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• Friesen et al. (2023)  + (Scientonomy Workshop, February 25, 2023)
• Scope of Scientonomy - Acceptance (Barseghyan-2015)  + (Scientonomy currently recognizes several d … Scientonomy currently recognizes several different [[Epistemic Stances Towards Theories|stances]] that an [[Epistemic Community|epistemic community]] might take towards a theory. The community might [[Theory Acceptance|accept]] the theory as the best currently available description of the world, it might regard a theory as worthy of [[Theory Pursuit|pursuit]] and further development, or it might regard the theory as adequate for [[Theory Use|use]] for some practical purpose, while not the best description of the world. [[CITE_Barseghyan (2015)|pp. 30-42]] These stances, and their opposites (i.e. that a theory is unaccepted, neglected, or unused)together constitute the range of stances that a community might take towards a theory. The concept of a [[Scientific Mosaic|scientific mosaic]] consisting of the set of all theories accepted, and all methods employed by the community [[CITE_Barseghyan (2015)|pp.1-11]] is central to scientonomy, as is the goal of explaining all changes in this mosaic. To fulfill this central goal, a scientonomic theory ought to explain how transitions from one accepted theory to another take place, and what logic governs that transition, but it doesn't necessarily need to explain why some theories are pursued and others neglected and why some are used and others remain unused. [[CITE_Barseghyan (2015) |p. 42]][[CITE_Barseghyan (2015) |p. 42]])
• Scope of Scientonomy - Social (Barseghyan-2015)  + (Scientonomy focuses on the [[Scientific Mosaic|scientific mosaic]] … Scientonomy focuses on the [[Scientific Mosaic|scientific mosaic]] of accepted [[Theory|theories]] and employed [[Method|methods]]. In their daily work, individual scientists rely on and formulate theories about the object of their research, and use methods to appraise their theories. Both the theories they believe and the criteria they use to assess them may change over time. Although historians of science have often focused on individual scientists, often those deemed great, like Galileo or Einstein, and the changes in their beliefs as they constructed and assessed theories, [[Scientific Change|changes to the scientific mosaic itself]] happen at the level of the community. Scientonomy thus seeks to focus efforts on the social level of the scientific community rather than on the individual.c community rather than on the individual.)
• Scope of Scientonomy - All Time Periods (Barseghyan-2015)  + (Scientonomy ought not to limit its applica … Scientonomy ought not to limit its applicability to a restricted time period. If a scientific mosaic can be identified at a certain period in time, then it is a task of scientonomy to explain any and all changes in that mosaic at that time period. Similarly, an observational scientonomists ought not exclude any time period from their domain.exclude any time period from their domain.)
• The Third Law (Sebastien-2016)  + (Sebastien's third law explained by Gregory Rupik)
• Question Rejection theorem (Barseghyan-Levesley-2021)  + (Similar to other scientonomic rejection th … Similar to other scientonomic rejection theorems, the question rejection theorem assumes that questions become rejected as they get pushed out of an agent's mosaic due to their incompatibility with some newly accepted elements. There are two most common scenarios of such incompatibility.</br></br>In the first scenario, a question becomes rejected due to the acceptance of a new theory that happens to be incompatible with some of the question's epistemic presuppositions. As explained by Barseghyan and Levesley: </br></br><blockquote>imagine an epistemic situation where agent A initially accepts the question “What is the relationship between the four elements?” together with the theoretical presupposition that there are four elements. Suppose also that at some later time the agent discovers that there are not four but three elements. Naturally, the agent rejects both the theory of four elements and the question about the relationships between these elements:</br></br>[[File:Question_Rejection_due_to_Incompatibility_(Barseghyan-Levesley-2021).png|788px|center||]]</br></br>Importantly, this rejection happens regardless of whether it ever occurs to the agent to ask a new question “What is the relationship between the three elements?”. Even if the agent never accepts any further questions concerning the three elements, the question “What is the relationship between the four elements?” would still be rejected.[[CITE_Barseghyan and Levesley (2021)|pp. 14-15]]</blockquote></br></br>In the second scenario, a question is being rejected due to the acceptance of the second-order theory stating that the question is unanswerable (the latter being incompatible with the question). In the words of Barseghyan and Levesley:</br></br><blockquote>Consider [an] epistemic situation, where agent A accepts some question Q, together with the theory that Q is answerable. When agent A comes to accept that Q is unanswerable, the agent rejects question Q. The scientonomic mechanism of this rejection is through the incompatibility of question Q and the theory “Question Q is unanswerable”:[[CITE_Barseghyan and Levesley (2021)|p. 15]]</br></br>[[File:Question_Rejection_due_to_Unanswerability_(Barseghyan-Levesley-2021).png|794px|center||]]</blockquote>Rejection_due_to_Unanswerability_(Barseghyan-Levesley-2021).png|794px|center||]]</blockquote>)
• Singular Authority Delegation (Loiselle-2017)  + (Singular authority delegation is a sub-typ … Singular authority delegation is a sub-type of authority delegation. It describes a situation in which a community delegates authority over some topic to a single community. </br></br>Instances of singular authority delegation occur commonly in the art world. Typically, the art market recognizes only one individual or community as being the sole expert on matters of attribution for a given artist. For example, the art market always and only consults the Wildenstein Institute to answer questions over the authenticity of paintings by Monet. </br></br>Another example of singular authority delegation is the relationship between the art market and the two people considered experts on Picasso: Maya Widmaier-Picasso and Claude Ruiz-Picasso. For matters of authenticity concerning the works of Picasso, the art market always and only delegates authority to the combined Maya-Claude mosaic. The art market will only accept a Picasso painting as authentic if ''both'' Maya and Claude agree that it is so. Maya and Claude are two separate authorities, and do not always agree. However, because the art market only delegates authority to a single entity-- the mosaic composed of theories agreed upon by Maya and Claude-- this is an instance of singular authority delegation.instance of singular authority delegation.)
