Difference between revisions of "Scientificity"

From Encyclopedia of Scientonomy
Jump to navigation Jump to search
Tags: Mobile edit Mobile web edit
 
(7 intermediate revisions by 3 users not shown)
Line 1: Line 1:
−
{{Topic
+
{{Definitional Topic
 
|Question=What is '''scientificity'''? How should it be ''defined''?
 
|Question=What is '''scientificity'''? How should it be ''defined''?
−
|Topic Type=Definitional
+
|Description=Sarwar and Fraser [[CiteRef::Sarwar and Fraser (2018)]] argue that a unique and independent epistemic stance can be taken by epistemic agenst towards theories, ''scientificity''. The history of science shows that that epistemic agents view some theories as scientific and some as unscientific; general relativity is currently considered scientific by the contemporary scientific community,[[CiteRef::Hartle (2006)]] while the theory of phlogiston is considered unscientific.[[CiteRef::Wisniak (2004)]] It is generally understood that there exist pseudoscientific theories, which are a subclass of unscientific theories.[[CiteRef::Hansson (2017)]] It is important, therefore, to have a definition of scientificity.
−
|Description=It is currently accepted in scientonomy that an epistemic agent can take three distinct stances towards a theory: acceptance, use, and pursuit.
+
|Parent Topic=
−
While these three stances are essential for understanding the process of scientific change, the current framework fails to capture an important epistemic stance that epistemic agents take towards theories, scientificity. It is a historical fact that epistemic agents view some theories as scientific and others as unscientific. For example, general relativity is currently considered scientific by the contemporary scientific community (Hartle, 2005), while phlogiston theory is considered unscientific (Wisniak, 2005). One suggested subspecies of unscientific theories that is often considered in the literature is pseudoscientific theories (Hanson, 2017). Furthermore, it is also possible for an agent not to have any definitive stance concerning the scientificity of a theory. In such cases, we can say that the scientificity of that theory is undefined for that agent. Consider the current status of marketing. There is clearly no consensus in the scientific community about the scientific status of marketing. Some view it as an amalgamation of theories from other scientific disciplines (which they claim render it scientific), while others contend that it does not have a scientific identity and it merely applies other theories (Brown, 1996; Anderson, 1983).
+
|Authors List=Ameer Sarwar, Patrick Fraser
−
 
+
|Formulated Year=2018
−
It is argued in (Sarwar & Fraser, 2018) that scientificity is a distinct epistemic stance, but it is unclear how it should be defined. Consider the following definition (suggested to us by Paul Patton in a private correspondence): “a theory is said to be scientific if it is taken to deal with a legitimate topic of scientific inquiry”. At first, this definition seems to be a plausible starting point. After all, questions have been recently accepted into the scientonomic ontology of epistemic elements, and it strikes one as intuitive that any theory that claims to be scientific must, at the very least, try to answer a question that is itself considered scientific. However, this definition won’t do as it has at least four drawbacks.
+
|Prehistory=
−
 
+
|History=
−
To begin with, it uses the concept of “a legitimate topic of scientific inquiry”, which itself is circularly dependent on the concept of scientificity. In order to understand what makes an inquiry scientifically legitimate, one must understand what scientificity is, and in order to understand what scientificity is, one must know what scientifically legitimate inquiry is. Clearly, this definition does little to clarify the notion of scientificity.
+
|Current View=If scientificity is a distinct epistemic stance, it must have a definition, but it is unclear what a precise definition would entail. Consider the following hypothetical formulation: “a theory is said to be scientific if it is taken to deal with a legitimate topic of scientific inquiry”. This may appear to be an intuitively plausible starting point, because any scientific theory must attempt to answer a question that is also scientific. However, this definition fails for several reasons.
  
−
Second, the phrase “legitimate topic of scientific inquiry” is itself undefined in the scientonomic context. The only time something similar to this phrase occurs in scientonomic literature is in Rawleigh’s definition of question acceptance: “a question is said to be accepted if it is taken as a legitimate topic of inquiry” (Rawleigh, 2018, p. 10). However, Rawleigh is cautious enough not to include “scientific” in his definition. Consequently, although we do have an accepted definition of question acceptance, we currently lack any notion of question scientificity. Thus, if we were to define the notion of theory scientificity by means of question scientificity, we would be relying on a yet undefined concept and would be pushing the task further back, without introducing much clarity to the definiendum.
+
First, it defers the content of scientificity's definition to the definition of “a legitimate topic of scientific inquiry”, which itself is dependent on the concept of scientificity. This circularity does little to define the notion of scientificity. Furthermore, according to Sarwar and Fraser, "dealing with a "legitimate topic of scientific inquiry" may be a necessary condition for the scientificity of a theory, but it cannot be a sufficient condition. It is possible that a theory may attempt to answer scientific questions, but the answers it provides may not be considered scientific".[[CiteRef::Sarwar and Fraser (2018)]] Sarwar and Fraser go further and claim that "it is reasonable to suspect that any attempt to define theory scientificity in terms of its relation to questions will inevitably be problematic... It is always possible to construct ''ad hoc'', non-scientific theories that answer a given [scientific] question. We could, for instance, answer the question of the shape of the Earth by something as nonsensical as “the Earth is donut-shaped”. If the scientificity of a theory were to be determined by the qualities of the questions being answered, then any nonsense could potentially qualify as scientific".[[CiteRef::Sarwar and Fraser (2018)]] The content of questions appears to be a fruitless avenue for defining scientificity. This highlights the complexity that arises when attempts to concretely define scientificity are made. Consequently, a definition is needed, but it is not provided.
−
 
 
−
Furthermore, dealing with a “legitimate topic of scientific inquiry” may be a necessary condition for the scientificity of a theory, but it cannot be a sufficient condition. It is possible that a theory may attempt to answer scientific questions, but the answers it provides may not be considered scientific. Take, for example, the question “what determines the variation in human temperament?” which is currently considered scientific in mainstream personality psychology. Naturally, the very fact that a certain theory attempts to answer this question is not sufficient to render theory scientific. After all, one could give astrological or phrenological explanations for the differences in human temperaments. This would be a case of a theory providing unscientific answers to a scientific question. Thus, attempting to answer a legitimate topic of scientific inquiry is not sufficient for a theory to be considered scientific.
 
