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This volume inaugurates a new critical edition of the writings of the great English philosopher and sage Francis Bacon (1561-1626) – the first such complete edition for more than a hundred years. It contains six of Bacon’s Latin scientific works, each accompanied by entirely new facing-page translations which, together with the extensive introduction and commentaries, offer fresh insights into one of the great minds of the early seventeenth century. Volume VI includes Bacon’s speculative writings between c. 1611-c. 1619, including his Phaenomena universi, Descriptio globi intellectuali, Thema coeli, De principiis atque originibus. +
This is the first critical edition since the nineteenth century of Bacon’s principal philosophical work in English, The Twoo Bookes of Francis Bacon. Of the proficience and advancement of Learning, divine and humane – traditionally known as The Advancement of Learning. This authoritative critical edition is based upon the collation and analysis of the original editions. Its comprehensive introduction examines Bacon’s appraisal of the current state of learning and his efforts to involve his contemporaries in his programme to reform and advance learning. Extensive commentary explores Bacon’s sources and early modern contexts for Bacon’s most important philosophical work in English. +
This volume belongs to the first new critical edition of the works of Francis Bacon (1561-1626) to have been produced since the nineteenth century. The edition presents the works in broadly chronological order and according to the best principles of modern textual scholarship. The seven works in the present volume belong to the final completed stages (Parts III-V) of Bacon’s hugely ambitious six-part sequence of philosophical works, collectively entitled Instauratio magna (1620-6). All are presented in the original Latin with new facing-page translations. Three of the seven texts (substantial works in two cases, and all sharing a startlingly improbable textual history) are published and translated here for the first time: these are an early version of the Historia densi, the ‘lost’ Abecedarium, and the Historia de animato & inanimato. Another – the Prodromi sive anticipationes philosophiae secundae – has likewise never been translated before. Together with their commentaries and the introduction they open the way to important new understandings of Bacon’s mature philosophical thought. +
Bacon’s essays reflect the experience and wide reading of a Renaissance man – philosopher, historian, judge, politician, adviser to the Prince – above all, astute observer of human nature. With uncompromising candour, he exposes man as he is, not as he ought to be, examining such givens of Renaissance power as negotiating for position, expediting a personal suit, speaking effectively, and the role of dissimulation in social and political situations. He scrutinizes judicial prerogatives and probes the causes and dangers of atheism and superstition. Even such topics as boldness or love or deformity have a practical bent. In Bacon’s own phrase, these essays ‘come home to Mens Businesse and Bosomes.’ It is especially through their matchless style that they come home–with imaginative vigour, concrete language, and the colloquial force of individual sentences. An introduction places the essays in their original context, examines their evolution over Bacon’s lifetime, and elucidates their form and prose style; a commentary examines his sources and relates essays to his other writings; a glossary and index are also included. +
Volume XI of The Oxford Francis Bacon comprises the first new critical edition of Bacon’s most important philosophical work, the Novum Organum, for a hundred years. One of the foundation documents of early-modern philosophy, Novum Organum is edited in accordance with modern textual-critical principles for the first time. Graham Rees presents the only edition ever to include the original Latin text with a brand new, facing-page translation, and a thorough Introduction and detailed commentary of the text. The edition represents a major step towards the reinstatement of Bacon as a central figure in the history of early-modern philosophy, and will be essential reading for anyone studying the history of science and ideas in the seventeenth-century. +
Francis Bacon (1561-1626) was a genuine midwife of modernity. He was one of the first thinkers to visualise a future which would be guided by a cooperative science-based vision of bettering human welfare. In this the first critical edition of his greatest philosophical work since the nineteenth-century, we find facing-page Latin translations and a thorough and detailed Introduction to the text. The text includes the original Latin with a facing-page translation, and has been edited in accordance with the highest standards of modern textual-critical principles, with a detailed and thorough introduction. +
