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D
This somewhat simplistic definition of ''definition'' is meant to highlight that definitions are themselves theories (statements, propositions). As a result, any [[Epistemic Stances|stance]] that can be taken by [[Epistemic Agent|epistemic agents]] towards theories can also be taken towards definitions. +
According to Barseghyan, definitions are an integral part of the process of scientific change.[[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2018)]] +
According to Barseghyan, definitions are essentially a species of theories. +
One can specify a [[Discipline|discipline]] in terms of a set of its [[Core Question| core questions]]. A delineating theory is a second-order [[Theory|theory]] identifying this set of core questions, and allowing it to exist as an [[Epistemic Element| epistemic element]] within the [[Scientific Mosaic|mosaic]].[[CiteRef::Patton and Al-Zayadi (2021)]] For example, the delineating theory of modern physics might identify 'How do matter and energy behave?' as a core question of modern physics. +
[[The Law of Theory Demarcation (Sarwar-Fraser-2018)|The law of theory demarcation]] states that a theory is deemed as scientific only if it satisfies the demarcation criteria employed by the epistemic community at the time. [[Theory Acceptance (Fraser-Sarwar-2018)|The definition of theory acceptance]] suggested by [[Patrick Fraser|Fraser]] and [[Ameer Sarwar|Sarwar]] states that an accepted theory is a ''scientific'' theory that is taken to be the best available description or prescription of its object of study. It follows from these two premises that whenever a theory is accepted, it must also have satisfied the demarcation criteria of the time. After all, if it did not, then the definition of theory acceptance is contradicted. Therefore, if the definition of theory acceptance and the law of demarcation criteria are accepted, then it must also be accepted that accepted theories satisfy the criteria of demarcation. This demarcation-acceptance synchronism is presented somewhat more… +
According to [[Zoe Sebastien|Sebastien]]'s definition of the term, descriptive theories aim at ''describing'' a certain object under study, where ''describe'' is understood in the broad sense and includes ''explain'', ''predict'', etc. Thus, the term encompasses theories that attempt to describe a certain phenomenon, process, or state of affairs in the past, present, or future. All of the following propositions would qualify as ''descriptive'': +
According to Barseghyan, many theories attempt to describe something. Thus, there are descriptive theories.[[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)|p. 5]] +
A discipline ''A'' is characterized by a non-empty set of [[Core Question| core questions]] ''Q<sub>CA</sub>'' and a [[Delineating Theory| delineating theory]] stating that ''Q<sub>CA</sub>'' are the core questions of the discipline.[[CiteRef::Patton and Al-Zayadi (2021)]] +
[[Epistemic Stances Towards Theories|Theories]] and [[Epistemic Stances Towards Questions| questions]] can both be the subject of the epistemic stances of [[Epistemic Agent|epistemic agents]]. [[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2018)]][[CiteRef::Rawleigh (2018)]][[CiteRef::Patton (2019)]] [[Discipline| Disciplines]] like biology, physics, and astrology can also be the subject of such stances. For example, biology and physics are accepted by the scientific community of the modern world as disciplines, but astrology is rejected. In our definition, a discipline is said to be accepted by an epistemic agent if that agent accepts the [[Core Question| core questions]] specified in the discipline's [[Delineating Theory|delineating theory]], as well as the delineating theory itself.[[CiteRef::Patton and Al-Zayadi (2021)]] +
No [[Theory|theory]] acceptance may take place in a genuinely dogmatic [[Scientific Community|community]]. "Namely," as is noted in [[Barseghyan (2015)]], Barseghyan notes, when introducing '''the theory rejection theorem''' in [[Barseghyan (2015)]], "theory change is impossible in cases where a currently accepted theory is considered as revealing the final and absolute truth".[[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)|p. 165]] +
A '''substantive method''' is one that presupposes at least one contingent proposition; one that depends on the state of something in the external world. According to our understanding of contingent propositions, all such propositions are '''fallible'''. As such, any substantive method will necessarily presuppose at least one contingent proposition, and is therefore fallible. Thus, by the '''synchronism of method rejection''' theorem, the rejection of a theory can result in the rejection of a method, rendering all substantive methods dynamic. +
