton’s posthumous work was as uncontroversial as it has seemed to late twentienth-century eyes. The book was dedicated to Peter King, baron of Ockham, the lord chancellor, who had defended Newton’s sometime disciple, William Whiston, during his trial for heresy in July 1713. Although Whiston later fell out with King, he nevertheless continued to maintain that King’s youthful writings on the primitive Church supported the Arian position for which he had himself been condemned.n for which he had himself been condemned.)
Kim (1999) + (It has been about a century and half since … It has been about a century and half since the ideas that we nowassociate with emergentism began taking shape.1 At the core ofthese ideas was the thought that as systems acquire increasinglyhigher degrees of organizational complexity they begin to exhibitnovel properties that in some sense transcend the properties of theirconstituent parts, and behave in ways that cannot be predicted onthe basis of the laws governing simpler systems. It is now standardto trace the birth of emergentism back to John Stuart Milland his distinction between “heteropathic” and “homopathic” laws,2although few of us would be surprised to learn that the sameor similar ideas had been entertained by our earlier philosophicalforebears.3 Academic philosophers – like Samuel Alexander andC.D. Broad in Britain, A.O. Lovejoy and Roy Wood Sellars inthe United States – played an important role in developing theconcept of emergence and the attendant doctrines of emergentism,but it is interesting to note that the fundamental idea seems to havehad a special appeal to scientists and those outside professionalphilosophy. These include the British biologist C. Lloyd Morgan,a leading theoretician of the emergentist movement early in thiscentury, and, more recently, the noted neurophysiologist Roger W.Sperry.e noted neurophysiologist Roger W. Sperry.)
Frigg (2006) + (It is now part and parcel of the official … It is now part and parcel of the official philosophical wisdom that models are essential to the acquisition and organisation of scientific knowledge. It is also generally accepted that most models represent their target systems in one way or another. But what does it mean for a model to represent its target system? I begin by introducing three conundrums that a theory of scientific representation has to come to terms with and then address the question of whether the semanticview of theories, which is the currently most widely accepted account of theories and models, provides us with adequate answers to these questions. After having argued in some detail that it does not, I briefly explain why other accounts of scientific modelling do not fit the bill either and conclude by pointing out in what direction a tenable account of scientific representation has to be sought.cientific representation has to be sought.)
Pandey (2023) + (It is unclear whether the first law forbid … It is unclear whether the first law forbids any conceivable scenarios or whether it is a tautology. This paper examines the first law with the goal of clarifying which scenarios it allows and which ones it forbids. I begin by highlighting a number of problems with the current formulations of the first laws for theories, methods, and questions, as well as the respective rejection theorems. New formulations for these laws and theorems are suggested to ensure their uniformity and the validity of their deductions. Next, I discuss a series of scenarios of theory replacement allowed by the first laws, such as the replacement by negation, the replacement by an answer to a different question, the replacement that involves the rejection of the question, and the replacement by a higher-order proposition. I then consider scenarios that are forbidden by the first law and show that this class only includes cases of rejection without replacement such as instances of element decay. This creates a dilemma. On the one hand, if cases of rejection without replacement are classified as non-scientonomic phenomena, the first law is a tautology. On the other hand, if such cases are classified as scientonomic phenomena, then the first law is not a tautology, but these cases stand as violations of the first law. The paper resolves this dilemma by opting for the former option: cases of rejection without replacement such as element decay due to catastrophic loss of records or destroyed communities are non-scientonomic, and should be considered as outside the scope of our discipline.ed as outside the scope of our discipline.)
Rupik (2021) + (It was commonly accepted in Goethe’s time … It was commonly accepted in Goethe’s time that plants were equipped both to propagate themselves and to play a certain role in the natural economy as a result of God’s beneficent and providential design. Goethe’s identification of sexual propagation as the “summit of nature” in The Metamorphosis of Plants (1790) might suggest that he, too, drew strongly from this theological-metaphysical tradition that had given rise to Christian Wolff’s science of teleology. Goethe, however, portrayed nature as inherently active and propagative, itself improvising into the future by multiple means, with no extrinsically pre-ordained goal or fixed end-point. Rooted in the nature philosophy of his friend and mentor Herder, Goethe’s plants exhibit their own historically and environmentally conditioned drives and directionality in The Metamorphosis of Plants. In this paper I argue that conceiving of nature as active productivity—not merely a passive product—freed Goethe of the need to tie plants’ forms and functions to a divine system of ends, and allowed him to consider possibilities for plants, and for nature, beyond the walls of teleology.for nature, beyond the walls of teleology.)
