Search by property

Jump to navigation Jump to search

This page provides a simple browsing interface for finding entities described by a property and a named value. Other available search interfaces include the page property search, and the ask query builder.

Search by property

A list of all pages that have property "Abstract" with value "The article is about philosophical issues in chemistry.". Since there have been only a few results, also nearby values are displayed.

Showing below up to 26 results starting with #1.

View (previous 50 | next 50) (20 | 50 | 100 | 250 | 500)


    

List of results

  • Yan, Tsai, and Huang (2022)  + (Scientonomy is the field that aims to deveScientonomy is the field that aims to develop a descriptive theory of the actual process of scientific change (Barseghyan, 2015). Scientometrics is the field that aims to employ statistical methods to investigate the quantitative features of scientific research, especially the impact of scientific articles and the significance of scientific citations (Leydesdorff & Milojević, 2013). In this paper, we aim to illustrate how to methodologically integrate scientonomy with scientometrics to investigate both qualitative and quantitative changes of a scientific community. We will use a case study to achieve our aim. The case study is about a scientific community studying a physiological phenomenon called heart-rate variability (HRV). Moreover, we will argue that this methodological integration outperforms cases in which researchers only employ the resources from one of the two fields.ploy the resources from one of the two fields.)
  • Dechauffour (2022)  + (Scientonomy seems to hold conflicting viewScientonomy seems to hold conflicting views about the historicity of scientific method. On the one hand, it is said that scientific methods are immanent to scientific mosaics and therefore change through time. On the other hand, the distinction between substantive and procedural methods seems to suggest that there are transcendent, unchangeable methods. I argue that this contradiction can be resolved by re-evaluating the role of problems: by integrating problems as constitutive elements of scientific mosaics, scientonomy can work towards a theory of scientific change without relying on the presupposition that some normative aspects of science must not change. In that perspective, norms originate in the relation between a problem, which creates a need for theoretical innovation, and a method, which creates an actual means to solve a problem. A problem-based scientonomy would then have to build a genealogical, rather than normative, approach to the source of scientificity by describing the progression from mysteries to scientific problems. Moreover, because they do not come from nowhere but express actual interactions with the world, problems can help us understand the relation between scientific change and other kinds of change. The primacy of actual problems over rational norms points to the immanence of reason: reason should be conceived as an evolutive feature of human communities. Finally, the relation between a theory of scientific change, evolutionary epistemology, and a general theory of change is investigated. general theory of change is investigated.)
  • Terrall (2002)  + (Self-styled adventurer, literary wit, philSelf-styled adventurer, literary wit, philosopher, and statesman of science, Pierre-Louis Moreau de Maupertuis (1698-1759) stood at the center of Enlightenment science and culture. Offering an elegant and accessible portrait of this remarkable man, Mary Terrall uses the story of Maupertuis's life, self-fashioning, and scientific works to explore what it meant to do science and to be a man of science in eighteenth-century Europe.</br></br>Beginning his scientific career as a mathematician in Paris, Maupertuis entered the public eye with a much-discussed expedition to Lapland, which confirmed Newton's calculation that the earth was flattened at the poles. He also made significant, and often intentionally controversial, contributions to physics, life science, navigation, astronomy, and metaphysics. Called to Berlin by Frederick the Great, Maupertuis moved to Prussia to preside over the Academy of Sciences there. Equally at home in salons, cafés, scientific academies, and royal courts, Maupertuis used his social connections and his printed works to enhance a carefully constructed reputation as both a man of letters and a man of science. His social and institutional affiliations, in turn, affected how Maupertuis formulated his ideas, how he presented them to his contemporaries, and the reactions they provoked.</br></br>Terrall not only illuminates the life and work of a colorful and important Enlightenment figure, but also uses his story to delve into many wider issues, including the development of scientific institutions, the impact of print culture on science, and the interactions of science and government. Smart and highly readable, Maupertuis will appeal to anyone interested in eighteenth-century science and culture.</br></br>“Terrall’s work is scholarship in the best sense. Her explanations of arcane 18th-century French physics, mathematics, astronomy, and biology are among the most lucid available in any language.” — ''Virginia Dawson, American Historical Review''</br></br>Winner of the 2003 Pfizer Award from the History of Science Society Award from the History of Science Society)
  • Mill (2003)  + (Since its first publication in 1859, few wSince its first publication in 1859, few works of political philosophy have provoked such continuous controversy as John Stuart Mill's "On Liberty", a passionate argument on behalf of freedom of self-expression. This classic work is now available in this volume which also includes essays by scholars in a range of fields. The text begins with a biographical essay by David Bromwich and an interpretative essay by George Kateb. Then Jean Bethke Elshtain, Owen Fiss, Judge Richard A. Posner and Jeremy Waldron present commentaries on the pertinence of Mill's thinking to early 21st century debates. They discuss, for example, the uses of authority and tradition, the shifting legal boundaries of free speech and free action, the relation of personal liberty to market individualism, and the tension between the right to live as one pleases and the right to criticize anyone's way of life.e right to criticize anyone's way of life.)
  • Cohen and Smith (Eds.) (2002)  + (Sir Isaac Newton (1642–1727) was one of thSir Isaac Newton (1642–1727) was one of the greatest scientists of all time, a thinker of extraordinary range and creativity who has left enduring legacies in mathematics and the natural sciences. In this volume a team of distinguished contributors examine all the main aspects of Newton's thought, including not only his approach to space, time, mechanics, and universal gravity in his Principia, his research in optics, and his contributions to mathematics, but also his more clandestine investigations into alchemy, theology, and prophecy, which have sometimes been overshadowed by his mathematical and scientific interests.his mathematical and scientific interests.)