• Sociocultural Factors in Theory Acceptance theorem (Barseghyan-2015)  + (Sociocultural factors can impact the proce … Sociocultural factors can impact the process of a theory's acceptance when the employed method of the community allows for such factors to affect the process. This is derived by the Second Law alone. For example, a community which ascribes infallible power to a leader or a group of leaders is in a position to accept a theory in virtue of the leaders. Furthermore, such factors can guide a scientific community to reject a theory based on the acceptance of another social theory with which it is at odds.</br></br>Barseghyan’s Laws of Scientific Change break from the traditional language used in philosophy of science, of internal versus external factors in the mosaic. External factors, a term that has traditionally referred to the influences of societal trends, politics, religion, and so on, if defined as “elements not included in the mosaic” then we must accept that these do not affect the mosaic at the time by the the very definition. This is the result of the fact that the 2nd law introduces new theories in the context of the accepted methods at the time. As a result, the language of “external” factors is problematic.[[CITE_Barseghyan (2015)]]</br></br>Socio-cultural factors ought to be defined more explicitly. The question is, instead, whether factors such as economics, politics, and religion can influence the theories accepted in the mosaic. It follows from the Second Law that theories are assessed by the method in the mosaic at the time. Therefore, if the method at the time mandates economic, political, religious, or other social requirements to be met by a theory before it is accept, only then do socio-cultural factors influence theory acceptance.</br></br>Barseghyan provides the example of a hypothetical religious community, with an accepted belief (i.e. theory) that holds that the religion’s High Priest always grasps the true essence of things. By the Third Law, a method may be employed the mosaic that states that any proposition is acceptable, given that the High Priest utters it. In this case, it would appear as though socio-cultural factors are influencing, if not dictating, the course of scientific change in the community. This should not be confused with a case where a High Priest or other elite enforces their beliefs unscientifically, through threats, bribery, or otherwise. Should this happen, the change would be unscientific, as it would violate either the method employed at the time (and thereby the Second Law), or it would be creating a method in the mosaic which does not follow from the accepted theories at the time (and thereby the Third Law).[[CITE_Barseghyan (2015)]]ghyan (2015)]])
• Assessment of Scientonomy - Relevant Facts (Barseghyan-2015)  + (Some facts ''ought'' to be relevant to the … Some facts ''ought'' to be relevant to the [[Theory Acceptance|assessment of a theory]] because the content of the theory itself implies their relevance, and others ought to be relevant simply by definition. When assessing a theory concerning scientific change, relevant facts that ought necessarily to be considered include questions pertinent to scientific change processes. For example: What [[Theory|theories]] and [[Method|methods]] were part of the [[Scientific Mosaic|scientific mosaic]] of the community in question, both before and after the instance of [[Scientific Change|scientific change]]? What modifications were proposed and what parts of the mosaic did they intend to replace? Which of these modifications became accepted into the mosaic, and how? </br></br>Relevant questions will depend on accepted views about the [[Scope of Scientonomy|scope of scientonomy]]. For example, if scientonomy deals with scientific change [[Scope of Scientonomy - Individual and Social|at the level of scientific communities]], then facts about the accepted views of communities ought to be relevant, and the views of particular individuals ought not. If scientonomy [[Scope of Scientonomy - Construction and Appraisal|deals only with theory appraisal]] and not with theory construction, then it follows that facts concerning the former, but not the latter, ought to be considered. </br></br>Relevant facts will also depend on the content of the mosaic at the time in question. For example, it is anachronistic to speak of religious constraints on science in the seventeenth century since, at that time, religion and natural philosophy were not regarded as separate domains of knowledge, but as part of the same mosaic.[[CITE_Barseghyan (2015)|p. 111]][[CITE_Barseghyan (2015)|p. 111]])
• The First Law for Theories (Barseghyan-2015)  + (Specifically, in contemporary ''empirical' … Specifically, in contemporary ''empirical'' science, "we do not reject our accepted empirical theories even when these theories face anomalies (counterexamples, disconfirming instances, unexplained results of observations and experiments)."[[CITE_Barseghyan (2015)|p.122-3]] This is known as anomaly-tolerance. Though it cannot be said to be a universal feature of science, it is by no means a new feature, as Barseghyan (2015) observes that "this anomaly-tolerance has been a feature of empirical science for a long time" and provides the following key examples of anomaly-tolerance, following Evans (1958, 1967, 1992), in the context of Newtonian theory.