McDermid (2017) + (James Beattie was a Scottish philosopher a … James Beattie was a Scottish philosopher and poet who spent his entire academic career as Professor of Moral Philosophy and Logic at Marischal College in Aberdeen. His best known philosophical work, An Essay on The Nature and Immutability of Truth In Opposition to Sophistry and Scepticism (1770), is a rhetorical tour de force which affirmed the sovereignty of common sense while attacking David Hume (1711-1776). A smash bestseller in its day, this Essay on Truth made Beattie very famous and Hume very angry. The work's fame proved fleeting, as did Beattie’s philosophical reputation.as did Beattie’s philosophical reputation.)
Bolt (1998) + (John Herschel's natural philosophy, as sum … John Herschel's natural philosophy, as summarized in his Preliminary Discourse on the Study of Natural Philosophy , has long been considered a continuation of Francis Bacon's New Organon; commentators have frequently interpreted both as promoting a naive, inductivist methodology. I argue rather that Herschel promotes a more warranted and more sophisticated account. A careful reading of the Discourse, as well as of his more specialized essays, shows instead that Herschel explicitly encourages and defends the use of hypothetical reasoning. Such a methodology also describes his own extensive investigations that range over much of the spectrum of the physical sciences in the early nineteenth century. In developing this methodology, Herschel also drew on textual resources of Bacon, Isaac Newton, Roger Boscovich, Dugald Stewart, and others; most importantly, he was especially indebted to the investigations, views, and methods of his astronomer father, William Herschel. In particular, John Herschel applied his synthesis of these ideas to the empirical confirmation of his father's wide-ranging and speculative theories. In both the Discourse and in his other works, such as the Treatise on Astronomy, John Herschel promotes the use of hypotheses and of deductive methods as the tools used by experts, portraying inductive methods as the means by which sciences begin or as the most appropriate approach employed by amateurs. I also show how events of his life, including the socio-political context of early-nineteenth-century Britain, shaped Herschel's expression of his natural philosophy. Herschel's central role in the rise of science and of the philosophy of science in the nineteenth century make it imperative that we obtain a more accurate understanding of the doctrines he disseminated to practitioners of science and to popular audiences of the Victorian era. This volume provides the beginning of this broader taskrovides the beginning of this broader task)
Dunn (2003) + (John Locke (1632-1704) one of the greatest … John Locke (1632-1704) one of the greatest English philosophers of the late seventeenth and early eighteenth century, argued in his masterpiece, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, that our knowledge is founded in experience and reaches us principally through our senses; but its message has been curiously misunderstood. In this book John Dunn shows how Locke arrived at his theory of knowledge, and how his exposition of the liberal values of tolerationand responsible government formed the backbone of enlightened European thought of the eighteenth century.uropean thought of the eighteenth century.)
