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Split Due to Inconclusiveness theorem (Barseghyan-2015) Reason1 + (Barseghyan notes that, "when a mosaic spli … Barseghyan notes that, "when a mosaic split is a result of the acceptance of two new theories, it may or may not be a result of inconclusiveness".[[CITE_Barseghyan (2015)|p. 209]][[File:Mosaic Split Resulting From Two Mutually Incompatible Theories May Not Be A Result of Inconclusive Theory Assessment.png|578px|center||]]"Thus," he concludes, "if we are to detect any instances of inconclusive theory assessment, we must refer to the case of a mosaic split that takes place with only one new theory becoming accepted by one part of the community with the other part sticking to the old theory. This scenario is covered by the possible mosaic split theorem. We can conclude that when a mosaic split takes place with only one new theory involved, this can only indicate that the outcome of the assessment of that theory was inconclusive."[[CITE_Barseghyan (2015)|pp. 209-210]]This is the deduction of the Split Due to Inconclusiveness Theorem.the Split Due to Inconclusiveness Theorem.)
Subtypes of Epistemic Element + (Barseghyan present the the redrafted ontology)
Theory Rejection theorem (Barseghyan-2015) Reason2 + (Barseghyan presented the initial deduction … Barseghyan presented the initial deduction (2015) of the theorem:[[CITE_Barseghyan (2015)|p. 167]]<blockquote> By the first law for theories, we know that an accepted theory can become rejected only when it is replaced in the mosaic by some other theory. But the law of compatibility doesn’t specify under what conditions this replacement takes place. For that we have to refer to the zeroth law, which states that at any moment of time the elements of the mosaic are mutually compatible. Suppose that a new theory meets the requirements of the time and becomes accepted into the mosaic. Question: what happens to the other theories of the mosaic? While some of the accepted theories may preserve their position in the mosaic, other theories may be rejected. The fate of an old accepted theory depends on whether it is compatible with the newly accepted theory. If it is compatible with the new accepted theory, it remains in the mosaic; the acceptance of the new theory doesn’t affect that old theory in any way. This is normally the case when the new theory comes as an addition to the theories that are already in the mosaic. For instance, when the new theory happens to be the first accepted theory of its domain, i.e. when there is a new field of science that has never had any accepted theories before). Yet, if an old theory is incompatible with the new one, the old theory becomes rejected, for otherwise the mosaic would contain mutually incompatible elements, which is forbidden by the law of compatibility. Therefore, there is only one scenario when a theory can no longer remain in the mosaic, i.e. when other theories which are incompatible with that theory become accepted.</blockquote>[[File:Theory-rejection-theorem.jpg|607px|center||]]le:Theory-rejection-theorem.jpg|607px|center||]])
Asynchronism of Method Employment theorem (Barseghyan-2015) + (Barseghyan presents a historical example s … Barseghyan presents a historical example showing that scientific change is not necessarily a ''synchronous'' process. <blockquote> When it comes to acquiring data about such minute objects as molecules or living cells, the unaided human eye is virtually useless. This proposition yields, among other things, an abstract requirement that, when counting the number of cells, the resulting value is acceptable only if it is obtained with an “aided” eye. This abstract requirement has been implemented in a variety of different ways. First, there is the counting chamber method where the cells are placed in a counting chamber – a microscope slide with a special sink – and the number of cells is counted manually under a microscope. There is also the plating method where the cells are distributed on a plate with a growth medium and each cell gives rise to a single colony. The number of cells is then deduced from the number of colonies. In addition, there is the flow cytometry method where the cells are hit by a laser beam one by one and the number of cells is counted by means of detecting the light reflected by the cells. Finally, there is the spectrophotometry method where the number of cells is obtained by means of measuring the turbidity in a spectrophotometer.[[CITE_Barseghyan (2015)|pp. 151-152]]</blockquote>These are three different implementations of the ''same'' abstract requirement, which were, importantly, all devised and employed at different times.ortantly, all devised and employed at different times.)
Contextual Appraisal theorem (Barseghyan-2015) Reason1 + (Barseghyan presents the following descript … Barseghyan presents the following description of the deduction of the ''contextual appraisal theorem'':<blockquote> By the second law, in actual theory assessment a contender theory is assessed by the method employed at the time ... In addition, it follows from the first law for theories that a theory is assessed only if it attempts to enter into the mosaic; once in the mosaic, the theory no longer needs any further appraisal. In this sense, the accepted theory and the contender theory are never on equal footing, for it is up to the contender theory to show that it deserves to become accepted. In order to replace the accepted theory in the mosaic, the contender theory must be declared superior by the current method; to be “as good as” the accepted theory is not sufficient.</blockquote>[[File:Contextual-appraisal.jpg|607px|center||]]le:Contextual-appraisal.jpg|607px|center||]])
The Zeroth Law (Harder-2015) + (Barseghyan presents the following example … Barseghyan presents the following example of two hypothetical communities to illustrate the notion of ''incompatibility tolerance''.<blockquote>First, imagine a community that believes that all of their accepted theories are absolutely (demonstratively) true. This ''infallibilist'' community also knows that, according to classical logic, p and not-p cannot be both true. Since, according to this community, all accepted theories are strictly true, the only way the community can avoid triviality is by stipulating that any two accepted theories must be mutually consistent. In other words, by the third law, they end up employing the classical logical law of noncontradiction as their criterion of compatibility.Now, imagine another community that accepts the position of ''fallibilism''. This community holds that no theory in empirical science can be demonstratively true and, consequently, all accepted empirical theories are merely quasi-true. But if any accepted empirical theory is only quasi-true, it is possible for two accepted empirical theories to be mutually inconsistent. In other words, this community accepts that two contradictory propositions may both contain grains of truth, i.e. to be quasi-true. [[CITE_Bueno et al (1998)]]. In order to avoid triviality, this community employs a paraconsistent logic, i.e. a logic where a contradiction does not imply everything. This fallibilist community does not necessarily reject classical logic; it merely realizes that the application of classical logic to quasi-true propositions entails triviality. Thus, the community also realizes that the application of classical principle of noncontradiction to empirical science is problematic, for no empirical theory is strictly true. As a result, by the third law, this community employs criteria of compatibility very different from those employed by the infallibilist community.[[CITE_Barseghyan (2015)||pp.154-6]]</blockquote>[[CITE_Barseghyan (2015)||pp.154-6]]</blockquote>)
