Search by property

This page provides a simple browsing interface for finding entities described by a property and a named value. Other available search interfaces include the page property search, and the ask query builder.

List of results

Inferring Theory Assessment Outcomes from Acceptance or Unacceptance of Two Contenders (Patton-Overgaard-Barseghyan-2017) + (The following inferences can be drawn rega … The following inferences can be drawn regarding theory assessment outcomes from the acceptance or unacceptance of two contender theories:[[File:Inferring Theory Assessment Outcomes from Acceptance Unacceptance of Two Contenders (Patton-Overgaard-Barseghyan-2017).png|790px|center||]][[File:Inferring Theory Assessment Outcomes from Acceptance Unacceptance of Two Contenders (Patton-Overgaard-Barseghyan-2017).png|790px|center||]])
Inferring Theory Assessment Outcomes from Acceptance or Unacceptance of a Single Contender (Patton-Overgaard-Barseghyan-2017) + (The following inferences can be drawn regarding theory assessment outcomes from the acceptance or unacceptance of a single contender theory:)
The First Law (Barseghyan-2015) + (The following passage from [[Barseghyan (2015)|''The Laws of Scientific Change'']] … The following passage from [[Barseghyan (2015)|''The Laws of Scientific Change'']] summarizes the gist of the law:<blockquote>According to ''the first law'', any element of the mosaic of accepted theories and employed methods remains in the mosaic except insofar as it is overthrown by another element or elements. Basically, the law assumes that there is certain inertia in the scientific mosaic: once in the mosaic, elements remain in the mosaic until they get replaced by other elements. It is reasonable therefore to call it ''the law of scientific inertia''.[[CITE_Barseghyan (2015)|p. 123]]</blockquote>[[CITE_Barseghyan (2015)|p. 123]]</blockquote>)
Scope of Scientonomy - Appraisal (Barseghyan-2015) + (The goal of [[scientonomy]] … The goal of [[scientonomy]] is to give a descriptive account of the process of [[Scientific Change|scientific change]]. Given this goal, it is obvious that it must describe and explain how changes in the [[Scientific Mosaic|mosaic]] of accepted scientific [[Theory|theories]] and employed [[Method|methods]] take place. Any actual instance of scientific change is the result of an appraisal. Therefore, a theory of scientific change ''must'' provide an account of how theories are actually appraised and thereby explain how changes in the mosaic occur. On the other hand, it ''can'' but is ''not required'' to account for the process of theory construction.[[CITE_Barseghyan (2015)|p. 29]][[CITE_Barseghyan (2015)|p. 29]])
The Third Law (Sebastien-2016) + (The initial third law explained by Hakob Barseghyan)
Scientonomic Workflow (Barseghyan et al.-2016) + (The key stages of the workflow are: * ''' … The key stages of the workflow are:* '''Pose Questions:''' The goal of this stage is to scrutinize the current state of the scientonomic theory and our knowledge of scientific change and identify as many open questions as possible. The annual [[Scientonomy Seminar|seminar on scientonomy]] hosted by the University of Toronto's [http://hps.utoronto.ca/ Institute for the History and Philosophy of Science and Technology] is currently the main venue facilitating this stage of the workflow. * '''Suggest Modifications:''' The goal of this stage is to advance our knowledge of scientific change by proposing modifications to our current body of knowledge. These suggested modifications are published and properly documented. These modifications are currently published in the [[Journal of Scientonomy]] but, in principle, they can be published in any journal which makes use of the scientonomic mechanism of modifications. Once a modification is published, this encyclopedia documents that [[:Category:Modification|suggestions]] and invites experts to review it.