This volume belongs to the critical edition of the complete works of Francis Bacon (1561-1626), an edition that presents the works in broadly chronological order and in accordance with the principles of modern textual scholarship. This volume contains critical editions of five varied works Bacon composed during the 1620s. The most significant and substantial of these five works is his biography of Henry VII (The historie of the raigne of King Henry the seventh) but the volume testifies as well to Bacon’s continuing robust allegiance to his youthful vaunt that all knowledge was his province, for it also includes his sketch for a biography of Henry VIII, An advertisement touching an holy war (a thoughtful debate over the prospect of holy war in his own time), Apophthegmes (a lively collection of witty anecdotes, classical to early modern), and his select verse translations from the psalms. In each case an authoritative text has been established based upon fresh collation of the relevant manuscripts and of multiple copies of the seventeenth editions, and subjected to a thorough bibliographical analysis of the treatment of Bacon’s texts in the early modern printing-house. The Introductions discuss the occasion and context for each work, evaluate his creative transmutation of his sources, and weigh their contemporary reception. A comprehensive commentary identifies and parses Bacon’s use of source material, from his refinement of published literary and historical sources and contemporary MSS to the political white papers composed while he served as counsellor to King James. An extensive glossary is integrated into this commentary. An Appendix provides full bibliographical descriptions of all of the textual witnesses, manuscript and printed edition. +
Harvey Siegel's (1985) attempts to revive the traditional epistemological formulation of the rationality of science. Contending that "a general commitment to evidence" is constitutive of method and rationality in science, Siegel advances its compatibility with specific, historically attuned formulations of principles of evidential support as a virtue of his aprioristic candidate for science's rationality. In point of fact, this account is compatible with virtually any formulation of evidential support, which runs afoul of Siegel's claim that scientific beliefs must be evaluated with respect to their rationality. The unwelcome consequence of Siegel's view is that most any belief, scientific or pseudoscientific, can be defended as rational. Indeed, if we want to furnish a warrant for rational choice, we must turn to the very historically informed principles of evidential support that are dismissed by Siegel as providing a misleading portrait of science's rationality. +
All students of physics need to understand the basic concepts of electricity and magnetism. E&M is central to the study of physics, and central to understanding the developments of the last two hundred years of not just science, but technology and society in general. But the core of electricity and magnetism can be difficult to understand - many of the ideas are counterintuitive and difficult to appreciate. This volume in the Greenwood Guides to Great Ideas in Science series traces the central concepts of electricity and magnetism from the ancient past to the present day, enabling students to develop a deeper understanding of how the science arose as it has. +
Covering physics, astronomy, chemistry, the various branches of biology, and geology, this book is the perfect introduction to the history of science. A compilation of interesting readings, Scientific Revolutions reflects the richness and diversity of scientific culture and practice. Its primary focus is on the extraordinary bursts of scientific activity that propel science in new and different directions. Useful as a reference work for readers interested in the sciences. +
Intriguingly different in approach from conventional works in the same area of inquiry, this study deals with the central problems and concerns of the sociology of knowledge as it has traditionally been conceived of. In other words, it is concerned with the relationship of knowledge, social interests and social structure, and with the various attempts which have been made to analyse the relationship.
Barry Barnes takes the classic writings in the sociology of knowledge – by Marx, Lukács, Weber, Mannheim, Goldmann, Habermas and others – and uses them as resources in coming to grips with what he regards as the currently most interesting and significant questions in this area. This approach reflects one of the principal themes of the book itself. Knowledge, it is argued, is best treated as a resource available to those possessing it. This is the best perspective from which to understand its relationship to action and its historical significance; it is a perspective which avoids the problems of holding that knowledge is derivative, as well as those generated by the view that knowledge is a strong determinant of consciousness. the result is an unusual textbook, particularly valuable when read in conjunction with the original works it discusses. +
The central thesis of this book is that sociological analysis is necessary for understanding scientific knowledge, though other fields, such as psychology and philosophy are also needed. Such knowledge is attained through historical case studies. The sociology of scientific knowledge is one part of a larger project to understand science itself in scientific terms. +
This book systematically creates a general descriptive theory of scientific change that explains the mechanics of changes in both scientific theories and the methods of their assessment. It was once believed that, while scientific theories change through time, their change itself is governed by a fixed method of science. Nowadays we know that there is no such thing as an unchangeable method of science; the criteria employed by scientists in theory evaluation also change through time. But if that is so, how and why do theories and methods change? Are there any general laws that govern this process, or is the choice of theories and methods completely arbitrary and random?
