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Theory Rejection theorem (Barseghyan-2015) is Tautological (Pandey-2023) + (Pandey makes a case that the first law and all of its corollaries are tautological.[[CITE_Pandey (2023)]])
Method Rejection theorem (Barseghyan-2015) is Tautological (Pandey-2023) + (Pandey makes a case that the first law and all of its corollaries are tautological.[[CITE_Pandey (2023)]])
Norm Rejection theorem (Pandey-2023) is Tautological (Pandey-2023) + (Pandey makes a case that the first law and all of its corollaries are tautological.[[CITE_Pandey (2023)]])
Theory Rejection theorem (Barseghyan-Pandey-2023) is Tautological (Pandey-2023) + (Pandey makes a case that the first law and all of its corollaries are tautological.[[CITE_Pandey (2023)]])
Question Rejection theorem (Barseghyan-Levesley-Pandey-2023) is Tautological (Pandey-2023) + (Pandey makes a case that the first law and all of its corollaries are tautological.[[CITE_Pandey (2023)]])
The First Law (Barseghyan-2015) is Tautological (Pandey-2023) + (Pandey provides the following summary of t … Pandey provides the following summary of the argument:<blockquote>I then discussed a number of scenarios of theory replacement ''allowed'' by the first law, such as the replacement by negation, the replacement by an answer to a different question, the replacement that involves the rejection of the question, and the replacement by a higher-order proposition. The only scenario, I argued, that the first law ''forbids'' is that of the rejection without any replacement whatsoever, as in the cases of element decay. The very existence of the phenomenon of element decay, therefore, poses a problem for the first law: if element decay is forbidden by the first law, then does this imply that the first law has been falsified? This brought us to our dilemma: either (1) exclude the cases of rejection without replacement from the scope of scientonomy and admit that the first law is a tautology or (2) include the cases of rejection without replacement into the scope of scientonomy and admit that such cases present a serious anomaly for the first law.</blockquote> <blockquote>My solution was to opt for the first option, as it seemed to be the lesser of two evils. In support of this option, I indicated how the procedure of limiting the scope is ubiquitous in many other fields of inquiry; thus, there is nothing inherently vicious in excluding certain non-epistemic phenomena (such as element decay) from the scope of our discipline. I also drew parallels between the scientonomic first law and Newton’s first law: while the latter too has been considered tautological, not many have thought that it is necessarily a serious problem. Thus, the tautological nature of our first law is not inevitably problematic. It is still unclear at this stage whether this should prompt scientonomers to consider alternatives to the first law.[[CITE_Pandey (2023)|p. 43]]</blockquote>CITE_Pandey (2023)|p. 43]]</blockquote>)
Ontology of Scientific Change + (Paul Patton's overview of the scientonomic ontology)
Possible Mosaic Split theorem (Barseghyan-2015) + (Possible [[Scientific Mosaic|mosaic]] … Possible [[Scientific Mosaic|mosaic]] split is a form of mosaic split that can happen if it is ever the case that [[Theory|theory]] assessment reaches an inconclusive result. In this case, a mosaic split can, but need not necessarily, result.[[CITE_Barseghyan (2015)|pp. 208-213]] That is, "the sufficient condition for this second variety of mosaic split is an element of inconclusiveness in the assessment outcome of at least one of the contender theories".[[CITE_Barseghyan (2015)|p. 208]] Barseghyan notes that, "if there have been any actual cases of inconclusive theory assessment, they can be detected only indirectly".[[CITE_Barseghyan (2015)|p. 208]] Therefore: <blockquote>One way of detecting an inconclusive theory assessment is through studying a particular instance of mosaic split. Unlike inconclusiveness, mosaic split is something that is readily detectable. As long as the historical record of a time period is available, it is normally possible to tell whether there was one united mosaic or whether there were several different mosaics. For instance, we are quite confident that in the 17th and 18th centuries there were many differences between the British and French mosaics.[[CITE_Barseghyan (2015)|p. 208]] </blockquote>Thus, the historical examples of mosaic split below also serve as points of detection for historical instances of inconclusive theory assessment.istorical instances of inconclusive theory assessment.)
Scientonomy (Barseghyan-2015) + (Presentation of scientonomy by Hakob Barseghyan)
Scientific Mosaic (Rawleigh-2022) + (Rather than conceiving a scientific mosaic … Rather than conceiving a scientific mosaic as a simple set-theoretic unity of epistemic elements, this definition is model-theoretic: it replaces the explicitly set-theoretic wording “set of all epistemic elements” with a semantic “model of all accepted elements”.[[CITE_Rawleigh (2022)|p. 91]] The definition considers a scientific mosaic to be a model for interpreting all natural language sentences, whether those be observational, theoretical, or simply ordinary conversational sentences.TODO: Add Rawleigh's discussion from his 2022.: Add Rawleigh's discussion from his 2022.)
Question Exists + (Rawleigh argued that questions are an integral part of the process of scientific change.[[CITE_Rawleigh (2018)]])
Epistemic Stances Towards Questions - Question Acceptance (Rawleigh-2018) + (Rawleigh argued that, just like theories, [[Question|questions]] too can be [[Question Acceptance|accepted]] or unaccepted. A question can be accepted by an agent at one period at not accepted by another.)
