Property:Description First Paragraph
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This is a property of type Text.
A
This definition aims to discern between accidental groups, i.e. the ones that don't have a collective intentionality, and actual communities, i.e. groups that do have collective intentionality. +
By allowing the discussants to suggest alternative formulations in their comments, the workflow incentivizes commenting and aids consensus building. It often happens that the discussants agree that a little tweak in the original formulation would solve the problem. This can help speed up the advancement of our communal knowledge. In contrast, when the discussants are not permitted to reformulate the original formulations, the discussants have no other choice than to write a whole new paper arguing for what is otherwise a little tweak to the original formulation. Not only is this wasteful, but it also creates a bottleneck where a consensus formation is postponed due to bureaucratic restrictions. Thus, it is important to remove this bottleneck and allow the participants to alter original formulations. +
Some facts ''ought'' to be relevant to the [[Theory Acceptance|assessment of a theory]] because the content of the theory itself implies their relevance, and others ought to be relevant simply by definition. When assessing a theory concerning scientific change, relevant facts that ought necessarily to be considered include questions pertinent to scientific change processes. For example: What [[Theory|theories]] and [[Method|methods]] were part of the [[Scientific Mosaic|scientific mosaic]] of the community in question, both before and after the instance of [[Scientific Change|scientific change]]? What modifications were proposed and what parts of the mosaic did they intend to replace? Which of these modifications became accepted into the mosaic, and how? +
The theorem states that the employment of a method is not necessarily simultaneous with the acceptance of a new theory. Being a direct logical consequence of [[The Third Law|the third law]], the theorem highlights the fact that some methods are a result of the implementation of some abstract requirements of other methods. In this way, a new method can be devised as a means of resolving a particular creative gap, and subsequently become employed long after the acceptance of the theory that led to the employment of the abstract method. +
If we consider the fact that scientific research is so specialized that no single research lab can account for all accepted theories in their discipline, we quickly recognize that there exists some form of distribution of labour among subcommunities. Authority delegation is an attempt to capture that distribution of labour, in scientonomic terms. +
The definition tweaks the [[Authority Delegation (Overgaard-Loiselle-2016)|original definition]] of the term by [[Nicholas Overgaard|Overgaard]] and [[Mirka Loiselle|Loiselle]] to ensure that the relationship of authority delegation can obtain between [[Epistemic Agent|epistemic agents]] of all types. It also substitutes [[Question|''question'']] for ''topic'', as the former is the proper scientonomic term that should be used. +
B
There is only one type of agents that can bear a mosaic - community.[[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)|pp. 43-52]] As for ''individual'' epistemic agents, their status and role in the process of scientific change is unclear; thus, the notion of an individual bearing a mosaic is problematic. +
C
One potential way of addressing the problem of closure mechanism is by introducing a “countdown” mechanism, where the community is given a three-month (90-day) discussion period for commenting on a suggested modification and, if no objections raised during this period, the proposed modification becomes accepted by default. According to Shaw and Barseghyan: +
To ensure that a suggested modification is properly evaluated and a verdict is reached, the community should be given a certain time period to discuss the modification, after which a communal vote should be taken. This vote should be offered to all members of the community, who should be given a short timeframe to decide. +
A [[Group|group]] that has a collective intentionality. +
When dealing with a community, it might be useful to analyze it in terms of its constituent subcommunities (e.g. the community of particle physicists within the community of physicists). But such an analysis is based on an assumption that a community can consist of other communities, i.e. subcommunities. This assumption is by no means trivial; indeed, there might exist a view that each community is to be treated separately as one indivisible whole and, thus, any talk of its constituents is meaningless. According to Overgaard, communities can be said to be consisting of other communities.[[CiteRef::Overgaard (2017)|p. 58]] Thus, there is such a thing as a subcommunity, i.e. a community that is part of a larger community. +
This definition of ''compatibility'' captures the main gist of the notion as it was originally intended by [[Rory Harder|Harder]] and [[Hakob Barseghyan|Barseghyan]] - the idea that two elements are compatible when they can coexist within the same mosaic. +
The corollary is meant to restate the content of [[Rory Harder|Harder]]'s [[The Zeroth Law (Harder-2015)|the zeroth law]] of scientific change. Since the corollary follows deductively from the definition of [[Compatibility (Fraser-Sarwar-2018)|''compatibility'']], it highlights that the zeroth law as it was formulated by Harder is tautologous. Since the corollary covers the same idea as the zeroth law, all the theorems that were thought to be deducible by means of the zeroth law (e.g. [[Theory Rejection theorem (Barseghyan-2015)|the theory rejection theorem]] or [[Method Rejection theorem (Barseghyan-2015)|the method rejection theorem]]) can now be considered deducible by means of the corollary. +
