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Lakatos (1961) + (Lakatos's PhD Thesis.)
Laudan (1984a) + (Laudan constructs a fresh approach to a lo … Laudan constructs a fresh approach to a longtime problem for the philosopher of science: how to explain the simultaneous and widespread presence of both agreement and disagreement in science. Laudan critiques the logical empiricists and the post-positivists as he stresses the need for centrality and values and the interdependence of values, methods, and facts as prerequisites to solving the problems of consensus and dissent in science.blems of consensus and dissent in science.)
Hoyningen-Huene (2006) + (Let me begin with a convention. I will ref … Let me begin with a convention. I will refer to the distinction between the context of discovery and the context of justification as “the DJ distinction” (where I may note, for potentially misled younger readers, that this “DJ” has nothing to do with the music business). This paper is based on an older paper of mine (Hoyningen-Huene 1987). In the present paper, I will first recapitulate some of the topics of the older paper, and will contribute further considerations. Subsequently, I will discuss Thomas Kuhn’s ideas about justification in science. Thus will be clarified, in which sense precisely Kuhn opposed the DJ distinction. This is noteworthy, because in the 1960s and 1970s, many philosophers concluded from Kuhn’s opposition to the context distinction that he just did not understand what it was all about (and they inferred from this that he was just too uneducated as a philosopher to be taken seriously).d as a philosopher to be taken seriously).)
Kochiras (2014) + (Locke's philosophy of science consists lar … Locke's philosophy of science consists largely in his metaphysical and epistemological views of material substances and their powers. Locke has been widely hailed for providing an epistemological foundation for the experimental science of his day, and his thought is closely aligned with that of its practitioners, elaborating certain themes present in sparer form in Boyle and Newton. But if his epistemology helps to usher in the age of science, he still belongs to the age of natural philosophy. And if he is a devotee of the new science, he often appears an uncertain one, recognizing profound difficulties in it. In consequence, Locke's work is characterized by tensions and nuances, providing a rich source for scholarly research and debate. source for scholarly research and debate.)
Chappell (Ed.) (1994) + (Locke's philosophy, as edited by Chappell.)
Barseghyan and Shaw (2022) + (Many have struggled to identify the proper … Many have struggled to identify the proper way(s) that normative philosophical claims about science can benefit from history. The primary worry here has been that deriving philosophical ‘oughts’ from historical facts would commit the naturalistic fallacy (Schickore, 2011). The task of this paper is to introduce a novel solution to this problem. Specifically, we claim that the emerging field of scientonomy provides a promising avenue for how philosophy of science may benefit from the history of science. By taking descriptive findings and coupling them with additional normative premises, philosophers of science can draw normative methodological conclusions which can guide future scientific practices. Moreover, it is sometimes thought that philosophical claims about science are invariably local due to the diversity of scientific practices. While acknowledging this disunity, we show how a general theory of scientific change is possible and how it can be used to inform normative philosophy of science. Thus, we aim to outline a viable path for integrated history and philosophy of science that does not relinquish normativity and avoids the problem of cherry-picking which has plagued general accounts of science (Chang, 2011; Mizrahi, 2015).s of science (Chang, 2011; Mizrahi, 2015).)
Nickles (2017a) + (Many scientists, philosophers, and laypers … Many scientists, philosophers, and laypersons have regarded science as the one human enterprise that successfully escapes the contingencies of history to establish eternal truths about the universe, via a special, rational method of inquiry. Historicists oppose this view. In the 1960s several historically informed philosophers of science challenged the then-dominant accounts of scientific method advanced by the Popperians and the positivists (the logical positivists and logical empiricists) for failing to fit historical scientific practice and failing particularly to account for deep scientific change. While several strands of historicism originated in nineteenth-century historiography, this article focuses, first, on the historicist conceptions of scientific rationality that became prominent in the 1960s and 1970s, as the maturation of the field of historiography of science began to suggest competing models of scientific development, and, second, on recent approaches such as historical epistemology.pproaches such as historical epistemology.)
Longino (2008) + (Miriam Solomon's social empiricism is mark … Miriam Solomon's social empiricism is marked by emphasis on community level rationality in science and the refusal to impose a distinction between the epistemic and the non-epistemic character of factors (“decision vectors”) that incline scientists for or against a theory. While she attempts to derive some norms from the analysis of cases, her insistent naturalism undermines her effort to articulate norms for the (appropriate) distribution of decision vectors.opriate) distribution of decision vectors.)