Question Acceptance Exists + (Rawleigh emphasized that the process of scientific change involves not only theories and methods but also questions.[[CITE_Rawleigh (2018)]])
The First Law for Theories (Barseghyan-2015) + (Replacement-by-negation is not the only po … Replacement-by-negation is not the only possible scenario for the replacement of accepted proposition. In fact, as is noted in Barseghyan (2015), various scientific communities may have additional requirements for what can replace an accepted proposition. Barseghyan (2015) summarizes the following episode in contemporary physics as an example of a time when a scientific community imposed additional requirements on theory replacement: <blockquote>Consider, for instance, the case of quantum field theory (QFT) in the 1950-60s. In the late 1940s, QFT was successfully applied to electromagnetic interactions by Schwinger, Tomonaga, and Feynman when a new theory of quantum electrodynamics (QED) was created. Hope was high that QFT could also be applied to other fundamental interactions. However, it soon became apparent that the task of creating quantum field theories of weak and strong interactions was not an easy one. It was at that time (the 1950-60s) when QFT was severely criticized by many physicists. Some physicists criticized the techniques of renormalization which were used to eliminate the infinities in calculated quantities. Dirac, for instance, thought that the procedure of renormalization was an “ugly trick”. Another line of criticism was levelled against QFT by Landau, who argued in 1959 that QFT had to be rejected since it employed unobservable concepts such as local field operators, causality, and continuous space time on the microphysical level. It is a historical fact however that, all the criticism notwithstanding, QFT was not rejected.268 In short, there was serious criticism levelled against the then-accepted theory, but it didn’t lead to its rejection, for the physics community of the time didn’t allow for a simple replacement-by-negation scenario.[[CITE_Barseghyan (2015)|p.122]]</blockquote>arseghyan (2015)|p.122]]</blockquote>)
Scientificity Is a Subtype of Epistemic Stance (Sarwar-Fraser-2018) + (Sarwar and Fraser argued that in addition … Sarwar and Fraser argued that in addition to other epistemic stances, there is also the stance of scientificity. Thus, epistemic agents can consider a theory scientific or unscientific regardless of whether they accept, use, or pursue it. As such, they argue, scientificity is a distinct epistemic stance.[[CITE_Sarwar and Fraser (2018)]][[CITE_Sarwar and Fraser (2018)]])
Non-Empty Mosaic theorem (Barseghyan-2015) Reason1 + (Scientific change is impossible in an empt … Scientific change is impossible in an empty mosaic. It can be deduced from the second law, which asserts that in order to become accepted into the mosaic, a theory is assessed by the method actually employed at the time, and the third law, which asserts that a method becomes employed only when it is deducible from other employed methods and accepted theories of the time.[[CITE_Barseghyan (2015)|p. 226]][[File:Non-empty-mosaic-theorem.jpg|608px|center||]][[File:Non-empty-mosaic-theorem.jpg|608px|center||]])
Scientific Underdeterminism theorem (Barseghyan-2015) + (Scientific underdetermination is the thesi … Scientific underdetermination is the thesis that the process of [[Scientific Change|scientific change]] is not deterministic, and science could have evolved differently than it did. Hypothetically, two [[Scientific Community|scientific communities]] developing separately could experience an entirely different sequence of successive states of their respective [[Scientific Mosaic|scientific mosaics.]] Even without the TSC, the implausibility of scientific determinism can be seen by considering the process of [[Theory|theory]] construction, which is outside the present scope of the TSC. Theory construction requires creative imagination, and the formulation of a given theory is therefore not inevitable. Still, underdetermination can also be inferred as a theorem from the axioms of the TSC.[[CITE_Barseghyan (2015)|pp. 196-198]][[File:Scientific-underdetermination.jpg|607px|center||]]This deductive inference occurs as follows. The theorem is the consequence of two related theses: that of underdetermined method change, and that of underdetermined theory change. Since method change and theory change are exactly the transitions in the scientific mosaic, showing that neither method change nor theory change is deterministic is sufficient to imply the Scientific Underdetermination theorem (SUT).The underdetermination of method change follows from the 3rd Law: “A method becomes employed only when it is deducible from some subset of other employed methods and accepted theories of the time.” As a result of this law, a method can be employed in two ways: either it strictly follows from other accepted theories and employed methods, in which case the change is, in fact, deterministic, or it implements the abstract requirements of some other employed method. In the latter case, the change is underdetermined since abstract requirements can give rise to many different implementations. As a concrete example, we have an accepted theory that states, “when counting the number of living cells, the resulting value is acceptable only if it is obtained with an ‘aided’ eye.” A number of different methods can implement this abstract requirement, like the plating method or the counting chamber method.[[CITE_Barseghyan (2015)|p. 198]] Thus the method is underdetermined by the abstract requirements, so the process of method change implementing these requirements is not deterministic, which is exactly the statement of the underdetermination of method change.The underdetermination of theory change comes from the 2nd law and the possibility of inconclusive theory assessment. The 2nd law states that “In order to become accepted into the mosaic, a theory is assessed by the method actually employed at the time”. This assessment can result in conclusive acceptance, conclusive rejection, or it can be inconclusive. In both conclusive cases, the theory change is deterministic, but if the theory assessment is inconclusive, then the theory can be accepted or rejected. So the process of theory change is not necessarily deterministic, since it is, in fact, possible for assessment to be inconclusive. The question of whether there actually exist cases of inconclusive theory assessment is a task for the history of science, and is irrelevant to our discussion.These two theses combine to form the SUT, since changes in theories and methods are all the transitions that occur in the scientific mosaic, and we have seen that the underdetermination of theory and method change follow deductively from the 2nd law, the 3rd law and the possibility of inconclusive theory assessment.ibility of inconclusive theory assessment.)