[[CITE_Barseghyan (2015)|p.123]] </br></br><blockquote>The famous case of Newtonian theory and Mercury’s anomalous perihelion is a good indication that anomalies were not lethal for theories also in the 19th century empirical science. In 1859, it was observed that the behaviour of planet Mercury doesn’t quite fit the predictions of the then-accepted Newtonian theory of gravity. The rate of the advancement of Mercury’s perihelion (precession) wasn’t the one predicted by the Newtonian theory. For the Newtonian theory this was an anomaly. Several generations of scientists tried to find a solution to this problem. But, importantly, this anomaly didn’t falsify the Newtonian theory. The theory remained accepted for another sixty years until it was replaced by general relativity circa 1920. </br></br>This wasn’t the first time that the Newtonian theory faced anomalies. In 1750 it was believed that the Earth is an oblate-spheroid (i.e. that it is flattened at the poles). This was a prediction that followed from the then-accepted Newtonian theory, a prediction that had been confirmed by Maupertuis and his colleagues by 1740. However, soon very puzzling results came from the Cape of Good Hope: the measurements of Nicolas Louis de Lacaille were suggesting that, unlike the northern hemisphere, the southern hemisphere is prolate rather than oblate. Thus, the Earth was turning out to be pear-shaped! Obviously, the length of the degree of the meridian measured by Lacaille was an anomaly for the accepted oblate-spheroid view and, correspondingly, for the Newtonian theory. Of course, as with any anomaly, this one too forced the community to look for its explanation by rechecking the data, by remeasuring the arc, and by providing additional assumptions. Although it took another eighty years until the puzzle was solved, Lacaille’s anomalous results didn’t lead to the rejection of the then-accepted oblate-spheroid view. Finally, in 1834-38, Thomas Maclear repeated Lacaille’s measurements and established that the deviation of Lacaille’s results from the oblate-spheroid view were due to the gravitational attraction of Table Mountain. The treatment of Lacaille’s results – as something bothersome but not lethal – reveals the anomaly-tolerance of empirical science even in the 18th century.[[CITE_Barseghyan (2015)|p.123]]</blockquote>.123]]</blockquote>)
• Split Due to Inconclusiveness theorem (Barseghyan-2015)  + (Split due to inconclusiveness can occur when two mutually incompatible theories are accepted simultaneously by the same community.)
• Dogmatism No Theory Change theorem (Barseghyan-2015) Reason1  + (Suppose a community has an accepted theory … Suppose a community has an accepted theory that asserts that it is the final and absolute truth. By the [[The Third Law (Barseghyan-2015) |Third Law]] we deduce the method: accept no new theories ever. By the [[The Second Law|Second Law]] we deduce that no new theory can ever be accepted by the employed method of the time. By the [[The First Law (Barseghyan-2015)|First Law]], we deduce that the accepted theory will remain the accepted theory forever.[[CITE_Barseghyan (2015)|p. 165-167]]</br></br>[[File:Dogmatism-theorem.jpg|607px|center||]][[File:Dogmatism-theorem.jpg|607px|center||]])
• Possible Mosaic Split theorem (Barseghyan-2015)  + (Suppose we have a method for assessing the … Suppose we have a method for assessing theories about the efficacy of new pharmaceuticals that says "accept that the pharmaceutical is effective only if a clinically significant result is obtained in a sufficient number of randomized controlled trials." The wording of the method is such that it requires a significant degree of judgement on the part of the community - what constitutes 'clinical significance' and a 'sufficient number' of trials will vary from person to person and by context. This introduces the possibility of mosaic split when it is unclear if two contender theories satisfy this requirement. </br></br>Carrying on the above example, suppose two drugs are being tested for some condition C: drugs A and B. We'll call T₁ the theory that A is more effective than B at treating condition C and T₂ the theory that B is more effective than A at treating condition C. These two theories are not compatible, and so cannot both be elements of the mosaic according to the [[The Zeroth Law|zeroth law]]. Suppose further that both are assessed by the method of the time, meaning that both are subject to double blind trials. In these trials drug A is clearly superior to drug B at inducing clinical remission, but drug B has fewer side effects and is still more effective than a placebo and has had more studies conducted. Even if we accept T₁ we may have reason to suspect that T₂ better satisfies the method. We can interpret this in two ways: by supposing that our assessment shows that we should accept T₁ and that our assessment is inconclusive about T₂ or by taking both assessments to be inconclusive. In the first case it is permissible according to the [[Second Law|second law]] to accept T₁ and to either accept or reject T₂, and in the second case both may be accepted or rejected.</br>[[File:Assessment_outcomes_from_two_contenders_resulting_in_mosaic_split.jpg|454px|center||]] </br></br>Because any time an assessment outcome is [[Outcome Inconclusive|inconclusive]] we may either accept or reject the theory being assessed we always face the possibility that one subsection of the community will reject the theory and another subsection will accept it. In these cases the two communities now bear distinct mosaics and a mosaic split has occurred. However it is important to note that the ambiguity inherent in inconclusive assessments means that it is never entailed that there will be competing subsections of the community. A community may, in the face of an inconclusive assessment, collectively agree to accept or reject the theory being assessed. Thus, in cases with an inconclusive assessment mosaic split is possible but never necessarily entailed by the circumstances.ing assessed. Thus, in cases with an inconclusive assessment mosaic split is possible but never necessarily entailed by the circumstances.)