E
According to Oh, there is such a thing as element decay.[[CiteRef::Oh (2021)]] +
Element decay is not a scientonomic phenomenon and, thus, is outside of the scope of scientonomy. +
A method is said to be ''employed'' at time ''t'' if, at time ''t,'' theories became accepted only when their acceptance is permitted by the method. [[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)|p. 53]] ''The second law'' of theory acceptance is a direct consequence of ''employed method'' as it is defined. +
According to this definition of the term, ''employed method'' is nothing but the actual expectations of a certain community at a certain time. This is in tune with the actual scientonomic usage of the term. It is safe to say that this definition is tacitly used throughout Barseghyan's [[Barseghyan (2015)|''The Laws of Scientific Change'']]. For instance, when he says that the method of intuition schooled by experience was employed by the community of Aristotelian-Medieval natural philosophers, he actually means that this community expected new theories to be intuitively true.[[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)|pp. 143-145]][[CiteRef::Patton, Overgaard, and Barseghyan (2017)|p. 35]] When he says that the double-blind trial method is currently employed in drug testing, he means that "the community expects new drugs to be tested in double-blind trials".[[CiteRef::Patton, Overgaard, and Barseghyan (2017)|p. 35]][[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)|pp. 134-142]] Originally, this tacit definition of emp… +
[[Joshua Allen]] makes a case for this broad definition of the term. According to Allen:[[CiteRef::Allen (2023)|pp. 75-76]] +
According to Allen, epistemic actions are a key part of everyday epistemic practice. +
An ''epistemic agent'' acts in relation to [[Epistemic Element|epistemic elements]] such as theories, questions, and methods. The actions of an epistemic agent amount to taking [[Epistemic Stance|epistemic stances]] towards these elements, such as accepting or pursuing a theory, accepting a question, or employing a method. The stances of an epistemic agent must be ''intentional''. To be so, they must satisfy the following conditions: +
According to Barseghyan, epistemic agents are an essential part of the process of scientific change, as they take stances towards epistemic elements. +
This definition attempts to capture what is arguably the key feature of epistemic communities - their collective intentionality to study/know the world. This feature, according to the definition, distinguishes epistemic communities from [[Non-Epistemic Community|non-epistemic communities]], such as political, economic, or familial communities. To use [[Nicholas Overgaard|Overgaard]]'s own example, "it is clear that an orchestra is a community: the various musicians can be said to have a collective intentionality to play a piece of music" and yet its collective intentionality is different from that of knowing the world.[[CiteRef::Overgaard (2017)|p. 59]] +
According to [[Nicholas Overgaard|Overgaard]], communities that do not have a collective intentionality to know the world can still have sub-communities that do have such an intentionality. Overgaard illustrates this with the example of Google, a company that can be considered a [[Non-Epistemic Community|non-epistemic community]] as its collective intentionality is that to make profit. Yet, as an innovative company, Google has many sub-communities which do have a collective intentionality to know the world, such as "a research and development team trying to better know Internet technologies, or a marketing team trying to better know how to reach consumers".[[CiteRef::Overgaard (2017)|p. 59]] By [[Epistemic Community (Overgaard-2017)|definition]], these sub-communities are [[Epistemic Community|epistemic]]. Thus, argues Overgaard, it is possible for an epistemic community to be the sub-community of a non-epistemic community. +
The claim of the existence of epistemic communities can be traced back to Overgaard, who presented the distinction between epistemic and non-epistemic communities in his [[Overgaard (2017)|''A Taxonomy for the Social Agents of Scientific Change'']].[[CiteRef::Overgaard (2017)]] +