Contrary to the widespread opinion, the book argues that scientific change is indeed a law-governed process and that there can be a general descriptive theory of scientific change. It does so by first presenting meta-theoretical issues, divided into chapters on the scope, possibility and assessment of theory of scientific change. It then builds a theory about the general laws that govern the process of scientific change, and goes into detail about the axioms and theorems of the theory. +
Recent developments in theoretical scientonomy coupled with a reflection on the practice of the Encyclopedia of Scientonomy all suggest that the ontology of scientific change currently accepted in scientonomy has serious flaws. The new ontology, suggested in this paper, solves some of the issues permeating the current ontology. Building on [[Modification:Sciento-2018-0002|Rawleigh’s suggestion]], it considers a ''theory'' as an attempt to answer a certain ''question''. It also introduces the category of ''definition'' as a subtype of theory. It also reveals that ''methods'' and ''methodologies'' of the currently accepted ontology do not differ from the perspective of their propositional content and, thus, belong to the same class of epistemic elements. This is captured in the new definition of ''method'' as a set of criteria for theory evaluation. It is also argued that ''methods'' are a subtype of ''normative theories''. It is shown that ''normative theories'' of all types, including methods, ethical norms, and aesthetic norms, can be both ''accepted and employed''. Finally, a new definition of ''scientific mosaic'' is suggested to fit the new ontology. +
Incomplete and imprecise temporal data is abundant in various branches of science and technology as well as everyday life (e.g., “''A'' began after 1066 but before 1069 and ended after 1245”, “''B'' took place no later than 156 BC”). While point-circles and lines/bars have been traditionally used to depict precise temporal points and intervals, it is unclear how imprecise and incomplete temporal data can be effectively visualized or even represented. This paper suggests an intuitive diagrammatic notation for visualizing both imprecise and incomplete temporal information. It suggests using traditional whiskers with edges to depict temporal imprecision and whiskers without edges to depict incomplete temporal entities. This notation can be easily incorporated into linear temporal visualizations, such as historical timelines, Gantt charts, and timetables, to identify gaps in temporal information. The paper lays down the diagrammatic elements of the notation and illustrates their applicability to all standard relations between temporal entities. It also shows how these elements can be combined to produce complex timelines. Some possible future directions are also outlined. +
Despite a growing body of literature that attempts to draw a line between legitimate and illegitimate forms of presentism in academic history, ‘avoid presentism’ is still often preached as the first rule of historiography. Distinct from other forms of presentism is ''selective presentism'' – the practice of taking some present-day activity, event, idea, or problem as a starting point in our selection of historical facts. Throughout the paper I examine the relation of some of the most popular selection criteria – ''selection by actor intentionality'', ''selection by later effect'', and ''selection by problem'' – to presentist practices and draw three conclusions. First, each of these selection criteria can produce presentist or non-presentist histories depending on the past of which specific activity, idea, or problem the historian is interested in. Second, the historiographic legitimacy of these selection criteria is independent from their presentist or non-presentist applications; importantly, selective presentism is not among the ‘bad’ forms of presentism and is not to be avoided. Finally, various selection criteria are best understood as complementary; pluralist history invites a variety of selection criteria that help shed light on different aspects of the past, and thus – collectively – enrich our understanding of it. +
Canonical discussions in the philosophy of science distinguish between acceptance and pursuit as epistemic stances that are customarily taken towards theories by epistemic agents (Laudan 1977; Wykstra 1980; Whitt 1990; Achinstein 1993; Barseghyan & Shaw 2017). Since a theory can be conceived as an attempt to answer a question (Jardine 2000; Rescher 2000; Rawleigh 2018) it is reasonable to inquire into the types of stances that epistemic agents can take towards questions. This paper explores the notion of ''question pursuit'' by differentiating it from related epistemic stances of ''theory pursuit'' and ''question acceptance''. The analysis of the extant academic literature reveals that in most cases the phrase ‘question pursuit’ and