Uzgalis (2016) + (John Locke (b. 1632, d. 1704) was a Britis … John Locke (b. 1632, d. 1704) was a British philosopher, Oxford academic and medical researcher. Locke's monumental An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1689) is one of the first great defenses of empiricism and concerns itself with determining the limits of human understanding in respect to a wide spectrum of topics. It thus tells us in some detail what one can legitimately claim to know and what one cannot. Locke's association with Anthony Ashley Cooper (later the First Earl of Shaftesbury) led him to become successively a government official charged with collecting information about trade and colonies, economic writer, opposition political activist, and finally a revolutionary whose cause ultimately triumphed in the Glorious Revolution of 1688. Among Locke's political works he is most famous for The Second Treatise of Government in which he argues that sovereignty resides in the people and explains the nature of legitimate government in terms of natural rights and the social contract. He is also famous for calling for the separation of Church and State in his Letter Concerning Toleration. Much of Locke's work is characterized by opposition to authoritarianism. This is apparent both on the level of the individual person and on the level of institutions such as government and church. For the individual, Locke wants each of us to use reason to search after truth rather than simply accept the opinion of authorities or be subject to superstition. He wants us to proportion assent to propositions to the evidence for them. On the level of institutions it becomes important to distinguish the legitimate from the illegitimate functions of institutions and to make the corresponding distinction for the uses of force by these institutions. Locke believes that using reason to try to grasp the truth, and determine the legitimate functions of institutions will optimize human flourishing for the individual and society both in respect to its material and spiritual welfare. This in turn, amounts to following natural law and the fulfillment of the divine purpose for humanity.llment of the divine purpose for humanity.)
Jolley (1992) + (Jolley examines the reception of Descartes' philosophy within his contemporary scientific, academic, and religious communities.)
De Pierris and Friedman (2013) + (Kant famously attempted to “answer” what h … Kant famously attempted to “answer” what he took to be Hume's skeptical view of causality, most explicitly in the Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics (1783); and, because causality, for Kant, is a central example of a category or pure concept of the understanding, his relationship to Hume on this topic is central to his philosophy as a whole. Moreover, because Hume's famous discussion of causality and induction is equally central to his philosophy, understanding the relationship between the two philosophers on this issue is crucial for a proper understanding of modern philosophy more generally. Yet ever since Kant offered his response to Hume the topic has been subject to intense controversy. There is no consensus, of course, over whether Kant's response succeeds, but there is no more consensus about what this response is supposed to be. There has been sharp disagreement concerning Kant's conception of causality, as well as Hume's, and, accordingly, there has also been controversy over whether the two conceptions really significantly differ. There has even been disagreement concerning whether Hume's conception of causality and induction is skeptical at all. We shall not discuss these controversies in detail; rather, we shall concentrate on presenting one particularperspective on this very complicated set of issues. We shall clearlyindicate, however, where especially controversial points of interpretationarise and briefly describe some of the main alternatives.ly describe some of the main alternatives.)
Lakatos (1961) + (Lakatos's PhD Thesis.)
Laudan (1984a) + (Laudan constructs a fresh approach to a lo … Laudan constructs a fresh approach to a longtime problem for the philosopher of science: how to explain the simultaneous and widespread presence of both agreement and disagreement in science. Laudan critiques the logical empiricists and the post-positivists as he stresses the need for centrality and values and the interdependence of values, methods, and facts as prerequisites to solving the problems of consensus and dissent in science.blems of consensus and dissent in science.)
Hoyningen-Huene (2006) + (Let me begin with a convention. I will ref … Let me begin with a convention. I will refer to the distinction between the context of discovery and the context of justification as “the DJ distinction” (where I may note, for potentially misled younger readers, that this “DJ” has nothing to do with the music business). This paper is based on an older paper of mine (Hoyningen-Huene 1987). In the present paper, I will first recapitulate some of the topics of the older paper, and will contribute further considerations. Subsequently, I will discuss Thomas Kuhn’s ideas about justification in science. Thus will be clarified, in which sense precisely Kuhn opposed the DJ distinction. This is noteworthy, because in the 1960s and 1970s, many philosophers concluded from Kuhn’s opposition to the context distinction that he just did not understand what it was all about (and they inferred from this that he was just too uneducated as a philosopher to be taken seriously).d as a philosopher to be taken seriously).)
Kochiras (2014) + (Locke's philosophy of science consists lar … Locke's philosophy of science consists largely in his metaphysical and epistemological views of material substances and their powers. Locke has been widely hailed for providing an epistemological foundation for the experimental science of his day, and his thought is closely aligned with that of its practitioners, elaborating certain themes present in sparer form in Boyle and Newton. But if his epistemology helps to usher in the age of science, he still belongs to the age of natural philosophy. And if he is a devotee of the new science, he often appears an uncertain one, recognizing profound difficulties in it. In consequence, Locke's work is characterized by tensions and nuances, providing a rich source for scholarly research and debate. source for scholarly research and debate.)