According to Barseghyan, epistemic community is an epistemic agent, i.e. it is capable of taking [[Epistemic Stance|epistemic stances]] towards [[Epistemic Element|epistemic elements]].[[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2018)]] +
TODO: Nikki add a description +
According to Barseghyan and Levesley, questions can have epistemic presuppositions. +
Fraser and Sarwar argued that, as an epistemic stance, compatibility can be taken towards epistemic elements of all types.[[CiteRef::Fraser and Sarwar (2018)|p. 70]] +
The only stance that an epistemic agent can take towards a method is [[Employed Method|''employment'']], i.e. a method is either employed or unemployed by an agent in theory evaluation. +
In his [[Barseghyan (2018)|"Redrafting the Ontology of Scientific Change"]], Barseghyan argued that since [[Normative Theory|norms]] are a subtype of [[Theory|theory]], all the epistemic stances that can in principle be taken by an epistemic agent towards theories of all types can also be taken towards norms. In addition to these more universal stances, norms can also be [[Norm Employment|employed]], i.e. they have the capacity of constituting the actual expectations of the epistemic agent. This applies to norms of all types.[[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2018)]] +
Rawleigh argued that, just like theories, [[Question|questions]] too can be [[Question Acceptance|accepted]] or unaccepted. A question can be accepted by an agent at one period at not accepted by another. +
It is argued by Sarwar and Fraser that, in addition to the already accepted epistemic stances, the stance of ''scientificity'' can be taken towards theories.[[CiteRef::Sarwar and Fraser (2018)]] +
According to Barseghyan, acceptance as an epistemic stance can be taken towards theories.[[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)|pp. 30-32]] +
According to Barseghyan, the epistemic stance of pursuit can be taken towards theories, i.e. an epistemic agent can find a theory pursuitworthy.[[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)|pp. 30-40]] +
According to Barseghyan, the epistemic stance of use can be taken towards theories, i.e. an epistemic agent can find a theory useful.[[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)|pp. 30-40]] +
A physical object or system is an epistemic tool for an [[Epistemic Agent|epistemic agent]] ''iff'' there is a procedure by which the tool can provide an acceptable source of knowledge for answering some [[Question|question]] under the employed [[Method|method]] of that agent. Examples of epistemic tools include rulers, thermometers, the Large Hadron Collider, the Hubble Space Telescope, a written text, a computer, a blackboard and chalk, a crystal ball, etc. +
There are several different senses in which one might take the concept of scientific error. One is the absolute sense. From our modern perspective, we might judge the geocentric [[Aristotle| Aristotelean-Ptolemaic cosmology's]] claim that the earth is stationary at the center of the universe as an error [[CiteRef:: Allchin (2001)]]. +
The analysis of several several instances of scientific error by [[Sarah Machado-Marques|Machado-Marques]] and [[Paul Patton|Patton]] suggest that the handling of these instances by scientists is in accord with the theory rejection theorem. Handling of error involves, according to this view, not only a rejection of some of the propositions that are considered to be accepted erroneously but also an acceptance of some new propositions. In some cases, an erroneously accepted ''first-order'' proposition is replaced by another ''first-order'' proposition incompatible with it. In other cases, an erroneously accepted ''first-order'' proposition is replaced by a ''second-order'' proposition stating the lack of sufficient reason for accepting the first-order proposition. According to this view, the handling of erroneously accepted theories involves their replacement with other theories; the handling of scientific error is therefore in full accord with the theory rejection theorem. +
This category encompasses that knowledge which hasn't been openly formulated by the agent but can, in principle, be open formulated. As such the category is agent-relative. The definition was first suggested by [[Hakob Barseghyan]] and [[Maxim Mirkin]] in their ''[[Barseghyan and Mirkin (2019)|The Role of Technological Knowledge in Scientific Change]]''[[CiteRef::Barseghyan and Mirkin (2019)]] and was restated by Mirkin in his ''[[Mirkin (2018)|The Status of Technological Knowledge in the Scientific Mosaic]]''. +