Feyerabend (1993) + (Modern philosophy of science has paid grea … Modern philosophy of science has paid great attention to the understanding of scientific "practice", in contrast to the earlier concentration on scientific "method". This work, which has contributed to this debate, shows the deficiencies of some widespread ideas about the nature of knowledge. He argues that the only feasible explanations of scientific successes are historical explanations and that anarchism must now replace rationalism in the theory of knowledge. The third edition of this text contains a new preface and additional reflections which take account both of recent debates on science and on the impact of scientific products and practices on the human community. While disavowing populism or relativism, Feyerabend continues to insist that the voice of the inexpert must be heard. Thus many environmental perils were first identified by non-experts against prevailing assumptions in the scientific community.g assumptions in the scientific community.)
Reider (2016) + (Most philosophers agree that the world con … Most philosophers agree that the world contains epistemic subjects, the subjects of knowledge claims and other epistemic assessments. But does the world contain specifically epistemic agents? We talk as if epistemic subjects are agents -- 'His belief is irresponsible,' 'She ought to have known' -- but may on reflection wonder whether we should take the talk at face value. Are you responsible for your beliefs in anything like the way you are responsible for your actions? Does failing to know impugn your character in a way that parallels your failure to act with practical wisdom? Affirmative answers may emerge from reflection on the social dimension of knowing: from how you may come to know through others' testimony or let others know in turn. Can we make sense of such epistemic community without attributing specifically epistemic agency to its participants? Flipping our opening question on its head, should the social provenance of epistemic agency affect how we conceptualize the nature of epistemic subjects?ptualize the nature of epistemic subjects?)
Norton (2009) + (Much of what David Hume said about a wide … Much of what David Hume said about a wide range of subjectsremains of great importance today. In the first volume of his firstwork, A Treatise of Human Nature, a work in which he articulateda new “science of human nature,” Hume focused on an interrelatedset of issues in theory of knowledge, metaphysics, and philosophicalpsychology. More particularly, he explained how it is that we formsuch important conceptions as space and time, cause and effect,external objects, and personal identity. At the same time, he offeredan equally important account of how or why we believe in the objectsof these conceptions – an account of why we believe that causes arenecessarily connected to effects, that there are enduring externalobjects, and that there are enduring selves – even though the humanmind is unable to provide a satisfactory proof that these phenomenaexist. In the second volume of the Treatise Hume expanded hisaccount of human psychology, focusing on the origin and role of thepassions and the nature of human freedom. In the third and finalvolume of this work he explored the origins and nature of morality.In later works he returned to many of these philosophical issues,but he also made substantial contributions to our understanding ofpolitical theory, aesthetics, economics, and philosophy of religion.In addition, he wrote an influential, six-volume History of England,a work published in over 175 editions in the eighteenth and nineteenthcenturies, and still in print. nineteenth centuries, and still in print.)
Sarwar (2022) + (My aim in this chapter is to introduce the … My aim in this chapter is to introduce the general system theory and to provide directions for research. One of the central issues in scientonomy is that its object of study is ill-defined. I will begin to approach this question by drawing on the general system theory. In so doing, I will introduce the scientonomic community to a radically different way of thinking about explaining changes in scientific worldviews. Even if many of my ideas appear radical, I hope that by contradistinction the reader may appreciate how the scientonomic ideas may be made more precise.ientonomic ideas may be made more precise.)
Paley (1809) + (Natural Theology or Evidences of the Exist … Natural Theology or Evidences of the Existence and Attributes of the Deity is an 1802 work of Christian apologetics and philosophy of religion by the English clergyman William Paley (July 1743 – 25 May 1805). The book expounds his arguments from natural theology, making a teleological argument for the existence of God, notably beginning with the watchmaker analogy.The book was written in the context of the natural theology tradition. In earlier centuries, theologians such as John Ray and William Derham, as well as philosophers of classical times such as Cicero, argued for the existence and goodness of God from the general well-being of living things and the physical world.Paley's Natural Theology is an extended argument, constructed around a series of examples including finding a watch; comparing the eye to a telescope; and the existence of finely adapted mechanical structures in animals, such as joints which function like hinges or manmade ball and socket joints. Paley argues that these all lead to an intelligent Creator, and that a system is more than the sum of its parts. The last chapters are more theological in character, arguing that the attributes of God must be sufficient for the extent of his operations, and that God must be good because designs seen in nature are beneficial.The book was many times republished and remains in print. It continues to be consulted by creationists. Charles Darwin took its arguments seriously and responded to them; evolutionary biologists like Stephen Jay Gould and Richard Dawkins continue to discuss Paley's book to respond to modern proponents with similar ideas.d to modern proponents with similar ideas.)
