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• Existence of Question  + (Nicholas Overgaard explains the topic)
• Dogmatism No Theory Change theorem (Barseghyan-2015)  + (No [[Theory|theory]] … No [[Theory|theory]] acceptance may take place in a genuinely dogmatic [[Scientific Community|community]]. "Namely," as is noted in [[Barseghyan (2015)]], Barseghyan notes, when introducing '''the theory rejection theorem''' in [[Barseghyan (2015)]], "theory change is impossible in cases where a currently accepted theory is considered as revealing the final and absolute truth".[[CITE_Barseghyan (2015)|p. 165]][[CITE_Barseghyan (2015)|p. 165]])
• Non-Hierarchical Authority Delegation (Loiselle-2017)  + (Non-hierarchical authority delegation is a … Non-hierarchical authority delegation is a sub-type of multiple authority delegation. It describes a situation in which a community delegates authority over some topic to multiple communities, and treat each community as being at the same level of authority. Consider a case of multiple authority delegation in which either expert A OR expert B might be consulted. If the word of expert A is valued as equally as the word of expert B, we have a case of non-hierarchical authority delegation. </br></br>At the moment, non-hierarchical authority delegation is only a theoretical possibility. No historical examples have been found.y. No historical examples have been found.)
• Norm Employment (Barseghyan-2018)  + (Norm employment explained by Barseghyan)
• Delineating Theory (Patton-Al-Zayadi-2021)  + (One can specify a [[Discipline|discipline]] … One can specify a [[Discipline|discipline]] in terms of a set of its [[Core Question| core questions]]. A delineating theory is a second-order [[Theory|theory]] identifying this set of core questions, and allowing it to exist as an [[Epistemic Element| epistemic element]] within the [[Scientific Mosaic|mosaic]].[[CITE_Patton and Al-Zayadi (2021)]] For example, the delineating theory of modern physics might identify 'How do matter and energy behave?' as a core question of modern physics.ve?' as a core question of modern physics.)
• Dynamic Substantive Methods theorem (Barseghyan-2015)  + (One example is the transition from the con … One example is the transition from the controlled trial method to the blind trial method and then to the double blind trial method. Blind trials were introduced as an implementation of the more abstract method that required to account for the placebo effect on patients when testing drugs. Once the placebo effect became known, the method changed. And after, when it became known that the experimenter's bias also had a role on patients when testing drugs, the method changed once more, from blind to double-blind.ged once more, from blind to double-blind.)
• Asynchronism of Method Employment theorem (Barseghyan-2015)  + (One key corollary of the third law is put … One key corollary of the third law is put forth in Barseghyan (2015). "Scientific change is not necessarily a ''synchronous process'': changes in theories are not necessarily simultaneous with changes in methods".[[CITE_Barseghyan (2015)|pp. 150]]</br></br><blockquote>Suppose a new theory becomes accepted and some new abstract constraints become imposed. In this case, we can say that the acceptance of a theory resulted in the employment of a new method and the employment of a new method was synchronous with the acceptance of a new theory. But we also know that there is the second scenario of method employment, where a method implements some abstract requirements of other employed methods. In this scenario, there is a certain creative gap between abstract requirements that follow directly from accepted theories and methods that implement these abstract requirements. Devising a new method that would implement abstract requirements takes a fair amount of ingenuity and, therefore, there are no guarantees that these abstract requirements will be immediately followed by a new concrete method. In short, changes in methods are not necessarily simultaneous with changes in theories.[[CITE_Barseghyan (2015)|pp. 150-151]]</blockquote>[[CITE_Barseghyan (2015)|pp. 150-151]]</blockquote>)
• Closure Mechanism - Acceptance by Default (Shaw-Barseghyan-2019)  + (One potential way of addressing the proble … One potential way of addressing the problem of closure mechanism is by introducing a “countdown” mechanism, where the community is given a three-month (90-day) discussion period for commenting on a suggested modification and, if no objections raised during this period, the proposed modification becomes accepted by default. According to Shaw and Barseghyan: </br></br><blockquote>This allows for the possibility of inclusive debate without stalling on the development of our theory of scientific change. One disadvantage is that it doesn’t address the worry about masked objections raised in the previous section – people still may not explicitly dissent.[[CITE_Shaw and Barseghyan (2019)|p. 11]]</blockquote>haw and Barseghyan (2019)|p. 11]]</blockquote>)