  • Ariew (1986)  + (Some philosophers of science suggest that Some philosophers of science suggest that philosophical assumptions must</br>influence historical scholarship, because history (like science) has no neutral data and</br>because the treatment of any particular historical episode is going to be influenced to</br>some degree by one's prior philosophical conceptions of what is important in science.</br>However, if the history of science must be laden with philosophical assumptions, then how</br>can the history of science be evidence for the philosophy of science? Would not an</br>inductivist history of science confirm an inductivist philosophy of science and a</br>conventionalist history of science confirm a conventionalist philosophy of science? I</br>attempt to resolve this problem; essentially, I deny the claim that the history of science</br>must be influenced by one's conception of what is important in science - one's general</br>philosophy of science. To accomplish the task I look at a specific historical episode,</br>together with its history, and draw some metamethodological conclusions from it. The</br>specific historical episode I examine is Descartes' critique of Galileo's scientific methodology.tique of Galileo's scientific methodology.)
  • Longino (2016a)  + (Study of the social dimensions of scientifStudy of the social dimensions of scientific knowledge encompasses the</br>effects of scientific research on human life and social relations, the effects</br>of social relations and values on scientific research, and the social aspects</br>of inquiry itself. Several factors have combined to make these questions</br>salient to contemporary philosophy of science. These factors include the</br>emergence of social movements, like environmentalism and feminism,</br>critical of mainstream science; concerns about the social effects of</br>science-based technologies; epistemological questions made salient by big</br>science; new trends in the history of science, especially the move away</br>from internalist historiography; anti-normative approaches in the</br>sociology of science; turns in philosophy to naturalism and pragmatism.</br>This entry reviews the historical background to current research in this</br>area and features of contemporary science that invite philosophical</br>attention. The philosophical work can roughly be classified into two</br>camps. One acknowledges that scientific inquiry is in fact carried out in</br>social settings and asks whether and how standard epistemology must be</br>supplemented to address this feature. The other treats sociality as a</br>fundamental aspect of knowledge and asks how standard epistemology</br>must be modified from this broadly social perspective. Concerns in the</br>supplementing approach include such matters as trust and answerability</br>raised by multiple authorship, the division of cognitive labor, the</br>reliability of peer review, the challenges of privately funded science, as</br>well as concerns arising from the role of scientific research in society. The</br>reformist approach highlights the challenge to normative philosophy from</br>social, cultural, and feminist studies of science while seeking to develop</br>philosophical models of the social character of scientific knowledge, and</br>treats the questions of the division of cognitive labor, expertise and authority, the interactions of science and society, etc., from the perspective</br>of philosophical models of the irreducibly social character of scientific</br>knowledge. social character of scientific knowledge.)
  • Longino (2015)  + (Study of the social dimensions of scientifStudy of the social dimensions of scientific knowledge encompasses the</br>effects of scientific research on human life and social relations, the effects</br>of social relations and values on scientific research, and the social aspects</br>of inquiry itself. Several factors have combined to make these questions</br>salient to contemporary philosophy of science. These factors include the</br>emergence of social movements, like environmentalism and feminism,</br>critical of mainstream science; concerns about the social effects of</br>science-based technologies; epistemological questions made salient by big</br>science; new trends in the history of science, especially the move away</br>from internalist historiography; anti-normative approaches in the</br>sociology of science; turns in philosophy to naturalism and pragmatism.</br>This entry reviews the historical background to current research in this</br>area and features of contemporary science that invite philosophical</br>attention.ience that invite philosophical attention.)
  • Longino (2019)  + (Study of the social dimensions of scientifStudy of the social dimensions of scientific knowledge encompasses the</br>effects of scientific research on human life and social relations, the effects</br>of social relations and values on scientific research, and the social aspects</br>of inquiry itself. Several factors have combined to make these questions</br>salient to contemporary philosophy of science. These factors include the</br>emergence of social movements, like environmentalism and feminism,</br>critical of mainstream science; concerns about the social effects of</br>science-based technologies; epistemological questions made salient by big</br>science; new trends in the history of science, especially the move away</br>from internalist historiography; anti-normative approaches in the</br>sociology of science; turns in philosophy to naturalism and pragmatism.</br>This entry reviews the historical background to current research in this</br>area and features of contemporary science that invite philosophical</br>attention.ience that invite philosophical attention.)
  • Héder and Nádasi (Eds.) (2019)  + (Technology, in all its forms, has had and Technology, in all its forms, has had and continues to have an indisputable impact on society and culture. Philosophy of technology seeks to understand this impact and the meaning of technology for society and culture. Although its origins can be traced back to the Greeks, it wasn’t until the late 19th century to the beginning of the 20th century that it gained ground as a philosophical discipline. Now more than ever it is considered an essential philosophical enterprise. </br></br>‘The Budapest Workshop on Philosophy of Technology’ was a lively and successful event that sort to discuss, reflect on and apply this branch of philosophical inquiry to both historical and contemporary examples. Importantly, the contributors’ methodological approaches were influenced by, although not limited to, Michael Polanyi’s term ‘post-critical’. Moving beyond the rigidity of past approaches, the selected essays were driven by two lines of inquiry, what has been the historical role of technology in social and scientific change? And, how can a ‘post-critical’ approach enhance and extend our understanding of philosophy of technology?</br></br>This edited volume begins by exploring the role of technology in social and scientific developments from a historical perspective, before moving towards a discussion of philosophy of technology from a ‘Post-Critical’ epistemic stance. Free from the constraints of previous methodologies, the third part of this work engages with the term ‘Post-Critical’ in its broadest sense. The contributors to this section consider the phenomenology of the body and the influence of technology on our lives. Finally, the four concluding chapters of this book apply this philosophical approach to a wide range of contemporary problems from Decision Support Systems to Crisis Communication.n Support Systems to Crisis Communication.)