• Necessary Mosaic Split theorem (Barseghyan-2015)  + (Suppose we have some community C' with mos … Suppose we have some community C' with mosaic M' and that this community assesses two theories, T₁ and T₂, both of which satisfy M'. Let us further suppose that T₁ and T₂ both describe the same object and are incompatible with one another. According to the second law both T₁ and T₂ will be accepted because they both satisfy M', but both cannot simultaneously be accepted by C' due to the zeroth law. The necessary mosaic split theorem says that the result will be a new community C₁ which accepts T₁ and M₁, which precludes their accepting T₂. Simultaneously a new community C₂ will emerge which accepts T₂ and the resulting theory M₂, which precludes their accepting T₁.</br></br>Barseghyan (2015) neatly summarizes this series of events:</br><blockquote> When two mutually incompatible theories simultaneously satisfy the implicit requirements of the scientific community, members of the community are basically in a position to pick either one. And given that any contender theory always has its champions (if only the authors), there will inevitably be two parties with their different preferences. As a result, the community must inevitably split in two.[[CITE_Barseghyan (2015)|p. 204]]<blockquote>[[CITE_Barseghyan (2015)|p. 204]]<blockquote>)
• Social Level (Barseghyan-2015)  + (TODO)
• Methodology (Barseghyan-2015)  + (TODO)
• Methodology (Sebastien-2016)  + (TODO)
• Demarcation Criteria (Barseghyan-2015)  + (TODO)
• Acceptance Criteria (Barseghyan-2015)  + (TODO)
• Substantive Method (Barseghyan-2015)  + (TODO)
• The First Law for Questions (Barseghyan-Levesley-2021)  + (TODO)
• The First Law for Norms (Barseghyan-Pandey-2023)  + (TODO)
• The First Law for Theories (Barseghyan-Pandey-2023)  + (TODO)
• Norm Rejection theorem (Pandey-2023)  + (TODO)
• Question Rejection theorem (Barseghyan-Levesley-Pandey-2023)  + (TODO)

• Question Pursuit (Barseghyan-2022)  + (TODO: Add the description)

• Theory Acceptance (Barseghyan-2015)  + (TODO: Description here)
• Theory Use (Barseghyan-2015)  + (TODO: Description here)
• Logical Presupposition (Barseghyan-Levesley-2021)  + (TODO: Nikki add a description)
• Epistemic Presupposition (Barseghyan-Levesley-2021)  + (TODO: Nikki add a description)
• Sufficient Reason theorem (Palider-2019)  + (The '''Sufficient Reason theorem''' shows … The '''Sufficient Reason theorem''' shows how a sufficient reason leads to acceptance. This theorem follows from the definition of a [[Sufficient Reason (Palider-2019)]] and from [[The Second Law (Patton-Overgaard-Barseghyan-2017)]]. By the second law, if a theory satisfies the acceptance criteria of the method employed at the time, it becomes accepted. The claim of this theorem is that if there is a sufficient reason for a theory, then that theory satisfies the acceptance criteria of the time. This claim is justified as follows. </br></br>The fourth condition of a sufficient reason states that the sufficient reason, alongside the employed method of the time, ''normatively infers'' (see [[Normative Inference (Palider-2019)]]) that the agent should accept the reasoned for theory. This statement is stipulated to mean that the acceptance criteria of the time are satisfied. However, it should be understood as further explicating what it means for the acceptance criteria to be satisfied, rather than simply being equated to a previously vague notion. It specifies that the [[Support (Palider-2019)]] (in condition 2 of a sufficient reason) constitutes strong enough "evidence" for the method to deem the supported theory as one that should be accepted. The conclusion that the supported theory should be accepted roughly means that the assessment of the theory is conclusive, i.e. conclusively in favour of acceptance. By this understanding of normative inference, as explaining what satisfying acceptance criteria means, it follows that when there is a sufficient reason, acceptance criteria are satisfied, hence the supported theory becomes accepted.</br></br>One thing to note within the second law is that acceptance could potentially occur if assessment is inconclusive. The connection between normative inference and inconclusive assessments has not been explored, but one possible idea is that inconclusive assessments are those that include a permissible normative operator in the conclusion of normative inference. in the conclusion of normative inference.)
• The Law of Theory Demarcation (Sarwar-Fraser-2018)  + (The ''law of theory demarcation'' tries to … The ''law of theory demarcation'' tries to provide a mechanism of how the scientific status of theories changes overtime. The assessment outcomes of the law (satisfied, unsatisfied, and inconclusive) are ''logically'' separated from their consequences. In particular, the assessment outcome of conclusively satisfying the demarcation criteria leads to a theory being scientific, the assessment outcome of consclusively not satisfying the criteria lead to the theory being unscientific, and the final inconclusive outcome can lead to the theory being scientific, unscientific, or uncertain.[[CITE_Sarwar and Fraser (2018)]][[CITE_Sarwar and Fraser (2018)]])