Friesen et al. (2023) + (Scientonomy Workshop, February 25, 2023)
Scope of Scientonomy - Acceptance (Barseghyan-2015) + (Scientonomy currently recognizes several d … Scientonomy currently recognizes several different [[Epistemic Stances Towards Theories|stances]] that an [[Epistemic Community|epistemic community]] might take towards a theory. The community might [[Theory Acceptance|accept]] the theory as the best currently available description of the world, it might regard a theory as worthy of [[Theory Pursuit|pursuit]] and further development, or it might regard the theory as adequate for [[Theory Use|use]] for some practical purpose, while not the best description of the world. [[CITE_Barseghyan (2015)|pp. 30-42]] These stances, and their opposites (i.e. that a theory is unaccepted, neglected, or unused)together constitute the range of stances that a community might take towards a theory. The concept of a [[Scientific Mosaic|scientific mosaic]] consisting of the set of all theories accepted, and all methods employed by the community [[CITE_Barseghyan (2015)|pp.1-11]] is central to scientonomy, as is the goal of explaining all changes in this mosaic. To fulfill this central goal, a scientonomic theory ought to explain how transitions from one accepted theory to another take place, and what logic governs that transition, but it doesn't necessarily need to explain why some theories are pursued and others neglected and why some are used and others remain unused. [[CITE_Barseghyan (2015) |p. 42]][[CITE_Barseghyan (2015) |p. 42]])
Scope of Scientonomy - Social (Barseghyan-2015) + (Scientonomy focuses on the [[Scientific Mosaic|scientific mosaic]] … Scientonomy focuses on the [[Scientific Mosaic|scientific mosaic]] of accepted [[Theory|theories]] and employed [[Method|methods]]. In their daily work, individual scientists rely on and formulate theories about the object of their research, and use methods to appraise their theories. Both the theories they believe and the criteria they use to assess them may change over time. Although historians of science have often focused on individual scientists, often those deemed great, like Galileo or Einstein, and the changes in their beliefs as they constructed and assessed theories, [[Scientific Change|changes to the scientific mosaic itself]] happen at the level of the community. Scientonomy thus seeks to focus efforts on the social level of the scientific community rather than on the individual.c community rather than on the individual.)
Scope of Scientonomy - All Time Periods (Barseghyan-2015) + (Scientonomy ought not to limit its applica … Scientonomy ought not to limit its applicability to a restricted time period. If a scientific mosaic can be identified at a certain period in time, then it is a task of scientonomy to explain any and all changes in that mosaic at that time period. Similarly, an observational scientonomists ought not exclude any time period from their domain.exclude any time period from their domain.)
The Third Law (Sebastien-2016) + (Sebastien's third law explained by Gregory Rupik)
Singular Authority Delegation (Loiselle-2017) + (Singular authority delegation is a sub-typ … Singular authority delegation is a sub-type of authority delegation. It describes a situation in which a community delegates authority over some topic to a single community. Instances of singular authority delegation occur commonly in the art world. Typically, the art market recognizes only one individual or community as being the sole expert on matters of attribution for a given artist. For example, the art market always and only consults the Wildenstein Institute to answer questions over the authenticity of paintings by Monet. Another example of singular authority delegation is the relationship between the art market and the two people considered experts on Picasso: Maya Widmaier-Picasso and Claude Ruiz-Picasso. For matters of authenticity concerning the works of Picasso, the art market always and only delegates authority to the combined Maya-Claude mosaic. The art market will only accept a Picasso painting as authentic if ''both'' Maya and Claude agree that it is so. Maya and Claude are two separate authorities, and do not always agree. However, because the art market only delegates authority to a single entity-- the mosaic composed of theories agreed upon by Maya and Claude-- this is an instance of singular authority delegation.instance of singular authority delegation.)