The Zeroth Law (Harder-2015) + (Barseghyan presents the following example … Barseghyan presents the following example of the possibility for simultaneous use of mutually incompatible theories, even in the same scientific project. "Circa 1600, astronomers could easily use both Ptolemaic and Copernican astronomical theories to calculate the ephemerides of different planets. Similarly, in order to obtain a useful tool for calculating atomic spectra, Bohr mixed some propositions of classical electrodynamics with a number of quantum hypotheses.[[CITE_Smith (1988)]] Finally, when nowadays we build a particle accelerator, we use both classical and quantum physics in our calculations. Thus, sometimes propositions from two or more incompatible theories are mixed in order to obtain something practically useful".[[CITE_Barseghyan (2015)||pp.157-8]][[CITE_Barseghyan (2015)||pp.157-8]])
The Zeroth Law (Harder-2015) + (Barseghyan presents the following example … Barseghyan presents the following example of the indirect incompatibility that can exist between theories and methods:<blockquote>Say there is an accepted theory which says that better nutrition can improve a patient’s condition. We know from the discussion in the previous section that the conjunction of this proposition with the basic requirement to accept only the best available theories yields a requirement that the factor of improved nutrition must be taken into account when testing a drug’s efficacy.Now, envision a method which doesn’t take the factor of better nutrition into account and prescribes that a drug’s efficacy should be tested in a straightforward fashion by giving it only to one group of patients. This method will be incompatible with the requirement that the possible impact of improved nutrition must be taken into account. Therefore, indirectly, it will also be incompatible with a theory from which the requirement follows.[[CITE_Barseghyan (2015)|p.163-4]]</blockquote>arseghyan (2015)|p.163-4]]</blockquote>)
The Zeroth Law (Harder-2015) + (Barseghyan presents the following historic … Barseghyan presents the following historical examples of the simultaneous pursuit of mutually incompatible theories. Of course, we should note that there is "nothing extraordinary" about this: it is the pursuit of different options that makes scientific change possible!<blockquote>Take for instance, Clausius’s attempt to derive Carnot’s theorem, where he drew on two incompatible theories of heat – Carnot’s caloric theory of heat, where heat was considered a fluid, and also Joule’s kinetic theory of heat, where the latter was conceived as a “force” that can be converted into work.[[CITE_Meheus (2003)]]. Thus, the existence of incompatible propositions in the context of pursuit is quite obvious. There is good reason to believe that “reasoning from an inconsistent theory usually plays an important heuristic role”[[CITE_Meheus(2003)||pp.131]] and that "the use of inconsistent representations of the world as heuristic guideposts to consistent theories is an important part of scientific discovery"[[CITE_Smith(1988)||pp.429]].[[CITE_Barseghyan (2015)||pp.158]]</blockquote>(2015)||pp.158]]</blockquote>)
Compatibility Criteria (Barseghyan-2015) + (Barseghyan presents the following hypothet … Barseghyan presents the following hypothetical-historical example when compatibility criteria are introduced in [[Barseghyan (2015)]].<blockquote>It can be argued that our contemporary criteria of compatibility have not always been employed. Consider the case of the reconciliation of the Aristotelian natural philosophy and metaphysics with Catholic theology. As soon as most works of Aristotle and its Muslim commentators were translated into Latin (circa 1200), it became obvious that some propositions of Aristotle’s original system were inconsistent with several dogmas of the then-accepted Catholic theology. Take, for instance, the Aristotelian conceptions of determinism, the eternity of the cosmos, and the mortality of the individual soul. Evidently, these conceptions were in direct conflict with the accepted Catholic doctrines of God’s omnipotence and free will, of creation, and of the immortality of the individual human soul.[[CITE_Lindberg (2007)|p. 228–253]]. Moreover, some of the passages of Scripture, when taken literally, appeared to be in conflict with the propositions of the Aristotelian natural philosophy. In particular, Scripture seemed to imply that the Earth is flat (e.g. Daniel 4:10-11; Mathew 4:8; Revelation 7:1), which was in conflict with the Aristotelian view that the Earth is spherical. It is no surprise, therefore, that many of the propositions of the Aristotelian natural philosophy were condemned on several occasions during the 13th century.[[CITE_Lindberg (2007)|p.226-249]]. To resolve the conflict, Albert the Great, Thomas Aquinas and others modified both the Aristotelian natural philosophy and the biblical descriptions of natural phenomena to make them consistent with each other. On the one hand, they stipulated that the laws of the Aristotelian natural philosophy describe the natural course of events only insofar as they do not limit God’s omnipotence, for God can violate any laws if he so desires. Similarly, they modified Aristotle’s determinism by adding that the future of the cosmos is determined by its present only insofar as it is not affected by free will or divine miracles. Similar modifications were introduced to many other Aristotelian propositions. On the other hand, it was also made clear that biblical descriptions of cosmological and physical phenomena are not to be taken literally, for Scripture often employs a simple language in order to be accessible to common folk. Thus, where possible, literal interpretations of Scripture were supposed to be replaced by interpretations based on the Aristotelian natural philosophy.[[CITE_Grant (2004)|p.220-224, 245]] Importantly, it is only after this reconciliation that the modified Aristotelian-medieval natural philosophy became accepted by the community.[[CITE_Lindberg (2007)|p.250-1]]This and similar examples seem to be suggesting that the compatibility criteria employed by the medieval scientific community were quite different from those employed nowadays. While apparently we are inconsistency-tolerant (at least when dealing with theories in empirical science), the medieval scientific community was inconsistency-intolerant in the sense that they wouldn’t tolerate any open inconsistencies in the mosaic.[[CITE_Barseghyan (2015)|p.160-161]]</blockquote>ghyan (2015)|p.160-161]]</blockquote>)
The Zeroth Law (Harder-2015) + (Barseghyan writes that "the conflict betwe … Barseghyan writes that "the conflict between general relativity and quantum physics is probably the most famous illustration of this phenomenon," that phenomenon being the knowing acceptance of two contradicting theories by a community. "We normally take general relativity as the best description of the world at the level of massive objects and quantum physics as the best available description of the micro-world. But we also know that, from the classical logical perspective, the two theories contradict each other. The inconsistency of their conjunction becomes apparent when they are applied to objects that are both extremely massive and extremely small (i.e. a singularity inside a black hole)".[[CITE_Barseghyan (2015)||pp.154]]Relativity maintains that all signals are local. That is, no signal can travel faster than light. Quantum theory, on the other hand, predicts faster than light influences. This has been known since the 1930's,[[CITE_Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen (1935)]] yet both quantum theory and relativity remain in the mosaic. Yet, despite the existence of this contradiction, the community accepts both theories as the best available descriptions of their respective domains. descriptions of their respective domains.)