Chappell (Ed.) (1994) + (Locke's philosophy, as edited by Chappell.)

Barseghyan and Shaw (2022) + (Many have struggled to identify the proper … Many have struggled to identify the proper way(s) that normative philosophical claims about science can benefit from history. The primary worry here has been that deriving philosophical ‘oughts’ from historical facts would commit the naturalistic fallacy (Schickore, 2011). The task of this paper is to introduce a novel solution to this problem. Specifically, we claim that the emerging field of scientonomy provides a promising avenue for how philosophy of science may benefit from the history of science. By taking descriptive findings and coupling them with additional normative premises, philosophers of science can draw normative methodological conclusions which can guide future scientific practices. Moreover, it is sometimes thought that philosophical claims about science are invariably local due to the diversity of scientific practices. While acknowledging this disunity, we show how a general theory of scientific change is possible and how it can be used to inform normative philosophy of science. Thus, we aim to outline a viable path for integrated history and philosophy of science that does not relinquish normativity and avoids the problem of cherry-picking which has plagued general accounts of science (Chang, 2011; Mizrahi, 2015).s of science (Chang, 2011; Mizrahi, 2015).)
Nickles (2017a) + (Many scientists, philosophers, and laypers … Many scientists, philosophers, and laypersons have regarded science as the one human enterprise that successfully escapes the contingencies of history to establish eternal truths about the universe, via a special, rational method of inquiry. Historicists oppose this view. In the 1960s several historically informed philosophers of science challenged the then-dominant accounts of scientific method advanced by the Popperians and the positivists (the logical positivists and logical empiricists) for failing to fit historical scientific practice and failing particularly to account for deep scientific change. While several strands of historicism originated in nineteenth-century historiography, this article focuses, first, on the historicist conceptions of scientific rationality that became prominent in the 1960s and 1970s, as the maturation of the field of historiography of science began to suggest competing models of scientific development, and, second, on recent approaches such as historical epistemology.pproaches such as historical epistemology.)
Longino (2008) + (Miriam Solomon's social empiricism is mark … Miriam Solomon's social empiricism is marked by emphasis on community level rationality in science and the refusal to impose a distinction between the epistemic and the non-epistemic character of factors (“decision vectors”) that incline scientists for or against a theory. While she attempts to derive some norms from the analysis of cases, her insistent naturalism undermines her effort to articulate norms for the (appropriate) distribution of decision vectors.opriate) distribution of decision vectors.)
Feyerabend (1993) + (Modern philosophy of science has paid grea … Modern philosophy of science has paid great attention to the understanding of scientific "practice", in contrast to the earlier concentration on scientific "method". This work, which has contributed to this debate, shows the deficiencies of some widespread ideas about the nature of knowledge. He argues that the only feasible explanations of scientific successes are historical explanations and that anarchism must now replace rationalism in the theory of knowledge. The third edition of this text contains a new preface and additional reflections which take account both of recent debates on science and on the impact of scientific products and practices on the human community. While disavowing populism or relativism, Feyerabend continues to insist that the voice of the inexpert must be heard. Thus many environmental perils were first identified by non-experts against prevailing assumptions in the scientific community.g assumptions in the scientific community.)
Reider (2016) + (Most philosophers agree that the world con … Most philosophers agree that the world contains epistemic subjects, the subjects of knowledge claims and other epistemic assessments. But does the world contain specifically epistemic agents? We talk as if epistemic subjects are agents -- 'His belief is irresponsible,' 'She ought to have known' -- but may on reflection wonder whether we should take the talk at face value. Are you responsible for your beliefs in anything like the way you are responsible for your actions? Does failing to know impugn your character in a way that parallels your failure to act with practical wisdom? Affirmative answers may emerge from reflection on the social dimension of knowing: from how you may come to know through others' testimony or let others know in turn. Can we make sense of such epistemic community without attributing specifically epistemic agency to its participants? Flipping our opening question on its head, should the social provenance of epistemic agency affect how we conceptualize the nature of epistemic subjects?ptualize the nature of epistemic subjects?)
