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A list of all pages that have property "Description First Paragraph" with value "TODO". Since there have been only a few results, also nearby values are displayed.

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    • Question Pursuit (Barseghyan-2022)  + (TODO: Add the description)
    • Theory Acceptance (Barseghyan-2015)  + (TODO: Description here)
    • Theory Use (Barseghyan-2015)  + (TODO: Description here)
    • Epistemic Presupposition (Barseghyan-Levesley-2021)  + (TODO: Nikki add a description)
    • The Law of Question Acceptance (Barseghyan-Levesley-2021)  + (TODO: Nikki add a description)
    • Question Rejection theorem (Barseghyan-Levesley-2021)  + (TODO: Nikki add a description)
    • Logical Presupposition (Barseghyan-Levesley-2021)  + (TODO: Nikki add a description)
    • Sufficient Reason theorem (Palider-2019)  + (The '''Sufficient Reason theorem''' shows The '''Sufficient Reason theorem''' shows how a sufficient reason leads to acceptance. This theorem follows from the definition of a [[Sufficient Reason (Palider-2019)]] and from [[The Second Law (Patton-Overgaard-Barseghyan-2017)]]. By the second law, if a theory satisfies the acceptance criteria of the method employed at the time, it becomes accepted. The claim of this theorem is that if there is a sufficient reason for a theory, then that theory satisfies the acceptance criteria of the time. This claim is justified as follows. time. This claim is justified as follows.)
    • The Law of Theory Demarcation (Sarwar-Fraser-2018)  + (The ''law of theory demarcation'' tries toThe ''law of theory demarcation'' tries to provide a mechanism of how the scientific status of theories changes overtime. The assessment outcomes of the law (satisfied, unsatisfied, and inconclusive) are ''logically'' separated from their consequences. In particular, the assessment outcome of conclusively satisfying the demarcation criteria leads to a theory being scientific, the assessment outcome of consclusively not satisfying the criteria lead to the theory being unscientific, and the final inconclusive outcome can lead to the theory being scientific, unscientific, or uncertain.Sarwar and Fraser (2018)fic, or uncertain.Sarwar and Fraser (2018))
    • Scope of Scientonomy - Implicit and Explicit (Barseghyan-2017)  + (The [[Method|methods]]The [[Method|methods]] employed in [[Theory Assessment Outcomes|theory assessment]] do not always correspond to the professed scientific [[Methodology|methodology]], and may be purely implicit. Thus, a scientonomic theory ought to distinguish between accepted methodologies and employed methods. Because of their role in theory assessment, and thus in determining the contents of the [[Scientific Mosaic|scientific mosaic]], a scientonomic theory ought to include employed methods, whether they are explicit or implicit. pp. 52-61r they are explicit or implicit. pp. 52-61)
    • Scientific Change (Barseghyan-2015)  + (The [[Scientific Mosaic|scientific mosaic]]The [[Scientific Mosaic|scientific mosaic]] is in a process of perpetual change. Most of the theories that we accept nowadays didn’t even exist two or three hundred years ago. Similarly, at least some of the methods that we employ in theory assessment nowadays have nothing to do with the methods employed in the 17th century. Thus, it is safe to say that the process of scientific change involves both theories and methods.p.9 Changes in the scientific mosaic can be viewed as a series of successive frames, where each frame represents a state of that mosaic at a given point of time. Obviously, such a frame would include all accepted theories and all employed methods of the time. p. 9and all employed methods of the time. p. 9)
    • The Third Law (Sebastien-2016)  + (The [[The Third Law (Barseghyan-2015)|initial formulation]]The [[The Third Law (Barseghyan-2015)|initial formulation]] of the law, proposed by Barseghyan in [[Barseghyan (2015)|''The Laws of Scientific Change'']], stated that a [[Method|method]] becomes [[Employed Method|employed]] only when it is deducible from other employed methods and accepted theories of the time.p.132 In that formulation, it wasn't clear whether employed methods follow from ''all'' or only ''some'' of the accepted theories and employed methods of the time. This led to a logical paradox which this reformulation attempts to solve.Sebastien (2016)ulation attempts to solve.Sebastien (2016))
    • Underdetermined Method Change theorem (Barseghyan-2015)  + (The [[The Third Law|third law]]The [[The Third Law|third law]] allows for two distinct scenarios of method employment. A [[Method|method]] may become employed because it follows strictly from accepted [[Theory|theories]] or employed methods, or it may the abstract requirements of some other employed method. This second scenario allows for creative ingenuity and depends on the technology of the times, therefore it may be fulfilled in many ways and allows underdeterminism p. 198.y ways and allows underdeterminism p. 198.)