Like [[Demarcation Criteria|demarcation]] and [[Acceptance Criteria|acceptance criteria]], compatibility criteria can be part of a community's employed method. The community employs these criteria to determine whether two theories are mutually compatible or incompatible, i.e. whether they can be simultaneously part of the community's mosaic. Different communities can have different compatibility criteria. While some communities may opt to employ the logical law of noncontradiction as their criterion of compatibility, other communities may be more tolerant towards logical inconsistencies. According to Barseghyan, the fact that these days scientists "often simultaneously accept theories which strictly speaking logically contradict each other is a good indication that the actual criteria of compatibility employed by the scientific community might be quite different from the classical logical law of noncontradiction".[[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)|p. 11]] For example, this is apparent in … +
Like [[Demarcation Criteria|demarcation]] and [[Acceptance Criteria|acceptance criteria]], compatibility criteria can be part of an epistemic agent's employed method. An epistemic agent employs these criteria to determine whether two elements (e.g. methods, theories, questions) are mutually compatible or incompatible, i.e. whether they can be simultaneously part of the agent's mosaic. In principle, these criteria can be employed to determine the compatibility of elements present in the mosaic, as well as those outside of it (e.g. scientists often think about whether a proposed theory is compatible with the theories actually accepted at the time). [[Patrick Fraser|Fraser]] and [[Ameer Sarwar|Sarwar]] point out that [[Hakob Barseghyan|Barseghyan]]'s [[Compatibility Criteria (Barseghyan-2015)|original definition]] of the term "excludes a simple point that is assumed elsewhere in scientonomy: elements other than theories (i.e. methods and questions) may be compatible or incompatible wit… +
According to [[Patrick Fraser|Fraser]] and [[Ameer Sarwar|Sarwar]], "[[Compatibility (Fraser-Sarwar-2018)|compatibility]] is a distinct epistemic stance that agents can take towards elements".[[CiteRef::Fraser and Sarwar (2018)|p.70]] They show this by arguing that it is possible to take the stance of compatibility towards a pair of elements without taking any of the other stances towards these elements. Thus, compatibility is distinct from [[Theory Acceptance|acceptance]], since two elements need not be in the same mosaic, or even accepted by any agent to be considered, in principle, compatible. For example, an epistemic agent may consider Ptolemaic astrology compatible with Aristotelian natural philosophy without accepting either Ptolemaic astrology or Aristotelian natural philosophy. Compatibility is also different from [[Theory Use|use]], since a pair of theories can be considered compatible regardless of whether any of them is considered useful. For instance, one can consider q… +
<blockquote>The traditional version of comparativism holds that when two theories are compared it doesn’t make any difference which of the two is currently accepted. In reality, however, the starting point for every theory assessment is the current state of the mosaic. Every new theory is basically an attempt to modify the mosaic by inserting some new elements into the mosaic and, possibly, by removing some old elements from the mosaic. Therefore, what gets decided in actual theory assessment is whether a proposed modification is to be accepted. In other words, we judge two competing theories not in a vacuum, as the traditional version of ''comparativism'' suggests, but only in the context of a specific mosaic. It is this version of the comparativist view that is implicit in the laws of scientific change.[[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)|p. 184]] </blockquote> +
The core questions of a [[Discipline| discipline]] are those general questions that are essential to a discipline, having the power to define it and establish its boundaries within a hierarchy of questions. They are identified as such in the discipline's [[Delineating Theory| delineating theory]].[[CiteRef::Patton and Al-Zayadi (2021)]] The [[Scientific Mosaic| scientific mosaic]] consists of [[Theory| theories]] and [[Question| questions]].[[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)]][[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2018)]][[CiteRef::Rawleigh (2018)]][[CiteRef::Sebastien (2016)]] Questions form hierarchies in which more specific questions are [[Subquestion| subquestions]] of broader questions. Theories enter into this hierarchy as well since questions presuppose theories, and theories are answers to questions. It is the position of core questions within such hierarchies that confer upon them the power to define and establish the boundaries of a discipline by indicating which questions and theories are incl… +