  • Theiner (2015)  + (Th e concept of distributed cognition (DC)Th e concept of distributed cognition (DC) fi gures prominently in contemporary discussions</br>of the idea that the social, cultural, and technological distribution of cognitive labor</br>in groups can give rise to “group cognition” or “collective intelligence.” Since there are</br>diff erent ways of understanding the notion of DC, there is much debate about what</br>“ontological heft ” we should attach to the thesis that groups are distributed cognitive</br>systems. Th e goal of this chapter is to map out the conceptual terrain on which this debate</br>is taking place. My approach is grounded in the framework of DC which has been developed,</br>since the mid-1980s, notably by Edwin Hutchins, Donald Norman, and David</br>Kirsh. In particular, I borrow here as my starting point their suggestion that taking up the</br>DC perspective is not itself an empirical thesis about a certain kind of cognition; rather,</br>it is a methodological decision to select scales of investigation from which all of cognition</br>can be analyzed as distributed. cognition can be analyzed as distributed.)
  • Carruthers, Stitch, and Siegal (Eds.) (2002)  + (The Cognitive Basis of Science concerns thThe Cognitive Basis of Science concerns the question ''What makes science possible?'' Specifically, what features of the human mind and of human culture and cognitive development permit and facilitate the conduct of science? The essays in this volume address these questions, which are inherently interdisciplinary, requiring co-operation between philosophers, psychologists, and others in the social and cognitive sciences. They concern the cognitive, social, and motivational underpinnings of scientific reasoning in children and lay persons as well as in professional scientists. The editors’ introduction lays out the background to the debates, and the volume includes a consolidated bibliography that will be a valuable reference resource for all those interested in this area. The volume will be of great importance to all researchers and students interested in the philosophy or psychology of scientific reasoning, as well as those, more generally, who are interested in the nature of the human mind.nterested in the nature of the human mind.)
  • Butts and Hintikka (Eds.) (1977)  + (The Fifth International Congress of Logic,The Fifth International Congress of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science was held at the University of Western Ontario, London, Canada, 27 August to 2 September 1975. The Congress was held under the auspices of the International Union of History and Philosophy of Science, Division of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science, and was sponsored by the National Research Council of Canada and the University of Western Ontario. As those associated closely with the work of the Division over the years know well, the work undertaken by its members varies greatly and spans a number of fields not always obviously related. In addition, the volume of work done by first rate scholars and scientists in the various fields of the Division has risen enormously. For these and related reasons it seemed to the editors chosen by the Divisional officers that the usual format of publishing the proceedings of the Congress be abandoned in favour of a somewhat more flexible, and hopefully acceptable, method of presentation. Accordingly, the work of the invited participants to the Congress has been divided into four volumes appearing in the University of Western Ontario Series in Philosophy of Science. The volumes are entitled, Logic, Foundations of Mathematics and Computability Theory, Foundational Problems in the Special Sciences, Basic Problems in Methodology and Linguistics, and Historical and Philosophical Dimensions of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science.ic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science.)
  • Berryman (2016b)  + (The Greek tradition regarded Leucippus as The Greek tradition regarded Leucippus as the founder of atomism in</br>ancient Greek philosophy. Little is known about him, and his views are</br>hard to distinguish from those of his associate Democritus. He is</br>sometimes said to have been a student of Zeno of Elea, and to have</br>devised the atomist philosophy in order to escape from the problems</br>raised by Parmenides and his followers.ms raised by Parmenides and his followers.)
  • Theiner and O'Connor (2010)  + (The Group Mind Thesis—understood as the clThe Group Mind Thesis—understood as the claim that groups as a whole</br>can be the subjects of mental states—was a popular idea in the intellectual</br>landscape of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.2 For many</br>scientists and philosophers of that period, it provided a succinct expression</br>of what they perceived to be two characteristic features of groups: on the</br>one hand, their ability to function as collective agents who can have intentions,</br>make decisions, and pursue their own goals; on the other hand, the</br>idea that groups are emergent wholes which are more than the sum of its</br>members. Combine the two features, and the functional analogies between</br>individual and group behavior strongly suggest adopting an intentional</br>stance towards both.opting an intentional stance towards both.)
  • Fieser and Dowden (Ed.) (2017)  + (The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (IThe Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (IEP) (ISSN 2161-0002) was founded in 1995 to provide open access to detailed, scholarly information on key topics and philosophers in all areas of philosophy. The Encyclopedia receives no funding, and operates through the volunteer work of the editors, authors, volunteers, and technical advisers. At present, the IEP has over a million visitors per month, and about 20 million page views per year. The Encyclopedia is free of charge and available to all users of the Internet world-wide. The staff of 30 editors and approximately 300 authors hold doctorate degrees and are professors at universities around the world, most notably from English-speaking countries.</br></br>The purpose of the IEP is to provide detailed, scholarly information on key topics and philosophers in all areas of philosophy. The Encyclopedia's articles are written with the intention that most of the article can be understood by advanced undergraduates majoring in philosophy and by other scholars who are not working in the field covered by that article. The IEP articles are written by experts but not for experts in analogy to the way the Scientific American magazine is written by scientific experts but not primarily for scientific experts. A critical feature of the IEP is its status as a freely accessible and not-for-profit resource, which the General Editors, present and future, will seek to perpetuate. As such, the IEP will not be used to make a profit in any manner, such as by re-publishing articles or by charging for access to its articles or by posting advertising. No person at the IEP will receive any financial compensation for any IEP work. No for-profit organization will have any financial stake in the IEP, nor can a for-profit organization advertise within the IEP.fit organization advertise within the IEP.)