• The Third Law (Barseghyan-2015)  + (The ''third law'' has also proven useful i … The ''third law'' has also proven useful in explicating such requirements as Confirmed Novel Predictions (CNP).[[CITE_Barseghyan (2015)|pp. 146-150]]</br> </br>According to the hypothetico-deductive method, a theory which challenges our accepted ontology must provide CNP in order to become accepted. However, the history of CNP has been a point of confusion for some time. By the Third Law, one can show that the requirement of CNP has not always been expected of new theories. When Newton published his Principia (~1740), CNP were not a requirement of his professed method, yet they were still provided. This is also true in the cases of Fresnel's wave theory of light (~1820), Einstein's general relativity (~1920), continental drift theory (1960s), and electroweak unification (1970s).[[CITE_Barseghyan (2015)|p. 146]]</br></br>On the other hand, Clark’s law of diminishing returns (1900) had no such predictions. They also played no role in the acceptance of Mayer's lunar theory (1760s), Coulomb's inverse square law (early 1800s), the three laws of thermodynamics (1850s), and quantum mechanics (1927).[[CITE_Barseghyan (2015)|p. 146]]</br></br>Barseghyan explains that this indicates that is because "we do expect confirmed novel predictions but only in very special circumstances. There was one common characteristic in all those episodes… they all altered our views on the structural elements of the world".[[CITE_Barseghyan (2015)|p. 146]] For instance, in our key examples, Newton’s proposal of unobservable entities, such as gravity and absolute space, challenged the ''accepted ontology'' of the time, while Clark’s simply accounted for the data already available. </br></br>Barseghyan presents his historical hypothesis that this specific requirement for CNP has been employed in natural science since the 18th century. Assuming he is correct (for the sake of argument), he continues: "The ''third law'' stipulates that the requirement of confirmed novel predictions could become employed only if it was a deductive consequence of the accepted theories and other employed methods of the time. So a question arises: what theories and methods does this requirement follow from?".[[CITE_Barseghyan (2015)|pp. 147-148]] </br></br>Barseghyan answers the question with two principles. For one, there is a principle, implicit in our contemporary mosaic and accepted since the eighteenth century, that states: "the world is more complex than it appears in observations, that there is more to the world than meets the eye".[[CITE_Barseghyan (2015)|p. 148]] Thus, observations may not tell the whole story, as what we observe may an effect of an unobservable. Secondly, "it has been accepted since the early eighteenth century that, in principle, any phenomenon can be produced by an infinite number of different underlying mechanisms".[[CITE_Barseghyan (2015)|p. 148]] "This leads us to the thesis of underdetermination that, in principle, any finite body of evidence can be explained in an infinite number of ways".[[CITE_Barseghyan (2015)|p. 148]] Therefore:</br></br><blockquote> The abstract requirement that follows from these two principles is that whenever we assess a theory that introduces some new internal mechanisms (new types of sub-stances, particles, forces, fields, interaction, processes etc.) we must take into account that this hypothesized internal mechanism may turn out to be fictitious even if it manages to predict the known phenomena with utmost precision. In other words, we ddo not tolerate "fiddling" with the ''accepted ontology;'' if a theory attemptes to modify the accepted ontology, it must show that it is not cooked-up.[[CITE_Barseghyan (2015)|p. 148]]</blockquote></br></br>This abstract requirement can then be implemented in several ways, including through our contemporary requirement of ''confirmed novel predictions''. This is an illustration of the second scenario of method employment.</br></br>Thus, in utilizing the third law, one can discover both when certain criteria become an implicit rule and under what conditions they are necessary.cit rule and under what conditions they are necessary.)
• Scope of Scientonomy - Implicit and Explicit (Barseghyan-2017)  + (The [[Method|methods]] … The [[Method|methods]] employed in [[Theory Assessment Outcomes|theory assessment]] do not always correspond to the professed scientific [[Methodology|methodology]], and may be purely implicit. Thus, a scientonomic theory ought to distinguish between accepted methodologies and employed methods. Because of their role in theory assessment, and thus in determining the contents of the [[Scientific Mosaic|scientific mosaic]], a scientonomic theory ought to include employed methods, whether they are explicit or implicit. [[CITE_Barseghyan (2015) |pp. 52-61]][[CITE_Barseghyan (2015) |pp. 52-61]])
• Scientific Change (Barseghyan-2015)  + (The [[Scientific Mosaic|scientific mosaic]] … The [[Scientific Mosaic|scientific mosaic]] is in a process of perpetual change. Most of the theories that we accept nowadays didn’t even exist two or three hundred years ago. Similarly, at least some of the methods that we employ in theory assessment nowadays have nothing to do with the methods employed in the 17th century. Thus, it is safe to say that the process of scientific change involves both theories and methods.[[CITE_Barseghyan(2015)|p.9]] Changes in the scientific mosaic can be viewed as a series of successive frames, where each frame represents a state of that mosaic at a given point of time. Obviously, such a frame would include all accepted theories and all employed methods of the time. [[CITE_Barseghyan(2015)|p. 9]]CITE_Barseghyan(2015)|p. 9]])
• The Third Law (Sebastien-2016)  + (The [[The Third Law (Barseghyan-2015)|initial formulation]] … The [[The Third Law (Barseghyan-2015)|initial formulation]] of the law, proposed by Barseghyan in [[Barseghyan (2015)|''The Laws of Scientific Change'']], stated that a [[Method|method]] becomes [[Employed Method|employed]] only when it is deducible from other employed methods and accepted theories of the time.[[CITE_Barseghyan (2015)|p.132]] In that formulation, it wasn't clear whether employed methods follow from ''all'' or only ''some'' of the accepted theories and employed methods of the time. This led to a logical paradox which this reformulation attempts to solve.[[CITE_Sebastien (2016)]] </br></br>This reformulation of the law makes explicit that an employed method need not necessarily follow from ''all'' other employed methods and accepted theories but only from ''some'' of them. This made it possible for an employed method to be logically inconsistent and yet [[The Zeroth Law|compatible]] with openly accepted [[Methodology|methodological dicta]].