Contextual Appraisal theorem (Barseghyan-2015) + (Barseghyan's deduction of the ''contextual … Barseghyan's deduction of the ''contextual appraisal theorem'' can be further understood through a brief example. Consider a situation wherein "the proponents of some alternative quantum theory argue that the currently accepted theory is no better than their own quantum theory".[[CITE_Barseghyan (2015)|p. 185]] But, importantly, we notice that they are taking theory assessment out of its ''historical context''! "Particularly," Barseghyan comments, "they ignore the phenomenon of scientific inertia – they ignore that, in order to remain in the mosaic, the accepted theory doesn’t need to do anything (by ''the first law'' for theories) and that it is their obligation to show that their contender theory is better (by ''the second law'')".[[CITE_Barseghyan (2015)|p. 185]]TE_Barseghyan (2015)|p. 185]])
Possible Mosaic Split theorem (Barseghyan-2015) + (Barseghyan's example of mosaic split which … Barseghyan's example of mosaic split which ''may'' result from ''one'' contender theory, proceeds as follows. <blockquote> Consider first the case with one contender theory. Suppose there is a scientific mosaic with its theories and methods and there is also a contender theory which becomes assessed by the currently employed method. If the assessment outcome is conclusive “accept”, the theory necessarily becomes accepted. If the outcome is conclusive “not accept”, the theory remains unaccepted. Both of these cases are quite straightforward. But what will happen if the outcome turns out to be inconclusive, i.e. if the assessment by the current method doesn’t provide a definitive prescription? When the assessment outcome is inconclusive, there are three possible courses of events. First, the new theory can remain unaccepted; in that case the mosaic will maintain its current state. Second, the new theory can also become accepted by the whole community; in that case a regular theory change will take place and the new theory will replace the old one. None of these two scenarios is particularly interesting here. However, there is also the third possible course of events. When the outcome of theory assessment is inconclusive, members of the community are free to choose whichever of the two scenarios – they can accept the theory, but they can equally choose to leave it unaccepted. Naturally, there are no guarantees that all of them will necessarily choose the same course of action. It is quite conceivable that some will opt for accepting the new theory, whereas the rest will prefer to keep the old theory. In other words, when the assessment of a contender theory yields an inconclusive outcome, the mosaic may split in two.[[CITE_Barseghyan (2015)|pp. 204-205]]</blockquote>[[File:Assessment_Outcomes_from_One_Contender_Theory.png|498px|center||]]sment_Outcomes_from_One_Contender_Theory.png|498px|center||]])
Necessary Method theorem (Barseghyan-2015) Reason1 + (Barseghyan's explanation of the deduction … Barseghyan's explanation of the deduction is as follows:[[CITE_Barseghyan (2015)|pp. 227-228]]<blockquote>By the [[Non-Empty Mosaic theorem (Barseghyan-2015)|Non-Empty Mosaic theorem]], any mosaic contains at least one element, which is either a theory or a method. But which one is it: is it a theory or is it a method? It is easy to see that if this necessary element of the mosaic were a theory, the process of scientific change would never begin in the first place. Suppose there is a community that accepts only one belief and employs no method whatsoever; this community has no expectations whatsoever. It is obvious that the mosaic of this community will never acquire another element. On the one hand, in order for new theories to become accepted into the mosaic, the mosaic must contain at least one method (by the second law). On the other hand, in order for the mosaic to acquire a new method, there must be not only accepted theories, but also at least one other employed method (by the third law). Indeed, if we recall the historical examples of the third law that we have discussed, we will see that new methods become employed when they are deductive consequences of accepted theories and at least one other employed method. Thus, the necessary (indispensable) element cannot be a theory – it must be a method.</blockquote>[[File:Necessary Method theorem Deduction.png|553px|center||]]File:Necessary Method theorem Deduction.png|553px|center||]])
The Third Law (Barseghyan-2015) + (Barseghyan's formulation of the third law … Barseghyan's formulation of the third law states that a [[Method|method]] becomes [[Employed Method|employed]] only when it is deducible from other employed methods and accepted [[Theory|theories]] of the time. "Essentially," Barseghyan writes, "the third law stipulates that our accepted theories shape our employed methods".[[CITE_Barseghyan (2015)|p. 132]]According to this formulation, a method becomes employed when:# it strictly follows from some other employed methods and accepted theories, ''or'' # it implements some abstract requirements of other employed methods. In a nutshell, this suggests that [[Theory Acceptance|accepted theories]] shape the set of [[Employed Method|implicit criteria employed]] in theory assessment.In practice, the third law states that when a new phenomenon is discovered, this discovery produces an abstract requirement to take that discovery into account when testing relevant theories. This abstract requirement is then specified by a new employed method.The third law does not stipulate how methods should go about specifying any new abstract requirement. The third law functions as a descriptive account of how methods change, and is not responsible for describing how methods ought to change. As such, it is an effective means of explicating the requirements of other employed methods.The third law has an important corollary: scientific change is not necessarily a ''synchronous '' process, which notably differs from Kuhn's view of scientific change as a ''wholesale,'' ''synchronous'' process.[[CITE_Barseghyan (2015)|p. 151]] This corollary is known as the [[Asynchronism of Method Employment theorem (Barseghyan-2015)]].[[Asynchronism of Method Employment theorem (Barseghyan-2015)]].)
