Ontology of Scientific Change

What is the ontology of scientific change? What are the fundamental elements that undergo scientific change?

Paul Patton's overview of the scientonomic ontology

In principle, the process of scientific change can concern many different types of entities. One important question is to establish the most fundamental units that undergo scientific change. Over the years, it has been argued that the fundamental units of scientific change include theories (Popper), paradigms (Kuhn), research programmes (Lakatos), research traditions (early Laudan), methods (Kuhn, Shapere, later Laudan), and values (Kuhn, later Laudan). Any descriptive theory of scientific change needs to establish a basic ontology of scientific change.

In the scientonomic context, this question was first formulated by Hakob Barseghyan in 2015. The question is currently accepted as a legitimate topic for discussion by Scientonomy community.

In Scientonomy, the accepted answers to the question can be summarized as follows:

• The subtypes of epistemic agent are epistemic community and individual epistemic agent.
• The subtypes of epistemic element are explicit, implicit, question and theory.
• The subtypes of epistemic stance are compatibility, norm employment, question acceptance, theory acceptance, theory pursuit and theory use.
• The stance of compatibility can be taken towards an epistemic element.
• The possible outcomes of theory assessment are satisfied, not satisfied, and inconclusive.

Scientonomic History

Initially, this question hasn't been openly stated in the LSC. Instead, the ontology of scientific change was posited implicitly in the Metatheory through the definition of scientific mosaic as a set of all accepted theories and employed methods.1p.5 Towards the end of 2016, it gradually became clear that the ontology of a field cannot and should not be postulated via definitions. What constitutes the elements of a certain ontology is for the respective empirical research to be established and, thus, is not a matter of definitions. In other words, the question of what constitutes the ontology of a certain field is a descriptive question, not definitional. Indeed, what sort of elements change during the process of scientific change is not something that should be decided by a definition, but should be formulated as a descriptive theory that says "Such-and-such elements undergo scientific change".

Acceptance Record

Here is the complete acceptance record of this question (it includes all the instances when the question was accepted as a legitimate topic for discussion by a community):

Community	Accepted From	Acceptance Indicators	Still Accepted	Accepted Until	Rejection Indicators
Scientonomy	1 January 2016	The question was tacitly accepted even before its explicit formulation in 2017. Thus, it has the same acceptance date as the rest of the original TSC.	Yes

All Theories

According to our records, no theory has attempted to answer this question.

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Accepted Theories

According to our records, no theory on this topic has ever been accepted.

Suggested Modifications

According to our records, there have been no suggested modifications on this topic.

Current View

In Scientonomy, the accepted answers to the question are Epistemic Community Is a Subtype of Epistemic Agent (Barseghyan-2018), Individual Epistemic Agent Is a Subtype of Epistemic Agent (Patton-2019), Question Is a Subtype of Epistemic Element (Rawleigh-2018), Theory Is a Subtype of Epistemic Element (Barseghyan-2015), Explicit Is a Subtype of Epistemic Element (Mirkin-2018), Implicit Is a Subtype of Epistemic Element (Mirkin-2018), Theory Acceptance Is a Subtype of Epistemic Stance (Barseghyan-2015), Norm Employment Is a Subtype of Epistemic Stance (Barseghyan-2018), Question Acceptance Is a Subtype of Epistemic Stance (Rawleigh-2018), Compatibility Is a Subtype of Epistemic Stance (Fraser-Sarwar-2018), Theory Use Is a Subtype of Epistemic Stance (Barseghyan-2015), Theory Pursuit Is a Subtype of Epistemic Stance (Barseghyan-2015), Epistemic Stances Towards Epistemic Elements - Compatibility (Fraser-Sarwar-2018) and Theory Assessment Outcomes (Patton-Overgaard-Barseghyan-2017).

Subtypes of Epistemic Agent

Epistemic Community Is a Subtype of Epistemic Agent (Barseghyan-2018) states: "Epistemic Community is a subtype of Epistemic Agent, i.e. epistemic agent is a supertype of epistemic community."

According to Barseghyan, epistemic community is an epistemic agent, i.e. it is capable of taking epistemic stances towards epistemic elements.2

Individual Epistemic Agent Is a Subtype of Epistemic Agent (Patton-2019) states: "Individual Epistemic Agent is a subtype of Epistemic Agent, i.e. epistemic agent is a supertype of individual epistemic agent."

According to Patton, individuals are "capable of taking epistemic stances towards epistemic elements, with reason, based on a semantic understanding of the elements and their available alternatives, and with the goal of producing knowledge".3p. 82

Subtypes of Epistemic Element

Question Is a Subtype of Epistemic Element (Rawleigh-2018) states: "Question is a subtype of Epistemic Element, i.e. epistemic element is a supertype of question."