Rescher (2000b) + (Nature and Understanding explores the pros … Nature and Understanding explores the prospect of looking from a scientific point of view at such central ideas of traditional metaphysics as the simplicity of nature, its comprehensibility, or its systematic integrity. Rescher seeks to describe - in a way accessible to philosophers and nonphilosophers alike - the metaphysical situation that characterizes the process of inquiry in natural science. His principal aim is to see what light can be shed on reality by examining the modus operandi of natural science itself, focusing as much on its findings as on its conceptual and methodological presuppositions. This is the culmination of many years of penetrating work in this area of philosophy by one of its most eminent exponents. It is the definitive presentation of some of Rescher's key ideas.esentation of some of Rescher's key ideas.)
Smith (2009) + (No work of science has drawn more attentio … No work of science has drawn more attention from philosophers than Newton's Principia. The reasons for this, however, and consequently the focus of the attention have changed significantly from one century to the next. During the 20th Century philosophers have viewed the Principia in the context of Einstein's new theory of gravity in his theory of general relativity. The main issues have concerned the relation between Newton'sand Einstein's theories of gravity and what the need to replace the former with the latter says about the nature, scope, and limits of scientific knowledge. During most of the 18th Century, by contrast, Newton's theory of gravity remained under dispute, especially because of the absence of a mechanism — in particular, a contact mechanism — producing gravitational forces. The philosophic literature correspondingly endeavored to clarify and to resolve, one way or the other, the dispute over whether the Principia should or should not be viewed as methodologically well founded. By the 1790s Newton's theory of gravity had become established among those engaged in research in orbital mechanics and physical geodesy, leading to the Principia becoming the exemplar of science at its most successful. Philosophic interest in the Principia during the 19th Century therefore came to focus on how Newton had achieved this success, in part to characterize the knowledge that had been achieved and in part to pursue comparable knowledge in other areas of research. Unfortunately, a very large fraction of the philosophic literature in all three centuries has suffered from a quite simplistic picture of the Principia itself. The main goal of this entry is to replace that simplistic picture with one that does more justice to the richness of both the content and the methodology of the Principiantent and the methodology of the Principia)
Thijssen (2003) + (On March 7, 1277, the Bishop of Paris, Ste … On March 7, 1277, the Bishop of Paris, Stephen Tempier, prohibited the teaching of 219 philosophical and theological theses that were being discussed and disputed in the faculty of arts under his jurisdiction. Tempier’s condemnation has gained great symbolic meaning in the minds of modern intellectual historians, and possibly for this reason, there is still considerable disagreement about what motivated Tempier to promulgate his prohibition, what exactly was condemned, and who the targets were. In addition, the effects of Tempier’s action on the course of medieval thought in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, and even beyond, has been the subject of much debate. The lack of a commonly accepted standard account of Tempier’s actions plus the enormous amount of literature and of textual evidence that either directly or indirectly bears on the events of 1277, puts specific limitations to the present entry. It will be confined to presenting those historical facts that are uncontroversial and to indicating the main issues of current debate with respect to Tempier’s condemnation.te with respect to Tempier’s condemnation.)
Abbott et al. (2016) + (On September 14, 2015 at 09:50:45 UTC the … On September 14, 2015 at 09:50:45 UTC the two detectors of the Laser Interferometer Gravitational-Wave Observatory simultaneously observed a transient gravitational-wave signal. The signal sweeps upwards in frequency from 35 to 250 Hz with a peak gravitational-wave strain of 1.0 × 10−21. It matches the waveform predicted by general relativity for the inspiral and merger of a pair of black holes and the ringdown of the resulting single black hole. These observations demonstrate the existence of binary stellar-mass black hole systems. This is the first direct detection of gravitational waves and the first observation of a binary black hole merger.observation of a binary black hole merger.)
Castelvecchi and Witze (2016) + (One hundred years after Albert Einstein predicted the existence of gravitational waves, scientists have finally spotted these elusive ripples in space-time.)
Fraser (2022) + (One of the most salient lessons from HPS a … One of the most salient lessons from HPS as a discipline is that science is a living, breathing endeavor; one whose rules and values are constantly changing. As such, there is an essential tension between the hope for a coherent, unified conception of scientific rationality on the one hand, and the recognition of the diversity of perspectives which fit into the framework called science. The big question, of which I hope to answer a small part, is: how can rationality and relativism be reconciled with one another? To do this, I present a rational reconstruction of a theory of scientific change which resembles Barseghyan’s theory of scientific change. I interpret scientific knowledge modally; the scientific mosaic of a community at a particular time is taken to represent the actual instantiation of a collection of possible scientific changes, all linked to one another through a Kripkean semantics of possible worlds. I then draw a correspondence between accepted scientific theories and employed methods with logical axioms and rules of inference respectively and use this to construct a logical framework for studying the modality of scientific knowledge. I use this framework to obtain a notion of scientific rationality which is contextually localized, but still presents a clear direction of scientific development at every individual time step.development at every individual time step.)