According to this definition, knowledge is said to be ''explicit'' if it has been openly formulated by the agent in question. As such the notion of ''explicit'' is agent-relative. The definition was first suggested by [[Hakob Barseghyan]] and [[Maxim Mirkin]] in their ''[[Barseghyan and Mirkin (2019)|The Role of Technological Knowledge in Scientific Change]]''[[CiteRef::Barseghyan and Mirkin (2019)]] and was restated by Mirkin in his ''[[Mirkin (2018)|The Status of Technological Knowledge in the Scientific Mosaic]]''. +
G
Allen makes a case that while many types of epistemic actions are local, i.e. available to only ''some'' agents at ''some'' periods, there are also global epistemic actions. According to Allen, "taking a stance of acceptance (i.e., accepting) seems to be a global action, as without this epistemic action no process of scientific change seems possible". [[CiteRef::Allen (2023)|p. 79]] +
Allen makes a case that there is such a thing as a global epistemic action, (e.g. ''accepting a theory'').[[CiteRef::Allen (2023)|p. 79]] +
Allen makes a case that epistemic actions can be global or local.[[CiteRef::Allen (2023)]] +
In the scientonomic workflow, the goals of peer review are to assesses a paper for pursuitworthiness of the modifications suggested in the paper. Thus, peer reviewers should not evaluate submissions for acceptability, but only for pursuitworthiness. +
In [[Nicholas Overgaard|Overgaard]]'s taxonomy, the term ''group'' refers to the most basic societal entity - a set of two or more people. As such, it is meant to play the role of the most abstract class which has two sub-classes - [[Community (Overgaard-2017)|community]] and [[Accidental Group (Overgaard-2017)|accidental group]].[[CiteRef::Overgaard (2017)]] +
H
The editors should be granted official ''housekeeping rights'' to create and modify the necessary pages of the encyclopedia to handle ripple effects. Specific handling of ripple effects should depend on whether the additional change is ''implied'' by the modification or whether it is conceivable to accept the modification without accepting the additional change. There are two possible scenarios. +
Hierarchical authority delegation is a sub-type of [[Multiple Authority Delegation (Loiselle-2017)|multiple authority delegation]]. It describes a situation in which a community delegates authority over some [[Question|question]] to multiple communities, but at different degrees of authority. Consider a case of multiple authority delegation in which either expert A OR expert B might be consulted. If the word of expert A is always accepted over the word of expert B, we have a case of hierarchical authority delegation. +
The definition tweaks the [[Hierarchical Authority Delegation (Loiselle-2017)|original definition]] of the term by [[Mirka Loiselle|Loiselle]] to ensure that the relationship of hierarchical authority delegation can obtain between [[Epistemic Agent|epistemic agents]] of all types. It also substitutes [[Question|''question'']] for ''topic'', as the former is the proper scientonomic term that should be used. +
To reconstruct the state of a ''mosaic'' at time ''t,'' it is necessary to understand which theories were accepted at the time, and which methods were employed at the time. [[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)|p. 12]] This process is the concern of historical (empirical) questions. '''Theory of scientific change,''' although closely linked is concerned with theoretical questions. ''History of Scientific Change'' is one of the key concepts in current scientonomy. Thus, its proper definition is of great importance to recognize a descriptive theory of ''scientific change.'' +
I
Implication aims to capture the idea of one theory "following" from another. Although this idea is usually associated with that of deduction, sometimes deduction is too strict. When a theory constitutes evidence for another theory, that theory may imply the other depending on the strength of the evidence. There is no cutoff point for how strong the evidence needs to be that is shared by all agents. Instead, each agent has some ''rules of implication'' which determine when a theory ''implies'' another. This may be rules of logical entailment, of Bayesian confirmation theory, or of a detective's instinct. +
Implicit is the opposite of ''explicit'' and, thus, it doesn't require more than a very minimalist definition. This definition creates a strong link between the two concepts and won't require any changes in the definition of ''implicit'' when the respective definition of ''explicit'' happens to change. +