* '''Evaluate Modifications:''' The goal of this stage is to assess the suggested modifications and decide which of them are acceptable and which are not. This is done by [[Community:Scientonomy|the community of scientonomists]] on the respective discussion pages of this encyclopedia. If a consensus emerges, the fate of the modification is documented. If a modification causes disagreement among scientonomists, it becomes a topic of discussion during [[Scientonomy Workshop|scientonomic workshops]], which aim at bridging the gaps between opposing parties and arriving at consensus. * '''Document Changes:''' The goal of this stage is to document all the changes in our communal body of knowledge. If a modification is considered acceptable by the community, then the respective articles of this encyclopedia are modified to reflect that change. If a modification is considered unacceptable, then the respective verdict is documented for that modification.The primary role of this encyclopedia in the scientonomic workflow is to document the current state of scientonomic knowledge, trace all suggested modifications, and list open questions. Here is an outline of the main stages of the scientonomic workflow:This workflow gives researchers a simple way of knowing where the community stands on different topics, i.e. what theories it currently accepts, what open questions it tries to answer, what modifications have been proposed and how they have been assessed. It ensures that our communal knowledge is advanced in a ''piecemeal'' and ''transparent'' fashion:* '''Piecemeal''': modifications to the communal mosaic are suggested one by one, which allows for a sober critical evaluation of these suggestions by the community.* '''Transparent ''': suggested modifications and their evaluations are properly documented, so that there is no mystery as to whether, when, or why a certain modification was or wasn't accepted.The workflow is ''scalable'', as it can - in principle - be implemented in other fields of digital humanities and beyond.r fields of digital humanities and beyond.)
The Law of Compatibility (Fraser-Sarwar-2018) + (The law of compatibility links the compati … The law of compatibility links the compatibility criteria with various assessment outcomes. If [[Compatibility|compatibility]] is defined as the ability of a pair of elements to co-exist in the same mosaic, then the assessment for compatibility is essentially the process by which the epistemic agent decides whether any given pair of elements (i.e. theories, questions, methods) can be simultaneously part of their mosaic. Such an assessment can yield three possible outcomes - ''satisfied'', ''not satisfied'', and ''inconclusive''.[[CITE_Fraser and Sarwar (2018)|p. 73]] Accordingly, the law of compatibility states that if a pair of elements does satisfy the compatibility criteria of the time, then it is deemed as compatible. If, however, an element is taken to be incompatible with the other one, then the pair is deemed as incompatible. Finally, the assessment of compatibility may be inconclusive. In this case, the pair may be deemed compatible, incompatible, or its status may remain unknown. The diagram below summarizes the relation between assessment outcomes and their effects:[[File:The Law of Compatibility Assessment Outcomes (Fraser-Sarwar-2018).png|617px|center||]][[File:The Law of Compatibility Assessment Outcomes (Fraser-Sarwar-2018).png|617px|center||]])
Necessary Mosaic Split theorem (Barseghyan-2015) Reason1 + (The necessary mosaic split theorem follows … The necessary mosaic split theorem follows as a deductive consequence of the [[The Second Law|second law]] and the zeroth law. Per the zeroth law, two incompatible elements cannot simultaneously remain in a mosaic, and per the second law any theory that satisfies the method of the time (and the assessment of the theory by the method is not inconclusive) is accepted into the mosaic. This creates the apparently contradictory situation where either of the two theories A) must be accepted because it satisfies the employed method and B) must not be accepted because it in not compatible with another accepted theory. [[File:Necessary-mosaic-split.jpg|607px|center||]][[File:Necessary-mosaic-split.jpg|607px|center||]])