Sarton (1987) + (Originally Published 1931.)
Sarton (2011) + (Originally published by Harvard University Press in 1952.)
Sarton (1957a) + (Originally published in 1936 by Harvard University Press.)
Sarton (2007) + (Originally published in 1948.)
Sarton (2017) + (Originally published in 1955.)
Ruse (1999) + (Originally published in 1979, The Darwinia … Originally published in 1979, The Darwinian Revolution was the first comprehensive and readable synthesis of the history of evolutionary thought. Though the years since have seen an enormous flowering of research on Darwin and other nineteenth-century scientists concerned with evolution, as well as the larger social and cultural responses to their work, The Darwinian Revolution remains remarkably current and stimulating.emains remarkably current and stimulating.)

(Originally-20published-20in-201955.)

Schantz and Seidel (Eds.) (2011) + (Over history, cognitive relativism has bee … Over history, cognitive relativism has been an unpopular viewpoint in the philosophy of knowledge. Yet relativist ideas in epistemology have experienced an unprecedented popularity in the twentieth century due thinkers such as Willard Quine, Thomas Kuhn, and Ludwig Wittgenstein. The questions of whether these ideas, in fact, support relativism, and whether or not a social constructivist view of science is logically coherent and feasible is the subject of this series of essays.e is the subject of this series of essays.)
Leary (1979) + (Over the past one hundred years psychology … Over the past one hundred years psychology has evolved into a major scientific discipline. Nonetheless, psychology is presently in a state of considerable turmoil regarding its proper subject matter and method. Is psychology a natural science, a social science, or a hybrid of the two? What relation should psychology maintain with philosophy? These general questions, currently under debate, were addressed by Wilhelm Wundt, one of the founders of modern experimental psychology. This articleis an attempt to specify Wundt’s conceptualization of psychology and to place it in its historical context. Secondarily it also traces certain major developments since the time of Wundt. The conclusion that is reached is that the apparent contemporary "crisis" in psychology is really nothing new and that, in fact, the present condition of psychology does not necessarily constitute a crisis. In its broad outline at least, present-day psychology reflects the program which Wundt espoused one hundredyears ago.hich Wundt espoused one hundred years ago.)
Feyerabend (1981b) + (Over the past thirty years Paul Feyerabend … Over the past thirty years Paul Feyerabend has developed an extremely distinctive and influential approach to problems in the philosophy of science. The most important and seminal of his published essays are collected here in two volumes, with new introductions to provide an overview and historical perspective on the discussions of each part. Volume 1 presents papers on the interpretation of scientific theories, together with papers applying the views developed to particular problems in philosophy and physics. The essays in volume 2 examine the origin and history of an abstract rationalism, as well as its consequences for the philosophy of science and methods of scientific research. Professor Feyerabend argues with great force and imagination for a comprehensive and opportunistic pluralism. In doing so he draws on extensive knowledge of scientific history and practice, and he is alert always to the wider philosophical, practical and political implications of conflicting views. These two volumes fully display the variety of his ideas, and confirm the originality and significance of his work. originality and significance of his work.)
Feyerabend (1981a) + (Over the past thirty years Paul Feyerabend … Over the past thirty years Paul Feyerabend has developed an extremely distinctive and influential approach to problems in the philosophy of science. The most important and seminal of his published essays are collected here in two volumes, with new introductions to provide an overview and historical perspective on the discussions of each part. Volume 1 presents papers on the interpretation of scientific theories, together with papers applying the views developed to particular problems in philosophy and physics. The essays in volume 2 examine the origin and history of an abstract rationalism, as well as its consequences for the philosophy of science and methods of scientific research. Professor Feyerabend argues with great force and imagination for a comprehensive and opportunistic pluralism. In doing so he draws on extensive knowledge of scientific history and practice, and he is alert always to the wider philosophical, practical and political implications of conflicting views. These two volumes fully display the variety of his ideas, and confirm the originality and significance of his work. originality and significance of his work.)