A core theory of a [[Discipline| discipline]] is a [[Theory| theory]] presupposed by the discipline's [[Core Question| core questions]].[[CiteRef::Patton and Al-Zayadi (2021)]] The [[Scientific Mosaic| scientific mosaic]] consists of [[Theory| theories]] and [[Question| questions]].[[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)]][[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2018)]][[CiteRef::Rawleigh (2018)]][[CiteRef::Sebastien (2016)]] Questions constitute hierarchies where more specific questions are [[Subquestion| subquestions]] of broader questions. Within this hierarchy, certain general questions play a special role as core questions. These questions are essential to a discipline, and have the power to identify it and determine its boundaries. For example, a core question of evolutionary biology would be 'how did living species originate as a result of evolution?'. Questions always presuppose theories, which endow them with semantic content. Those presupposed by a discipline's core questions, are that discipline's co… +
D
This somewhat simplistic definition of ''definition'' is meant to highlight that definitions are themselves theories (statements, propositions). As a result, any [[Epistemic Stances|stance]] that can be taken by [[Epistemic Agent|epistemic agents]] towards theories can also be taken towards definitions. +
According to Barseghyan, definitions are an integral part of the process of scientific change.[[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2018)]] +
According to Barseghyan, definitions are essentially a species of theories. +
One can specify a [[Discipline|discipline]] in terms of a set of its [[Core Question| core questions]]. A delineating theory is a second-order [[Theory|theory]] identifying this set of core questions, and allowing it to exist as an [[Epistemic Element| epistemic element]] within the [[Scientific Mosaic|mosaic]].[[CiteRef::Patton and Al-Zayadi (2021)]] For example, the delineating theory of modern physics might identify 'How do matter and energy behave?' as a core question of modern physics. +
[[The Law of Theory Demarcation (Sarwar-Fraser-2018)|The law of theory demarcation]] states that a theory is deemed as scientific only if it satisfies the demarcation criteria employed by the epistemic community at the time. [[Theory Acceptance (Fraser-Sarwar-2018)|The definition of theory acceptance]] suggested by [[Patrick Fraser|Fraser]] and [[Ameer Sarwar|Sarwar]] states that an accepted theory is a ''scientific'' theory that is taken to be the best available description or prescription of its object of study. It follows from these two premises that whenever a theory is accepted, it must also have satisfied the demarcation criteria of the time. After all, if it did not, then the definition of theory acceptance is contradicted. Therefore, if the definition of theory acceptance and the law of demarcation criteria are accepted, then it must also be accepted that accepted theories satisfy the criteria of demarcation. This demarcation-acceptance synchronism is presented somewhat more… +
According to [[Zoe Sebastien|Sebastien]]'s definition of the term, descriptive theories aim at ''describing'' a certain object under study, where ''describe'' is understood in the broad sense and includes ''explain'', ''predict'', etc. Thus, the term encompasses theories that attempt to describe a certain phenomenon, process, or state of affairs in the past, present, or future. All of the following propositions would qualify as ''descriptive'': +
According to Barseghyan, many theories attempt to describe something. Thus, there are descriptive theories.[[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)|p. 5]] +
A discipline ''A'' is characterized by a non-empty set of [[Core Question| core questions]] ''Q<sub>CA</sub>'' and a [[Delineating Theory| delineating theory]] stating that ''Q<sub>CA</sub>'' are the core questions of the discipline.[[CiteRef::Patton and Al-Zayadi (2021)]] +
[[Epistemic Stances Towards Theories|Theories]] and [[Epistemic Stances Towards Questions| questions]] can both be the subject of the epistemic stances of [[Epistemic Agent|epistemic agents]]. [[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2018)]][[CiteRef::Rawleigh (2018)]][[CiteRef::Patton (2019)]] [[Discipline| Disciplines]] like biology, physics, and astrology can also be the subject of such stances. For example, biology and physics are accepted by the scientific community of the modern world as disciplines, but astrology is rejected. In our definition, a discipline is said to be accepted by an epistemic agent if that agent accepts the [[Core Question| core questions]] specified in the discipline's [[Delineating Theory|delineating theory]], as well as the delineating theory itself.[[CiteRef::Patton and Al-Zayadi (2021)]] +
No [[Theory|theory]] acceptance may take place in a genuinely dogmatic [[Scientific Community|community]]. "Namely," as is noted in [[Barseghyan (2015)]], Barseghyan notes, when introducing '''the theory rejection theorem''' in [[Barseghyan (2015)]], "theory change is impossible in cases where a currently accepted theory is considered as revealing the final and absolute truth".[[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)|p. 165]] +
A '''substantive method''' is one that presupposes at least one contingent proposition; one that depends on the state of something in the external world. According to our understanding of contingent propositions, all such propositions are '''fallible'''. As such, any substantive method will necessarily presuppose at least one contingent proposition, and is therefore fallible. Thus, by the '''synchronism of method rejection''' theorem, the rejection of a theory can result in the rejection of a method, rendering all substantive methods dynamic. +
E
According to Oh, there is such a thing as element decay.[[CiteRef::Oh (2021)]] +