• Indicators of Method Employment (Barseghyan-2015)  + (One putative method of learning the [[Employed Method|''employed method'']] … One putative method of learning the [[Employed Method|''employed method'']] of the time is by studying texts concerning scientific [[Methodology|''methodology'']] to learn what method was prescribed by the [[Scientific Community|community]] or advocated by ''great scientists''. However, such indicators can yield incorrect results. During the second half of the eighteenth century and the first half of the nineteenth century, the scientific community explicitly advocated the ''empiricist-inductivist'' methodology championed by [[Isaac Newton]]. This methodology held that new theories should be deduced from phenomena, and that unobservable entities should not be posited. However, the historical record actually shows that several theories positing unobservable entities did, in fact, become accepted during this period. These include Benjamin Franklin's theory of electricity, which posited an unobservable ''electric fluid'', the ''phlogiston'' theory of combustion, and the theory that light is a waveform in a ''luminiferous ether''. Thus the ''accepted methodology'' [[Scope of Scientonomy - Explicit and Implicit|does not necessarily indicate]] the ''employed method'' of the time. [[CITE_Barseghyan (2015)|pp. 53-54]]</br></br>More promising indicators of method employment are ''indirect'', via inference from historical facts about what theories are accepted, the process of appraisal, and the prior state of the mosaic. For example, one might note what sort of theories become accepted during a particular time period by some community and try to determine why. If theories become accepted after some novel prediction they make has been confirmed, then the employed method of the time was most likely ''hypothetico-deductive''. On the other hand, if theories do not require confirmed novel predictions to become accepted, then some other method might be the one employed. The most suitable indirect indicators of method employment will vary from case to case with context and culture.rom case to case with context and culture.)
• One-sided Authority Delegation (Overgaard-Loiselle-2016)  + (One-sided authority delegation is a sub-ty … One-sided authority delegation is a sub-type of authority delegation. It describes a situation where one community delegates authority over some topic to another community, but the other community does not delegate any authority back. </br></br>A good example of one-sided authority delegation is the relationship between contemporary philosophers and physicists. Philosophers themselves are not physicists (though, they certainly can be), meaning they must rely on the theories accepted by physicists to conduct research about, say, the quantum entities that populate the world. As soon as a physicist accepts a new particle (e.g. the Higgs boson), philosophers too will accept the existence of that particle. However, if philosophers for some reason begin to debate the ontological status of that new particle, physicists are unlikely to pay any attention to the philosophers. So, at least in principle, it is possible for one community to delegation authority to another, but for the other to delegate no authority to the first community.egate no authority to the first community.)
• Mutual Authority Delegation (Overgaard-Loiselle-2016)  + (Overgaard and Loiselle illustrate the rela … Overgaard and Loiselle illustrate the relationship of mutual authority delegation by a number of examples. For one, physicists acknowledge that biologists are the experts on questions concerning life, and likewise biologists acknowledge that physicists are the experts on questions concerning physical processes. Similar relationships can be found within individual scientific disciplines. Consider, for instance, the relationship between theoretical and applied physicists, where despite the differences in their methods and overall objectives, the two communities customarily delegate authority to each other on a wide array of topics.y to each other on a wide array of topics.)
• The First Law for Methods (Barseghyan-2015) is Tautological (Pandey-2023)  + (Pandey makes a case that the first law and all of its corollaries are tautological.[[CITE_Pandey (2023)]])
• The First Law for Theories (Barseghyan-2015) is Tautological (Pandey-2023)  + (Pandey makes a case that the first law and all of its corollaries are tautological.[[CITE_Pandey (2023)]])
• The First Law for Norms (Barseghyan-Pandey-2023) is Tautological (Pandey-2023)  + (Pandey makes a case that the first law and all of its corollaries are tautological.[[CITE_Pandey (2023)]])
• The First Law for Questions (Barseghyan-Levesley-2021) is Tautological (Pandey-2023)  + (Pandey makes a case that the first law and all of its corollaries are tautological.[[CITE_Pandey (2023)]])
• The First Law for Theories (Barseghyan-Pandey-2023) is Tautological (Pandey-2023)  + (Pandey makes a case that the first law and all of its corollaries are tautological.[[CITE_Pandey (2023)]])
• Question Rejection theorem (Barseghyan-Levesley-2021) is Tautological (Pandey-2023)  + (Pandey makes a case that the first law and all of its corollaries are tautological.[[CITE_Pandey (2023)]])
• Theory Rejection theorem (Barseghyan-2015) is Tautological (Pandey-2023)  + (Pandey makes a case that the first law and all of its corollaries are tautological.[[CITE_Pandey (2023)]])