Non-Empty Mosaic theorem (Barseghyan-2015) + (The non-empty [[Scientific Mosaic|mosaic]] … The non-empty [[Scientific Mosaic|mosaic]] theorem asserts that in order for a process of [[Scientific Change|scientific change]] to be possible, the mosaic must necessarily contain at least one element. Scientific change is impossible in an empty mosaic. It can be deduced from the [[The Second Law (Barseghyan-2015)|second law]], which asserts that in order to become accepted into the mosaic, a [[Theory|theory]] is assessed by the [[Method|method]] actually employed at the time, and the [[The Third Law (Barseghyan-2015)|third law]], which asserts that a method becomes employed only when it is deducible from other employed methods and accepted theories of the time.[[CITE_Barseghyan (2015)|p. 226]][[CITE_Barseghyan (2015)|p. 226]])
Individual Epistemic Agent Is a Subtype of Epistemic Agent (Patton-2019) Reason1 + (The notion of epistemic agency implies tha … The notion of epistemic agency implies that an agent takes epistemic stances ''intentionally''. That is: * the agent has a semantic understanding of the propositions that constitute the epistemic element in question, and of its alternatives, and * the agent is capable of choosing among them with reason, and with the goal of acquiring knowledge. It is clear that a typical individual human being can satisfy these requirements. The main exceptions are prelinguistic infants, or people with certain neurological conditions that render them incapable of understanding propositions. Besides these absolute constraints, the applicability of the definition may also vary as a matter of degree, since individuals may differ one from another in the depth of their semantic understanding of the epistemic element in question and other contextually relevant epistemic elements. Such differences might be produced, for example, by scientific or professional training. An individual's merits as an epistemic agent will be assessed by others based on whether their claims can satisfy the requirements of the [[Method|method]] employed by those others. The issues raised by norms of epistemic merit are best understood in terms of the concept of [[Authority Delegation|authority delegation]].[[Authority Delegation|authority delegation]].)
Epistemic Community Is a Subtype of Epistemic Agent (Barseghyan-2018) Reason1 + (The notion of epistemic agency implies tha … The notion of epistemic agency implies that an agent takes epistemic stances ''intentionally''. That is: * the agent has a semantic understanding of the propositions that constitute the epistemic element in question, and of its alternatives, and * the agent is capable of choosing among them with reason, and with the goal of acquiring knowledge. Communities can meet these conditions. An [[Epistemic Community|''epistemic community'']], by definition, has a collective intentionality to know the world and can thus be said to pursue the goal of acquiring knowledge.[[CITE_Overgaard (2017)]] In order for a community to be a communal epistemic agent, it must be the case that its epistemic stances belong to the community as a whole, rather than simply to its constituent members. To understand how this can be, we must consider some general properties of systems with multiple interacting parts. Such systems, if their parts are appropriately organized in relation to one another, often exhibit ''emergent properties''.[[CITE_Bedau (2003)]][[CITE_Kim (1999)]][[CITE_O'Connor and Yu Wong (2015)]][[CITE_Wimsatt (2006)]][[CITE_Wimsatt (2007)|pp. 274-312]] William Wimsatt defined the emergent properties of a system as those that depend on the way its parts are organized.[[CITE_Wimsatt (2006)]][[CITE_Wimsatt (2007)|pp. 274-312]] ''Aggregate systems'' as those in which the parts do not bear an organized relationship to one another. The parts all play similar causal roles and can be interchanged or rearranged without consequence. The behaviour of the whole is just an additive, statistical consequence of that of its parts and no emergent properties are present. A jumbled pile of electronic parts is an example of an aggregate system. Its properties, like its mass and its volume, are just the sum of the masses and volumes of all its parts. A ''composed system'' possesses new emergent properties due to the way in which its parts are organized in relation to one another. A radio assembled by arranging electronic parts in the proper relation to one another is an example of a composed system. The ability to be a radio is an emergent property because none of the radio's parts exhibit it by itself. The parts are organized so that each one plays its own distinctive, specialized role in producing the emergent property.A number of authors have argued that epistemic communities are organized so as to give rise to emergent properties.