Sociocultural Factors in Theory Acceptance theorem (Barseghyan-2015) + (Sociocultural factors can impact the proce … Sociocultural factors can impact the process of a theory's acceptance when the employed method of the community allows for such factors to affect the process. This is derived by the Second Law alone. For example, a community which ascribes infallible power to a leader or a group of leaders is in a position to accept a theory in virtue of the leaders. Furthermore, such factors can guide a scientific community to reject a theory based on the acceptance of another social theory with which it is at odds.Barseghyan’s Laws of Scientific Change break from the traditional language used in philosophy of science, of internal versus external factors in the mosaic. External factors, a term that has traditionally referred to the influences of societal trends, politics, religion, and so on, if defined as “elements not included in the mosaic” then we must accept that these do not affect the mosaic at the time by the the very definition. This is the result of the fact that the 2nd law introduces new theories in the context of the accepted methods at the time. As a result, the language of “external” factors is problematic.[[CITE_Barseghyan (2015)]]Socio-cultural factors ought to be defined more explicitly. The question is, instead, whether factors such as economics, politics, and religion can influence the theories accepted in the mosaic. It follows from the Second Law that theories are assessed by the method in the mosaic at the time. Therefore, if the method at the time mandates economic, political, religious, or other social requirements to be met by a theory before it is accept, only then do socio-cultural factors influence theory acceptance.Barseghyan provides the example of a hypothetical religious community, with an accepted belief (i.e. theory) that holds that the religion’s High Priest always grasps the true essence of things. By the Third Law, a method may be employed the mosaic that states that any proposition is acceptable, given that the High Priest utters it. In this case, it would appear as though socio-cultural factors are influencing, if not dictating, the course of scientific change in the community. This should not be confused with a case where a High Priest or other elite enforces their beliefs unscientifically, through threats, bribery, or otherwise. Should this happen, the change would be unscientific, as it would violate either the method employed at the time (and thereby the Second Law), or it would be creating a method in the mosaic which does not follow from the accepted theories at the time (and thereby the Third Law).[[CITE_Barseghyan (2015)]]ghyan (2015)]])
Assessment of Scientonomy - Relevant Facts (Barseghyan-2015) + (Some facts ''ought'' to be relevant to the … Some facts ''ought'' to be relevant to the [[Theory Acceptance|assessment of a theory]] because the content of the theory itself implies their relevance, and others ought to be relevant simply by definition. When assessing a theory concerning scientific change, relevant facts that ought necessarily to be considered include questions pertinent to scientific change processes. For example: What [[Theory|theories]] and [[Method|methods]] were part of the [[Scientific Mosaic|scientific mosaic]] of the community in question, both before and after the instance of [[Scientific Change|scientific change]]? What modifications were proposed and what parts of the mosaic did they intend to replace? Which of these modifications became accepted into the mosaic, and how? Relevant questions will depend on accepted views about the [[Scope of Scientonomy|scope of scientonomy]]. For example, if scientonomy deals with scientific change [[Scope of Scientonomy - Individual and Social|at the level of scientific communities]], then facts about the accepted views of communities ought to be relevant, and the views of particular individuals ought not. If scientonomy [[Scope of Scientonomy - Construction and Appraisal|deals only with theory appraisal]] and not with theory construction, then it follows that facts concerning the former, but not the latter, ought to be considered. Relevant facts will also depend on the content of the mosaic at the time in question. For example, it is anachronistic to speak of religious constraints on science in the seventeenth century since, at that time, religion and natural philosophy were not regarded as separate domains of knowledge, but as part of the same mosaic.[[CITE_Barseghyan (2015)|p. 111]][[CITE_Barseghyan (2015)|p. 111]])
The First Law for Theories (Barseghyan-2015) + (Specifically, in contemporary ''empirical' … Specifically, in contemporary ''empirical'' science, "we do not reject our accepted empirical theories even when these theories face anomalies (counterexamples, disconfirming instances, unexplained results of observations and experiments)."[[CITE_Barseghyan (2015)|p.122-3]] This is known as anomaly-tolerance. Though it cannot be said to be a universal feature of science, it is by no means a new feature, as Barseghyan (2015) observes that "this anomaly-tolerance has been a feature of empirical science for a long time" and provides the following key examples of anomaly-tolerance, following Evans (1958, 1967, 1992), in the context of Newtonian theory.[[CITE_Barseghyan (2015)|p.123]] <blockquote>The famous case of Newtonian theory and Mercury’s anomalous perihelion is a good indication that anomalies were not lethal for theories also in the 19th century empirical science. In 1859, it was observed that the behaviour of planet Mercury doesn’t quite fit the predictions of the then-accepted Newtonian theory of gravity. The rate of the advancement of Mercury’s perihelion (precession) wasn’t the one predicted by the Newtonian theory. For the Newtonian theory this was an anomaly. Several generations of scientists tried to find a solution to this problem. But, importantly, this anomaly didn’t falsify the Newtonian theory. The theory remained accepted for another sixty years until it was replaced by general relativity circa 1920. This wasn’t the first time that the Newtonian theory faced anomalies. In 1750 it was believed that the Earth is an oblate-spheroid (i.e. that it is flattened at the poles). This was a prediction that followed from the then-accepted Newtonian theory, a prediction that had been confirmed by Maupertuis and his colleagues by 1740. However, soon very puzzling results came from the Cape of Good Hope: the measurements of Nicolas Louis de Lacaille were suggesting that, unlike the northern hemisphere, the southern hemisphere is prolate rather than oblate. Thus, the Earth was turning out to be pear-shaped! Obviously, the length of the degree of the meridian measured by Lacaille was an anomaly for the accepted oblate-spheroid view and, correspondingly, for the Newtonian theory. Of course, as with any anomaly, this one too forced the community to look for its explanation by rechecking the data, by remeasuring the arc, and by providing additional assumptions. Although it took another eighty years until the puzzle was solved, Lacaille’s anomalous results didn’t lead to the rejection of the then-accepted oblate-spheroid view. Finally, in 1834-38, Thomas Maclear repeated Lacaille’s measurements and established that the deviation of Lacaille’s results from the oblate-spheroid view were due to the gravitational attraction of Table Mountain. The treatment of Lacaille’s results – as something bothersome but not lethal – reveals the anomaly-tolerance of empirical science even in the 18th century.[[CITE_Barseghyan (2015)|p.123]]</blockquote>.123]]</blockquote>)
Split Due to Inconclusiveness theorem (Barseghyan-2015) + (Split due to inconclusiveness can occur when two mutually incompatible theories are accepted simultaneously by the same community.)