Method Rejection theorem (Barseghyan-2015) Reason1 + (By [[The First Law (Barseghyan-2015)|the first law]] … By [[The First Law (Barseghyan-2015)|the first law]] for methods, an employed method will remain employed until it is replaced by other methods. By [[Compatibility Corollary (Fraser-Sarwar-2018)|the compatibility corollary]], the elements of the scientific mosaic are compatible with each other at any moment of time. Thus, a method can only become rejected when it is replaced by an incompatible method or methods.[[CITE_Barseghyan (2015)|pp. 172-176]] [[CITE_Fraser and Sarwar (2018)|pp. 72-74]][[File:Method Rejection Theorem deduction (Barseghyan-Fraser-Sarwar-2018).png|627px|center||]][[File:Method Rejection Theorem deduction (Barseghyan-Fraser-Sarwar-2018).png|627px|center||]])
Theory Rejection theorem (Barseghyan-2015) Reason1 + (By [[The First Law (Barseghyan-2015)|the first law]] … By [[The First Law (Barseghyan-2015)|the first law]] for theories, an accepted theory remains accepted until it is replaced by other theories. By [[Compatibility Corollary (Fraser-Sarwar-2018)|the compatibility corollary]], the elements of the scientific mosaic are compatible with each other at any moment of time. It follows, therefore, that a theory can only become rejected when it is replaced by an incompatible theory or theories.[[CITE_Barseghyan (2015)|pp. 167-172]] [[CITE_Fraser and Sarwar (2018)|pp. 72-74]][[File:Theory Rejection Theorem deduction (Barseghyan-Fraser-Sarwar-2018).png|623px|center||]][[File:Theory Rejection Theorem deduction (Barseghyan-Fraser-Sarwar-2018).png|623px|center||]])
Allow Modification Reformulations (Shaw-Barseghyan-2019) + (By allowing the discussants to suggest alt … By allowing the discussants to suggest alternative formulations in their comments, the workflow incentivizes commenting and aids consensus building. It often happens that the discussants agree that a little tweak in the original formulation would solve the problem. This can help speed up the advancement of our communal knowledge. In contrast, when the discussants are not permitted to reformulate the original formulations, the discussants have no other choice than to write a whole new paper arguing for what is otherwise a little tweak to the original formulation. Not only is this wasteful, but it also creates a bottleneck where a consensus formation is postponed due to bureaucratic restrictions. Thus, it is important to remove this bottleneck and allow the participants to alter original formulations. If a discussion yielded a new formulation, any such formulation should be clearly stated and added to the respective suggested modification, possibly under a separate heading (e.g. by distinguishing “Original Suggestion” from “Final Suggestion”). By default, the new formulation should bear the name of the author(s) of the original suggested modification, unless the original author(s) decides to give credit to those who significantly contributed to the reformulation. This should be decided collegially by the author, the commentators, and the editors on a case-by-case basis., and the editors on a case-by-case basis.)
Individual Level (Barseghyan-2015) + (By the ''individual level'' Barseghyan means an "individual scientist who has her own set of ideas and beliefs about the world, and employs certain methods which might be different than the accepted methods of the time".[[CITE_Barseghyan (2015)|p. 43]])
Epistemic Stances Towards Questions - Question Acceptance (Rawleigh-2018) + (Consider, for instance, the question "what … Consider, for instance, the question "what is the distance to the sphere of the stars?" which was once accepted as a legitimate topic of inquiry, but is no longer accepted. Similarly, the question "what is the mechanism of evolution of species?" is accepted nowadays, but wasn't accepted in the 17th century. Thus, we can say that questions acceptance is the stance that epistemic agents take towards questions.t epistemic agents take towards questions.)
Element Decay Is a Non-Scientonomic Phenomenon (Oh-2021) + (Element decay is not a scientonomic phenomenon and, thus, is outside of the scope of scientonomy.)
Epistemic Stances Towards Theories - Theory Acceptance (Barseghyan-2015) + (Epistemic stances explained by Barseghyan)
The First Law for Methods (Barseghyan-2015) + (Formulated for [[method]] … Formulated for [[method]]s, the first law states that the implicit expectations employed in theory assessment will continue to be employed until they are replaced by some alternate expectations.Just as is the case for [[The First Law for Theories (Barseghyan-2015)]], this law does not impose limitations on the sort of methods that can replace employed methods.[[CITE_Barseghyan (2015)|p. 125]] However, importantly, "the community never remains with no expectations whatsoever. When facing a new theory, the community always has some implicit expectations concerning such theories. These expectations may be very specific or they may be very abstract and vague, but some expectations are always present, for otherwise no theory assessment would be possible."[[CITE_Barseghyan (2015)|p. 126]][[CITE_Barseghyan (2015)|p. 126]])
Epistemic Stances Towards Epistemic Elements - Compatibility (Fraser-Sarwar-2018) + (Fraser and Sarwar argued that, as an epistemic stance, compatibility can be taken towards epistemic elements of all types.[[CITE_Fraser and Sarwar (2018)|p. 70]])
Scientonomic Workflow (Barseghyan et al.-2016) + (Gregory Rupik outlines the scientonomic workflow)

Barseghyan (2018) + (Hakob Barseghyan presenting the redrafted ontology)

Scientonomic Workflow (Barseghyan et al.-2016) + (Hakob Barseghyan presents the workflow in action)
René Descartes + (Hakob Barseghyan's lecture on Cartesian Worldview)
Isaac Newton + (Hakob Barseghyan's lecture on Newtonian Worldview)
Theory Pursuit (Barseghyan-2015) + (Hakob Barseghyan’s lecture on pursued theories)
The Zeroth Law (Harder-2015) + (Harder's reformulation of the Zeroth Law s … Harder's reformulation of the Zeroth Law states that “at any moment of time, the elements of the mosaic are compatible with each other”. ''Compatibility'' is a broader concept than strict logical ''consistency'', and is determined by the compatibility criteria of each mosaic.In Barseghyan's presentation of the Zeroth Law, he explains it thus: "The law of compatibility has three closely linked aspects. First, it states that two theories simultaneously accepted in the same mosaic cannot be incompatible with one another. It also states that at any moment two simultaneously employed methods cannot be incompatible with each other. Finally, it states that, at any moment of time, there can be no incompatibility between accepted theories and employed methods".[[CITE_Barseghyan (2015)||pp.157]] Importantly, the Zeroth Law extends only to theories and methods that are ''accepted'', not merely ''used'' or ''pursued''. What does it mean that the ''law of compatibility'' also extends to employed ''methods''? This matter receives significant attention in [[Barseghyan (2015)]]. As per Barseghyan, if two disciplines employ different requirements, their methods are not incompatible as they apply to two different disciplines, they merely "appear conflicting".