• Method Rejection theorem (Barseghyan-2015) is Tautological (Pandey-2023)  + (Pandey makes a case that the first law and all of its corollaries are tautological.[[CITE_Pandey (2023)]])
• Norm Rejection theorem (Pandey-2023) is Tautological (Pandey-2023)  + (Pandey makes a case that the first law and all of its corollaries are tautological.[[CITE_Pandey (2023)]])
• Theory Rejection theorem (Barseghyan-Pandey-2023) is Tautological (Pandey-2023)  + (Pandey makes a case that the first law and all of its corollaries are tautological.[[CITE_Pandey (2023)]])
• Question Rejection theorem (Barseghyan-Levesley-Pandey-2023) is Tautological (Pandey-2023)  + (Pandey makes a case that the first law and all of its corollaries are tautological.[[CITE_Pandey (2023)]])
• The First Law (Barseghyan-2015) is Tautological (Pandey-2023)  + (Pandey provides the following summary of t … Pandey provides the following summary of the argument:</br></br><blockquote>I then discussed a number of scenarios of theory replacement ''allowed'' by the first law, such as the replacement by negation, the replacement by an answer to a different question, the replacement that involves the rejection of the question, and the replacement by a higher-order proposition. The only scenario, I argued, that the first law ''forbids'' is that of the rejection without any replacement whatsoever, as in the cases of element decay. The very existence of the phenomenon of element decay, therefore, poses a problem for the first law: if element decay is forbidden by the first law, then does this imply that the first law has been falsified? This brought us to our dilemma: either (1) exclude the cases of rejection without replacement from the scope of scientonomy and admit that the first law is a tautology or (2) include the cases of rejection without replacement into the scope of scientonomy and admit that such cases present a serious anomaly for the first law.</blockquote> </br></br><blockquote>My solution was to opt for the first option, as it seemed to be the lesser of two evils. In support of this option, I indicated how the procedure of limiting the scope is ubiquitous in many other fields of inquiry; thus, there is nothing inherently vicious in excluding certain non-epistemic phenomena (such as element decay) from the scope of our discipline. I also drew parallels between the scientonomic first law and Newton’s first law: while the latter too has been considered tautological, not many have thought that it is necessarily a serious problem. Thus, the tautological nature of our first law is not inevitably problematic. It is still unclear at this stage whether this should prompt scientonomers to consider alternatives to the first law.[[CITE_Pandey (2023)|p. 43]]</blockquote>CITE_Pandey (2023)|p. 43]]</blockquote>)
• Ontology of Scientific Change  + (Paul Patton's overview of the scientonomic ontology)
• Possible Mosaic Split theorem (Barseghyan-2015)  + (Possible [[Scientific Mosaic|mosaic]] … Possible [[Scientific Mosaic|mosaic]] split is a form of mosaic split that can happen if it is ever the case that [[Theory|theory]] assessment reaches an inconclusive result. In this case, a mosaic split can, but need not necessarily, result.[[CITE_Barseghyan (2015)|pp. 208-213]] That is, "the sufficient condition for this second variety of mosaic split is an element of inconclusiveness in the assessment outcome of at least one of the contender theories".[[CITE_Barseghyan (2015)|p. 208]] </br></br>Barseghyan notes that, "if there have been any actual cases of inconclusive theory assessment, they can be detected only indirectly".[[CITE_Barseghyan (2015)|p. 208]] Therefore: </br><blockquote>One way of detecting an inconclusive theory assessment is through studying a particular instance of mosaic split. Unlike inconclusiveness, mosaic split is something that is readily detectable. As long as the historical record of a time period is available, it is normally possible to tell whether there was one united mosaic or whether there were several different mosaics. For instance, we are quite confident that in the 17th and 18th centuries there were many differences between the British and French mosaics.[[CITE_Barseghyan (2015)|p. 208]] </br></blockquote></br></br>Thus, the historical examples of mosaic split below also serve as points of detection for historical instances of inconclusive theory assessment.istorical instances of inconclusive theory assessment.)

• Scientonomy (Barseghyan-2015)  + (Presentation of scientonomy by Hakob Barseghyan)

• Scientific Mosaic (Rawleigh-2022)  + (Rather than conceiving a scientific mosaic … Rather than conceiving a scientific mosaic as a simple set-theoretic unity of epistemic elements, this definition is model-theoretic: it replaces the explicitly set-theoretic wording “set of all epistemic elements” with a semantic “model of all accepted elements”.[[CITE_Rawleigh (2022)|p. 91]] The definition considers a scientific mosaic to be a model for interpreting all natural language sentences, whether those be observational, theoretical, or simply ordinary conversational sentences.</br></br>TODO: Add Rawleigh's discussion from his 2022.: Add Rawleigh's discussion from his 2022.)