Dogmatism No Theory Change theorem (Barseghyan-2015) Reason1 + (Suppose a community has an accepted theory … Suppose a community has an accepted theory that asserts that it is the final and absolute truth. By the [[The Third Law (Barseghyan-2015) |Third Law]] we deduce the method: accept no new theories ever. By the [[The Second Law|Second Law]] we deduce that no new theory can ever be accepted by the employed method of the time. By the [[The First Law (Barseghyan-2015)|First Law]], we deduce that the accepted theory will remain the accepted theory forever.[[CITE_Barseghyan (2015)|p. 165-167]][[File:Dogmatism-theorem.jpg|607px|center||]][[File:Dogmatism-theorem.jpg|607px|center||]])
Possible Mosaic Split theorem (Barseghyan-2015) + (Suppose we have a method for assessing the … Suppose we have a method for assessing theories about the efficacy of new pharmaceuticals that says "accept that the pharmaceutical is effective only if a clinically significant result is obtained in a sufficient number of randomized controlled trials." The wording of the method is such that it requires a significant degree of judgement on the part of the community - what constitutes 'clinical significance' and a 'sufficient number' of trials will vary from person to person and by context. This introduces the possibility of mosaic split when it is unclear if two contender theories satisfy this requirement. Carrying on the above example, suppose two drugs are being tested for some condition C: drugs A and B. We'll call T1 the theory that A is more effective than B at treating condition C and T2 the theory that B is more effective than A at treating condition C. These two theories are not compatible, and so cannot both be elements of the mosaic according to the [[The Zeroth Law|zeroth law]]. Suppose further that both are assessed by the method of the time, meaning that both are subject to double blind trials. In these trials drug A is clearly superior to drug B at inducing clinical remission, but drug B has fewer side effects and is still more effective than a placebo and has had more studies conducted. Even if we accept T1 we may have reason to suspect that T2 better satisfies the method. We can interpret this in two ways: by supposing that our assessment shows that we should accept T1 and that our assessment is inconclusive about T2 or by taking both assessments to be inconclusive. In the first case it is permissible according to the [[Second Law|second law]] to accept T1 and to either accept or reject T2, and in the second case both may be accepted or rejected.[[File:Assessment_outcomes_from_two_contenders_resulting_in_mosaic_split.jpg|454px|center||]] Because any time an assessment outcome is [[Outcome Inconclusive|inconclusive]] we may either accept or reject the theory being assessed we always face the possibility that one subsection of the community will reject the theory and another subsection will accept it. In these cases the two communities now bear distinct mosaics and a mosaic split has occurred. However it is important to note that the ambiguity inherent in inconclusive assessments means that it is never entailed that there will be competing subsections of the community. A community may, in the face of an inconclusive assessment, collectively agree to accept or reject the theory being assessed. Thus, in cases with an inconclusive assessment mosaic split is possible but never necessarily entailed by the circumstances.ing assessed. Thus, in cases with an inconclusive assessment mosaic split is possible but never necessarily entailed by the circumstances.)
Necessary Mosaic Split theorem (Barseghyan-2015) + (Suppose we have some community C' with mos … Suppose we have some community C' with mosaic M' and that this community assesses two theories, T1 and T2, both of which satisfy M'. Let us further suppose that T1 and T2 both describe the same object and are incompatible with one another. According to the second law both T1 and T2 will be accepted because they both satisfy M', but both cannot simultaneously be accepted by C' due to the zeroth law. The necessary mosaic split theorem says that the result will be a new community C1 which accepts T1 and M1, which precludes their accepting T2. Simultaneously a new community C2 will emerge which accepts T2 and the resulting theory M2, which precludes their accepting T1.Barseghyan (2015) neatly summarizes this series of events:<blockquote> When two mutually incompatible theories simultaneously satisfy the implicit requirements of the scientific community, members of the community are basically in a position to pick either one. And given that any contender theory always has its champions (if only the authors), there will inevitably be two parties with their different preferences. As a result, the community must inevitably split in two.[[CITE_Barseghyan (2015)|p. 204]]<blockquote>[[CITE_Barseghyan (2015)|p. 204]]<blockquote>)

Acceptance Criteria (Barseghyan-2015) + (TODO)
Demarcation Criteria (Barseghyan-2015) + (TODO)
Methodology (Barseghyan-2015) + (TODO)
Methodology (Sebastien-2016) + (TODO)
Norm Rejection theorem (Pandey-2023) + (TODO)
Question Rejection theorem (Barseghyan-Levesley-Pandey-2023) + (TODO)
Social Level (Barseghyan-2015) + (TODO)
Substantive Method (Barseghyan-2015) + (TODO)
The First Law for Norms (Barseghyan-Pandey-2023) + (TODO)
The First Law for Questions (Barseghyan-Levesley-2021) + (TODO)
The First Law for Theories (Barseghyan-Pandey-2023) + (TODO)

Question Pursuit (Barseghyan-2022) + (TODO: Add the description)
Theory Acceptance (Barseghyan-2015) + (TODO: Description here)
Theory Use (Barseghyan-2015) + (TODO: Description here)
Logical Presupposition (Barseghyan-Levesley-2021) + (TODO: Nikki add a description)
Question Rejection theorem (Barseghyan-Levesley-2021) + (TODO: Nikki add a description)
The Law of Question Acceptance (Barseghyan-Levesley-2021) + (TODO: Nikki add a description)
Epistemic Presupposition (Barseghyan-Levesley-2021) + (TODO: Nikki add a description)
Sufficient Reason theorem (Palider-2019) + (The '''Sufficient Reason theorem''' shows … The '''Sufficient Reason theorem''' shows how a sufficient reason leads to acceptance. This theorem follows from the definition of a [[Sufficient Reason (Palider-2019)]] and from [[The Second Law (Patton-Overgaard-Barseghyan-2017)]]. By the second law, if a theory satisfies the acceptance criteria of the method employed at the time, it becomes accepted. The claim of this theorem is that if there is a sufficient reason for a theory, then that theory satisfies the acceptance criteria of the time. This claim is justified as follows. The fourth condition of a sufficient reason states that the sufficient reason, alongside the employed method of the time, ''normatively infers'' (see [[Normative Inference (Palider-2019)]]) that the agent should accept the reasoned for theory. This statement is stipulated to mean that the acceptance criteria of the time are satisfied. However, it should be understood as further explicating what it means for the acceptance criteria to be satisfied, rather than simply being equated to a previously vague notion. It specifies that the [[Support (Palider-2019)]] (in condition 2 of a sufficient reason) constitutes strong enough "evidence" for the method to deem the supported theory as one that should be accepted. The conclusion that the supported theory should be accepted roughly means that the assessment of the theory is conclusive, i.e. conclusively in favour of acceptance. By this understanding of normative inference, as explaining what satisfying acceptance criteria means, it follows that when there is a sufficient reason, acceptance criteria are satisfied, hence the supported theory becomes accepted.One thing to note within the second law is that acceptance could potentially occur if assessment is inconclusive. The connection between normative inference and inconclusive assessments has not been explored, but one possible idea is that inconclusive assessments are those that include a permissible normative operator in the conclusion of normative inference. in the conclusion of normative inference.)