[[CITE_Barseghyan (2015)||pp.162]] Even considering methods in the same discipline, two methods that "appear conflicting" are not necessarily incompatible. For instance, these methods may either be complementary ("connected by a logical AND"), providing multiple requirements for new theories, or provide ''alternative'' requirements for new theories ("connected by a logical OR").[[CITE_Barseghyan (2015)||pp.162-3]] Thus, Barseghyan asserts that methods are only incompatible "when they state ''exhaustive'' conditions for the acceptance of a theory. Say the first method stipulates that a theory is acceptable if and only if it provides confirmed novel predictions, while the second method requires that in order to become accepted a theory must necessarily solve more problems than the accepted theory. In this case, the two methods are incompatible and, by the ''law of compatibility'', they cannot be simultaneously employed".[[CITE_Barseghyan (2015)||pp.163]] Barseghyan also proposes that the only possible conflict between ''methods'' and ''theories'' is an indirect one, given that theories are descriptive propositions, whereas methods are prescriptive and normative. Thus, the method would have to be incompatible with those methods which follow from the theory for the method and theory to be incompatible.We should be careful not to confuse the concepts of ''compatibility'' and ''consistency''. Barseghyan details the distinction between these two concepts:<blockquote>"the formal definition of inconsistency is that a set is inconsistent just in case it entails some sentence and its negation, i.e. ''p'' and ''not-p''. The classical logical principle of noncontradiction stipulates that ''p'' and ''not-p'' cannot be true ... In contrast, the notion of compatibility implicit in the zeroth law is much more flexible, for its actual content depends on the criteria of compatibility employed at a given time. As a result, the actually employed criteria of compatibility can differ from mosaic to mosaic. While in some mosaics compatibility may be understood in the classical logical sense of consistency, in other mosaics it may be more flexible ... in principle, there can exist such mosaics, where two theories that are inconsistent in the classical logical sense are nevertheless mutually compatible and can be simultaneously accepted within the same mosaic. In other words, a mosaic can be ''inconsistency-intolerant'' or ''inconsistency-tolerant'' depending on the criteria of compatibility employed by the scientific community of the time"[[CITE_Barseghyan (2015)||pp.154]].</blockquote>The abstract criteria of compatibility have many possible implementations with in a community. These criteria are employed [[method|methods]], and therefore can change over time according to [[The Third Law (Barseghyan-2015)|the law of method employment]]. They dictate the standard that other theories and methods must meet so as to remain compatible with each other. The compatibility criterion of the contemporary scientific mosaic is believed to be along the lines of a non-explosive paraconsistent logic.[[CITE_Priest, Tanaka, and Weber (2015)]] This logic allows known contradictions, like the contradiction between signal locality in special relativity and signal non-locality in quantum mechanics to coexist without implying triviality. The compatibility criterion can be understood as a consequence of fallibilism about science. Even a community's best theories are merely truth-like, not strictly true. Our current compatibility criteria appears to be formulated as such. It is very likely that our current compatibility criteria has not always been the one employed. Discovery of the kind of compatibility criteria contained in the current and historical mosaics is an important empirical task for observational scientonomy.The zeroth law is thus named to emphasize that it applies to the mosaic while viewed from a ''static'' perspective. The other three laws take a ''dynamic'' perspective.[[CITE_Barseghyan (2015)||pp.153]].TE_Barseghyan (2015)||pp.153]].)
The First Law for Methods (Barseghyan-2015) + (Here are some possibilities for how method … Here are some possibilities for how method replacement by the first law might occur, as formulated by Barseghyan (2015):<blockquote>In the most basic case, a community can reject some of the more specific requirements of its currently employed method and revert to a more abstract method. Alternatively, it can replace those rejected requirements with some new specific requirements. Suppose the employed method stipulates that a new theory must be tested in repeatable experiments and observations. In principle, the community may one day remove some of the ingredients of this method, say, the requirement of repeatability. As a result, the community can either revert to a more abstract method or it can introduce a new requirement to replace the repeatability clause. For instance, the community may revert to the more abstract method which stipulates a new theory must be tested in experiments and observations (no repeatability requirement). Alternatively, it can introduce a new requirement that in addition to empirical testing a new theory must also explain all the facts explained by the accepted theory. Which of these two scenarios materialize at each particular instance is decided by a number of contingent factors.[[CITE_Barseghyan (2015)|p. 125]]</blockquote>[[CITE_Barseghyan (2015)|p. 125]]</blockquote>)
Dynamic Substantive Methods theorem (Barseghyan-2015) Reason1 + (Here is the deduction as it appears in Bar … Here is the deduction as it appears in Barseghyan (2015):[[CITE_Barseghyan (2015)|p. 220]]<blockquote> According to the thesis of fallibilism, accepted in the contemporary epistemology, no contingent proposition (i.e. proposition with empirical content) can be demonstratively true. Therefore, since substantive methods are based on fallible contingent propositions, they cannot be immune to change. Imagine a typical mosaic with an accepted theory and a method that implements the constraints imposed by this theory. It is obvious that the method in question is necessarily substantive (by the definition of substantive method). Now, suppose that there appears a new theory that manages to satisfy the current requirements and, as a result, replaces the accepted theory in the mosaic. Naturally, this new theory imposes new abstract constraints (by the third law). It is conceivable that these new abstract constraints are incompatible with the requirements of the current method. In such an instance, the old method will be replaced by the new one (by the method rejection theorem). In short, a rejection of theories can trigger a rejection of the substantive method. This idea has been already implicit in the synchronism of method rejection theorem. Thus, there are no guarantees that an employed substantive method will necessarily remain employed ad infinitum. Consequently, any substantive method is necessarily ''dynamic''.</blockquote>[[File:Dynamic-substantive-methods.jpg|607px|center||]][[File:Dynamic-substantive-methods.jpg|607px|center||]])