• Question Exists  + (Rawleigh argued that questions are an integral part of the process of scientific change.[[CITE_Rawleigh (2018)]])
• Epistemic Stances Towards Questions - Question Acceptance (Rawleigh-2018)  + (Rawleigh argued that, just like theories, [[Question|questions]] too can be [[Question Acceptance|accepted]] or unaccepted. A question can be accepted by an agent at one period at not accepted by another.)
• Question Acceptance Exists  + (Rawleigh emphasized that the process of scientific change involves not only theories and methods but also questions.[[CITE_Rawleigh (2018)]])
• The First Law for Theories (Barseghyan-2015)  + (Replacement-by-negation is not the only po … Replacement-by-negation is not the only possible scenario for the replacement of accepted proposition. In fact, as is noted in Barseghyan (2015), various scientific communities may have additional requirements for what can replace an accepted proposition. Barseghyan (2015) summarizes the following episode in contemporary physics as an example of a time when a scientific community imposed additional requirements on theory replacement: </br></br><blockquote>Consider, for instance, the case of quantum field theory (QFT) in the 1950-60s. In the late 1940s, QFT was successfully applied to electromagnetic interactions by Schwinger, Tomonaga, and Feynman when a new theory of quantum electrodynamics (QED) was created. Hope was high that QFT could also be applied to other fundamental interactions. However, it soon became apparent that the task of creating quantum field theories of weak and strong interactions was not an easy one. It was at that time (the 1950-60s) when QFT was severely criticized by many physicists. Some physicists criticized the techniques of renormalization which were used to eliminate the infinities in calculated quantities. Dirac, for instance, thought that the procedure of renormalization was an “ugly trick”. Another line of criticism was levelled against QFT by Landau, who argued in 1959 that QFT had to be rejected since it employed unobservable concepts such as local field operators, causality, and continuous space time on the microphysical level. It is a historical fact however that, all the criticism notwithstanding, QFT was not rejected.268 In short, there was serious criticism levelled against the then-accepted theory, but it didn’t lead to its rejection, for the physics community of the time didn’t allow for a simple replacement-by-negation scenario.[[CITE_Barseghyan (2015)|p.122]]</blockquote>arseghyan (2015)|p.122]]</blockquote>)
• Scientificity Is a Subtype of Epistemic Stance (Sarwar-Fraser-2018)  + (Sarwar and Fraser argued that in addition … Sarwar and Fraser argued that in addition to other epistemic stances, there is also the stance of scientificity. Thus, epistemic agents can consider a theory scientific or unscientific regardless of whether they accept, use, or pursue it. As such, they argue, scientificity is a distinct epistemic stance.[[CITE_Sarwar and Fraser (2018)]][[CITE_Sarwar and Fraser (2018)]])
• Non-Empty Mosaic theorem (Barseghyan-2015) Reason1  + (Scientific change is impossible in an empt … Scientific change is impossible in an empty mosaic. It can be deduced from the second law, which asserts that in order to become accepted into the mosaic, a theory is assessed by the method actually employed at the time, and the third law, which asserts that a method becomes employed only when it is deducible from other employed methods and accepted theories of the time.[[CITE_Barseghyan (2015)|p. 226]]</br></br>[[File:Non-empty-mosaic-theorem.jpg|608px|center||]][[File:Non-empty-mosaic-theorem.jpg|608px|center||]])
• Scientific Underdeterminism theorem (Barseghyan-2015)  + (Scientific underdetermination is the thesi … Scientific underdetermination is the thesis that the process of [[Scientific Change|scientific change]] is not deterministic, and science could have evolved differently than it did. Hypothetically, two [[Scientific Community|scientific communities]] developing separately could experience an entirely different sequence of successive states of their respective [[Scientific Mosaic|scientific mosaics.]] Even without the TSC, the implausibility of scientific determinism can be seen by considering the process of [[Theory|theory]] construction, which is outside the present scope of the TSC. Theory construction requires creative imagination, and the formulation of a given theory is therefore not inevitable. Still, underdetermination can also be inferred as a theorem from the axioms of the TSC.[[CITE_Barseghyan (2015)|pp. 196-198]]</br>[[File:Scientific-underdetermination.jpg|607px|center||]]</br></br>This deductive inference occurs as follows. The theorem is the consequence of two related theses: that of underdetermined method change, and that of underdetermined theory change. Since method change and theory change are exactly the transitions in the scientific mosaic, showing that neither method change nor theory change is deterministic is sufficient to imply the Scientific Underdetermination theorem (SUT).