    • Error Rejection by Replacement (Machado-Marques-Patton-2021)  + (The analysis of several several instances The analysis of several several instances of scientific error by [[Sarah Machado-Marques|Machado-Marques]] and [[Paul Patton|Patton]] suggest that the handling of these instances by scientists is in accord with the theory rejection theorem. Handling of error involves, according to this view, not only a rejection of some of the propositions that are considered to be accepted erroneously but also an acceptance of some new propositions. In some cases, an erroneously accepted ''first-order'' proposition is replaced by another ''first-order'' proposition incompatible with it. In other cases, an erroneously accepted ''first-order'' proposition is replaced by a ''second-order'' proposition stating the lack of sufficient reason for accepting the first-order proposition. According to this view, the handling of erroneously accepted theories involves their replacement with other theories; the handling of scientific error is therefore in full accord with the theory rejection theorem. accord with the theory rejection theorem.)
    • Inexplicable (Mirkin-Barseghyan-2018)  + (The category is agent-relative and encompaThe category is agent-relative and encompasses that knowledge which cannot - even in principle - be explicated. The definition was first suggested by [[Hakob Barseghyan]] and [[Maxim Mirkin]] in their ''[[Barseghyan and Mirkin (2019)|The Role of Technological Knowledge in Scientific Change]]''Barseghyan and Mirkin (2019) and was restated by Mirkin in his ''[[Mirkin (2018)|The Status of Technological Knowledge in the Scientific Mosaic]]''.[[Mirkin (2018)|The Status of Technological Knowledge in the Scientific Mosaic]]''.)
    • Epistemic Community Exists  + (The claim of the existence of epistemic coThe claim of the existence of epistemic communities can be traced back to Overgaard, who presented the distinction between epistemic and non-epistemic communities in his [[Overgaard (2017)|''A Taxonomy for the Social Agents of Scientific Change'']].Overgaard (2017)[[Overgaard (2017)|''A Taxonomy for the Social Agents of Scientific Change'']].Overgaard (2017))
    • Core Question (Patton-Al-Zayadi-2021)  + (The core questions of a [[Discipline| discipline]]The core questions of a [[Discipline| discipline]] are those general questions that are essential to a discipline, having the power to define it and establish its boundaries within a hierarchy of questions. They are identified as such in the discipline's [[Delineating Theory| delineating theory]].Patton and Al-Zayadi (2021) The [[Scientific Mosaic| scientific mosaic]] consists of [[Theory| theories]] and [[Question| questions]].Barseghyan (2015)Barseghyan (2018)Rawleigh (2018)Sebastien (2016) Questions form hierarchies in which more specific questions are [[Subquestion| subquestions]] of broader questions. Theories enter into this hierarchy as well since questions presuppose theories, and theories are answers to questions. It is the position of core questions within such hierarchies that confer upon them the power to define and establish the boundaries of a discipline by indicating which questions and theories are incl…ich questions and theories are incl…)
    • Compatibility Corollary (Fraser-Sarwar-2018)  + (The corollary is meant to restate the contThe corollary is meant to restate the content of [[Rory Harder|Harder]]'s [[The Zeroth Law (Harder-2015)|the zeroth law]] of scientific change. Since the corollary follows deductively from the definition of [[Compatibility (Fraser-Sarwar-2018)|''compatibility'']], it highlights that the zeroth law as it was formulated by Harder is tautologous. Since the corollary covers the same idea as the zeroth law, all the theorems that were thought to be deducible by means of the zeroth law (e.g. [[Theory Rejection theorem (Barseghyan-2015)|the theory rejection theorem]] or [[Method Rejection theorem (Barseghyan-2015)|the method rejection theorem]]) can now be considered deducible by means of the corollary.dered deducible by means of the corollary.)
    • Procedural Method (Barseghyan-2015)  + (The definition assumes that it is possibleThe definition assumes that it is possible to conceive of methods that do not presuppose any substantive knowledge about the world. If a method doesn't presuppose any accepted theories other than definitions, the method is procedural.p. 219 As a possible example of a procedural method, [[Hakob Barseghyan|Barseghyan]] mentions what he calls the ''deductive acceptance method'', according to which "if a proposition is deductively inferred from other accepted propositions, it is to be accepted".p. 221 This method, according to Barseghyan presupposes only some definition of ''deductive inference'' as well as some very abstract method such as "only accept the best available theories".p. 220-221 The latter is another possible instance of a procedural method, as it too doesn't seem to presuppose any substantive knowledge of the world.se any substantive knowledge of the world.)