A study of the process of scientific change reveals many cases when a question that was considered legitimate in a certain time-period became illegitimate in another period. For example, the questions such as “what is the weight of phlogiston?” or “why does some matter gain mass as it loses phlogiston?” were accepted as legitimate topics of inquiry for the most part of the 18th century. Yet, once the phlogiston theory was rejected, these questions became illegitimate. Another examples is the question “what is the distance from the earth to the sphere of stars?” that was once considered legitimate by astronomers, but is no longer accepted.4p. 4

Similarly, there are questions which are considered legitimate these days but weren't accepted even a few centuries ago. An example of this is the question “what’s the underlying mechanics of the evolution of species?” - a perfectly legitimate topic of biological research nowadays that would have been deemed illegitimate three hundred years ago.4p. 4

These examples suggest that questions are part of the process of scientific changes. More specifically, they are a subtype of epistemic element.

Theory Is a Subtype of Epistemic Element (Barseghyan-2015) states: "Theory is a subtype of Epistemic Element, i.e. epistemic element is a supertype of theory."

According to this theory, theories are a subtype of epistemic element. Among other things, this assumes that epsitemic stances can be taken by epistemic agents towards theories.

Explicit Is a Subtype of Epistemic Element (Mirkin-2018) states: "Explicit is a subtype of Epistemic Element, i.e. epistemic element is a supertype of explicit."

Implicit Is a Subtype of Epistemic Element (Mirkin-2018) states: "Implicit is a subtype of Epistemic Element, i.e. epistemic element is a supertype of implicit."

Subtypes of Epistemic Stance

Theory Acceptance Is a Subtype of Epistemic Stance (Barseghyan-2015) states: "Theory Acceptance is a subtype of Epistemic Stance, i.e. epistemic stance is a supertype of theory acceptance."

Norm Employment Is a Subtype of Epistemic Stance (Barseghyan-2018) states: "Norm Employment is a subtype of Epistemic Stance, i.e. epistemic stance is a supertype of norm employment."

Question Acceptance Is a Subtype of Epistemic Stance (Rawleigh-2018) states: "Question Acceptance is a subtype of Epistemic Stance, i.e. epistemic stance is a supertype of question acceptance."

Compatibility Is a Subtype of Epistemic Stance (Fraser-Sarwar-2018) states: "Compatibility is a subtype of Epistemic Stance, i.e. epistemic stance is a supertype of compatibility."

According to Fraser and Sarwar, "compatibility is a distinct epistemic stance that agents can take towards elements".5p.70 They show this by arguing that it is possible to take the stance of compatibility towards a pair of elements without taking any of the other stances towards these elements. Thus, compatibility is distinct from acceptance, since two elements need not be in the same mosaic, or even accepted by any agent to be considered, in principle, compatible. For example, an epistemic agent may consider Ptolemaic astrology compatible with Aristotelian natural philosophy without accepting either Ptolemaic astrology or Aristotelian natural philosophy. Compatibility is also different from use, since a pair of theories can be considered compatible regardless of whether any of them is considered useful. For instance, one can consider quantum mechanics and evolutionary biology compatible, while finding only the former useful. Finally, compatibility is also distinct from pursuit, since an agent can consider a pair of theories compatible with or without pursuing either. An agent, for instance, may find two alternative quantum theories pursuitworthy while clearly realizing that the two are incompatible.

Theory Use Is a Subtype of Epistemic Stance (Barseghyan-2015) states: "Theory Use is a subtype of Epistemic Stance, i.e. epistemic stance is a supertype of theory use."

Theory Pursuit Is a Subtype of Epistemic Stance (Barseghyan-2015) states: "Theory Pursuit is a subtype of Epistemic Stance, i.e. epistemic stance is a supertype of theory pursuit."

Epistemic Stances Towards Epistemic Elements

Epistemic Stances Towards Epistemic Elements - Compatibility (Fraser-Sarwar-2018) states: "The stance of compatibility can be taken towards an epistemic element."

Fraser and Sarwar argued that, as an epistemic stance, compatibility can be taken towards epistemic elements of all types.5p. 70

Theory Assessment Outcomes

Theory Assessment Outcomes (Patton-Overgaard-Barseghyan-2017) states: "The possible outcomes of theory assessment are satisfied, not satisfied, and inconclusive."

According to this ontology of theory assessment outcomes, when a theory is assessed by a method, one of the three following outcomes can obtain:1p. 199

• Satisfied: the theory is deemed to conclusively meet the requirements of the method employed at the time.
• Not Satisfied: the theory is deemed to conclusively not meet the requirements of the method employed at the time.
• Inconclusive: it is unclear whether or not the requirements of the method employed at the time are met.

While the first two assessment outcomes are conclusive, the third outcome is inconclusive, as it permits more than one possible course of action. Thus, in this view, a theory's assessment outcome is not necessarily conclusive; an inconclusive outcome is also conceivable.

This ontology is assumed by the second law of scientific change as formulated by Patton, Overgaard, and Barseghyan in 2017.

Related Topics

It has the following sub-topic(s):

• Bearers of Mosaic
• Epistemic Stances Towards Epistemic Elements
• Existence of Method Hierarchies
• Hierarchy of Theories
• Status of Multiple Mutual Delegation
• Status of Non-Hierarchical Authority Delegation
• Subtypes of Epistemic Agent
• Subtypes of Epistemic Element
• Subtypes of Epistemic Stance
• Theory Assessment Outcomes

This topic is also related to the following topic(s):

• Mechanism of Scientific Change