[[CITE_List and Pettit (2006)]][[CITE_Palermos and Pritchard (2016)]][[CITE_Palermos (2016)]][[CITE_Theiner (2015)]][[CITE_Theiner, Allen, and Goldstone (2010)]][[CITE_Theiner and O'Connor (2010)]] Wimsatt's ideas have been specifically applied to epistemic communities by Theiner and O'Connor. [[CITE_Theiner and O'Connor (2010)]] An epistemic community is an organized system of individual epistemic agents, each of which makes its own distinctive contribution to the epistemic stances taken by the communal agent as a whole. These roles are determined by institutional and other forms of organization of the communal agent, and involve varied and complementary areas of specialized knowledge. Collective decision-making processes and institutional frameworks interact with and influence the views of individual community members. These allow a community to take epistemic stances towards epistemic elements that are distinct from those its individual members might take if left to their own devices. In an analysis of legal decision-making processes, Tollefsen [[CITE_Tollefsen (2004)]] has shown that there are a variety of circumstances under which a community's epistemic stances are not the simple aggregate of its individual member's stances. Longino [[CITE_Longino (1990)]][[CITE_Longino (2019)]][[CITE_Longino (1996)]] maintains that, when communities have normatively appropriate structures, critical interactions among community members holding different points of view mitigate the influence of individual subjective preferences and allow communities to achieve a level of objectivity in their taking of epistemic stances that are not generally possible for individual agents. Barseghyan [[CITE_Barseghyan (2015)|pp. 43-52]] has argued that the methods used by individual prominent scientists often, in fact, do not coincide with those of their community and that a community's acceptance of a theory is a function of the methods employed by that community rather than individual idiosyncrasies. Thus, it appears that most epistemic communities fit the requirements for communal epistemic agents.equirements for communal epistemic agents.)
Epistemic Stances Towards Methods - Employment (Barseghyan-2015) + (The only stance that an epistemic agent can take towards a method is [[Employed Method|''employment'']], i.e. a method is either employed or unemployed by an agent in theory evaluation.)
Resolution to the Paradox of Normative Propositions (Sebastien-2016) + (The paradox and its resolution explained by Gregory Rupik)
Resolution to the Paradox of Normative Propositions (Sebastien-2016) + (The paradox of normative propositions aris … The paradox of normative propositions arises from the following three premises: # there have been many historical cases where employed [[Method|scientific methods]] conflicted with professed [[Methodology|methodologies]];# by [[The Third Law (Barseghyan-2015)|the third law]], employed methods are deducible from accepted theories, including methodologies;# two proposition cannot be mutually inconsistent if one logically follows from another. Sebastien's solution rejects premise (2), by clarifying that an employed method shouldn't necessarily follow from ''all'' accepted theories, but only from ''some''. In those cases, when an employed method is in conflict with an accepted methodology, it is an indication that the former doesn't follow from the latter. As for their mutual inconsistency, that is allowed by [[The Zeroth Law (Harder-2015)|the zeroth law]].[[The Zeroth Law (Harder-2015)|the zeroth law]].)
Possible Mosaic Split theorem (Barseghyan-2015) Reason1 + (The possible mosaic split theorem follows … The possible mosaic split theorem follows as a deductive consequence of the second and zeroth laws, given a situation a situation where the assessment of two theories obtains an inconclusive result. This will happen when it is unclear whether or not a theory satisfies the employed method of the community.[[File:Possible-mosaic-split.jpg|607px|center||]][[File:Possible-mosaic-split.jpg|607px|center||]])