−
 
 
−
Finally, it is reasonable to suspect that any attempt to define theory scientificity in terms of its relation to questions will inevitably be problematic for the same reasons listed above. It is always possible to construct ad hoc, non-scientific theories that answer a given question. We could, for instance, answer the question of the shape of the Earth by something as nonsensical as “the Earth is donut-shaped”. If the scientificity of a theory were to be determined by the qualities of the questions being answered, then any nonsense could potentially qualify as scientific. Therefore, the content of questions cannot determine scientific theories from unscientific theories.
 
−
 
 
−
Although this was only a single attempt to formulate a definition of scientificity, it highlights many of the complexities that arise when one tackles this problem. It is therefore an important, though complex open question as to how one might properly formulate the notion of scientificity.
 
−
|Authors List=Ameer Sarwar, Patrick Fraser,
 
−
|Formulated Year=2018
 
 
|Page Status=Stub
 
|Page Status=Stub
 +
|Editor Notes=
 
}}
 
}}

Latest revision as of 23:08, 11 December 2022

What is scientificity? How should it be defined?

Sarwar and Fraser 1 argue that a unique and independent epistemic stance can be taken by epistemic agenst towards theories, scientificity. The history of science shows that that epistemic agents view some theories as scientific and some as unscientific; general relativity is currently considered scientific by the contemporary scientific community,2 while the theory of phlogiston is considered unscientific.3 It is generally understood that there exist pseudoscientific theories, which are a subclass of unscientific theories.4 It is important, therefore, to have a definition of scientificity.

In the scientonomic context, this term was first used by Patrick Fraser and Ameer Sarwar in 2018.

Scientonomic History

Acceptance Record

Our records state that this term has never been accepted by any community.

All Theories

According to our records, no definition of the term has been suggested.If a definition of this term is missing, please click here to add it.

Accepted Theories

According to our records, no definition of the term has ever been accepted.

Suggested Modifications

According to our records, there have been no suggested modifications on this term.

Current Definition

If scientificity is a distinct epistemic stance, it must have a definition, but it is unclear what a precise definition would entail. Consider the following hypothetical formulation: “a theory is said to be scientific if it is taken to deal with a legitimate topic of scientific inquiry”. This may appear to be an intuitively plausible starting point, because any scientific theory must attempt to answer a question that is also scientific. However, this definition fails for several reasons. First, it defers the content of scientificity's definition to the definition of “a legitimate topic of scientific inquiry”, which itself is dependent on the concept of scientificity. This circularity does little to define the notion of scientificity. Furthermore, according to Sarwar and Fraser, "dealing with a "legitimate topic of scientific inquiry" may be a necessary condition for the scientificity of a theory, but it cannot be a sufficient condition. It is possible that a theory may attempt to answer scientific questions, but the answers it provides may not be considered scientific".1 Sarwar and Fraser go further and claim that "it is reasonable to suspect that any attempt to define theory scientificity in terms of its relation to questions will inevitably be problematic... It is always possible to construct ad hoc, non-scientific theories that answer a given [scientific] question. We could, for instance, answer the question of the shape of the Earth by something as nonsensical as “the Earth is donut-shaped”. If the scientificity of a theory were to be determined by the qualities of the questions being answered, then any nonsense could potentially qualify as scientific".1 The content of questions appears to be a fruitless avenue for defining scientificity. This highlights the complexity that arises when attempts to concretely define scientificity are made. Consequently, a definition is needed, but it is not provided.

There is currently no accepted answer to this question.

Ontology

Existence

There is currently no accepted view concerning the existence of scientificitys.

Disjointness

No classes are currently accepted as being disjoint with this class.

Subtypes

No classes are currently accepted as subtypes of a scientificity.

Supertypes

No classes are currently accepted as supertypes of a scientificity.

Associations

No associations of a scientificity are currently accepted.


If a question concerning the ontology of a scientificity is missing, please add it here.

Dynamics

If a question concerning the dynamics of a scientificity is missing, please add it here.

References

  1. a b c  Sarwar, Ameer and Fraser, Patrick. (2018) Scientificity and The Law of Theory Demarcation. Scientonomy 2, 55-66. Retrieved from https://www.scientojournal.com/index.php/scientonomy/article/view/31275.
  2. ^  Hartle, James. (2006) General Relativity in the Undergraduate Physics Curriculum. American Journal of Physics 74 (1), 14-21..
  3. ^  Wisniak, Jaime. (2004) Phlogiston: The rise and fall of a theory. Indian Journal of Chemical Technology 11 (5), 732-743. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/123456789/9538.
  4. ^  Hansson, Sven. (2017) Science and Pseudo-Science. In Zalta (Ed.) (2017).

Retrieved from "https://www.scientowiki.com/index.php?title=Scientificity&oldid=16762"