</br></br>In all other respects, this formulation preserves the gist of Barseghyan's original formulation. According to the third law, a method becomes employed when:</br># it strictly follows from some subset of other employed methods and accepted theories, ''or'' </br># it implements some abstract requirements of other employed methods. </br></br>This restates Barseghyan's original suggestion that [[Theory Acceptance|accepted theories]] shape the set of [[Employed Method|implicit criteria employed]] in theory assessment. When a new theory is accepted, this often leads to the employment of an abstract requirement to take that new theory into account when testing relevant contender theories. This abstract requirement is then specified by a new employed method.</br></br>The evolution of the drug trial methods is an example of the third law in action. For example, the discovery of the placebo effect in drug testing demonstrates that fake treatment can cause improvement in patient symptoms. As a result of its discovery the abstract requirement of “when assessing a drug’s efficacy, the possible placebo effect must be taken into account” was generated. This abstract requirement is, by definition, an accepted theory which stipulates that, if ignored, substantial doubt would be cast on any trial. As a result of this new theory, the Single-Blind Trial method was devised. The currently employed method in drug testing is the Double-Blind Trial, a method which specifies all of the abstract requirements of its predecessors. It is an apt illustration of how new methods are generated through the acceptance of new theories, as well as how new methods employ the abstract requirements of their predecessors.[[CITE_Barseghyan (2015)|pp. 132-152]]</br></br>In Barseghyan’s explication of the Aristotelian-Medieval method, he illustrates how Aristotelian natural philosophy impacted the method of the time. One of the key features of the Aristotelian-scholastic method was the requirement of intuition schooled by experience, i.e. that a proposition is acceptable if it grasps the nature of a thing though intuition schooled by experience. The requirement itself was a deductive consequence of several assumptions accepted at the time. One of the assumptions underlying this requirement was the idea that every natural thing has a nature, a substantial quality that makes a thing what it is (e.g. a human's nature is their capacity of reason). Another assumption underlying the requirement was the idea that nature of a thing can be grasped intuitively by those who are most experienced with the things of that type. The requirements of the intuitive truth followed from these assumptions. The scholastic-Aristotelians scholars wouldn’t require intuitive truths grasped by an experienced person if they didn’t believe that things have natures that could be grasped intuitively by experts.</br></br>The third law has also proven useful in explicating such requirements as Confirmed Novel Predictions (CNP). According to the hypothetico-deductive method, a theory which challenges our accepted ontology must provide CNP in order to become accepted. However, the history of CNP has been a point of confusion for some time. By the Third Law, one can show that the requirement of CNP has not always been expected of new theories. When Newton published his Principia, CNP were not a requirement of his professed method, yet they were still provided. On the other hand, Clark’s law of diminishing returns had no such predictions. This is because Newton’s proposal of unobservable entities, such as gravity and absolute space, challenged the accepted ontology of the time, while Clark’s simply accounted for the data already available. Thus, in utilizing the Third Law, one can discover both when certain criteria become an implicit rule and under what conditions they are necessary. under what conditions they are necessary.)
• Underdetermined Method Change theorem (Barseghyan-2015)  + (The [[The Third Law|third law]] … The [[The Third Law|third law]] allows for two distinct scenarios of method employment. A [[Method|method]] may become employed because it follows strictly from accepted [[Theory|theories]] or employed methods, or it may the abstract requirements of some other employed method. This second scenario allows for creative ingenuity and depends on the technology of the times, therefore it may be fulfilled in many ways and allows underdeterminism [[CITE_Barseghyan (2015)|p. 198]]. </br>[[File:Underdetermined-method-change.jpg|607px|center||]][[File:Underdetermined-method-change.jpg|607px|center||]])
• Error Rejection by Replacement (Machado-Marques-Patton-2021)  + (The analysis of several several instances … The analysis of several several instances of scientific error by [[Sarah Machado-Marques|Machado-Marques]] and [[Paul Patton|Patton]] suggest that the handling of these instances by scientists is in accord with the theory rejection theorem. Handling of error involves, according to this view, not only a rejection of some of the propositions that are considered to be accepted erroneously but also an acceptance of some new propositions. In some cases, an erroneously accepted ''first-order'' proposition is replaced by another ''first-order'' proposition incompatible with it. In other cases, an erroneously accepted ''first-order'' proposition is replaced by a ''second-order'' proposition stating the lack of sufficient reason for accepting the first-order proposition. According to this view, the handling of erroneously accepted theories involves their replacement with other theories; the handling of scientific error is therefore in full accord with the theory rejection theorem. accord with the theory rejection theorem.)
• Inexplicable (Mirkin-Barseghyan-2018)  + (The category is agent-relative and encompa … The category is agent-relative and encompasses that knowledge which cannot - even in principle - be explicated. The definition was first suggested by [[Hakob Barseghyan]] and [[Maxim Mirkin]] in their ''[[Barseghyan and Mirkin (2019)|The Role of Technological Knowledge in Scientific Change]]''[[CITE_Barseghyan and Mirkin (2019)]] and was restated by Mirkin in his ''[[Mirkin (2018)|The Status of Technological Knowledge in the Scientific Mosaic]]''.[[Mirkin (2018)|The Status of Technological Knowledge in the Scientific Mosaic]]''.)