One putative method of learning the [[Employed Method|''employed method'']] of the time is by studying texts concerning scientific [[Methodology|''methodology'']] to learn what method was prescribed by the [[Scientific Community|community]] or advocated by ''great scientists''. However, such indicators can yield incorrect results. During the second half of the eighteenth century and the first half of the nineteenth century, the scientific community explicitly advocated the ''empiricist-inductivist'' methodology championed by [[Isaac Newton]]. This methodology held that new theories should be deduced from phenomena, and that unobservable entities should not be posited. However, the historical record actually shows that several theories positing unobservable entities did, in fact, become accepted during this period. These include Benjamin Franklin's theory of electricity, which posited an unobservable ''electric fluid'', the ''phlogiston'' theory of combustion, and the theory that li… +
''Indicators of theory acceptance'' are historical facts that provide evidence indicating that a scientific [[Theory|theory]] was accepted by some [[Scientific Community|community]] at a particular time. The opinions of [[Individual Level|individual scientists]] are not clear indicators of the acceptance of a theory by a community. Possible indicators are sources that typically indicate the opinion of an entire scientific community such as encyclopedias, textbooks, university curricula and the minutes of association meetings. [[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)| pp. 113-117]] +
According to Patton, there is such a things as an individual epistemic agents, capable of taking [[Epistemic Stance|epistemic stances]] towards [[Epistemic Element|epistemic elements]].[[CiteRef::Patton (2019)]] +
According to Patton, individuals are "capable of taking epistemic stances towards epistemic elements, with reason, based on a semantic understanding of the elements and their available alternatives, and with the goal of producing knowledge".[[CiteRef::Patton (2019)|p. 82]] +
By the ''individual level'' Barseghyan means an "individual scientist who has her own set of ideas and beliefs about the world, and employs certain methods which might be different than the accepted methods of the time".[[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)|p. 43]] +
The category is agent-relative and encompasses that knowledge which cannot - even in principle - be explicated. The definition was first suggested by [[Hakob Barseghyan]] and [[Maxim Mirkin]] in their ''[[Barseghyan and Mirkin (2019)|The Role of Technological Knowledge in Scientific Change]]''[[CiteRef::Barseghyan and Mirkin (2019)]] and was restated by Mirkin in his ''[[Mirkin (2018)|The Status of Technological Knowledge in the Scientific Mosaic]]''. +
Inferring Theory Assessment Outcomes from Acceptance or Unacceptance of Two Contenders (Patton-Overgaard-Barseghyan-2017) +
The following inferences can be drawn regarding theory assessment outcomes from the acceptance or unacceptance of two contender theories: +
Inferring Theory Assessment Outcomes from Acceptance or Unacceptance of a Single Contender (Patton-Overgaard-Barseghyan-2017) +
The following inferences can be drawn regarding theory assessment outcomes from the acceptance or unacceptance of a single contender theory: +
L
Allen explains that to say that a local epistemic action is available to an epistemic agent amounts to saying that the agent employs the norm that such an action is permissible/desirable/obligatory/etc.[[CiteRef::Allen (2023)|p. 79]] +
Allen's theorem is based on the definition of ''local action availability'' that states that "the availability of local epistemic action ''A'' to an agent amounts to the employment of the norm that says “Epistemic action ''A'' is permissible/obligatory/desirable/etc.”".[[CiteRef::Allen (2023)|p. 79]] Thus, from the law of norm employment, one can argue that:[[CiteRef::Allen (2023)|p. 81]] +
Allen suggests that local actions are the ones that are not universally available but are specific to a time period and/or an agent. For example "such epistemic actions as simulating, experimenting, or modelling seem to be local actions since they need not necessarily be part of the repertoire of epistemic actions of all conceivable epistemic agents; such local actions emerge at a certain time and become available to some but not all epistemic agents".[[CiteRef::Allen (2023)|p. 79]] +
Allen points out that many epistemic actions are local (e.g. actions of simulating, experimenting, or modelling).[[CiteRef::Allen (2023)|p. 79]] +