</br></br>The underdetermination of method change follows from the 3rd Law: “A method becomes employed only when it is deducible from some subset of other employed methods and accepted theories of the time.” As a result of this law, a method can be employed in two ways: either it strictly follows from other accepted theories and employed methods, in which case the change is, in fact, deterministic, or it implements the abstract requirements of some other employed method. In the latter case, the change is underdetermined since abstract requirements can give rise to many different implementations. As a concrete example, we have an accepted theory that states, “when counting the number of living cells, the resulting value is acceptable only if it is obtained with an ‘aided’ eye.” A number of different methods can implement this abstract requirement, like the plating method or the counting chamber method.[[CITE_Barseghyan (2015)|p. 198]] Thus the method is underdetermined by the abstract requirements, so the process of method change implementing these requirements is not deterministic, which is exactly the statement of the underdetermination of method change.</br></br>The underdetermination of theory change comes from the 2nd law and the possibility of inconclusive theory assessment. The 2nd law states that “In order to become accepted into the mosaic, a theory is assessed by the method actually employed at the time”. This assessment can result in conclusive acceptance, conclusive rejection, or it can be inconclusive. In both conclusive cases, the theory change is deterministic, but if the theory assessment is inconclusive, then the theory can be accepted or rejected. So the process of theory change is not necessarily deterministic, since it is, in fact, possible for assessment to be inconclusive. The question of whether there actually exist cases of inconclusive theory assessment is a task for the history of science, and is irrelevant to our discussion.</br></br>These two theses combine to form the SUT, since changes in theories and methods are all the transitions that occur in the scientific mosaic, and we have seen that the underdetermination of theory and method change follow deductively from the 2nd law, the 3rd law and the possibility of inconclusive theory assessment.ibility of inconclusive theory assessment.)
• Friesen et al. (2023)  + (Scientonomy Workshop, February 25, 2023)
• Scope of Scientonomy - Acceptance (Barseghyan-2015)  + (Scientonomy currently recognizes several d … Scientonomy currently recognizes several different [[Epistemic Stances Towards Theories|stances]] that an [[Epistemic Community|epistemic community]] might take towards a theory. The community might [[Theory Acceptance|accept]] the theory as the best currently available description of the world, it might regard a theory as worthy of [[Theory Pursuit|pursuit]] and further development, or it might regard the theory as adequate for [[Theory Use|use]] for some practical purpose, while not the best description of the world. [[CITE_Barseghyan (2015)|pp. 30-42]] These stances, and their opposites (i.e. that a theory is unaccepted, neglected, or unused)together constitute the range of stances that a community might take towards a theory. The concept of a [[Scientific Mosaic|scientific mosaic]] consisting of the set of all theories accepted, and all methods employed by the community [[CITE_Barseghyan (2015)|pp.1-11]] is central to scientonomy, as is the goal of explaining all changes in this mosaic. To fulfill this central goal, a scientonomic theory ought to explain how transitions from one accepted theory to another take place, and what logic governs that transition, but it doesn't necessarily need to explain why some theories are pursued and others neglected and why some are used and others remain unused. [[CITE_Barseghyan (2015) |p. 42]][[CITE_Barseghyan (2015) |p. 42]])
• Scope of Scientonomy - Social (Barseghyan-2015)  + (Scientonomy focuses on the [[Scientific Mosaic|scientific mosaic]] … Scientonomy focuses on the [[Scientific Mosaic|scientific mosaic]] of accepted [[Theory|theories]] and employed [[Method|methods]]. In their daily work, individual scientists rely on and formulate theories about the object of their research, and use methods to appraise their theories. Both the theories they believe and the criteria they use to assess them may change over time. Although historians of science have often focused on individual scientists, often those deemed great, like Galileo or Einstein, and the changes in their beliefs as they constructed and assessed theories, [[Scientific Change|changes to the scientific mosaic itself]] happen at the level of the community. Scientonomy thus seeks to focus efforts on the social level of the scientific community rather than on the individual.c community rather than on the individual.)
• Scope of Scientonomy - All Time Periods (Barseghyan-2015)  + (Scientonomy ought not to limit its applica … Scientonomy ought not to limit its applicability to a restricted time period. If a scientific mosaic can be identified at a certain period in time, then it is a task of scientonomy to explain any and all changes in that mosaic at that time period. Similarly, an observational scientonomists ought not exclude any time period from their domain.exclude any time period from their domain.)