The Law of Theory Demarcation (Sarwar-Fraser-2018) + (The ''law of theory demarcation'' tries to … The ''law of theory demarcation'' tries to provide a mechanism of how the scientific status of theories changes overtime. The assessment outcomes of the law (satisfied, unsatisfied, and inconclusive) are ''logically'' separated from their consequences. In particular, the assessment outcome of conclusively satisfying the demarcation criteria leads to a theory being scientific, the assessment outcome of consclusively not satisfying the criteria lead to the theory being unscientific, and the final inconclusive outcome can lead to the theory being scientific, unscientific, or uncertain.[[CITE_Sarwar and Fraser (2018)]][[CITE_Sarwar and Fraser (2018)]])
The Third Law (Barseghyan-2015) + (The ''third law'' has also proven useful i … The ''third law'' has also proven useful in explicating such requirements as Confirmed Novel Predictions (CNP).[[CITE_Barseghyan (2015)|pp. 146-150]] According to the hypothetico-deductive method, a theory which challenges our accepted ontology must provide CNP in order to become accepted. However, the history of CNP has been a point of confusion for some time. By the Third Law, one can show that the requirement of CNP has not always been expected of new theories. When Newton published his Principia (~1740), CNP were not a requirement of his professed method, yet they were still provided. This is also true in the cases of Fresnel's wave theory of light (~1820), Einstein's general relativity (~1920), continental drift theory (1960s), and electroweak unification (1970s).[[CITE_Barseghyan (2015)|p. 146]]On the other hand, Clark’s law of diminishing returns (1900) had no such predictions. They also played no role in the acceptance of Mayer's lunar theory (1760s), Coulomb's inverse square law (early 1800s), the three laws of thermodynamics (1850s), and quantum mechanics (1927).[[CITE_Barseghyan (2015)|p. 146]]Barseghyan explains that this indicates that is because "we do expect confirmed novel predictions but only in very special circumstances. There was one common characteristic in all those episodes… they all altered our views on the structural elements of the world".[[CITE_Barseghyan (2015)|p. 146]] For instance, in our key examples, Newton’s proposal of unobservable entities, such as gravity and absolute space, challenged the ''accepted ontology'' of the time, while Clark’s simply accounted for the data already available. Barseghyan presents his historical hypothesis that this specific requirement for CNP has been employed in natural science since the 18th century. Assuming he is correct (for the sake of argument), he continues: "The ''third law'' stipulates that the requirement of confirmed novel predictions could become employed only if it was a deductive consequence of the accepted theories and other employed methods of the time. So a question arises: what theories and methods does this requirement follow from?".[[CITE_Barseghyan (2015)|pp. 147-148]] Barseghyan answers the question with two principles. For one, there is a principle, implicit in our contemporary mosaic and accepted since the eighteenth century, that states: "the world is more complex than it appears in observations, that there is more to the world than meets the eye".[[CITE_Barseghyan (2015)|p. 148]] Thus, observations may not tell the whole story, as what we observe may an effect of an unobservable. Secondly, "it has been accepted since the early eighteenth century that, in principle, any phenomenon can be produced by an infinite number of different underlying mechanisms".[[CITE_Barseghyan (2015)|p. 148]] "This leads us to the thesis of underdetermination that, in principle, any finite body of evidence can be explained in an infinite number of ways".[[CITE_Barseghyan (2015)|p. 148]] Therefore:<blockquote> The abstract requirement that follows from these two principles is that whenever we assess a theory that introduces some new internal mechanisms (new types of sub-stances, particles, forces, fields, interaction, processes etc.) we must take into account that this hypothesized internal mechanism may turn out to be fictitious even if it manages to predict the known phenomena with utmost precision. In other words, we ddo not tolerate "fiddling" with the ''accepted ontology;'' if a theory attemptes to modify the accepted ontology, it must show that it is not cooked-up.[[CITE_Barseghyan (2015)|p. 148]]</blockquote>This abstract requirement can then be implemented in several ways, including through our contemporary requirement of ''confirmed novel predictions''. This is an illustration of the second scenario of method employment.Thus, in utilizing the third law, one can discover both when certain criteria become an implicit rule and under what conditions they are necessary.cit rule and under what conditions they are necessary.)