Pitt (Ed.) (1985) + (Papers related to and arising from the Fourth International Conference on History and Philosophy of Science, Blacksburg, Virginia, November 1982.)
Feyerabend (2010) + (Paul Feyerabend’s globally acclaimed work, … Paul Feyerabend’s globally acclaimed work, which sparked and continues to stimulate fierce debate, examines the deficiencies of many widespread ideas about scientific progress and the nature of knowledge. Feyerabend argues that scientific advances can only be understood in a historical context. He looks at the way the philosophy of science has consistently overemphasized practice over method, and considers the possibility that anarchism could replace rationalism in the theory of knowledge. This updated edition of the classic text includes a new introduction by Ian Hacking, one of the most important contemporary philosophers of science. Hacking reflects on both Feyerabend’s life and personality as well as the broader significance of the book for current discussions.cance of the book for current discussions.)
Feyerabend (1975a) + (Paul Feyerabend’s globally acclaimed work, … Paul Feyerabend’s globally acclaimed work, which sparked and continues to stimulate fierce debate, examines the deficiencies of many widespread ideas about scientific progress and the nature of knowledge. Feyerabend argues that scientific advances can only be understood in a historical context. He looks at the way the philosophy of science has consistently overemphasized practice over method, and considers the possibility that anarchism could replace rationalism in the theory of knowledge.ce rationalism in the theory of knowledge.)
Matilal and Charkrabarti (Eds.) (1994) + (Perspectives on testimony in Indian philosophy.)
Anstey (2011) + (Peter Anstey presents a thorough and innov … Peter Anstey presents a thorough and innovative study of John Locke's views on the method and content of natural philosophy. Focusing on Locke's Essay concerning Human Understanding, but also drawing extensively from his other writings and manuscript remains, Anstey argues that Locke was an advocate of the Experimental Philosophy: the new approach to natural philosophy championed by Robert Boyle and the early Royal Society who were opposed to speculative philosophy. On the question of method, Anstey shows how Locke's pessimism about the prospects for a demonstrative science of nature led him, in the Essay, to promote Francis Bacon's method of natural history, and to downplay the value of hypotheses and analogical reasoning in science. But, according to Anstey, Locke never abandoned the ideal of a demonstrative natural philosophy, for he believed that if we could discover the primary qualities of the tiny corpuscles that constitute material bodies, we could then establish a kind of corpuscular metric that would allow us a genuine science of nature. It was only after the publication of the Essay, however, that Locke came to realize that Newton's Principia provided a model for the role of demonstrative reasoning in science based on principles established upon observation, and this led him to make significant revisions to his views in the 1690s. On the content of Locke's natural philosophy, it is argued that even though Locke adhered to the Experimental Philosophy, he was not averse to speculation about the corpuscular nature of matter. Anstey takes us into new terrain and new interpretations of Locke's thought in his explorations of his mercurialist transmutational chymistry, his theory of generation by seminal principles, and his conventionalism about species.es, and his conventionalism about species.)
Palider (2022) + (Philosophy of science and history of scien … Philosophy of science and history of science have been unable to integrate in a meaningful fashion. The major difficulty has been the question of how the history of science can inform the philosophy of science. By making several distinctions to characterize the type of philosophy of science relevant for integrated HPS, I show how traditional approaches to integration failed. These include a top-down and a bottom-up philosophical approach to integrated HPS. I then present a more fruitful way of integrating the disciplines, that of iterations.ating the disciplines, that of iterations.)
Garber (1992) + (Physics and its foundations were central t … Physics and its foundations were central to Descartes' thought. Although today he is probably best known for his metaphysics of mind and body, or for his epistemological program, in the seventeenth century Descartes was at very least equally well known for his mechanistic physics and the mechanist world of geometrical bodies in motion which he played a large role in making acceptable to his contemporaries. In this essay I shall outline Descartes' mechanical philosophy in its historical context. After some brief remarks on the immediate background to Descartes' program for physics, and a brief outline of the historical development of his physics, we shall discuss the foundations of Descartes' physics, including his concepts of body and motion and his views on the laws of motion.otion and his views on the laws of motion.)