  • Annas and Barnes (Eds.) (1985)  + (The Modes of Scepticism is one of the mostThe Modes of Scepticism is one of the most important and influential of all ancient philosophical texts. The texts made an enormous impact on Western thought when they were rediscovered in the 16th century and they have shaped the whole future course of Western philosophy. Despite their importance, the Modes have been little discussed in recent times. This book translates the texts and supplies them with a discursive commentary, concentrating on philosophical issues but also including historical material. The book will be of interest to professional scholars and philosophers but its clear and non-technical style makes it intelligible to beginners and the interested layman.le to beginners and the interested layman.)
  • Aristotle (1984)  + (The Oxford Translation of Aristotle was orThe Oxford Translation of Aristotle was originally published in 12 volumes between 1912 and 1954. It is universally recognized as the standard English version of Aristotle. This revised edition contains the substance of the original Translation, slightly emended in light of recent scholarship; three of the original versions have been replaced by new translations; and a new and enlarged selection of Fragments has been added. The aim of the translation remains the same: to make the surviving works of Aristotle readily accessible to English speaking readers.ly accessible to English speaking readers.)
  • Curd (2016)  + (The Presocratics were 6th and 5th century The Presocratics were 6th and 5th century BCE Greek thinkers who</br>introduced a new way of inquiring into the world and the place of human</br>beings in it. They were recognized in antiquity as the first philosophers</br>and scientists of the Western tradition. This article is a general</br>introduction to the most important Presocratic philosophers and the main</br>themes of Presocratic thought. More detailed discussions can be found by</br>consulting the articles on these philosophers (and related topics) in the</br>SEP (listed below). The standard collection of texts for the Presocratics is</br>that by H. Diels revised by W. Kranz (abbreviated as DK). In it, each</br>thinker is assigned an identifying chapter number (e.g., Heraclitus is 22,</br>Anaxagoras 59); then the reports from ancient authors about that thinker's</br>life and thought are collected in a section of “testimonies” (A) and</br>numbered in order, while the passages the editors take to be direct</br>quotations are collected and numbered in a section of “fragments” (B).</br>Alleged imitations in later authors are sometimes added in a section</br>labeled C. Thus, each piece of text can be uniquely identified: DK</br>59B12.3 identifies line 3 of Anaxagoras fragment 12; DK 22A1 identifies</br>testimonium 1 on Heraclitus.A1 identifies testimonium 1 on Heraclitus.)
  • Ludwig and Jankovic (2015)  + (The Routledge Handbook of Collective IntenThe Routledge Handbook of Collective Intentionality provides a wide-ranging survey of topics in a rapidly expanding area of interdisciplinary research. It consists of 36 chapters, written exclusively for this volume, by an international team of experts. What is distinctive about the study of collective intentionality within the broader study of social interactions and structures is its focus on the conceptual and psychological features of joint or shared actions and attitudes, and their implications for the nature of social groups and their functioning. This Handbook fully captures this distinctive nature of the field and how it subsumes the study of collective action, responsibility, reasoning, thought, intention, emotion, phenomenology, decision-making, knowledge, trust, rationality, cooperation, competition, and related issues, as well as how these underpin social practices, organizations, conventions, institutions and social ontology. Like the field, the Handbook is interdisciplinary, drawing on research in philosophy, cognitive science, linguistics, legal theory, anthropology,</br>sociology, computer science, psychology, economics, and political science. Finally, the Handbook promotes several specific goals: (1) it provides an important resource for students and researchers interested in collective intentionality; (2) it integrates work across disciplines and areas of research as it helps to define the shape and scope of an emerging area of research;(3) it advances the study of collective intentionality.es the study of collective intentionality.)
  • Kuhn (1962a)  + (The Structure of Scientific Revolutions poThe Structure of Scientific Revolutions posited a new, historically grounded way of understanding scientific knowledge. Kuhn spoke of ''scientific paradigms'', which are shared constellations of theoretical and metaphysical beliefs, values, methods, and instrumental techniques shared by a scientific discipline. A ''scientific revolution'' occurs when one paradigm is replaced with another. Because paradigms are holistic networks of theories, methods, and values, they are ''incommensurable'' meaning that the terms and categories of the old paradigm cannot be translated into those of the new. Adoption of a new paradigm thus appears to involve something akin to a gestalt shift.involve something akin to a gestalt shift.)
  • Uebel (2016)  + (The Vienna Circle was a group of early tweThe Vienna Circle was a group of early twentieth-century philosophers</br>who sought to reconceptualize empiricism by means of their interpretation</br>of then recent advances in the physical and formal sciences. Their</br>radically anti-metaphysical stance was supported by an empiricist criterion</br>of meaning and a broadly logicist conception of mathematics. They denied</br>that any principle or claim was synthetic a priori. Moreover, they sought</br>to account for the presuppositions of scientific theories by regimenting</br>such theories within a logical framework so that the important role played</br>by conventions, either in the form of definitions or of other analytical</br>framework principles, became evident. The Vienna Circle’s theories were</br>constantly changing. In spite (or perhaps because) of this, they helped to</br>provide the blueprint for analytical philosophy of science as meta-theory</br>—a “second-order” reflection of “first-order” sciences. While the Vienna</br>Circle’s early form of logical empiricism (or logical positivism or</br>neopositivism: these labels will be used interchangeably here) no longer</br>represents an active research program, recent history of philosophy of</br>science has unearthed much previously neglected variety and depth in the</br>doctrines of the Circle’s protagonists, some of whose positions retain</br>relevance for contemporary analytical philosophy.ce for contemporary analytical philosophy.)