Allen argues that many types of epistemic actions are local (e.g. simulating, modeling, experimenting).[[CiteRef::Allen (2023)|p. 79]] +
TODO: Nikki add a description +
According to Barseghyan and Levesley, question can have logical presuppositions. +
M
Any ''method'' is essentially a set of criteria which can become [[Employed Method|employed]] in theory evaluation. Different methods may have different Methods can be very general and apply to theories of a variety of types (e.g. ''the hypothetico-deductive method''), or very specific (e.g. ''the double-blind trial method'' of drug testing). [[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)|pp. 4-5]] +
This definition of ''method'' is meant to encompass the criteria of evaluation of all types, regardless of their being explicit or implicit, and thus merge what was previously separated into two classes of elements - [[Method (Barseghyan-2015)|methods]] and [[Methodology (Sebastien-2016)|methodologies]]. +
According to this definition, in a hierarchy of methods more stringent requirements take precedence over less stringent requirement. Thus, when there are theories satisfying the most stringent requirements, these theories become accepted. However, when no such theory is available, the epistemic agent in question seeks for theories that satisfy the requirements of the second - less stringent - method in the hierarchy. If such a theory is not found, the agent is then prepared to accept theories that satisfy even the even less stringent requirements of the third method in hierarchy, and so on.[[CiteRef::Mercuri and Barseghyan (2019)]] +
As argued by [[Mathew Mercuri|Mercuri]] and [[Hakob Barseghyan|Barseghyan]], it is often the case that "criteria employed by the same epistemic agent constitute a certain preference hierarchy",[[CiteRef::Mercuri and Barseghyan (2019)|p. 45]] illustrated among other things by the fact that "practitioners in different fields customarily speak of more or less reliable evidence".[[CiteRef::Mercuri and Barseghyan (2019)|p. 46]] For example, when the community of art historians attempts to establish the authenticity of a certain work of art, they often accept the position of the expert they find most reliable; if, for whatever reason, this expert doesn't have a position on the authenticity of that work of art, the community refers to their second-best expert, and so on.[[CiteRef::Loiselle (2017)]] Another example of method hierarchies comes from the field of clinical epidemiology that features "a variety of different requirements – from more stringent to more lenient".[[CiteRef::Mercuri a… +
According to Barseghyan's 2018 redrafted ontology, methods are a species of normative theories.[[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2018)]] +
According to ''the method rejection theorem'', a [[Method|method]] ceases to be employed only when other methods that are incompatible with it become employed. +
Pandey makes a case that the first law and all of its corollaries are tautological.[[CiteRef::Pandey (2023)]] +
This definition of the term confines it to the respective normative ''field'' of inquiry. Specific methodological ''theories'' are referred to as [[Method (Barseghyan-2018)|''methods'']]. +
A methodology can affect an employed method when it implements one or more abstract requirements of another employed method. Thus, the role normative methodology plays in the process of scientific change is a creative role, in which methods are changed through the implementation of other abstract requirements from some other employed method. +
According to Barseghyan (2015), for mosaics to merge, that is, to "turn into one united mosaic," there must first exist (at least) two distinct mosaics. This necessarily means that there are elements which are present in one mosaic but absent in the other. "To use the language of set theory," Barseghyan writes, "these are the elements that constitute the so-called ''symmetric difference'' of two mosaics [...] Therefore, in order for the two mosaics to merge into one, these elements should either be rejected in both or accepted in both, so that the differences between the two are resolved".[[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)|p. 214]] +