• Epistemic Community Exists  + (The claim of the existence of epistemic co … The claim of the existence of epistemic communities can be traced back to Overgaard, who presented the distinction between epistemic and non-epistemic communities in his [[Overgaard (2017)|''A Taxonomy for the Social Agents of Scientific Change'']].[[CITE_Overgaard (2017)]][[CITE_Overgaard (2017)]])
• Core Question (Patton-Al-Zayadi-2021)  + (The core questions of a [[Discipline| discipline]] … The core questions of a [[Discipline| discipline]] are those general questions that are essential to a discipline, having the power to define it and establish its boundaries within a hierarchy of questions. They are identified as such in the discipline's [[Delineating Theory| delineating theory]].[[CITE_Patton and Al-Zayadi (2021)]] The [[Scientific Mosaic| scientific mosaic]] consists of [[Theory| theories]] and [[Question| questions]].[[CITE_Barseghyan (2015)]][[CITE_Barseghyan (2018)]][[CITE_Rawleigh (2018)]][[CITE_Sebastien (2016)]] Questions form hierarchies in which more specific questions are [[Subquestion| subquestions]] of broader questions. Theories enter into this hierarchy as well since questions presuppose theories, and theories are answers to questions. It is the position of core questions within such hierarchies that confer upon them the power to define and establish the boundaries of a discipline by indicating which questions and theories are included. For example, the question 'how did living things originate as a result of evolution?' is a core question of evolutionary biology.s a core question of evolutionary biology.)
• Compatibility Corollary (Fraser-Sarwar-2018)  + (The corollary is meant to restate the cont … The corollary is meant to restate the content of [[Rory Harder|Harder]]'s [[The Zeroth Law (Harder-2015)|the zeroth law]] of scientific change. Since the corollary follows deductively from the definition of [[Compatibility (Fraser-Sarwar-2018)|''compatibility'']], it highlights that the zeroth law as it was formulated by Harder is tautologous. Since the corollary covers the same idea as the zeroth law, all the theorems that were thought to be deducible by means of the zeroth law (e.g. [[Theory Rejection theorem (Barseghyan-2015)|the theory rejection theorem]] or [[Method Rejection theorem (Barseghyan-2015)|the method rejection theorem]]) can now be considered deducible by means of the corollary.dered deducible by means of the corollary.)
• Procedural Method (Barseghyan-2015)  + (The definition assumes that it is possible … The definition assumes that it is possible to conceive of methods that do not presuppose any substantive knowledge about the world. If a method doesn't presuppose any accepted theories other than definitions, the method is procedural.[[CITE_Barseghyan (2015)|p. 219]] As a possible example of a procedural method, [[Hakob Barseghyan|Barseghyan]] mentions what he calls the ''deductive acceptance method'', according to which "if a proposition is deductively inferred from other accepted propositions, it is to be accepted".[[CITE_Barseghyan (2015)|p. 221]] This method, according to Barseghyan presupposes only some definition of ''deductive inference'' as well as some very abstract method such as "only accept the best available theories".[[CITE_Barseghyan (2015)|p. 220-221]] The latter is another possible instance of a procedural method, as it too doesn't seem to presuppose any substantive knowledge of the world.se any substantive knowledge of the world.)
• Authority Delegation (Patton-2019)  + (The definition tweaks the [[Authority Delegation (Overgaard-Loiselle-2016)|original definition]] … The definition tweaks the [[Authority Delegation (Overgaard-Loiselle-2016)|original definition]] of the term by [[Nicholas Overgaard|Overgaard]] and [[Mirka Loiselle|Loiselle]] to ensure that the relationship of authority delegation can obtain between [[Epistemic Agent|epistemic agents]] of all types. It also substitutes [[Question|''question'']] for ''topic'', as the former is the proper scientonomic term that should be used.per scientonomic term that should be used.)
• Hierarchical Authority Delegation (Patton-2019)  + (The definition tweaks the [[Hierarchical Authority Delegation (Loiselle-2017)|original definition]] … The definition tweaks the [[Hierarchical Authority Delegation (Loiselle-2017)|original definition]] of the term by [[Mirka Loiselle|Loiselle]] to ensure that the relationship of hierarchical authority delegation can obtain between [[Epistemic Agent|epistemic agents]] of all types. It also substitutes [[Question|''question'']] for ''topic'', as the former is the proper scientonomic term that should be used.per scientonomic term that should be used.)
• Multiple Authority Delegation (Patton-2019)  + (The definition tweaks the [[Multiple Authority Delegation (Loiselle-2017)|original definition]] … The definition tweaks the [[Multiple Authority Delegation (Loiselle-2017)|original definition]] of the term by [[Mirka Loiselle|Loiselle]] to ensure that the relationship of multiple authority delegation can obtain between [[Epistemic Agent|epistemic agents]] of all types. It also substitutes [[Question|''question'']] for ''topic'', as the former is the proper scientonomic term that should be used.per scientonomic term that should be used.)
• Mutual Authority Delegation (Patton-2019)  + (The definition tweaks the [[Mutual Authority Delegation (Overgaard-Loiselle-2016)|original definition]] … The definition tweaks the [[Mutual Authority Delegation (Overgaard-Loiselle-2016)|original definition]] of the term by [[Nicholas Overgaard|Overgaard]] and [[Mirka Loiselle|Loiselle]] to ensure that the relationship of multiple authority delegation can obtain between [[Epistemic Agent|epistemic agents]] of all types. It also substitutes [[Question|''question'']] for ''topic'', as the former is the proper scientonomic term that should be used.</br></br>Overgaard and Loiselle illustrate the relationship of mutual authority delegation by a number of examples. For one, physicists acknowledge that biologists are the experts on questions concerning life, and likewise biologists acknowledge that physicists are the experts on questions concerning physical processes. Similar relationships can be found within individual scientific disciplines. Consider, for instance, the relationship between theoretical and applied physicists, where despite the differences in their methods and overall objectives, the two communities customarily delegate authority to each other on a wide array of topics.y to each other on a wide array of topics.)