its cognates refer to a search for an answer to a question. The paper provides a definition of the term that reflects this common usage and draws five conclusions. First, question pursuit is different from question acceptance, for it is possible for an epistemic agent to accept a question without finding it pursuitworthy. Second, question pursuit and question acceptance are related semi-orthogonally: in order to be considered pursuitworthy a question must, at minimum, be accepted, but not all accepted questions are pursuitworthy. Third, question pursuit is irreducible to theory pursuit; finding a question pursuitworthy is not expressible in terms of finding some theory pursuitworthy. Fourth, a pursuit of a theory cannot be expressed as a pursuit of a same-order question, but only as a pursuit of a question about that theory, i.e. a higher-level question. Fifth, to have a chance to be considered pursuitworthy by an agent, a question must meet some minimal necessary preconditions: it should be accepted by that agent and the agent should either lack an accepted answer to the question or have reasons to suspect that the accepted answer might be improved upon. +
The paper presents a new scientonomic account of ''question dynamics''. To explain the process of question acceptance and rejection, we begin by introducing the notion of ''epistemic presupposition'' and show how it’s different from the notion of ''logical presupposition''. With the notion of epistemic presupposition at hand, we formulate ''the law of question acceptance'', a new scientonomic axiom, which states that a question becomes accepted only if all of its epistemic presuppositions are accepted, and it is accepted that the question is answerable. We then show how the process of question rejection can be explained by means of ''the question rejection theorem'', which states that a question becomes rejected when other elements that are incompatible with the question become accepted. To deduce this theorem in the usual scientonomic fashion (from the first law and the compatibility corollary), we first ascertain that the notion of compatibility/incompatibility is applicable to questions and show that one can legitimately speak of both question-theory and question-question incompatibility. We conclude by providing a quick illustration of the historical applicability of this new framework and suggest a number of questions for future research. +
The current scientonomic discourse focuses largely on theories and methods of natural, social, and formal ''sciences'', while the role of ''technological'' knowledge in the process of scientific change is virtually neglected. This neglect, we argue, has to do with the scientonomic distinction between two epistemic stances – ''acceptance'' of a theory as the best available description of its domain and its ''use'' in practical applications. The view that is implicit in contemporary ''scientonomy'' is that sciences alone can produce ''accepted'' knowledge, while technologies are all about knowledge ''use''. In contrast, we argue that there is ''accepted'' propositional technological knowledge which plays an indispensable role in the process of scientific change. We demonstrate that technological disciplines do not merely ''use'' theories but also produce ''accepted'' theories, such as “''x'' is an effective treatment for medical condition ''y''”, “''z'' is a viable technology for bridge-building”, and “''p'' is a statistically valid technique for assessing public opinion about ''q''”. There are both theoretical and historical reasons to believe that changes in technological knowledge exhibit the same patterns as changes in natural, social, and formal sciences. In addition, technological knowledge is intrinsically intertwined with scientific knowledge as accepted scientific and technological theories often jointly shape employed methods. +
In this paper, we demonstrate how a systematic ''taxonomy of stances'' can help elucidate two classic debates of the historical turn—the Lakatos–Feyerabend debate concerning theory rejection and the Feyerabend–Kuhn debate about pluralism during normal science. We contend that Kuhn, Feyerabend, and Lakatos were often talking at cross-purposes due to the lack of an agreed upon taxonomy of stances. Specifically, we provide three distinct stances that scientists take towards theories: ''acceptance'' of a theory as the best available description of its domain, ''use'' of a theory in practical applications, and ''pursuit'' (elaboration) of a theory. We argue that in the Lakatos–Feyerabend debate, Lakatos was concerned with ''acceptance'' whereas Feyerabend was mainly concerned with ''pursuit''. Additionally, we show how Feyerabend and Kuhn’s debate on the role of pluralism/monism in normal science involved a crucial conflation of all three stances. Finally, we outline a few general lessons concerning the process of scientific change. +