• The Third Law (Sebastien-2016)  + (Sebastien's third law explained by Gregory Rupik)
• Question Rejection theorem (Barseghyan-Levesley-2021)  + (Similar to other scientonomic rejection th … Similar to other scientonomic rejection theorems, the question rejection theorem assumes that questions become rejected as they get pushed out of an agent's mosaic due to their incompatibility with some newly accepted elements. There are two most common scenarios of such incompatibility.</br></br>In the first scenario, a question becomes rejected due to the acceptance of a new theory that happens to be incompatible with some of the question's epistemic presuppositions. As explained by Barseghyan and Levesley: </br></br><blockquote>imagine an epistemic situation where agent A initially accepts the question “What is the relationship between the four elements?” together with the theoretical presupposition that there are four elements. Suppose also that at some later time the agent discovers that there are not four but three elements. Naturally, the agent rejects both the theory of four elements and the question about the relationships between these elements:</br></br>[[File:Question_Rejection_due_to_Incompatibility_(Barseghyan-Levesley-2021).png|788px|center||]]</br></br>Importantly, this rejection happens regardless of whether it ever occurs to the agent to ask a new question “What is the relationship between the three elements?”. Even if the agent never accepts any further questions concerning the three elements, the question “What is the relationship between the four elements?” would still be rejected.[[CITE_Barseghyan and Levesley (2021)|pp. 14-15]]</blockquote></br></br>In the second scenario, a question is being rejected due to the acceptance of the second-order theory stating that the question is unanswerable (the latter being incompatible with the question). In the words of Barseghyan and Levesley:</br></br><blockquote>Consider [an] epistemic situation, where agent A accepts some question Q, together with the theory that Q is answerable. When agent A comes to accept that Q is unanswerable, the agent rejects question Q. The scientonomic mechanism of this rejection is through the incompatibility of question Q and the theory “Question Q is unanswerable”:[[CITE_Barseghyan and Levesley (2021)|p. 15]]</br></br>[[File:Question_Rejection_due_to_Unanswerability_(Barseghyan-Levesley-2021).png|794px|center||]]</blockquote>Rejection_due_to_Unanswerability_(Barseghyan-Levesley-2021).png|794px|center||]]</blockquote>)
• Singular Authority Delegation (Loiselle-2017)  + (Singular authority delegation is a sub-typ … Singular authority delegation is a sub-type of authority delegation. It describes a situation in which a community delegates authority over some topic to a single community. </br></br>Instances of singular authority delegation occur commonly in the art world. Typically, the art market recognizes only one individual or community as being the sole expert on matters of attribution for a given artist. For example, the art market always and only consults the Wildenstein Institute to answer questions over the authenticity of paintings by Monet. </br></br>Another example of singular authority delegation is the relationship between the art market and the two people considered experts on Picasso: Maya Widmaier-Picasso and Claude Ruiz-Picasso. For matters of authenticity concerning the works of Picasso, the art market always and only delegates authority to the combined Maya-Claude mosaic. The art market will only accept a Picasso painting as authentic if ''both'' Maya and Claude agree that it is so. Maya and Claude are two separate authorities, and do not always agree. However, because the art market only delegates authority to a single entity-- the mosaic composed of theories agreed upon by Maya and Claude-- this is an instance of singular authority delegation.instance of singular authority delegation.)
• Sociocultural Factors in Theory Acceptance theorem (Barseghyan-2015)  + (Sociocultural factors can impact the proce … Sociocultural factors can impact the process of a theory's acceptance when the employed method of the community allows for such factors to affect the process. This is derived by the Second Law alone. For example, a community which ascribes infallible power to a leader or a group of leaders is in a position to accept a theory in virtue of the leaders. Furthermore, such factors can guide a scientific community to reject a theory based on the acceptance of another social theory with which it is at odds.</br></br>Barseghyan’s Laws of Scientific Change break from the traditional language used in philosophy of science, of internal versus external factors in the mosaic. External factors, a term that has traditionally referred to the influences of societal trends, politics, religion, and so on, if defined as “elements not included in the mosaic” then we must accept that these do not affect the mosaic at the time by the the very definition. This is the result of the fact that the 2nd law introduces new theories in the context of the accepted methods at the time. As a result, the language of “external” factors is problematic.[[CITE_Barseghyan (2015)]]</br></br>Socio-cultural factors ought to be defined more explicitly. The question is, instead, whether factors such as economics, politics, and religion can influence the theories accepted in the mosaic. It follows from the Second Law that theories are assessed by the method in the mosaic at the time. Therefore, if the method at the time mandates economic, political, religious, or other social requirements to be met by a theory before it is accept, only then do socio-cultural factors influence theory acceptance.</br></br>Barseghyan provides the example of a hypothetical religious community, with an accepted belief (i.e. theory) that holds that the religion’s High Priest always grasps the true essence of things. By the Third Law, a method may be employed the mosaic that states that any proposition is acceptable, given that the High Priest utters it. In this case, it would appear as though socio-cultural factors are influencing, if not dictating, the course of scientific change in the community. This should not be confused with a case where a High Priest or other elite enforces their beliefs unscientifically, through threats, bribery, or otherwise. Should this happen, the change would be unscientific, as it would violate either the method employed at the time (and thereby the Second Law), or it would be creating a method in the mosaic which does not follow from the accepted theories at the time (and thereby the Third Law).[[CITE_Barseghyan (2015)]]ghyan (2015)]])