To understand what is meant by mosaic split, consider the following case. "A community initially accepts some theories and employs some methods; in other words, initially, there is one mosaic of theories and methods. Also, as a result of some events, this initially united community transforms into two different communities with two somewhat different mosaics of theories and methods."[[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)|p.202]] This is different than mere disagreement. ''Mosaic split'' only occurs if there are two communities that each present their different theories as accepted (in contexts like articles, conferences, textbooks and so on). That is, there is disagreement concerning the ''status'' of certain theories, and not just on the theories themselves.[[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)|p.203]] +
Multiple authority delegation is a sub-type of authority delegation. It describes a situation in which a community delegates authority over some topic to multiple communities. For example, in a case where a community might delegate authority to expert A OR expert B over topic X, we have a case of multiple authority delegation. +
The definition tweaks the [[Multiple Authority Delegation (Loiselle-2017)|original definition]] of the term by [[Mirka Loiselle|Loiselle]] to ensure that the relationship of multiple authority delegation can obtain between [[Epistemic Agent|epistemic agents]] of all types. It also substitutes [[Question|''question'']] for ''topic'', as the former is the proper scientonomic term that should be used. +
Overgaard and Loiselle illustrate the relationship of mutual authority delegation by a number of examples. For one, physicists acknowledge that biologists are the experts on questions concerning life, and likewise biologists acknowledge that physicists are the experts on questions concerning physical processes. Similar relationships can be found within individual scientific disciplines. Consider, for instance, the relationship between theoretical and applied physicists, where despite the differences in their methods and overall objectives, the two communities customarily delegate authority to each other on a wide array of topics. +
The definition tweaks the [[Mutual Authority Delegation (Overgaard-Loiselle-2016)|original definition]] of the term by [[Nicholas Overgaard|Overgaard]] and [[Mirka Loiselle|Loiselle]] to ensure that the relationship of multiple authority delegation can obtain between [[Epistemic Agent|epistemic agents]] of all types. It also substitutes [[Question|''question'']] for ''topic'', as the former is the proper scientonomic term that should be used. +
N
According to the [[Non-Empty Mosaic theorem (Barseghyan-2015)|non-empty mosaic theorem]], there must be at least one element present in a mosaic. The Necessary Method theorem specifies that this element must be a method. That is, "one method is a must for the whole enterprise of scientific change to take off the ground".[[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)|p. 228]] +
Necessary [[Scientific Mosaic|mosaic]] split is a form of mosaic split that must happen if it is ever the case that two incompatible [[Theory|theories]] both become accepted under the employed [[Method|method]] of the time. Since the theories are incompatible, under the [[The Zeroth Law|zeroth law]], they cannot be accepted into the same mosaic, and a mosaic split must then occur, as a matter of logical necessity.[[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)|pp. 204-207]] +
The non-empty [[Scientific Mosaic|mosaic]] theorem asserts that in order for a process of [[Scientific Change|scientific change]] to be possible, the mosaic must necessarily contain at least one element. Scientific change is impossible in an empty mosaic. It can be deduced from the [[The Second Law (Barseghyan-2015)|second law]], which asserts that in order to become accepted into the mosaic, a [[Theory|theory]] is assessed by the [[Method|method]] actually employed at the time, and the [[The Third Law (Barseghyan-2015)|third law]], which asserts that a method becomes employed only when it is deducible from other employed methods and accepted theories of the time.[[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)|p. 226]] +
This definition is meant to highlight the key difference between [[Epistemic Community|epistemic]] and non-epistemic communities. The former are said to have a collective intentionality to know the world, while the latter lack such an intentionality. A typical example of a non-epistemic community, according to [[Nicholas Overgaard|Overgaard]], is an orchestra that has a collective intentionality to play music but lack the intentionality of knowing the world.[[CiteRef::Overgaard (2017)|p. 59]] Another example of a non-epistemic community, according to Overgaard, is a political party. While a political party might have some accepted theories, such as ideas concerning, for instance, effective governance, "a political party would be considered a non-epistemic community because it lacks a collective intentionality to know the world".[[CiteRef::Overgaard (2017)|p. 59]] +