Norton (2009) + (Much of what David Hume said about a wide … Much of what David Hume said about a wide range of subjectsremains of great importance today. In the first volume of his firstwork, A Treatise of Human Nature, a work in which he articulateda new “science of human nature,” Hume focused on an interrelatedset of issues in theory of knowledge, metaphysics, and philosophicalpsychology. More particularly, he explained how it is that we formsuch important conceptions as space and time, cause and effect,external objects, and personal identity. At the same time, he offeredan equally important account of how or why we believe in the objectsof these conceptions – an account of why we believe that causes arenecessarily connected to effects, that there are enduring externalobjects, and that there are enduring selves – even though the humanmind is unable to provide a satisfactory proof that these phenomenaexist. In the second volume of the Treatise Hume expanded hisaccount of human psychology, focusing on the origin and role of thepassions and the nature of human freedom. In the third and finalvolume of this work he explored the origins and nature of morality.In later works he returned to many of these philosophical issues,but he also made substantial contributions to our understanding ofpolitical theory, aesthetics, economics, and philosophy of religion.In addition, he wrote an influential, six-volume History of England,a work published in over 175 editions in the eighteenth and nineteenthcenturies, and still in print. nineteenth centuries, and still in print.)
Sarwar (2022) + (My aim in this chapter is to introduce the … My aim in this chapter is to introduce the general system theory and to provide directions for research. One of the central issues in scientonomy is that its object of study is ill-defined. I will begin to approach this question by drawing on the general system theory. In so doing, I will introduce the scientonomic community to a radically different way of thinking about explaining changes in scientific worldviews. Even if many of my ideas appear radical, I hope that by contradistinction the reader may appreciate how the scientonomic ideas may be made more precise.ientonomic ideas may be made more precise.)
Paley (1809) + (Natural Theology or Evidences of the Exist … Natural Theology or Evidences of the Existence and Attributes of the Deity is an 1802 work of Christian apologetics and philosophy of religion by the English clergyman William Paley (July 1743 – 25 May 1805). The book expounds his arguments from natural theology, making a teleological argument for the existence of God, notably beginning with the watchmaker analogy.The book was written in the context of the natural theology tradition. In earlier centuries, theologians such as John Ray and William Derham, as well as philosophers of classical times such as Cicero, argued for the existence and goodness of God from the general well-being of living things and the physical world.Paley's Natural Theology is an extended argument, constructed around a series of examples including finding a watch; comparing the eye to a telescope; and the existence of finely adapted mechanical structures in animals, such as joints which function like hinges or manmade ball and socket joints. Paley argues that these all lead to an intelligent Creator, and that a system is more than the sum of its parts. The last chapters are more theological in character, arguing that the attributes of God must be sufficient for the extent of his operations, and that God must be good because designs seen in nature are beneficial.The book was many times republished and remains in print. It continues to be consulted by creationists. Charles Darwin took its arguments seriously and responded to them; evolutionary biologists like Stephen Jay Gould and Richard Dawkins continue to discuss Paley's book to respond to modern proponents with similar ideas.d to modern proponents with similar ideas.)
Rescher (2000b) + (Nature and Understanding explores the pros … Nature and Understanding explores the prospect of looking from a scientific point of view at such central ideas of traditional metaphysics as the simplicity of nature, its comprehensibility, or its systematic integrity. Rescher seeks to describe - in a way accessible to philosophers and nonphilosophers alike - the metaphysical situation that characterizes the process of inquiry in natural science. His principal aim is to see what light can be shed on reality by examining the modus operandi of natural science itself, focusing as much on its findings as on its conceptual and methodological presuppositions. This is the culmination of many years of penetrating work in this area of philosophy by one of its most eminent exponents. It is the definitive presentation of some of Rescher's key ideas.esentation of some of Rescher's key ideas.)