Synchronism of Method Rejection theorem (Barseghyan-2015) + (The principle of this theorem is first int … The principle of this theorem is first introduced in [[Barseghyan (2015)]]. We recall that "there are two somewhat distinct scenarios of method employment. In the first scenario, a method becomes employed when it strictly follows from newly accepted theories. In the second scenario, a method becomes employed when it implements the abstract requirements of some other employed method by means of other accepted theories. It can be shown that method rejection is only possible in the first scenario; no method can be rejected in the second scenario. Namely, it can be shown that method rejection can only take place when some other method becomes employed by strictly following from a new accepted theory; the employment of a method that is not a result of the acceptance of a new theory and is merely a new implementation of some already employed method cannot possibly lead to a method rejection."[[CITE_Barseghyan (2015)|p. 174]] As per Barseghyan, it is important to note that "two implementations of the same method are not mutually exclusive and the employment of one doesn’t lead to the rejection of the other".[[CITE_Barseghyan (2015)|p. 176]] Barseghyan illustrates this nicely with the example of cell-counting methods (see below). Furthermore, he writes, "an employment of a new concrete method cannot possibly lead to a rejection of any other employed method. Indeed, if we take into account the fact that a new concrete method follows deductively from the conjunction of an abstract method and other accepted theories, it will become obvious that this new concrete method cannot possibly be incompatible with any other element of the mosaic. We know from the ''zeroth law'' that at any stage the elements of the mosaic are compatible with each other. Therefore, no logical consequence of the mosaic can possibly be incompatible with other elements of the mosaic. But the new method that implemented the abstract method is just one such logical consequence".[[CITE_Barseghyan (2015)|p. 176-7]]According to ''the synchronism of method rejection theorem'', a [[Method|method]] becomes rejected only when some of the [[Theory|theories]] from which it follows become rejected. By the method rejection theorem, a method is rejected when other methods incompatible with it become employed. By the [[The Third Law (Barseghyan-2015)|Third Law]], this can happen only when some of the theories from which it follows are also rejected.[[CITE_Barseghyan (2015)|p. 177-183]]CITE_Barseghyan (2015)|p. 177-183]])
Underdetermined Theory Change theorem (Barseghyan-2015) + (The process of [[Theory Acceptance|theory assessment]] … The process of [[Theory Acceptance|theory assessment]] under the TSC is underdetermined for two reasons. First, only [[Theory|theories]] that are constructed are available for assessment. Whether or not a theory is ever constructed is, at least partly a matter of creativity, and is therefore outside the scope of the TSC. Second, it is at least theoretically possible that a process of theory assessment will be inconclusive. This might be because the requirements of the method employed at the time might be vague (e.g. Aristotelian requirements of "intuition schooled by experience").[[CITE_Barseghyan (2015)|p. 199-200]][[File:Underdetermined-theory-change.jpg|607px|center||]][[File:Underdetermined-theory-change.jpg|607px|center||]])
Theory Rejection theorem (Barseghyan-2015) + (The rejection of ''theology proper'' (the … The rejection of ''theology proper'' (the study of God, his being, his attributes, and his works) from the scientific mosaic is a historical illustration of the ''Theory Rejection theorem'' and how accepted theories in one field may become rejected due to theories in other fields. In essence, theological propositions were rejected, but were not replaced with more theological propositions. It is difficult to track the exact dynamics of theology's "exile," but it is possible that these propositions were rejected and replaced with the thesis of ''agnosticism'', or that they were rejected due to the acceptance of ''evolutionary biology''. The "exile," as Barseghyan terms it, could have also been a very gradual process, and that the rejection of theological propositions came about for different reasons in different mosaics. Despite the difficulties in tracking down the exact dynamics of the gradual rejection of theology from the scientific mosaic, Barseghyan summarizes the evidence as such: "what must be appreciated here is that a theory can be replaced in the mosaic by theories pertaining to other fields of inquiry".[[CITE_Barseghyan (2015)|p. 172]][[CITE_Barseghyan (2015)|p. 172]])