Fisher (2014) + (Pierre Gassendi (b. 1592, d. 1655) was a F … Pierre Gassendi (b. 1592, d. 1655) was a French philosopher, scientificchronicler, observer, and experimentalist, scholar of ancient texts anddebates, and active participant in contemporary deliberations of the firsthalf of the seventeenth century. His significance in early modern thoughthas in recent years been rediscovered and explored, towards a betterunderstanding of the dawn of modern empiricism, the mechanicalphilosophy, and relations of modern philosophy to ancient and medievaldiscussions. While Gassendi is perhaps best known in history ofphilosophy for his disputes with Descartes, his relations with other majorfigures, including Kepler, Galileo, Mersenne, Beeckman, and Hobbes,represented even more important transactions of ideas. And whileGassendi also sought to communicate anew the ideas of Epicurus, theStoics, and other earlier thinkers, his resulting amalgam of perspectivesprovides a modern view of his own making, one of the touchstones ofphilosophy and science in his times: our access to knowledge of thenatural world is dependent on the constraints and licenses that follow fromour epistemic grasp being limited to information provided by senses.limited to information provided by senses.)
Longino (2016b) + (Practice-centric and theory-centric approa … Practice-centric and theory-centric approaches in philosophy of science are described and contrasted. The contrast is developed through an examination of their different treatments of the underdetermination problem. The practice-centric approach is illustrated by a summary of comparative research on approaches in the biology of behaviour. The practice-centric approach is defended against charges that it encourages skepticism regarding the sciences.ourages skepticism regarding the sciences.)
Anagnostopoulos and Miller (Eds.) (2013) + (Preparing this homage to David Keyt has b … Preparing this homage to David Keyt has been a labor of love for the editors and contributors alike. The volume contains ﬁfteen essays by sixteen scholars including students, colleagues, and friends (the latter category being all inclusive!). All of the authors make important original contributions to the study of ancient Greek philosophy, and we wish to thank them all for agreeing to participate in this project, for their cooperation with the editing, and for the high quality of their essays. We are also grateful for their patience and good cheer throughout an unexpectedly protracted publication process. T he papers by Gerasimos Santas, Nils Rauhut, Mark McPherran, Charles Young, and Fred D. Miller, Jr. were delivered originally at a conference (aka “the Keytfest”) held at the University of Washington in Seattle in 2007 commemorating David Keyt’s ﬁ ftieth year as a professor of philosophy. Kenneth Clatterbaugh, Chair of the Department of Philosophy at the University of Washington, was very supportive of the program, and Bev Wessel provided valuable administrative assistance. Daniel Fisher, a student of David Keyt, offered generous ﬁ nancial support. Richard Parker, another former student, served as quipster and consummate master of ceremonies. W e are pleased to thank a number of people who have been very helpful with the editing and publication of this volume including Professor Stephen Hetherington, the editor of Springer’s Philosophical Studies Series; Ingrid van Laarhoven; Christi Lue; Ties Nijssen; Hendrikje Tuerlings; Professor Nicholas D. Smith, who helped to ﬁ nd a suitable publisher for the volume; and an anonymous reviewer who provided helpful comments. James Dabgotra ably assisted with the ﬁ rst round of editing, and Pamela Phillips did an excellent job copyediting the entire typescript and preparing it for the publisher. We also gratefully acknowledge ﬁnancial support from the Social Philosophy and Policy Foundation for the original conference and for the editing of the volume. Finally, we thank David Keyt for his assistance throughout the planning and preparation of the volume and especially for his willingness to contribute a fascinating memoir of his academic career which, in addition to delightful anecdotes about his encounters with notable scholars, offers illuminating insights into his own work and also into the recent history of the subdiscipline of ancient philosophy. With affection and admiration, we the editors and all the contributors dedicate this volume to David Keyt, in recognition of his major contributions to the study of ancient philosophy, and on behalf of the many students, colleagues, and friends whose lives he has touched and enriched over the past half century.d and enriched over the past half century.)
Latour (2005) + (Reassembling the social is Latour's challe … Reassembling the social is Latour's challenge to classical sociological understandings of the "social" and contends that there is not a necessary social ether which often influences human actions, but that by definition networks of human actions are the social aspect often erroneous identified. social aspect often erroneous identified.)
Barseghyan (2018) + (Recent developments in theoretical sciento … Recent developments in theoretical scientonomy coupled with a reflection on the practice of the Encyclopedia of Scientonomy all suggest that the ontology of scientific change currently accepted in scientonomy has serious flaws. The new ontology, suggested in this paper, solves some of the issues permeating the current ontology. Building on [[Modification:Sciento-2018-0002|Rawleigh’s suggestion]], it considers a ''theory'' as an attempt to answer a certain ''question''. It also introduces the category of ''definition'' as a subtype of theory. It also reveals that ''methods'' and ''methodologies'' of the currently accepted ontology do not differ from the perspective of their propositional content and, thus, belong to the same class of epistemic elements. This is captured in the new definition of ''method'' as a set of criteria for theory evaluation. It is also argued that ''methods'' are a subtype of ''normative theories''. It is shown that ''normative theories'' of all types, including methods, ethical norms, and aesthetic norms, can be both ''accepted and employed''. Finally, a new definition of ''scientific mosaic'' is suggested to fit the new ontology.ic'' is suggested to fit the new ontology.)