• Assessment of Scientonomy - Relevant Facts (Barseghyan-2015)  + (Some facts ''ought'' to be relevant to the … Some facts ''ought'' to be relevant to the [[Theory Acceptance|assessment of a theory]] because the content of the theory itself implies their relevance, and others ought to be relevant simply by definition. When assessing a theory concerning scientific change, relevant facts that ought necessarily to be considered include questions pertinent to scientific change processes. For example: What [[Theory|theories]] and [[Method|methods]] were part of the [[Scientific Mosaic|scientific mosaic]] of the community in question, both before and after the instance of [[Scientific Change|scientific change]]? What modifications were proposed and what parts of the mosaic did they intend to replace? Which of these modifications became accepted into the mosaic, and how? </br></br>Relevant questions will depend on accepted views about the [[Scope of Scientonomy|scope of scientonomy]]. For example, if scientonomy deals with scientific change [[Scope of Scientonomy - Individual and Social|at the level of scientific communities]], then facts about the accepted views of communities ought to be relevant, and the views of particular individuals ought not. If scientonomy [[Scope of Scientonomy - Construction and Appraisal|deals only with theory appraisal]] and not with theory construction, then it follows that facts concerning the former, but not the latter, ought to be considered. </br></br>Relevant facts will also depend on the content of the mosaic at the time in question. For example, it is anachronistic to speak of religious constraints on science in the seventeenth century since, at that time, religion and natural philosophy were not regarded as separate domains of knowledge, but as part of the same mosaic.[[CITE_Barseghyan (2015)|p. 111]][[CITE_Barseghyan (2015)|p. 111]])
• The First Law for Theories (Barseghyan-2015)  + (Specifically, in contemporary ''empirical' … Specifically, in contemporary ''empirical'' science, "we do not reject our accepted empirical theories even when these theories face anomalies (counterexamples, disconfirming instances, unexplained results of observations and experiments)."[[CITE_Barseghyan (2015)|p.122-3]] This is known as anomaly-tolerance. Though it cannot be said to be a universal feature of science, it is by no means a new feature, as Barseghyan (2015) observes that "this anomaly-tolerance has been a feature of empirical science for a long time" and provides the following key examples of anomaly-tolerance, following Evans (1958, 1967, 1992), in the context of Newtonian theory.[[CITE_Barseghyan (2015)|p.123]] </br></br><blockquote>The famous case of Newtonian theory and Mercury’s anomalous perihelion is a good indication that anomalies were not lethal for theories also in the 19th century empirical science. In 1859, it was observed that the behaviour of planet Mercury doesn’t quite fit the predictions of the then-accepted Newtonian theory of gravity. The rate of the advancement of Mercury’s perihelion (precession) wasn’t the one predicted by the Newtonian theory. For the Newtonian theory this was an anomaly. Several generations of scientists tried to find a solution to this problem. But, importantly, this anomaly didn’t falsify the Newtonian theory. The theory remained accepted for another sixty years until it was replaced by general relativity circa 1920. </br></br>This wasn’t the first time that the Newtonian theory faced anomalies. In 1750 it was believed that the Earth is an oblate-spheroid (i.e. that it is flattened at the poles). This was a prediction that followed from the then-accepted Newtonian theory, a prediction that had been confirmed by Maupertuis and his colleagues by 1740. However, soon very puzzling results came from the Cape of Good Hope: the measurements of Nicolas Louis de Lacaille were suggesting that, unlike the northern hemisphere, the southern hemisphere is prolate rather than oblate. Thus, the Earth was turning out to be pear-shaped! Obviously, the length of the degree of the meridian measured by Lacaille was an anomaly for the accepted oblate-spheroid view and, correspondingly, for the Newtonian theory. Of course, as with any anomaly, this one too forced the community to look for its explanation by rechecking the data, by remeasuring the arc, and by providing additional assumptions. Although it took another eighty years until the puzzle was solved, Lacaille’s anomalous results didn’t lead to the rejection of the then-accepted oblate-spheroid view. Finally, in 1834-38, Thomas Maclear repeated Lacaille’s measurements and established that the deviation of Lacaille’s results from the oblate-spheroid view were due to the gravitational attraction of Table Mountain. The treatment of Lacaille’s results – as something bothersome but not lethal – reveals the anomaly-tolerance of empirical science even in the 18th century.[[CITE_Barseghyan (2015)|p.123]]</blockquote>.123]]</blockquote>)
• Split Due to Inconclusiveness theorem (Barseghyan-2015)  + (Split due to inconclusiveness can occur when two mutually incompatible theories are accepted simultaneously by the same community.)