  • Palermos (2016)  + (The aim of this paper is to demonstrate thThe aim of this paper is to demonstrate that the postulation of irreducible,</br>distributed cognitive systems (or group minds as they are also known in the literature)</br>is necessary for the successful explanatory practice of cognitive science and</br>sociology. Towards this end, and with an eye specifically on the phenomenon of</br>distributed cognition, the debate over reductionism versus emergence is examined</br>from the perspective of Dynamical Systems Theory (DST). The motivation for this</br>novel approach is threefold. Firstly, DST is particularly popular amongst cognitive</br>scientists who work on modelling collective behaviors. Secondly, DST can deliver</br>two distinct arguments in support of the claim that the presence of mutual interactions</br>between group members necessitates the postulation of the corresponding</br>group entity. Thirdly, DST can also provide a succinct understanding of the way</br>group entities exert downward causation on their individual members. The outcome</br>is a naturalist account of the emergent, and thereby irreducible, nature of distributed</br>cognitive systems that avoids the reductionists’ threat of epiphenomenalism, while</br>being well in line with materialism while being well in line with materialism)
  • Bird (2011)  + (The article gives an overview of Thomas KuThe article gives an overview of Thomas Kuhn's work, life, and intellectual influence on multiple fields. Kuhn began his career in physics, and acquired an interest in the history and philosophy of science through his undergraduate teaching in the history of science at Harvard. His work on a book about the Copernican revolution led him to develop a new view of science, which he published in his ''Structure of Scientific Revolutions''. The initial reception of Kuhn's work by philosophers, was hostile, although they recognized its importance. His use of historical and psychological ideas was unfamiliar to them. This hostility moderated once they gained a better understanding of them, and once he clarified some of his ideas in subsequent work. The book met a more friendly initial reception among sociologists, who saw in it a way to understand science in terms familiar to their discipline.nce in terms familiar to their discipline.)
  • Gooding (1985)  + (The article is a collection of six essays The article is a collection of six essays by historians of science explaining their discipline. Gooding's contribution explains that historians of science are interested in the activities of scientific practitioners, the instruments and techniques they used to investigate nature, the ways they represented their findings and communicated them to others, the institutional arrangements they made to promote and finance science, and the development of their ideas and arguments as evidenced by their published works, manuscripts, and papers. published works, manuscripts, and papers.)
  • Finkenstaedt (1990)  + (The article starts from the specific diffiThe article starts from the specific difficulties of applying quantitative analysis to the humanities and the general resistance to such analysis in the Federal Republic of Germany. It gives a survey of the attempts to apply bibliometric methods in English Studies, the only subject investigated so far. The highly individual nature of research in the humanities is stressed and differences in subfields are illustrated. There is little influence of departmental size or age on the publication behaviour of individuals. More studies of citation behaviour are needed for a reliable evaluation of the impact of research in the humanities. the impact of research in the humanities.)
  • Latour (1988a)  + (The book is made of two parts: the first oThe book is made of two parts: the first one is a detailed exploration of the litterature around Pasteur’s rise from obscurity to fame and of the corresponding transformations of microbes from invisibility to prominence; the impossibility of a social explanation of science is then explored in a second part which provides the ontological basis for what has become known as "actor-network theory."as become known as "actor-network theory.")
  • Barnes, Bloor, and Henry (1996)  + (The central thesis of this book is that soThe central thesis of this book is that sociological analysis is necessary for understanding scientific knowledge, though other fields, such as psychology and philosophy are also needed. Such knowledge is attained through historical case studies. The sociology of scientific knowledge is one part of a larger project to understand science itself in scientific terms.rstand science itself in scientific terms.)
  • Corradini and O'Connor (2010)  + (The concept of emergence has seen a signifThe concept of emergence has seen a significant resurgence in philosophy and the sciences, yet debates regarding emergentist and reductionist visions of the natural world continue to be hampered by imprecision or ambiguity. Emergent phenomena are said to arise out of and be sustained by more basic phenomena, while at the same time exerting a "top-down" control upon those very sustaining processes. To some critics, this has the air of magic, as it seems to suggest a kind of circular causality. Other critics deem the concept of emergence to be objectionably anti-naturalistic. Objections such as these have led many thinkers to construe emergent phenomena instead as coarse-grained patterns in the world that, while calling for distinctive concepts, do not "disrupt" the ordinary dynamics of the finer-grained (more fundamental) levels. Yet, reconciling emergence with a (presumed) pervasive causal continuity at the fundamental level can seem to deflate emergence of its initially profound significance. This basic problematic is mirrored by similar controversy over how best to characterize the opposite systematizing impulse, most commonly given an equally evocative but vague term, "reductionism." The original essays in this volume help to clarify the alternatives: inadequacies in some older formulations and arguments are exposed and new lines of argument on behalf the two visions are advanced.nt on behalf the two visions are advanced.)