Sociocultural Factors in Theory Acceptance theorem (Barseghyan-2015) Reason1 + (Here is the detailed explanation of the de … Here is the detailed explanation of the deduction:<blockquote>When we refer to the second law, it becomes apparent that sociocultural factors can play part in the process of theory acceptance. In particular, it follows from the second law that something can affect a theory’s acceptance only insofar as it is permitted by the method employed at the time. If, for instance, the current method prescribes that theories are to be judged by their novel predictions, then confirmed novel predictions will be instrumental for the process of theory acceptance. But if the method prescribes that only intuitively true theories are acceptable, then the community’s intuitions will obviously affect the process of theory change. Similarly, if the method of the time ascribes an important role to the position of the dictator or the ruling party then, naturally, the process of theory acceptance will be influenced by the interests of the dictator or the ruling party. In short, it follows from the second law that sociocultural factors can affect a theory’s acceptance insofar as their influence is permitted by the method employed at the time.[[CITE_Barseghyan (2015)|p. 235]] </blockquote>_Barseghyan (2015)|p. 235]] </blockquote>)
Hierarchical Authority Delegation (Loiselle-2017) + (Hierarchical authority delegation is a sub … Hierarchical authority delegation is a sub-type of [[Multiple Authority Delegation (Loiselle-2017)|multiple authority delegation]]. It describes a situation in which a community delegates authority over some [[Question|question]] to multiple communities, but at different degrees of authority. Consider a case of multiple authority delegation in which either expert A OR expert B might be consulted. If the word of expert A is always accepted over the word of expert B, we have a case of hierarchical authority delegation.Here is an example from the art world. The Modigliani ''catalogue raisonée'' by Ambrogio Ceroni is widely regarded by the art market as being the most reliable source when it comes to matters of Modigliani attribution. That being said, it is also widely accepted that the catalogue is incomplete. In 1997, Modigliani scholar Marc Restellini began creating a new catalogue raisonée for the artist. Between 1997 and 2015 (when Restellini's project was abandoned), the art market held a relationship of hierarchical authority delegation with Ceroni and Restellini. If the painting was listed in the Ceroni catalogue, it was considered authentic, regardless of Restellini's opinion. If it was not in the Ceroni catalogue but ''was'' considered authentic by Restellini, then it was accepted as such by the art market. The fact that both Ceroni and Restellini were valued as independent authorities makes this an instance of multiple authority delegation; the fact that Ceroni's word was valued over Restellini makes it a case of hierarchical authority delegation.case of hierarchical authority delegation.)
Authority Delegation (Overgaard-Loiselle-2016) + (If we consider the fact that scientific re … If we consider the fact that scientific research is so specialized that no single research lab can account for all accepted theories in their discipline, we quickly recognize that there exists some form of distribution of labour among subcommunities. Authority delegation is an attempt to capture that distribution of labour, in scientonomic terms. What this definition of authority delegation jointly expresses is the acceptance of a theory and the associated employment of a method. In any instance of authority delegation, the delegating community accepts that the community delegated to is an expert in some field. It follows from accepting that expertise that the same delegating community will simply employ a method to accept whatever the expert community says to accept. Importantly, the method employed by the delegating community is distinct from that employed by the community delegated to; it would be misleading to suggest that the delegating community employs the same method as the community delegated to. This definition is careful to capture such particularities, as the definition merely expressed a new theory accepted and method employed by the delegating community.For a simple example, consider a relation of authority delegation between physicists and biologists. A community of physicists can be said to be delegating authority over the life sciences to a community of biologists, so long as the community of physicists ''both'' accepts that biologists are experts in the life sciences ''and'' will accept a theory on the life sciences if told so by the biologists.ife sciences if told so by the biologists.)
Implication (Palider-2019) + (Implication aims to capture the idea of on … Implication aims to capture the idea of one theory "following" from another. Although this idea is usually associated with that of deduction, sometimes deduction is too strict. When a theory constitutes evidence for another theory, that theory may imply the other depending on the strength of the evidence. There is no cutoff point for how strong the evidence needs to be that is shared by all agents. Instead, each agent has some ''rules of implication'' which determine when a theory ''implies'' another. This may be rules of logical entailment, of Bayesian confirmation theory, or of a detective's instinct. Having a notion of implication greatly clarifies an epistemic agent's theoretical thinking. Each agent may have their own rules of implication that differ from the modern concept of logical entailment or of deduction. Furthermore, implication clarifies what "deducible" means in [[The Third Law]]: a theory is deducible from another set of theories if it is implied by that set of theories. if it is implied by that set of theories.)
Implicit (Mirkin-Barseghyan-2018) + (Implicit is the opposite of ''explicit'' a … Implicit is the opposite of ''explicit'' and, thus, it doesn't require more than a very minimalist definition. This definition creates a strong link between the two concepts and won't require any changes in the definition of ''implicit'' when the respective definition of ''explicit'' happens to change.inition of ''explicit'' happens to change.)
The Third Law (Barseghyan-2015) + (In Barseghyan’s explication of the Aristot … In Barseghyan’s explication of the Aristotelian-Medieval method, he illustrates how Aristotelian natural philosophy impacted the method of the time.[[CITE_Barseghyan (2015)|p. 143]] Most notable is the acceptance of teleology – a theory which states that every thing has a nature it seeks to fulfill (e.g. an acorn’s nature is to become an oak tree). The best theories, then, would uncover the nature of a thing. If only the best theories are acceptable, this leads to the abstract requirement that "A theory is acceptable only if it grasps the nature of a thing".It stood to reason that the nature of a thing can only be intuitively grasped by an experienced person. This fundamental belief, combined with the abstract requirement outline above, led to a method which specifies these requirements known as the Aristotelian-Medieval method: "A proposition is acceptable if it grasps the nature of a thing through intuition schooled by experience, or if it is deduced from general intuitive propositions".[[CITE_Barseghyan (2015)|p. 145]] This is an illustration of how employed methods are deductive consequences of the accepted theories of the time.nces of the accepted theories of the time.)