Smith (2009) + (No work of science has drawn more attentio … No work of science has drawn more attention from philosophers than Newton's Principia. The reasons for this, however, and consequently the focus of the attention have changed significantly from one century to the next. During the 20th Century philosophers have viewed the Principia in the context of Einstein's new theory of gravity in his theory of general relativity. The main issues have concerned the relation between Newton'sand Einstein's theories of gravity and what the need to replace the former with the latter says about the nature, scope, and limits of scientific knowledge. During most of the 18th Century, by contrast, Newton's theory of gravity remained under dispute, especially because of the absence of a mechanism — in particular, a contact mechanism — producing gravitational forces. The philosophic literature correspondingly endeavored to clarify and to resolve, one way or the other, the dispute over whether the Principia should or should not be viewed as methodologically well founded. By the 1790s Newton's theory of gravity had become established among those engaged in research in orbital mechanics and physical geodesy, leading to the Principia becoming the exemplar of science at its most successful. Philosophic interest in the Principia during the 19th Century therefore came to focus on how Newton had achieved this success, in part to characterize the knowledge that had been achieved and in part to pursue comparable knowledge in other areas of research. Unfortunately, a very large fraction of the philosophic literature in all three centuries has suffered from a quite simplistic picture of the Principia itself. The main goal of this entry is to replace that simplistic picture with one that does more justice to the richness of both the content and the methodology of the Principiantent and the methodology of the Principia)
Thijssen (2003) + (On March 7, 1277, the Bishop of Paris, Ste … On March 7, 1277, the Bishop of Paris, Stephen Tempier, prohibited the teaching of 219 philosophical and theological theses that were being discussed and disputed in the faculty of arts under his jurisdiction. Tempier’s condemnation has gained great symbolic meaning in the minds of modern intellectual historians, and possibly for this reason, there is still considerable disagreement about what motivated Tempier to promulgate his prohibition, what exactly was condemned, and who the targets were. In addition, the effects of Tempier’s action on the course of medieval thought in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, and even beyond, has been the subject of much debate. The lack of a commonly accepted standard account of Tempier’s actions plus the enormous amount of literature and of textual evidence that either directly or indirectly bears on the events of 1277, puts specific limitations to the present entry. It will be confined to presenting those historical facts that are uncontroversial and to indicating the main issues of current debate with respect to Tempier’s condemnation.te with respect to Tempier’s condemnation.)
Abbott et al. (2016) + (On September 14, 2015 at 09:50:45 UTC the … On September 14, 2015 at 09:50:45 UTC the two detectors of the Laser Interferometer Gravitational-Wave Observatory simultaneously observed a transient gravitational-wave signal. The signal sweeps upwards in frequency from 35 to 250 Hz with a peak gravitational-wave strain of 1.0 × 10−21. It matches the waveform predicted by general relativity for the inspiral and merger of a pair of black holes and the ringdown of the resulting single black hole. These observations demonstrate the existence of binary stellar-mass black hole systems. This is the first direct detection of gravitational waves and the first observation of a binary black hole merger.observation of a binary black hole merger.)
Castelvecchi and Witze (2016) + (One hundred years after Albert Einstein predicted the existence of gravitational waves, scientists have finally spotted these elusive ripples in space-time.)
Fraser (2022) + (One of the most salient lessons from HPS a … One of the most salient lessons from HPS as a discipline is that science is a living, breathing endeavor; one whose rules and values are constantly changing. As such, there is an essential tension between the hope for a coherent, unified conception of scientific rationality on the one hand, and the recognition of the diversity of perspectives which fit into the framework called science. The big question, of which I hope to answer a small part, is: how can rationality and relativism be reconciled with one another? To do this, I present a rational reconstruction of a theory of scientific change which resembles Barseghyan’s theory of scientific change. I interpret scientific knowledge modally; the scientific mosaic of a community at a particular time is taken to represent the actual instantiation of a collection of possible scientific changes, all linked to one another through a Kripkean semantics of possible worlds. I then draw a correspondence between accepted scientific theories and employed methods with logical axioms and rules of inference respectively and use this to construct a logical framework for studying the modality of scientific knowledge. I use this framework to obtain a notion of scientific rationality which is contextually localized, but still presents a clear direction of scientific development at every individual time step.development at every individual time step.)