  • Priest, Tanaka, and Weber (2015)  + (The contemporary logical orthodoxy has it The contemporary logical orthodoxy has it that, from contradictory premises, anything can be inferred. Let ⊨ be a relation of logical consequence, defined either semantically or proof-theoretically. Call ⊨ explosive if it validates {A , ¬A} ⊨ B for every A and B (ex contradictionequodlibet (ECQ)). Classical logic, and most standard ‘non-classical’ logics too such as intuitionist logic, are explosive. Inconsistency, according to received wisdom, cannot be coherently reasoned about. Paraconsistent logic challenges this orthodoxy. A logical consequence relation, ⊨, is said to be paraconsistent if it is not explosive. Thus, if ⊨ is paraconsistent, then even if we are in certain circumstances where the available information is inconsistent, the inference relation does not explode into triviality. Thus, paraconsistent logic accommodates inconsistency in a sensible manner that treats inconsistent information as informative. The prefix ‘para’ in English has two meanings:‘quasi’ (or ‘similar to, modelled on’) or ‘beyond’. When the term ‘paraconsistent’ was coined by Miró Quesada at the Third Latin America Conference on Mathematical Logic in 1976, he seems to have had the first meaning in mind. Many paraconsistent logicians, however, have taken it to mean the second, which provided different reasons for the development of paraconsistent logic as we will see below. This article is not meant to be a complete survey of paraconsistent logic. The aim is to provide some aspects and features of the field that are philosophically salient.he field that are philosophically salient.)
  • Patton, Overgaard, and Barseghyan (2017)  + (The current formulation of ''the second laThe current formulation of ''the second law'' is flawed since it does not specify the causal relations between the outcomes of theory assessment and the actual acceptance/unacceptance of a theory; it merely tells us that a theory was assessed by the method employed at the time. We propose a new formulation of the second law: “If a theory satisfies the acceptance criteria of the method actually employed at the time, then it becomes accepted into the mosaic; if it does not, it remains unaccepted; if it is inconclusive whether the theory satisfies the method, the theory can be accepted or not accepted.” This new formulation makes the causal connection between theory assessment outcomes and cases of theory acceptance/unacceptance explicit. Also, this new formulation is not a tautology because it forbids certain logically possible scenarios, such as a theory satisfying the method of the time yet remaining unaccepted. Finally, we outline what inferences an observational scientonomist can make regarding theory assessment outcomes from the record of accepted theories.omes from the record of accepted theories.)
  • Fraser and Sarwar (2018)  + (The current formulation of ''the zeroth laThe current formulation of ''the zeroth law'' (the law of compatibility) is marred with a number of theoretical problems, which necessitate its reformulation. In this paper, we propose that ''compatibility'' is an independent stance that can be taken towards epistemic elements of all types. We then provide a new definition of ''compatibility criteria'' to reflect this change. We show that the content of the zeroth law is deducible from our definition of ''compatibility''. Instead of a static law of compatibility, we propose a new dynamic ''law of compatibility'' that explains how the stance of compatibility obtains. Unlike the zeroth law, this new law has empirical content, as it forbids certain conceivable scenarios. Having established these notions, we propose a classification space that exhaustively covers all the possible states a theory may occupy and all the transitions it may undergo during its lifecycle.tions it may undergo during its lifecycle.)
  • Barseghyan and Mirkin (2019)  + (The current scientonomic discourse focusesThe current scientonomic discourse focuses largely on theories and methods of natural, social, and formal ''sciences'', while the role of ''technological'' knowledge in the process of scientific change is virtually neglected. This neglect, we argue, has to do with the scientonomic distinction between two epistemic stances – ''acceptance'' of a theory as the best available description of its domain and its ''use'' in practical applications. The view that is implicit in contemporary ''scientonomy'' is that sciences alone can produce ''accepted'' knowledge, while technologies are all about knowledge ''use''. In contrast, we argue that there is ''accepted'' propositional technological knowledge which plays an indispensable role in the process of scientific change. We demonstrate that technological disciplines do not merely ''use'' theories but also produce ''accepted'' theories, such as “''x'' is an effective treatment for medical condition ''y''”, “''z'' is a viable technology for bridge-building”, and “''p'' is a statistically valid technique for assessing public opinion about ''q''”. There are both theoretical and historical reasons to believe that changes in technological knowledge exhibit the same patterns as changes in natural, social, and formal sciences. In addition, technological knowledge is intrinsically intertwined with scientific knowledge as accepted scientific and technological theories often jointly shape employed methods.ries often jointly shape employed methods.)
  • Rawleigh (2018)  + (The currently accepted scientonomic ontoloThe currently accepted scientonomic ontology includes two classes of epistemic elements – ''theories'' and ''methods''. However, the ontology underlying ''the Encyclopedia of Scientonomy'' includes ''questions''/''topics'' as a basic element of its semantic structure. Ideally there should be no discrepancy between the accepted ontology of theoretical scientonomy and that of the Encyclopedia. I argue that questions constitute a distinct class of epistemic elements as they are not reducible to other elements that undergo scientific change – theories or methods. I discuss and reject two attempts at reducing questions to either descriptive or normative theories. According to the descriptive-epistemic account, scientific questions can be logically reduced to descriptive propositions, while according to the normative-epistemic account, they can be reduced to normative propositions. I show that these interpretations are incapable of capturing the propositional content expressed by questions; any possible reduction is carried at the expense of losing the essential characteristic of questions. Further, I find that the attempts to reduce questions to theories introduce an infinite regress, where a theory is an attempt to answer a question, which is itself a theory which answers another question, ''ad infintum''. Instead, I propose to incorporate the question-answer semantic structure from erotetic logic in which questions constitute a distinct class of elements irreducible to propositions. An acceptance of questions into scientonomic ontology as a separate class of epistemic elements suggests a new avenue of research into the mechanism of question acceptance and rejection, i.e. how epistemic communities come to accept certain questions as legitimate and others as illegitimate. as legitimate and others as illegitimate.)