Response to the Argument from Social Construction (Barseghyan-2015) + (In The Laws of Scientific Change (2015), H … In The Laws of Scientific Change (2015), Hakob Barseghyan argues that none of the social constructivist theses preclude the possibility of a general theory of scientific change. He provides different reasons to invalidate each of the respective social constructivist theses. The general theory is that the argument from social construction does not undermine the possibility of the theory of scientific change (TSC). Barseghyan shows that each of the theses lead to bizarre implications that form threats not only to the scientonomic project but to all other disciplines that constitute descriptive propositions.Firstly, the contingency thesis does not void the possibility of TSC because the contingency thesis itself is a general theory of scientific change. That is to say, the contingency thesis is itself a general descriptive proposition that is attempting to illustrate the mechanism by which science undergoes changes, namely, that there are no patterns in the evolution of science [[CITE_Barseghyan (2015)|p. 92]]. For example, the idea that Aristotelian-Medieval physics could have been directly replaced by Einstein’s general relativity without the intermediary stage of Newtonian physics is an inference of the contingency thesis; such a claim is itself a descriptive proposition. Therefore, in virtue of the contingency thesis being a descriptive proposition, it falls under the same category of the general theory of scientific change. Hence, the contingency thesis does not invalidate the scientonomic project [[CITE_Barseghyan (2015)|pp. 91-92]].Secondly, the nominalist thesis similarly does not undermine the possibility of TSC as its claim negates the validity of any descriptive proposition that attempts to describe a particular phenomenon. Given the nominalist claim, disciplines such as Biology, Chemistry and Physics, would have to be discredited because they too constitute descriptive propositions. Therefore, if the nominalist thesis were to be true, it would not only be a particular threat to the general theory of scientific change alone[[CITE_Barseghyan (2015)|p. 92]].Finally, all three reducibility theses do not endanger the scientonomic project:• The ontological reducibility thesis does not undermine the project because the claim that higher-level systems compose of lower level elements does not imply that there can be no theory describing the higher-level system. For example, in Biology, the study of lower level elements like genes does not imply that a theory at a higher level is not possible: the theory of evolution is a description of a higher-level system, which would not be possible under this thesis. Likewise, the general theory of scientific change is not undermined by this thesis [[CITE_Barseghyan (2015)|p. 94]]. • The epistemic reducibility thesis is not an obstacle to TSC because it has an unprecedented implication just like the other thesis. If the thesis were to be true, then the laws of Biology would be reducible to the laws of Chemistry, which in turn would be reducible to the laws of Physics. The definition of epistemic reducibility is not clearly agreed upon or formulated. But, the basic premise would precludes not only TSC but all our schemes of knowledge. Therefore, it is not a threat to TSC particularly [[CITE_Barseghyan (2015)|p. 94]].• The methodological reducibility thesis renders all higher-level theories pointless. It implies that only sociology can study the changes in the scientific mosaic and, therefore, TSC is ultimately plausible. But, since all higher-level theories are rendered pointless, all disciplines would be said to be futile with the exception of Physics (note: it is assumed here that all disciplines can be potentially reduced down to Physics). Therefore, just as the other theses, the methodological reducibility thesis does not put forth any danger to the possibility of TSC [[CITE_Barseghyan (2015)|pp. 95-96]].arseghyan (2015)|pp. 95-96]].)
Group (Overgaard-2017) + (In [[Nicholas Overgaard|Overgaard]] … In [[Nicholas Overgaard|Overgaard]]'s taxonomy, the term ''group'' refers to the most basic societal entity - a set of two or more people. As such, it is meant to play the role of the most abstract class which has two sub-classes - [[Community (Overgaard-2017)|community]] and [[Accidental Group (Overgaard-2017)|accidental group]].[[CITE_Overgaard (2017)]][[CITE_Overgaard (2017)]])
Epistemic Stances Towards Normative Theories - Norm Employment (Barseghyan-2018) + (In his [[Barseghyan (2018)|"Redrafting the Ontology of Scientific Change"]] … In his [[Barseghyan (2018)|"Redrafting the Ontology of Scientific Change"]], Barseghyan argued that since [[Normative Theory|norms]] are a subtype of [[Theory|theory]], all the epistemic stances that can in principle be taken by an epistemic agent towards theories of all types can also be taken towards norms. In addition to these more universal stances, norms can also be [[Norm Employment|employed]], i.e. they have the capacity of constituting the actual expectations of the epistemic agent. This applies to norms of all types.[[CITE_Barseghyan (2018)]][[CITE_Barseghyan (2018)]])
Publishing Modification Comments (Shaw-Barseghyan-Yan-2019) + (In the scientonomic workflow, the discussi … In the scientonomic workflow, the discussions concerning suggested modifications should be published once a communal consensus is reached and the respective verdict is recorded in the encyclopedia. The discussions are to be published in the journal as special commentary articles co-authored by all participants of the discussion or in special edited collections. While it might be tempting to only publish those discussions that caused significant disagreement in the community, such an approach alternative solution may inadvertently incentivize dissent and disagreement for the sake of getting published. In contrast, by publishing ''all'' discussions, we incentivize all commenting without skewing the incentive towards disagreement.kewing the incentive towards disagreement.)
Goals of Peer Review - Pursuitworthiness (Shaw-Barseghyan-2019) + (In the scientonomic workflow, the goals of peer review are to assesses a paper for pursuitworthiness of the modifications suggested in the paper. Thus, peer reviewers should not evaluate submissions for acceptability, but only for pursuitworthiness.)
Theory (Barseghyan-2015) Reason1 + (It has often been argued that theories are … It has often been argued that theories are best construed not as propositions but as models which are abstract set-theoretic entities. Importantly, on this model-theoretic or semantic view of theories, models do not contain propositions but are structures of non-linguistic elements.[[CITE_Suppe (1989)]] Whether this is indeed the case is to be established not in this metatheory but in an actual TSC (in collaboration with HSC). What is important from our perspective is that, even on this model-theoretic view, knowledge of the world depends crucially on formulating descriptive propositions.[[CITE_Chakravartty (2007)]] For something to become accepted as true or truthlike it must be expressible in descriptive propositions at least in principle. Often propositions are not explicitly formulated but are accepted tacitly. However, what matters is that in principle they too can be expressed as propositions. If something is not expressible as a proposition, then it cannot have a truth value and cannot be accepted or unaccepted as the best description of anything. Take an example of the Aristotelian-medieval model of the cosmos. When the medieval scientific community accepted this model, the community essentially accepted a tightly connected set of propositions, such as “the Earth is in the centre of the universe”, “the Moon, the Sun and all other planets are embedded in concentric crystalline spheres which revolve around the central Earth”, “all celestial bodies are made of element aether”, “aether is indestructible”, “aether has a natural tendency to revolve around the centre of the universe”, “all terrestrial bodies are made of the four terrestrial elements”, etc. In short, while models may as well play an important role in scientific practice, no part of these models can be actually accepted or rejected if it is not expressible in descriptive propositions. Thus, from the perspective of our project, it is safe to treat theories as collections of propositions.t theories as collections of propositions.)