Intemann (2008) + (Recent feminist philosophers of science ha … Recent feminist philosophers of science have argued that feminist values can contribute to rational decisions about which scientific theories to accept. On this view, increasing the number of feminist scientists is important for ensuring rational and objective theory acceptance. The Underdetermination Thesis has played a key role in arguments for this view [Anderson (1995) Hypatia 10(3), 50–84; Hankinson Nelson (1990) Who knows? From Quine to a feminist empiricism. Temple University Press, Philadelphia; Longino (1990) Science as social knowledge. Princeton University Press, Princeton; Longino (2002) The fate of knowledge. Princeton University Press, Princeton; Kourany (2003) Philosophy of Science 70, 1–14]. This thesis is alleged to open an argumentative “gap” between evidence and theory acceptance and provide a rationale for filling the gap with feminist values. While I agree with the conclusion that feminist values can contribute to rational decisions about which theories to accept, I argue that the Underdetermination Thesis cannot support this claim. First, using earlier arguments [Laudan (1990) in: R. Giere (ed) Minnesota studies in the philosophy of science, vol 14, pp 267–297; Slezak (1991) International Studies in Philosophy of Science 5, 241–256; Pinnick (1994) Philosophy of Science 61, 664–657] I show that Underdetermination cannot, by itself, establish that feminist values should fill the gap in theory acceptance. Secondly, I argue that the very use of the Underdetermination Thesis concedes that feminist values are extra-scientific, a-rational, factors in theory acceptance. This concession denies feminists grounds to explain why their values contribute to rational scientific reasoning. Finally, I propose two alternative ways to explain how feminist values can contribute to rational theory acceptance that do not rely on Underdetermination.ce that do not rely on Underdetermination.)
Stump (2022) + (Relative, pragmatic, or dynamic theories o … Relative, pragmatic, or dynamic theories of the a priori have been considered by many philosophers of science. I present these theories as a model of how radical conceptual change occurs during a scientific revolution. When elements of a theory that are considered to be a priori or constitutive change, we have a revolutionary change that requires rethinking all of a scientific practice. Given that conceptual change is the flashpoint for discussion of the issues of incommensurability, the rationality of scientific change and relativism, by exploring theories of the a priori I show how radical conceptual change can occur and defend the rationality of scientific change. The viewpoint adopted avoids commitment to traditional a priori knowledge and to metaphysics, while still acknowledging that there is an important element in science that cannot simply be described as empirical. I present evidence to show that the model of scientific change can be applied widely.f scientific change can be applied widely.)
Newman (2014) + (René Descartes (1596–1650) is widely regar … René Descartes (1596–1650) is widely regarded as the father of modern philosophy. His noteworthy contributions extend to mathematics and physics. This entry focuses on his philosophical contributions in the theory of knowledge. Specifically, the focus is on the epistemological project of Descartes' famous work, Meditations on First Philosophy. Upon its completion, the work was circulated to other philosophers for their comments and criticisms. Descartes responded with detailed replies that provide a rich source of further information about the original work. He indeed published the first edition (1641) of the Meditations together with six sets of objections and replies, adding a seventh set with the second edition (1642).eventh set with the second edition (1642).)
Hatfield (2016) + (René Descartes (1596–1650) was a creative … René Descartes (1596–1650) was a creative mathematician of the first order, an important scientific thinker, and an original metaphysician. During the course of his life, he was a mathematician first, a natural scientist or “natural philosopher” second, and a metaphysician third. In mathematics, he developed the techniques that made possible algebraic (or “analytic”) geometry. In natural philosophy, he can be credited with several specific achievements: co-framer of the sine law of refraction, developer of an important empirical account of the rainbow, and proposer of a naturalistic account of the formation of the earth and planets (a precursor to the nebular hypothesis). More importantly, he offered a new vision of the natural world that continues to shape our thought today: a world of matter possessing a few fundamental properties and interacting according to a few universal laws. This natural world included an immaterial mind that, in human beings, was directly related to the brain; in this way, Descartes formulated the modern version of the mind–body problem. In metaphysics, he provided arguments for the existence of God, to show that the essence of matter is extension, and that the essence of mind is thought. Descartes claimed early on to possess a special method, which was variously exhibited in mathematics, natural philosophy, and metaphysics, and which, in the latter part of his life, included, or was supplemented by, a method of doubt.or was supplemented by, a method of doubt.)