• One-sided Authority Delegation (Patton-2019)  + (The definition tweaks the [[Mutual Authority Delegation (Overgaard-Loiselle-2016)|original definition]] … The definition tweaks the [[Mutual Authority Delegation (Overgaard-Loiselle-2016)|original definition]] of the term by [[Nicholas Overgaard|Overgaard]] and [[Mirka Loiselle|Loiselle]] to ensure that the relationship of one-sided authority delegation can obtain between [[Epistemic Agent|epistemic agents]] of all types. It also substitutes [[Question|''question'']] for ''topic'', as the former is the proper scientonomic term that should be used.per scientonomic term that should be used.)
• Non-Hierarchical Authority Delegation (Patton-2019)  + (The definition tweaks the [[Non-hierarchical Authority Delegation (Loiselle-2017)|original definition]] … The definition tweaks the [[Non-hierarchical Authority Delegation (Loiselle-2017)|original definition]] of the term by [[Mirka Loiselle|Loiselle]] to ensure that the relationship of non-hierarchical authority delegation can obtain between [[Epistemic Agent|epistemic agents]] of all types. It also substitutes [[Question|''question'']] for ''topic'', as the former is the proper scientonomic term that should be used.per scientonomic term that should be used.)
• Singular Authority Delegation (Patton-2019)  + (The definition tweaks the [[Singular Authority Delegation (Loiselle-2017)|original definition]] … The definition tweaks the [[Singular Authority Delegation (Loiselle-2017)|original definition]] of the term by [[Mirka Loiselle|Loiselle]] to ensure that the relationship of singular authority delegation can obtain between [[Epistemic Agent|epistemic agents]] of all types. It also substitutes [[Question|''question'']] for ''topic'', as the former is the proper scientonomic term that should be used.per scientonomic term that should be used.)
• Contextual Appraisal theorem (Barseghyan-2015)  + (The depiction of Galileo as a hero, standi … The depiction of Galileo as a hero, standing up against church authorities to present his "clearly superior" position, is well-known.[[CITE_Barseghyan (2015)|p. 187]] However, as Barseghyan rightly notes, it fails to take the contemporaneous ''scientific mosaic'' of Galileo's community into account. The traditional account, placing both theories aganist each other in a vacuum, "failed to appreciate both that theory assessment is an assessment of a proposed modification and that a theory is assessed by the method employed at the time. Once we focus our attention on the state of the scientific mosaic of the time," though, "it becomes obvious that the scientific community of the time simply couldn’t have acted differently".[[CITE_Barseghyan (2015)|p. 188]]</br></br>Let's consider the ''scientific mosaic'' circa the 1610s. It consisted of many interconnected Aristotelian-medieval theories, including ''geocentrism,'' which "was a deductive consequence of the Aristotelian law of natural motion and the theory of elements".[[CITE_Barseghyan (2015)|p. 188]] </br></br>So, "it was impossible to simply cut geocentrism out of the mosaic and replace it with heliocentrism – the whole Aristotelian theory of elements would have to be rejected as well. And it was only made more difficult because "the theory of elements itself was tightly connected with many other parts of the mosaic," such as the ''possibility of transformation of elements'' and the medical theory of the time (four humours).[[CITE_Barseghyan (2015)|p. 189]] "In short," summarizes Barseghyan, "in order to make the rejection of geocentrism possible, a whole array of other elements of the Aristotelian-medieval mosaic would have to be rejected as well".[[CITE_Barseghyan (2015)|p. 189]]</br></br>Now by ''the first law for theories'' and ''the theory rejection theorem'', "only the acceptance of an alternative set of theories could defeat the theories of the Aristotelian-medieval mosaic".[[CITE_Barseghyan (2015)|p. 189]] "Unfortunately for Galileo," concludes Barseghyan, "at the time there was no acceptable contender theory comparable in scope with the theories of the Aristotelian-medieval mosaic ... Galileo didn’t have an acceptable replacement for all the elements of the mosaic that had to be rejected together with geocentrism ... The traditional interpretation of this historical episode failed to appreciate this important point and, instead, preferred to blame the dogmatism of the clergy".[[CITE_Barseghyan (2015)|p. 189]]</br></br>Another key problem with the typical presentation of this episode is its assessment, "not by the implicit requirements of the time, but by the requirements of the hypothetico-deductive method, which became actually employed a whole century after the episode took place. Namely, Galileo was said to have shown the superiority of the Copernican heliocentrism by confirming some of its novel predictions," which, by the traditional account, was considered "a clear-cut indication of the superiority of the Copernican hypothesis".[[CITE_Barseghyan (2015)|p. 189]]</br></br>Yet, Barseghyan's more careful study of the episode reveals the following: "the requirements of hypothetico-deductivism had little in common with the actual expectations of the community of the time. Although the task of reconstructing the late Aristotelian-medieval method of natural philosophy is quite challenging and may take a considerable amount of labour, one thing is clear: the requirement of confirmed novel predictions was not among implicit expectations of the community of the time. Back then, theories simply didn’t get assessed by their confirmed novel predictions".[[CITE_Barseghyan (2015)|pp. 189-90]] And we note that important point becomes apparent through the ''contextual appraisal theorem''.ough the ''contextual appraisal theorem''.)