Scope of Scientonomy - Implicit and Explicit (Barseghyan-2017) + (The [[Method|methods]] … The [[Method|methods]] employed in [[Theory Assessment Outcomes|theory assessment]] do not always correspond to the professed scientific [[Methodology|methodology]], and may be purely implicit. Thus, a scientonomic theory ought to distinguish between accepted methodologies and employed methods. Because of their role in theory assessment, and thus in determining the contents of the [[Scientific Mosaic|scientific mosaic]], a scientonomic theory ought to include employed methods, whether they are explicit or implicit. [[CITE_Barseghyan (2015) |pp. 52-61]][[CITE_Barseghyan (2015) |pp. 52-61]])
Scientific Change (Barseghyan-2015) + (The [[Scientific Mosaic|scientific mosaic]] … The [[Scientific Mosaic|scientific mosaic]] is in a process of perpetual change. Most of the theories that we accept nowadays didn’t even exist two or three hundred years ago. Similarly, at least some of the methods that we employ in theory assessment nowadays have nothing to do with the methods employed in the 17th century. Thus, it is safe to say that the process of scientific change involves both theories and methods.[[CITE_Barseghyan(2015)|p.9]] Changes in the scientific mosaic can be viewed as a series of successive frames, where each frame represents a state of that mosaic at a given point of time. Obviously, such a frame would include all accepted theories and all employed methods of the time. [[CITE_Barseghyan(2015)|p. 9]]CITE_Barseghyan(2015)|p. 9]])
The Third Law (Sebastien-2016) + (The [[The Third Law (Barseghyan-2015)|initial formulation]] … The [[The Third Law (Barseghyan-2015)|initial formulation]] of the law, proposed by Barseghyan in [[Barseghyan (2015)|''The Laws of Scientific Change'']], stated that a [[Method|method]] becomes [[Employed Method|employed]] only when it is deducible from other employed methods and accepted theories of the time.[[CITE_Barseghyan (2015)|p.132]] In that formulation, it wasn't clear whether employed methods follow from ''all'' or only ''some'' of the accepted theories and employed methods of the time. This led to a logical paradox which this reformulation attempts to solve.[[CITE_Sebastien (2016)]] This reformulation of the law makes explicit that an employed method need not necessarily follow from ''all'' other employed methods and accepted theories but only from ''some'' of them. This made it possible for an employed method to be logically inconsistent and yet [[The Zeroth Law|compatible]] with openly accepted [[Methodology|methodological dicta]].In all other respects, this formulation preserves the gist of Barseghyan's original formulation. According to the third law, a method becomes employed when:# it strictly follows from some subset of other employed methods and accepted theories, ''or'' # it implements some abstract requirements of other employed methods. This restates Barseghyan's original suggestion that [[Theory Acceptance|accepted theories]] shape the set of [[Employed Method|implicit criteria employed]] in theory assessment. When a new theory is accepted, this often leads to the employment of an abstract requirement to take that new theory into account when testing relevant contender theories. This abstract requirement is then specified by a new employed method.The evolution of the drug trial methods is an example of the third law in action. For example, the discovery of the placebo effect in drug testing demonstrates that fake treatment can cause improvement in patient symptoms. As a result of its discovery the abstract requirement of “when assessing a drug’s efficacy, the possible placebo effect must be taken into account” was generated. This abstract requirement is, by definition, an accepted theory which stipulates that, if ignored, substantial doubt would be cast on any trial. As a result of this new theory, the Single-Blind Trial method was devised. The currently employed method in drug testing is the Double-Blind Trial, a method which specifies all of the abstract requirements of its predecessors. It is an apt illustration of how new methods are generated through the acceptance of new theories, as well as how new methods employ the abstract requirements of their predecessors.[[CITE_Barseghyan (2015)|pp. 132-152]]In Barseghyan’s explication of the Aristotelian-Medieval method, he illustrates how Aristotelian natural philosophy impacted the method of the time. One of the key features of the Aristotelian-scholastic method was the requirement of intuition schooled by experience, i.e. that a proposition is acceptable if it grasps the nature of a thing though intuition schooled by experience. The requirement itself was a deductive consequence of several assumptions accepted at the time. One of the assumptions underlying this requirement was the idea that every natural thing has a nature, a substantial quality that makes a thing what it is (e.g. a human's nature is their capacity of reason). Another assumption underlying the requirement was the idea that nature of a thing can be grasped intuitively by those who are most experienced with the things of that type. The requirements of the intuitive truth followed from these assumptions. The scholastic-Aristotelians scholars wouldn’t require intuitive truths grasped by an experienced person if they didn’t believe that things have natures that could be grasped intuitively by experts.The third law has also proven useful in explicating such requirements as Confirmed Novel Predictions (CNP). According to the hypothetico-deductive method, a theory which challenges our accepted ontology must provide CNP in order to become accepted. However, the history of CNP has been a point of confusion for some time. By the Third Law, one can show that the requirement of CNP has not always been expected of new theories. When Newton published his Principia, CNP were not a requirement of his professed method, yet they were still provided. On the other hand, Clark’s law of diminishing returns had no such predictions. This is because Newton’s proposal of unobservable entities, such as gravity and absolute space, challenged the accepted ontology of the time, while Clark’s simply accounted for the data already available. Thus, in utilizing the Third Law, one can discover both when certain criteria become an implicit rule and under what conditions they are necessary. under what conditions they are necessary.)