Theory Rejection theorem (Barseghyan-Pandey-2023) + (The rejection of ''theology proper'' (the … The rejection of ''theology proper'' (the study of God, his being, his attributes, and his works) from the scientific mosaic is a historical illustration of the ''Theory Rejection theorem'' and how accepted theories in one field may become rejected due to theories in other fields. In essence, theological propositions were rejected, but were not replaced with more theological propositions. It is difficult to track the exact dynamics of theology's "exile," but it is possible that these propositions were rejected and replaced with the thesis of ''agnosticism'', or that they were rejected due to the acceptance of ''evolutionary biology''. The "exile," as Barseghyan terms it, could have also been a very gradual process, and that the rejection of theological propositions came about for different reasons in different mosaics. Despite the difficulties in tracking down the exact dynamics of the gradual rejection of theology from the scientific mosaic, Barseghyan summarizes the evidence as such: "what must be appreciated here is that a theory can be replaced in the mosaic by theories pertaining to other fields of inquiry".[[CITE_Barseghyan (2015)|p. 172]][[CITE_Barseghyan (2015)|p. 172]])
Necessary Method theorem (Barseghyan-2015) + (The requirement of 'testability', accordin … The requirement of 'testability', according to which a scientific theory must be empirically testable, is often portrayed as "one of the prerequisites of science" though it is by no means a necessary element in any mosaic. Barseghyan (2015) develops the case study as follows:<blockquote>The explanation is simple: the requirement of testability is ''substantive'' and, therefore, we can easily conceive of a mosaic where it is not present. It is substantive for it is based, among other things, on such a non-trivial assumption as “observations and experiments are a trustworthy source of knowledge about the world”. Thus, the requirement is not a necessarily a part of any mosaic; it can become employed after the acceptance of the assumptions on which it is based. The historical record confirms this conclusion. It is well known that testability hasn’t always been among the implicit requirements of the scientific community. For example, it played virtually no role in the Aristotelian-medieval mosaic.[[CITE_Barseghyan(2015)|p. 139]] The same holds for any substantive method. For instance, the oft-cited requirement of repeatability of experiments is evidently part of our current mosaic, but not of every possible mosaic. Similarly, the requirement to avoid supernatural explanations is implicit in our contemporary mosaic, but it is not a necessary part of any mosaic.[[CITE_Barseghyan(2015)|p. 229]]</blockquote>_Barseghyan(2015)|p. 229]]</blockquote>)
Mechanism of Theory Acceptance + (The second law explained by Gregory Rupik)
The Second Law (Patton-Overgaard-Barseghyan-2017) + (The second law explained by Gregory Rupik)
The Second Law (Barseghyan-2015) + (The second law explained by Hakob Barseghyan)
Epistemic Stances Towards Normative Theories - Norm Employment (Barseghyan-2018) + (The stance of norm employment explained by Hakob Barseghyan)
Asynchronism of Method Employment theorem (Barseghyan-2015) + (The theorem states that the employment of … The theorem states that the employment of a method is not necessarily simultaneous with the acceptance of a new theory. Being a direct logical consequence of [[The Third Law|the third law]], the theorem highlights the fact that some methods are a result of the implementation of some abstract requirements of other methods. In this way, a new method can be devised as a means of resolving a particular creative gap, and subsequently become employed long after the acceptance of the theory that led to the employment of the abstract method. to the employment of the abstract method.)