Scope of Scientonomy - All Fields (Barseghyan-2015) + (It is a task of scientonomy to trace and e … It is a task of scientonomy to trace and explain all changes in a mosaic, regardless of which field (discipline) the change concerns. This applies to all fields of inquiry considered scientific by the respective community. For instance, if theology or astrology were parts of the mosaic under study, then a transition from one accepted theological or astrological theory to another during that time period should be explained by scientonomy.period should be explained by scientonomy.)
Epistemic Stances Towards Theories - Scientificity (Sarwar-Fraser-2018) + (It is argued by Sarwar and Fraser that, in addition to the already accepted epistemic stances, the stance of ''scientificity'' can be taken towards theories.[[CITE_Sarwar and Fraser (2018)]])
Compatibility Criteria (Barseghyan-2015) + (Like [[Demarcation Criteria|demarcation]] … Like [[Demarcation Criteria|demarcation]] and [[Acceptance Criteria|acceptance criteria]], compatibility criteria can be part of a community's employed method. The community employs these criteria to determine whether two theories are mutually compatible or incompatible, i.e. whether they can be simultaneously part of the community's mosaic. Different communities can have different compatibility criteria. While some communities may opt to employ the logical law of noncontradiction as their criterion of compatibility, other communities may be more tolerant towards logical inconsistencies. According to Barseghyan, the fact that these days scientists "often simultaneously accept theories which strictly speaking logically contradict each other is a good indication that the actual criteria of compatibility employed by the scientific community might be quite different from the classical logical law of noncontradiction".[[CITE_Barseghyan (2015)|p. 11]] For example, this is apparent in the case of general relativity vs. quantum physics where both theories are accepted as the best available descriptions of their respective domains (i.e. they are considered ''compatible''), but are known to be in conflict when applied simultaneously to such objects as black holes.ltaneously to such objects as black holes.)
Compatibility Criteria (Fraser-Sarwar-2018) + (Like [[Demarcation Criteria|demarcation]] … Like [[Demarcation Criteria|demarcation]] and [[Acceptance Criteria|acceptance criteria]], compatibility criteria can be part of an epistemic agent's employed method. An epistemic agent employs these criteria to determine whether two elements (e.g. methods, theories, questions) are mutually compatible or incompatible, i.e. whether they can be simultaneously part of the agent's mosaic. In principle, these criteria can be employed to determine the compatibility of elements present in the mosaic, as well as those outside of it (e.g. scientists often think about whether a proposed theory is compatible with the theories actually accepted at the time). [[Patrick Fraser|Fraser]] and [[Ameer Sarwar|Sarwar]] point out that [[Hakob Barseghyan|Barseghyan]]'s [[Compatibility Criteria (Barseghyan-2015)|original definition]] of the term "excludes a simple point that is assumed elsewhere in scientonomy: elements other than theories (i.e. methods and questions) may be compatible or incompatible with other elements (which, again, need not be theories)".[[CITE_Fraser and Sarwar (2018)|p. 72]] To fix this omission, Fraser and Sarwar "suggest that the word ‘theories’ be changed to ‘elements’ to account for the fact that the compatibility criteria apply to theories, methods, and questions alike".[[CITE_Fraser and Sarwar (2018)|p. 72]]Different communities can have different compatibility criteria. While some communities may opt to employ the logical law of noncontradiction as their criterion of compatibility, other communities may be more tolerant towards logical inconsistencies. According to Barseghyan, the fact that these days scientists "often simultaneously accept theories which strictly speaking logically contradict each other is a good indication that the actual criteria of compatibility employed by the scientific community might be quite different from the classical logical law of noncontradiction".[[CITE_Barseghyan (2015)|p. 11]] For example, this is apparent in the case of general relativity vs. quantum physics where both theories are accepted as the best available descriptions of their respective domains (i.e. they are considered ''compatible''), but are known to be in conflict when applied simultaneously to such objects as black holes.ltaneously to such objects as black holes.)
Necessary Method theorem (Barseghyan-2015) + (Most theories can satisfy the abstract req … Most theories can satisfy the abstract requirement of the necessary method. Barseghyan (2015) outlines the following example: <blockquote>Imagine a community with no initial beliefs whatsoever trying to learn something about the world. In other words, the only initial element of their mosaic is the abstract requirement to accept only the best available theories. Now, suppose they come up with all sorts of hypotheses about the world. Since their method is as inconclusive as it gets, chances are many of the hypotheses will simultaneously “meet their expectations”. In such circumstances, different parties will most likely end up accepting different theories, i.e. multiple mosaic splits are virtually inevitable. For example, while some may come to believe that our eyes are trustworthy, others may accept that intuitions (or gut feelings) are the only trustworthy source of knowledge. As a result, the two parties will employ different concrete methods (by the third law) and will end up with essentially different mosaics.[[CITE_Barseghyan (2015)|pp. 231-232]][[File:Theory Satisfying Abstract Requirement Mosaic 1.png|497px|center||]][[File:Theory Satisfying Abstract Requirement Mosaic 2.png|497px|center||]]<blockquote>These examples are not altogether fictitious. It is possible that something along these lines happened in ancient Greece, where some schools of philosophy accepted that the senses are, by and large, trustworthy, while other schools held that thesenses are unreliable and that the only source of certain knowledge is divine insight (intuition). Thus, the historical fact of the existence of diverse mosaics in the times of Plato and Aristotle shouldn’t come as a surprise. As a result, at early stages, multiple mosaic splits are quite likely.[[CITE_Barseghyan (2015)|pp. 233]]</blockquote>_Barseghyan (2015)|pp. 233]]</blockquote>)
Multiple Authority Delegation (Loiselle-2017) + (Multiple authority delegation is a sub-typ … Multiple authority delegation is a sub-type of authority delegation. It describes a situation in which a community delegates authority over some topic to multiple communities. For example, in a case where a community might delegate authority to expert A OR expert B over topic X, we have a case of multiple authority delegation.Multiple authority delegation can be further divided into two categories: [[Hierarchical_Authority_Delegation_(Loiselle-2017)|hierarchical]] and [[Non-Hierarchical_Authority_Delegation_(Loiselle-2017)|non-hierarchical]].[[Non-Hierarchical_Authority_Delegation_(Loiselle-2017)|non-hierarchical]].)

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