• Dogmatism No Theory Change theorem (Barseghyan-2015) Reason1  + (Suppose a community has an accepted theory … Suppose a community has an accepted theory that asserts that it is the final and absolute truth. By the [[The Third Law (Barseghyan-2015) |Third Law]] we deduce the method: accept no new theories ever. By the [[The Second Law|Second Law]] we deduce that no new theory can ever be accepted by the employed method of the time. By the [[The First Law (Barseghyan-2015)|First Law]], we deduce that the accepted theory will remain the accepted theory forever.[[CITE_Barseghyan (2015)|p. 165-167]]</br></br>[[File:Dogmatism-theorem.jpg|607px|center||]][[File:Dogmatism-theorem.jpg|607px|center||]])
• Possible Mosaic Split theorem (Barseghyan-2015)  + (Suppose we have a method for assessing the … Suppose we have a method for assessing theories about the efficacy of new pharmaceuticals that says "accept that the pharmaceutical is effective only if a clinically significant result is obtained in a sufficient number of randomized controlled trials." The wording of the method is such that it requires a significant degree of judgement on the part of the community - what constitutes 'clinical significance' and a 'sufficient number' of trials will vary from person to person and by context. This introduces the possibility of mosaic split when it is unclear if two contender theories satisfy this requirement. </br></br>Carrying on the above example, suppose two drugs are being tested for some condition C: drugs A and B. We'll call T₁ the theory that A is more effective than B at treating condition C and T₂ the theory that B is more effective than A at treating condition C. These two theories are not compatible, and so cannot both be elements of the mosaic according to the [[The Zeroth Law|zeroth law]]. Suppose further that both are assessed by the method of the time, meaning that both are subject to double blind trials. In these trials drug A is clearly superior to drug B at inducing clinical remission, but drug B has fewer side effects and is still more effective than a placebo and has had more studies conducted. Even if we accept T₁ we may have reason to suspect that T₂ better satisfies the method. We can interpret this in two ways: by supposing that our assessment shows that we should accept T₁ and that our assessment is inconclusive about T₂ or by taking both assessments to be inconclusive. In the first case it is permissible according to the [[Second Law|second law]] to accept T₁ and to either accept or reject T₂, and in the second case both may be accepted or rejected.</br>[[File:Assessment_outcomes_from_two_contenders_resulting_in_mosaic_split.jpg|454px|center||]] </br></br>Because any time an assessment outcome is [[Outcome Inconclusive|inconclusive]] we may either accept or reject the theory being assessed we always face the possibility that one subsection of the community will reject the theory and another subsection will accept it. In these cases the two communities now bear distinct mosaics and a mosaic split has occurred. However it is important to note that the ambiguity inherent in inconclusive assessments means that it is never entailed that there will be competing subsections of the community. A community may, in the face of an inconclusive assessment, collectively agree to accept or reject the theory being assessed. Thus, in cases with an inconclusive assessment mosaic split is possible but never necessarily entailed by the circumstances.ing assessed. Thus, in cases with an inconclusive assessment mosaic split is possible but never necessarily entailed by the circumstances.)
• Necessary Mosaic Split theorem (Barseghyan-2015)  + (Suppose we have some community C' with mos … Suppose we have some community C' with mosaic M' and that this community assesses two theories, T₁ and T₂, both of which satisfy M'. Let us further suppose that T₁ and T₂ both describe the same object and are incompatible with one another. According to the second law both T₁ and T₂ will be accepted because they both satisfy M', but both cannot simultaneously be accepted by C' due to the zeroth law. The necessary mosaic split theorem says that the result will be a new community C₁ which accepts T₁ and M₁, which precludes their accepting T₂. Simultaneously a new community C₂ will emerge which accepts T₂ and the resulting theory M₂, which precludes their accepting T₁.</br></br>Barseghyan (2015) neatly summarizes this series of events:</br><blockquote> When two mutually incompatible theories simultaneously satisfy the implicit requirements of the scientific community, members of the community are basically in a position to pick either one. And given that any contender theory always has its champions (if only the authors), there will inevitably be two parties with their different preferences. As a result, the community must inevitably split in two.[[CITE_Barseghyan (2015)|p. 204]]<blockquote>[[CITE_Barseghyan (2015)|p. 204]]<blockquote>)
• Social Level (Barseghyan-2015)  + (TODO)
• Methodology (Barseghyan-2015)  + (TODO)
• Methodology (Sebastien-2016)  + (TODO)