The Third Law (Barseghyan-2015) + (The third law explained by Hakob Barseghyan)

Modification:Sciento-2019-0007 + (The workshop discussion of this modification)
Modification:Sciento-2019-0001 + (The workshop discussion of this modification)
Modification:Sciento-2019-0002 + (The workshop discussion of this modification)
Modification:Sciento-2019-0003 + (The workshop discussion of this modification)
Modification:Sciento-2019-0005 + (The workshop discussion of this modification)
Modification:Sciento-2019-0006 + (The workshop discussion of this modification)
Modification:Sciento-2019-0004 + (The workshop discussion of this modification (25.02.2023))
Modification:Sciento-2018-0013 + (The workshop discussion of this modification (25.02.2023))
Modification:Sciento-2018-0014 + (The workshop discussion of this modification (25.02.2023))
The Zeroth Law (Harder-2015) + (The zeroth law explained by Hakob Barseghyan)
Theory Exists + (Theories are part of the process of scientific change.)
Scope of Scientonomy - Descriptive (Barseghyan-2015) + (There are at least three sorts of question … There are at least three sorts of questions that we might ask about the process of [[Scientific Change|scientific change]]; Historical questions having to do with what theories and methods were accepted by a particular community at a particular point in time, theoretical questions about the mechanisms of scientific change, and methodological questions about how scientific change ought to happen and what theories and methods ought to be accepted. The first two questions are descriptive in nature, and the third is normative. [[CITE_Barseghyan (2015)|pp. 12-13]]As the "science of science" [[scientonomy]] seeks a purely descriptive account of processes of change in the [[Scientific Mosaic|scientific mosaic]] and therefore encompasses only historical and theoretical questions. Keeping descriptive scientific questions distinct from questions of normative methodology avoids numerous pitfalls. For example, those who conflate the two sometimes argue that because some method is known to have flaws of logical consistency or soundness, it cannot possibly have been the one that was, in fact, used by scientists. However, there is a great deal historical evidence that scientists actually have used logically flawed methods. Inductive reasoning is a ubiquitous part of science, despite its well known flaws.[[CITE_Vickers (2014)]][[CITE_Barseghyan (2015)|pp. 19-20]] The intrusion of normative concerns could also undermine scientonomy's aspirations to scientific status. If any laws of scientific change discovered were accorded normative force they would become tautological truths incapable being called into question by empirical inquiry.called into question by empirical inquiry.)
Error (Machado-Marques-Patton-2021) + (There are several different senses in whic … There are several different senses in which one might take the concept of scientific error. One is the absolute sense. From our modern perspective, we might judge the geocentric [[Aristotle| Aristotelean-Ptolemaic cosmology's]] claim that the earth is stationary at the center of the universe as an error [[CITE_ Allchin (2001)]]. The sense of error we are interested in here is not this absolute sense of error as judged from a future perspective. Instead, our definition takes the perspective of the historical [[Epistemic Agent| agent]] and the [[Mechanism of Method Employment | method employed]] by the agent at that time. Our definition is grounded in [[Mechanism of Theory Acceptance| the law of theory acceptance]]. When a [[Theory| theory]] is erroneously accepted, the [[Nature of Appraisal| assessing]] agent believes it has satisfied the requirements of their employed method when, in fact, it has not. Error may be due to an honest mistake by the epistemic agent that created the theory, or to scientific misconduct--actions which the theory-creator agent is aware violate the epistemic and moral [[Normative Theory | norms]] of scientific inquiry accepted at the time.f scientific inquiry accepted at the time.)
Technological Knowledge as Part of Mosaic (Mirkin-2018) + (There is accepted propositional technologi … There is accepted propositional technological knowledge which appears to exhibit the same patterns of change as questions, theories, and methods in the natural, social, and formal sciences. Technological theories attempting to describe the construction and operation of artifacts as well as to prescribe their correct mode of operation are not merely used, but also often accepted by epistemic agents. Since technology often involves methods different from those found in science and produces normative propositions, many of which remain tacit, one may be tempted to think that changes in technological knowledge should be somehow exempt from the laws of scientific change. Yet, the discussion of the historical cases of sorting algorithms, telescopes, crop rotation, and colorectal cancer surgeries show that technological theories and methods are often an integral part of an epistemic agent’s mosaic and seem to exhibit the same scientonomic patterns of change typical of accepted theories therein. Thus, propositional technological knowledge can be part of a mosaic.logical knowledge can be part of a mosaic.)
Bearers of Mosaic - Communities (Barseghyan-2015) + (There is only one type of agents that can … There is only one type of agents that can bear a mosaic - community.[[CITE_Barseghyan (2015)|pp. 43-52]] As for ''individual'' epistemic agents, their status and role in the process of scientific change is unclear; thus, the notion of an individual bearing a mosaic is problematic.ndividual bearing a mosaic is problematic.)