Element decay is not a scientonomic phenomenon and, thus, is outside of the scope of scientonomy. +
A method is said to be ''employed'' at time ''t'' if, at time ''t,'' theories became accepted only when their acceptance is permitted by the method. [[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)|p. 53]] ''The second law'' of theory acceptance is a direct consequence of ''employed method'' as it is defined. +
According to this definition of the term, ''employed method'' is nothing but the actual expectations of a certain community at a certain time. This is in tune with the actual scientonomic usage of the term. It is safe to say that this definition is tacitly used throughout Barseghyan's [[Barseghyan (2015)|''The Laws of Scientific Change'']]. For instance, when he says that the method of intuition schooled by experience was employed by the community of Aristotelian-Medieval natural philosophers, he actually means that this community expected new theories to be intuitively true.[[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)|pp. 143-145]][[CiteRef::Patton, Overgaard, and Barseghyan (2017)|p. 35]] When he says that the double-blind trial method is currently employed in drug testing, he means that "the community expects new drugs to be tested in double-blind trials".[[CiteRef::Patton, Overgaard, and Barseghyan (2017)|p. 35]][[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)|pp. 134-142]] Originally, this tacit definition of emp… +
[[Joshua Allen]] makes a case for this broad definition of the term. According to Allen:[[CiteRef::Allen (2023)|pp. 75-76]] +
According to Allen, epistemic actions are a key part of everyday epistemic practice. +
An ''epistemic agent'' acts in relation to [[Epistemic Element|epistemic elements]] such as theories, questions, and methods. The actions of an epistemic agent amount to taking [[Epistemic Stance|epistemic stances]] towards these elements, such as accepting or pursuing a theory, accepting a question, or employing a method. The stances of an epistemic agent must be ''intentional''. To be so, they must satisfy the following conditions: +
According to Barseghyan, epistemic agents are an essential part of the process of scientific change, as they take stances towards epistemic elements. +
This definition attempts to capture what is arguably the key feature of epistemic communities - their collective intentionality to study/know the world. This feature, according to the definition, distinguishes epistemic communities from [[Non-Epistemic Community|non-epistemic communities]], such as political, economic, or familial communities. To use [[Nicholas Overgaard|Overgaard]]'s own example, "it is clear that an orchestra is a community: the various musicians can be said to have a collective intentionality to play a piece of music" and yet its collective intentionality is different from that of knowing the world.[[CiteRef::Overgaard (2017)|p. 59]] +
According to [[Nicholas Overgaard|Overgaard]], communities that do not have a collective intentionality to know the world can still have sub-communities that do have such an intentionality. Overgaard illustrates this with the example of Google, a company that can be considered a [[Non-Epistemic Community|non-epistemic community]] as its collective intentionality is that to make profit. Yet, as an innovative company, Google has many sub-communities which do have a collective intentionality to know the world, such as "a research and development team trying to better know Internet technologies, or a marketing team trying to better know how to reach consumers".[[CiteRef::Overgaard (2017)|p. 59]] By [[Epistemic Community (Overgaard-2017)|definition]], these sub-communities are [[Epistemic Community|epistemic]]. Thus, argues Overgaard, it is possible for an epistemic community to be the sub-community of a non-epistemic community. +
The claim of the existence of epistemic communities can be traced back to Overgaard, who presented the distinction between epistemic and non-epistemic communities in his [[Overgaard (2017)|''A Taxonomy for the Social Agents of Scientific Change'']].[[CiteRef::Overgaard (2017)]] +
According to Barseghyan, epistemic community is an epistemic agent, i.e. it is capable of taking [[Epistemic Stance|epistemic stances]] towards [[Epistemic Element|epistemic elements]].[[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2018)]] +
TODO: Nikki add a description +
According to Barseghyan and Levesley, questions can have epistemic presuppositions. +
Fraser and Sarwar argued that, as an epistemic stance, compatibility can be taken towards epistemic elements of all types.[[CiteRef::Fraser and Sarwar (2018)|p. 70]] +
The only stance that an epistemic agent can take towards a method is [[Employed Method|''employment'']], i.e. a method is either employed or unemployed by an agent in theory evaluation. +
In his [[Barseghyan (2018)|"Redrafting the Ontology of Scientific Change"]], Barseghyan argued that since [[Normative Theory|norms]] are a subtype of [[Theory|theory]], all the epistemic stances that can in principle be taken by an epistemic agent towards theories of all types can also be taken towards norms. In addition to these more universal stances, norms can also be [[Norm Employment|employed]], i.e. they have the capacity of constituting the actual expectations of the epistemic agent. This applies to norms of all types.[[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2018)]] +
Rawleigh argued that, just like theories, [[Question|questions]] too can be [[Question Acceptance|accepted]] or unaccepted. A question can be accepted by an agent at one period at not accepted by another. +