  • Cohen et al. (Eds.) (1976)  + (The death of Imre Lakatos on February 2, 1The death of Imre Lakatos on February 2, 1974 was a personal and philosophical loss to the worldwide circle of his friends, colleagues and students. This volume reflects the range of his interests in mathematics, logic, politics and especially in the history and methodology of the sciences. Indeed, Lakatos was a man in search of rationality in all of its forms. He thought he had found it in the historical development of scientific knowledge, yet he also saw rationality endangered everywhere. To honor Lakatos is to honor his sharp and aggressive criticism as well as his humane warmth and his quick wit. He was a person to love and to struggle with.was a person to love and to struggle with.)
  • Hempel (1945)  + (The defining characteristic of an empiricaThe defining characteristic of an empirical statement is its capability of being tested by a confrontation with experimental findings, i.e. with the results of suitable experiments or 'focused' observations. This feature distinguishes statements which have empirical content both from the statements of the formal sciences, logic and mathematics which require no experimental tests for their validation, and from the formulations of transempirical metaphysics, which do not</br>admit of any.al metaphysics, which do not admit of any.)
  • Sarwar and Fraser (2018)  + (The demarcation between science and non-scThe demarcation between science and non-science seems to play an important role in the process of scientific change, as theories regularly transition from being considered scientific to being considered unscientific and ''vice versa''. However, theoretical scientonomy is yet to shed light on this process. The goal of this paper is to tackle the problem of demarcation from the scientonomic perspective. Specifically, we introduce ''scientificity'' as a distinct epistemic stance that an agent can take towards a theory. We contend that changes in this stance are to be traced and explained by scientonomy. Thus, we formulate a new ''law of theory demarcation'' to account for changes in scientificity within the scientonomic framework.ificity within the scientonomic framework.)
  • Schickore and Steinle (Eds.) (2006)  + (The distinction between the contexts of diThe distinction between the contexts of discovery and justification has had a turbulent career in philosophy of science. At times celebrated as the hallmark of philosophical approaches to science, at times condemned as ambiguous, distorting, and misleading, the distinction dominated philosophical debates from the early decades of the twentieth century to the 1980s. In recent years, the distinction has vanished from philosophers’ official agenda. However, even though it is rarely explicitly addressed, it still informs our conception of the content, domain, and goals of philosophy of science. The fact that new developments in philosophy of experimentation and history and sociology of science have been marginalized by traditional scholarship in philosophy indicates that the context distinction still pervades philosophical thinking about science. This volume helps clear the grounds for the productive and fruitful integration of these new developments into philosophy of science.We identify several focal points for the re-assessment of the distinction: the original contexts, especially the work of the Logical Empiricists, its alleged forerunners in the nineteenth century, and its evolution and dissemination throughout the twentieth centuryemination throughout the twentieth century)
  • Popper (1972)  + (The essays in this volume represent an appThe essays in this volume represent an approach to human knowledge that has had a profound influence on many recent thinkers. Popper breaks with a traditional commonsense theory of knowledge that can be traced back to Aristotle. A realist and fallibilist, he argues closely and in simple language that scientific knowledge, once stated in human language, is no longer part of ourselves but a separate entity that grows through critical selection.ity that grows through critical selection.)
  • Lennon and Dea (2014)  + (The expression “continental rationalism” rThe expression “continental rationalism” refers to a set of views more or</br>less shared by a number of philosophers active on the European continent</br>during the latter two thirds of the seventeenth century and the beginning of</br>the eighteenth. Rationalism is most often characterized as an</br>epistemological position. On this view, to be a rationalist requires at least</br>one of the following: (1) a privileging of reason and intuition over</br>sensation and experience, (2) regarding all or most ideas as innate rather</br>than adventitious, (3) an emphasis on certain rather than merely probable</br>knowledge as the goal of enquiry. While all of the continental rationalists</br>meet one or more of these criteria, this is arguably the consequence of a</br>deeper tie that binds them together—that is, a metaphysical commitment</br>to the reality of substance, and, in particular, to substance as an underlying</br>principle of unity.tance as an underlying principle of unity.)
  • McIntyre (1996)  + (The first full-length defense of social scThe first full-length defense of social scientific laws to appear in the last twenty years, this book upholds the prospect of the nomological explanation of human behavior against those who maintain that this approach is impossible, impractical, or irrelevant. By pursuing an analogy with the natural sciences, McIntyre shows that the barriers to nomological inquiry within the social sciences are not generated by factors unique to social inquiry, but arise from a largely common set of problems that face any scientific endeavor.All of the most widely supported arguments against social scientific laws have failed largely due to adherence to a highly idealized conception of nomologicality (allegedly drawn from the natural sciences themselves) and the limited doctrine of “descriptivism.” Basing his arguments upon a more realistic view of scientific theorizing that emphasizes the pivotal role of “redescription” in aiding the search for scientific laws, McIntyre is optimistic about attaining useful law-like explanations of human behavior.l law-like explanations of human behavior.)
  • Locke (2015d)  + (The fourth book of John Locke's An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, originally published in 1689 as edited by Jonathan Bennett in 2015.)
  • Fleck (1936)  + (The fundamental error in many discussions The fundamental error in many discussions from the field of epistemology is the (more or less open) manipulation of the symbolic epistemological subject, known as ‘human spirit’, ‘human mind’, ‘research worker’ or simply ‘man’ (‘John’, ’Socrates’), which has no concrete living position, which does not basically undergo changes even in the course of centuries and which represents every ‘normal’ man regardless of the surroundings and the epoch. Thus it is to be absolute, unchanging and general.is to be absolute, unchanging and general.)