Discipline Exists + (There is such a thing as a discipline.)
Explicable-Implicit (Mirkin-Barseghyan-2018) + (This category encompasses that knowledge w … This category encompasses that knowledge which hasn't been openly formulated by the agent but can, in principle, be open formulated. As such the category is agent-relative. The definition was first suggested by [[Hakob Barseghyan]] and [[Maxim Mirkin]] in their ''[[Barseghyan and Mirkin (2019)|The Role of Technological Knowledge in Scientific Change]]''[[CITE_Barseghyan and Mirkin (2019)]] and was restated by Mirkin in his ''[[Mirkin (2018)|The Status of Technological Knowledge in the Scientific Mosaic]]''.[[Mirkin (2018)|The Status of Technological Knowledge in the Scientific Mosaic]]''.)
Accidental Group (Overgaard-2017) + (This definition aims to discern between accidental groups, i.e. the ones that don't have a collective intentionality, and actual communities, i.e. groups that do have collective intentionality.)
Epistemic Community (Overgaard-2017) + (This definition attempts to capture what i … This definition attempts to capture what is arguably the key feature of epistemic communities - their collective intentionality to study/know the world. This feature, according to the definition, distinguishes epistemic communities from [[Non-Epistemic Community|non-epistemic communities]], such as political, economic, or familial communities. To use [[Nicholas Overgaard|Overgaard]]'s own example, "it is clear that an orchestra is a community: the various musicians can be said to have a collective intentionality to play a piece of music" and yet its collective intentionality is different from that of knowing the world.[[CITE_Overgaard (2017)|p. 59]][[CITE_Overgaard (2017)|p. 59]])
Theory Acceptance (Sebastien-2016) + (This definition expands on [[Theory Acceptance (Barseghyan-2015)|the original definition of the term]] … This definition expands on [[Theory Acceptance (Barseghyan-2015)|the original definition of the term]] proposed by [[Hakob Barseghyan|Barseghyan]] to ensure that the term is applicable not only to ''descriptive'' theories but also to ''normative'' theories. It assumes that descriptive theories attempt to provide descriptions of their respective objects, while normative theories attempt to prescribe a certain object, the latter being understood as a certain state of affairs. understood as a certain state of affairs.)
Norm Employment (Barseghyan-2018) + (This definition is meant to ensure that th … This definition is meant to ensure that the notion of employment is applicable not only to methods but to norms of all types, as is the case in the ontology of epistemic elements suggested by [[Hakob Barseghyan|Barseghyan]] in 2018. According to that ontology, the capacity of being employed can be ascribed not only to norms of theory evaluation (i.e. methods), but to [[Epistemic Stances Towards Normative Theories - Norm Employment (Barseghyan-2018)|norms of all types]], including ethical norm and aesthetic norms.[[CITE_Barseghyan (2018)]][[CITE_Barseghyan (2018)]])
Non-Epistemic Community (Overgaard-2017) + (This definition is meant to highlight the … This definition is meant to highlight the key difference between [[Epistemic Community|epistemic]] and non-epistemic communities. The former are said to have a collective intentionality to know the world, while the latter lack such an intentionality. A typical example of a non-epistemic community, according to [[Nicholas Overgaard|Overgaard]], is an orchestra that has a collective intentionality to play music but lack the intentionality of knowing the world.[[CITE_Overgaard (2017)|p. 59]] Another example of a non-epistemic community, according to Overgaard, is a political party. While a political party might have some accepted theories, such as ideas concerning, for instance, effective governance, "a political party would be considered a non-epistemic community because it lacks a collective intentionality to know the world".[[CITE_Overgaard (2017)|p. 59]][[CITE_Overgaard (2017)|p. 59]])
Compatibility (Fraser-Sarwar-2018) + (This definition of ''compatibility'' captures the main gist of the notion as it was originally intended by [[Rory Harder|Harder]] and [[Hakob Barseghyan|Barseghyan]] - the idea that two elements are compatible when they can coexist within the same mosaic.)
Method (Barseghyan-2018) + (This definition of ''method'' is meant to … This definition of ''method'' is meant to encompass the criteria of evaluation of all types, regardless of their being explicit or implicit, and thus merge what was previously separated into two classes of elements - [[Method (Barseghyan-2015)|methods]] and [[Methodology (Sebastien-2016)|methodologies]].[[Methodology (Sebastien-2016)|methodologies]].)
Theory Acceptance (Fraser-Sarwar-2018) + (This definition of ''theory acceptance'' m … This definition of ''theory acceptance'' makes it explicit that any accepted theory is a ''scientific'' theory. It assumes that the question of whether a theory is accepted is meaningless without the theory being scientific. The point here is that no scientist would ask whether they should accept a theory without believing, if only implicitly, that the theory is indeed scientific. Since only scientific theories have the potential to become accepted, and because only some of these do in fact become accepted, it follows that all of the accepted theories are scientific.l of the accepted theories are scientific.)

Search by property

List of results

Navigation menu

Personal tools

Namespaces

Variants

Views

More

Search

Navigation

Main Categories

Tools