Non-hierarchical authority delegation is a sub-type of multiple authority delegation. It describes a situation in which a community delegates authority over some topic to multiple communities, and treat each community as being at the same level of authority. Consider a case of multiple authority delegation in which either expert A OR expert B might be consulted. If the word of expert A is valued as equally as the word of expert B, we have a case of non-hierarchical authority delegation. +
The definition tweaks the [[Non-hierarchical Authority Delegation (Loiselle-2017)|original definition]] of the term by [[Mirka Loiselle|Loiselle]] to ensure that the relationship of non-hierarchical authority delegation can obtain between [[Epistemic Agent|epistemic agents]] of all types. It also substitutes [[Question|''question'']] for ''topic'', as the former is the proper scientonomic term that should be used. +
This definition is meant to ensure that the notion of employment is applicable not only to methods but to norms of all types, as is the case in the ontology of epistemic elements suggested by [[Hakob Barseghyan|Barseghyan]] in 2018. According to that ontology, the capacity of being employed can be ascribed not only to norms of theory evaluation (i.e. methods), but to [[Epistemic Stances Towards Normative Theories - Norm Employment (Barseghyan-2018)|norms of all types]], including ethical norm and aesthetic norms.[[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2018)]] +
Pandey makes a case that the first law and all of its corollaries are tautological.[[CiteRef::Pandey (2023)]] +
Whereas [[Implication (Palider-2019)]] is an analytic relation between theories, inferences are taken to be the "movements of thought" that lead to belief revision. As argued for by Palider (2019) inferences, unlike implications, necessarily involve a normative component.[[CiteRef::Palider (2019)|p. 22]] An implication alone is insufficient for an agent to revise their beliefs, or accepted theories, what is needed is that the agent take the normative stance that they should accept the theory. A '''normative inference''' is what leads an agent to taking such a normative stance. +
While not explicitly stated, the definition assumes that normative propositions involve evaluation, i.e. they "say how something ''ought'' to be, what's good or bad, what's right or wrong".[[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)|p. 12]] In contrast with [[Descriptive Theory|''descriptive propositions'']], normative propositions do not aim to tell how things are, were, or will be, but rather what is good or bad, desirable or undesirable, permissible or impermissible. +
According to Sebastien, "normative propositions are relevant to the process of scientific change", i.e. "they "can be part of the scientific mosaic".[[CiteRef::Sebastien (2016)|p. 2]] +
According to Sebastien, norms, such as those of ethics, aesthetics, or methodology, are normative theories.[[CiteRef::Sebastien (2016)]] +
O
One-sided authority delegation is a sub-type of authority delegation. It describes a situation where one community delegates authority over some topic to another community, but the other community does not delegate any authority back. +
The definition tweaks the [[Mutual Authority Delegation (Overgaard-Loiselle-2016)|original definition]] of the term by [[Nicholas Overgaard|Overgaard]] and [[Mirka Loiselle|Loiselle]] to ensure that the relationship of one-sided authority delegation can obtain between [[Epistemic Agent|epistemic agents]] of all types. It also substitutes [[Question|''question'']] for ''topic'', as the former is the proper scientonomic term that should be used. +
To say that the theory acceptance outcome ''accept'' obtained as a result of a theory's assessment by a method is the same as to say that it is prescribed that the theory must be accepted. +
To say that the theory acceptance outcome ''inconclusive'' obtained as a result of a theory's assessment by a method is the same as to say that the theory ''can'' but ''shouldn't necessarily'' be accepted. +
To say that a theory's assessment by a method produced the outcome "inconclusive" is the same as to say that the community itself couldn't tell whether the requirements of the method were conclusively met. +