  • Bristow (2017)  + (The heart of the eighteenth century EnlighThe heart of the eighteenth century Enlightenment is the loosely organized activity of prominent French thinkers of the mid-decades of the eighteenth century, the so-called “philosophes” (e.g., Voltaire, D’Alembert, Diderot, Montesquieu). The philosophes constituted an informal society of men of letters who collaborated on a loosely defined project of Enlightenment exemplified by the project of the Encyclopedia. However, there are noteworthy centers of Enlightenment outside of France as well. There is a renowned Scottish Enlightenment (key figures are Frances Hutcheson, Adam Smith, [[David Hume]], Thomas Reid), a German Enlightenment (die Aufklärung, key figures of which include Christian Wolff, Moses Mendelssohn, G.E. Lessing and [[Immanuel Kant]]), and there are also other hubs of Enlightenment and Enlightenment thinkers scattered throughout Europe and America in the eighteenth century.ope and America in the eighteenth century.)
  • Ruse (2003)  + (The intricate forms of living things bespeThe intricate forms of living things bespeak design, and thus a creator: nearly 150 years after Darwin's theory of natural selection called this argument into question, we still speak of life in terms of design--the function of the eye, the purpose of the webbed foot, the design of the fins. Why is the "argument from design" so tenacious, and does Darwinism--itself still evolving after all these years--necessarily undo it?</br></br>The definitive work on these contentious questions, Darwin and Design surveys the argument from design from its introduction by the Greeks, through the coming of Darwinism, down to the present day. In clear, non-technical language Michael Ruse, a well-known authority on the history and philosophy of Darwinism, offers a full and fair assessment of the status of the argument from design in light of both the advances of modern evolutionary biology and the thinking of today's philosophers--with special attention given to the supporters and critics of "intelligent design."</br></br>The first comprehensive history and exposition of Western thought about design in the natural world, this important work suggests directions for our thinking as we move into the twenty-first century. A thoroughgoing guide to a perennially controversial issue, the book makes its own substantial contribution to the ongoing debate about the relationship between science and religion, and between evolution and its religious critics.tween evolution and its religious critics.)
  • Ereshefsky (2017)  + (The nature of species is controversial in The nature of species is controversial in biology and philosophy. Biologists disagree on the definition of the term ‘species,’ and philosophers disagree over the ontological status of species. Yet a proper understanding of species is important for a number of reasons. Species are the fundamental taxonomic units of biological classification. Environmental laws are framed in terms of species. Even our conception of human nature is affected by our understanding of species. In this entry, three issues concerning species are discussed. The first is the ontological status of species. The second is whether biologists should be species pluralists or species monists. The third is whether the theoretical term ‘species’ refers to a real category in nature.cies’ refers to a real category in nature.)
  • Mormann (2008)  + (The notion of idealization has received coThe notion of idealization has received considerable attention in contemporary philosophy of science but less in philosophy of mathematics. An exception was the ‘critical idealism’ of the neo-Kantian philosopher Ernst Cassirer. According to Cassirer the methodology of idealization plays a central role for mathematics and empirical science. In this paper it is argued that Cassirer's contributions in this area still deserve to be taken into account in the current debates in philosophy of mathematics.rent debates in philosophy of mathematics.)
  • Patton (2019)  + (The only subtype of ''epistemic agent'' cuThe only subtype of ''epistemic agent'' currently recognized within scientonomy is ''community''. The place of both ''individuals'' and ''epistemic tools'' in the scientonomic ontology is yet to be clarified. This paper extends the scientonomic ontology to include ''epistemic agents'' and ''epistemic tools'' as well as their relationship to one another. Epistemic agent is defined as an agent capable of taking epistemic stances towards epistemic elements. These stances must be taken intentionally, that is, based on a semantic understanding of the epistemic element in question and its available alternatives, with reason, and for the purpose of acquiring knowledge. I argue that there can be both ''communal'' and ''individual'' epistemic agents. Epistemic agents are linked by relationships of ''authority delegation'' based on their differing areas of expertise. Having established the role of epistemic agents in the process of scientific change, I then turn to the role of ''epistemic tools'', such as a thermometer, a text, or a particle accelerator in epistemic activities. I argue that epistemic tools play a different role in scientific change than do epistemic agents. This role is specified by an agent’s employed method. A physical object or system is an ''epistemic tool'' for some epistemic agent if there is a procedure by which the tool can provide an acceptable source of knowledge for answering some question under the employed method of the agent. An agent is said to ''rely'' on such a tool. agent is said to ''rely'' on such a tool.)
  • Aiton (1958)  + (The paper discusses Descartes vortex theory of planetary motion, and how it fared among subsequent thinkers.)
  • Shan (2023)  + (The paper investigates the applicability oThe paper investigates the applicability of corpus linguistics to the construction of a database of intellectual history. Working with the Royal Society Corpus (RSC), it presents a series of corpus queries that can aid with computationally identifying potential instances of communal theory acceptance in England during the period of 1665-1800. These queries allowed to identify a set of noun-adjective pairs potentially synonymous with “accepted theory” and retrieve around 1,400 excerpts potentially indicative of instances of communal theory acceptance. The paper also discusses some strategies for identifying the epistemic agent, as well as the RSC’s place within the broader historical context. Finally, I argue that, in addition to exploring corpus linguistics strategies, methodologies for interpreting computationally retrieved data should also be developed.y retrieved data should also be developed.)