Sarton (1987) + (Originally Published 1931.)
Sarton (2011) + (Originally published by Harvard University Press in 1952.)
Sarton (1957a) + (Originally published in 1936 by Harvard University Press.)
Sarton (2007) + (Originally published in 1948.)
Sarton (2017) + (Originally published in 1955.)
Ruse (1999) + (Originally published in 1979, The Darwinia … Originally published in 1979, The Darwinian Revolution was the first comprehensive and readable synthesis of the history of evolutionary thought. Though the years since have seen an enormous flowering of research on Darwin and other nineteenth-century scientists concerned with evolution, as well as the larger social and cultural responses to their work, The Darwinian Revolution remains remarkably current and stimulating.emains remarkably current and stimulating.)
Schantz and Seidel (Eds.) (2011) + (Over history, cognitive relativism has bee … Over history, cognitive relativism has been an unpopular viewpoint in the philosophy of knowledge. Yet relativist ideas in epistemology have experienced an unprecedented popularity in the twentieth century due thinkers such as Willard Quine, Thomas Kuhn, and Ludwig Wittgenstein. The questions of whether these ideas, in fact, support relativism, and whether or not a social constructivist view of science is logically coherent and feasible is the subject of this series of essays.e is the subject of this series of essays.)
Leary (1979) + (Over the past one hundred years psychology … Over the past one hundred years psychology has evolved into a major scientific discipline. Nonetheless, psychology is presently in a state of considerable turmoil regarding its proper subject matter and method. Is psychology a natural science, a social science, or a hybrid of the two? What relation should psychology maintain with philosophy? These general questions, currently under debate, were addressed by Wilhelm Wundt, one of the founders of modern experimental psychology. This articleis an attempt to specify Wundt’s conceptualization of psychology and to place it in its historical context. Secondarily it also traces certain major developments since the time of Wundt. The conclusion that is reached is that the apparent contemporary "crisis" in psychology is really nothing new and that, in fact, the present condition of psychology does not necessarily constitute a crisis. In its broad outline at least, present-day psychology reflects the program which Wundt espoused one hundredyears ago.hich Wundt espoused one hundred years ago.)
Feyerabend (1981b) + (Over the past thirty years Paul Feyerabend … Over the past thirty years Paul Feyerabend has developed an extremely distinctive and influential approach to problems in the philosophy of science. The most important and seminal of his published essays are collected here in two volumes, with new introductions to provide an overview and historical perspective on the discussions of each part. Volume 1 presents papers on the interpretation of scientific theories, together with papers applying the views developed to particular problems in philosophy and physics. The essays in volume 2 examine the origin and history of an abstract rationalism, as well as its consequences for the philosophy of science and methods of scientific research. Professor Feyerabend argues with great force and imagination for a comprehensive and opportunistic pluralism. In doing so he draws on extensive knowledge of scientific history and practice, and he is alert always to the wider philosophical, practical and political implications of conflicting views. These two volumes fully display the variety of his ideas, and confirm the originality and significance of his work. originality and significance of his work.)
Feyerabend (1981a) + (Over the past thirty years Paul Feyerabend … Over the past thirty years Paul Feyerabend has developed an extremely distinctive and influential approach to problems in the philosophy of science. The most important and seminal of his published essays are collected here in two volumes, with new introductions to provide an overview and historical perspective on the discussions of each part. Volume 1 presents papers on the interpretation of scientific theories, together with papers applying the views developed to particular problems in philosophy and physics. The essays in volume 2 examine the origin and history of an abstract rationalism, as well as its consequences for the philosophy of science and methods of scientific research. Professor Feyerabend argues with great force and imagination for a comprehensive and opportunistic pluralism. In doing so he draws on extensive knowledge of scientific history and practice, and he is alert always to the wider philosophical, practical and political implications of conflicting views. These two volumes fully display the variety of his ideas, and confirm the originality and significance of his work. originality and significance of his work.)
Pitt (Ed.) (1985) + (Papers related to and arising from the Fourth International Conference on History and Philosophy of Science, Blacksburg, Virginia, November 1982.)

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