Underdetermined Method Change theorem (Barseghyan-2015) + (The [[The Third Law|third law]] … The [[The Third Law|third law]] allows for two distinct scenarios of method employment. A [[Method|method]] may become employed because it follows strictly from accepted [[Theory|theories]] or employed methods, or it may the abstract requirements of some other employed method. This second scenario allows for creative ingenuity and depends on the technology of the times, therefore it may be fulfilled in many ways and allows underdeterminism [[CITE_Barseghyan (2015)|p. 198]]. [[File:Underdetermined-method-change.jpg|607px|center||]][[File:Underdetermined-method-change.jpg|607px|center||]])
Error Rejection by Replacement (Machado-Marques-Patton-2021) + (The analysis of several several instances … The analysis of several several instances of scientific error by [[Sarah Machado-Marques|Machado-Marques]] and [[Paul Patton|Patton]] suggest that the handling of these instances by scientists is in accord with the theory rejection theorem. Handling of error involves, according to this view, not only a rejection of some of the propositions that are considered to be accepted erroneously but also an acceptance of some new propositions. In some cases, an erroneously accepted ''first-order'' proposition is replaced by another ''first-order'' proposition incompatible with it. In other cases, an erroneously accepted ''first-order'' proposition is replaced by a ''second-order'' proposition stating the lack of sufficient reason for accepting the first-order proposition. According to this view, the handling of erroneously accepted theories involves their replacement with other theories; the handling of scientific error is therefore in full accord with the theory rejection theorem. accord with the theory rejection theorem.)
Inexplicable (Mirkin-Barseghyan-2018) + (The category is agent-relative and encompa … The category is agent-relative and encompasses that knowledge which cannot - even in principle - be explicated. The definition was first suggested by [[Hakob Barseghyan]] and [[Maxim Mirkin]] in their ''[[Barseghyan and Mirkin (2019)|The Role of Technological Knowledge in Scientific Change]]''[[CITE_Barseghyan and Mirkin (2019)]] and was restated by Mirkin in his ''[[Mirkin (2018)|The Status of Technological Knowledge in the Scientific Mosaic]]''.[[Mirkin (2018)|The Status of Technological Knowledge in the Scientific Mosaic]]''.)
Epistemic Community Exists + (The claim of the existence of epistemic co … The claim of the existence of epistemic communities can be traced back to Overgaard, who presented the distinction between epistemic and non-epistemic communities in his [[Overgaard (2017)|''A Taxonomy for the Social Agents of Scientific Change'']].[[CITE_Overgaard (2017)]][[CITE_Overgaard (2017)]])
Core Question (Patton-Al-Zayadi-2021) + (The core questions of a [[Discipline| discipline]] … The core questions of a [[Discipline| discipline]] are those general questions that are essential to a discipline, having the power to define it and establish its boundaries within a hierarchy of questions. They are identified as such in the discipline's [[Delineating Theory| delineating theory]].[[CITE_Patton and Al-Zayadi (2021)]] The [[Scientific Mosaic| scientific mosaic]] consists of [[Theory| theories]] and [[Question| questions]].[[CITE_Barseghyan (2015)]][[CITE_Barseghyan (2018)]][[CITE_Rawleigh (2018)]][[CITE_Sebastien (2016)]] Questions form hierarchies in which more specific questions are [[Subquestion| subquestions]] of broader questions. Theories enter into this hierarchy as well since questions presuppose theories, and theories are answers to questions. It is the position of core questions within such hierarchies that confer upon them the power to define and establish the boundaries of a discipline by indicating which questions and theories are included. For example, the question 'how did living things originate as a result of evolution?' is a core question of evolutionary biology.s a core question of evolutionary biology.)
Compatibility Corollary (Fraser-Sarwar-2018) + (The corollary is meant to restate the cont … The corollary is meant to restate the content of [[Rory Harder|Harder]]'s [[The Zeroth Law (Harder-2015)|the zeroth law]] of scientific change. Since the corollary follows deductively from the definition of [[Compatibility (Fraser-Sarwar-2018)|''compatibility'']], it highlights that the zeroth law as it was formulated by Harder is tautologous. Since the corollary covers the same idea as the zeroth law, all the theorems that were thought to be deducible by means of the zeroth law (e.g. [[Theory Rejection theorem (Barseghyan-2015)|the theory rejection theorem]] or [[Method Rejection theorem (Barseghyan-2015)|the method rejection theorem]]) can now be considered deducible by means of the corollary.dered deducible by means of the corollary.)
Procedural Method (Barseghyan-2015) + (The definition assumes that it is possible … The definition assumes that it is possible to conceive of methods that do not presuppose any substantive knowledge about the world. If a method doesn't presuppose any accepted theories other than definitions, the method is procedural.[[CITE_Barseghyan (2015)|p. 219]] As a possible example of a procedural method, [[Hakob Barseghyan|Barseghyan]] mentions what he calls the ''deductive acceptance method'', according to which "if a proposition is deductively inferred from other accepted propositions, it is to be accepted".[[CITE_Barseghyan (2015)|p. 221]] This method, according to Barseghyan presupposes only some definition of ''deductive inference'' as well as some very abstract method such as "only accept the best available theories".[[CITE_Barseghyan (2015)|p. 220-221]] The latter is another possible instance of a procedural method, as it too doesn't seem to presuppose any substantive knowledge of the world.se any substantive knowledge of the world.)

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