Wimsatt (2006) + (Richard Levins’ distinction between aggreg … Richard Levins’ distinction between aggregate, composed and evolvedsystems acquires new significance as we recognize the importance of mechanisticexplanation. Criteria for aggregativity provide limiting cases for absence of organization,so through their failure, can provide rich detectors for organizational properties.I explore the use of failures of aggregativity for the analysis of mechanisticsystems in diverse contexts. Aggregativity appears theoretically desireable, but weare easily fooled. It may be exaggerated through approximation, conditions ofderivation, and extrapolating from some conditions of decomposition illegtimatelyto others. Evolved systems particularly may require analyses under alternativecomplementary decompositions. Exploring these conditions helps us to betterunderstand the strengths and limits of reductionistic methods.gths and limits of reductionistic methods.)
Laudan, Laudan, and Donovan (1988) + (Science is accorded high value in our cult … Science is accorded high value in our culture because, unlike many other intellectual endeavors, it appears capable of producing increasingly reliable knowledge. During the last quarter century a group of historians and philosophers of science (known variously as 'theorists of scientific change', the 'post-positivist school' or the 'historical school') has proposed theories to explain progressive change in science. Their concepts and models have received such keen attention that terms like 'paradigm' have passed from obscurity to common speech. In this volume, we subject key claims of some of the theorists of scientific change to just that kind of empirical scrutiny that has been so characteristic of science itself. Certain claims emerge unscathed - the existence and importance of large-scale theories (guiding assumptions) in the physical sciences for example. Others, such as the supposed importance of novel predictions or the alleged insignificance of anomalies, seem to be without foundation. We conclude that only by engaging in testing of this sort will the study of science be able to make progress.study of science be able to make progress.)
Winther (2016) + (Scientific inquiry has led to immense expl … Scientific inquiry has led to immense explanatory and technologicalsuccesses, partly as a result of the pervasiveness of scientific theories.Relativity theory, evolutionary theory, and plate tectonics were, andcontinue to be, wildly successful families of theories within physics,biology, and geology. Other powerful theory clusters inhabitcomparatively recent disciplines such as cognitive science, climatescience, molecular biology, microeconomics, and Geographic InformationScience (GIS). Effective scientific theories magnify understanding, helpsupply legitimate explanations, and assist in formulating predictions.Moving from their knowledge-producing representational functions totheir interventional roles (Hacking 1983), theories are integral to building technologies used within consumer, industrial, and scientific milieus. This entry explores the structure of scientific theories from the perspective of the Syntactic, Semantic, and Pragmatic Views. Each of these answers questions such as the following in unique ways. What is the bestcharacterization of the composition and function of scientific theory? How is theory linked with world? Which philosophical tools can and should be employed in describing and reconstructing scientific theory? Is an understanding of practice and application necessary for a comprehensionof the core structure of a scientific theory? Finally, and most generally,how are these three views ultimately related? are these three views ultimately related?)
Allen (1988) + (Scientists, philosophers and theologians h … Scientists, philosophers and theologians have wrestled repeatedly with the question of whether knowledge is similar or different in their various understandings of the world and God. Although agreement is still elusive, the epistemology of critical realism, associated with Ian Barbour, John Polkinghorne and Arthur Peacocke, remains widely credible. Relying on the lifetime work of philosopher Ernan McMullin, this book expands our understanding of critical realism beyond a permanent stand-off between the subjective and objective, whether in science or theology. Critical realism illuminates the subject and the objectively known simultaneously. Responding to criticisms made against it, this book defends critical realism in science and theology with a specific role to play in our understanding of God. role to play in our understanding of God.)
Yan, Tsai, and Huang (2022) + (Scientonomy is the field that aims to deve … Scientonomy is the field that aims to develop a descriptive theory of the actual process of scientific change (Barseghyan, 2015). Scientometrics is the field that aims to employ statistical methods to investigate the quantitative features of scientific research, especially the impact of scientific articles and the significance of scientific citations (Leydesdorff & Milojević, 2013). In this paper, we aim to illustrate how to methodologically integrate scientonomy with scientometrics to investigate both qualitative and quantitative changes of a scientific community. We will use a case study to achieve our aim. The case study is about a scientific community studying a physiological phenomenon called heart-rate variability (HRV). Moreover, we will argue that this methodological integration outperforms cases in which researchers only employ the resources from one of the two fields.ploy the resources from one of the two fields.)

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