    • Authority Delegation (Patton-2019)  + (The definition tweaks the [[Authority Delegation (Overgaard-Loiselle-2016)|original definition]]The definition tweaks the [[Authority Delegation (Overgaard-Loiselle-2016)|original definition]] of the term by [[Nicholas Overgaard|Overgaard]] and [[Mirka Loiselle|Loiselle]] to ensure that the relationship of authority delegation can obtain between [[Epistemic Agent|epistemic agents]] of all types. It also substitutes [[Question|''question'']] for ''topic'', as the former is the proper scientonomic term that should be used.per scientonomic term that should be used.)
    • Hierarchical Authority Delegation (Patton-2019)  + (The definition tweaks the [[Hierarchical Authority Delegation (Loiselle-2017)|original definition]]The definition tweaks the [[Hierarchical Authority Delegation (Loiselle-2017)|original definition]] of the term by [[Mirka Loiselle|Loiselle]] to ensure that the relationship of hierarchical authority delegation can obtain between [[Epistemic Agent|epistemic agents]] of all types. It also substitutes [[Question|''question'']] for ''topic'', as the former is the proper scientonomic term that should be used.per scientonomic term that should be used.)
    • Multiple Authority Delegation (Patton-2019)  + (The definition tweaks the [[Multiple Authority Delegation (Loiselle-2017)|original definition]]The definition tweaks the [[Multiple Authority Delegation (Loiselle-2017)|original definition]] of the term by [[Mirka Loiselle|Loiselle]] to ensure that the relationship of multiple authority delegation can obtain between [[Epistemic Agent|epistemic agents]] of all types. It also substitutes [[Question|''question'']] for ''topic'', as the former is the proper scientonomic term that should be used.per scientonomic term that should be used.)
    • One-sided Authority Delegation (Patton-2019)  + (The definition tweaks the [[Mutual Authority Delegation (Overgaard-Loiselle-2016)|original definition]]The definition tweaks the [[Mutual Authority Delegation (Overgaard-Loiselle-2016)|original definition]] of the term by [[Nicholas Overgaard|Overgaard]] and [[Mirka Loiselle|Loiselle]] to ensure that the relationship of one-sided authority delegation can obtain between [[Epistemic Agent|epistemic agents]] of all types. It also substitutes [[Question|''question'']] for ''topic'', as the former is the proper scientonomic term that should be used.per scientonomic term that should be used.)
    • Mutual Authority Delegation (Patton-2019)  + (The definition tweaks the [[Mutual Authority Delegation (Overgaard-Loiselle-2016)|original definition]]The definition tweaks the [[Mutual Authority Delegation (Overgaard-Loiselle-2016)|original definition]] of the term by [[Nicholas Overgaard|Overgaard]] and [[Mirka Loiselle|Loiselle]] to ensure that the relationship of multiple authority delegation can obtain between [[Epistemic Agent|epistemic agents]] of all types. It also substitutes [[Question|''question'']] for ''topic'', as the former is the proper scientonomic term that should be used.per scientonomic term that should be used.)
    • Non-Hierarchical Authority Delegation (Patton-2019)  + (The definition tweaks the [[Non-hierarchical Authority Delegation (Loiselle-2017)|original definition]]The definition tweaks the [[Non-hierarchical Authority Delegation (Loiselle-2017)|original definition]] of the term by [[Mirka Loiselle|Loiselle]] to ensure that the relationship of non-hierarchical authority delegation can obtain between [[Epistemic Agent|epistemic agents]] of all types. It also substitutes [[Question|''question'']] for ''topic'', as the former is the proper scientonomic term that should be used.per scientonomic term that should be used.)
    • Singular Authority Delegation (Patton-2019)  + (The definition tweaks the [[Singular Authority Delegation (Loiselle-2017)|original definition]]The definition tweaks the [[Singular Authority Delegation (Loiselle-2017)|original definition]] of the term by [[Mirka Loiselle|Loiselle]] to ensure that the relationship of singular authority delegation can obtain between [[Epistemic Agent|epistemic agents]] of all types. It also substitutes [[Question|''question'']] for ''topic'', as the former is the proper scientonomic term that should be used.per scientonomic term that should be used.)
    • Handling Ripple Effects - Editorial House Keeping (Shaw-Barseghyan-2019)  + (The editors should be granted official ''hThe editors should be granted official ''housekeeping rights'' to create and modify the necessary pages of the encyclopedia to handle ripple effects. Specific handling of ripple effects should depend on whether the additional change is ''implied'' by the modification or whether it is conceivable to accept the modification without accepting the additional change. There are two possible scenarios. change. There are two possible scenarios.)
    • Inferring Theory Assessment Outcomes from Acceptance or Unacceptance of Two Contenders (Patton-Overgaard-Barseghyan-2017)  + (The following inferences can be drawn regarding theory assessment outcomes from the acceptance or unacceptance of two contender theories:)
    • Inferring Theory Assessment Outcomes from Acceptance or Unacceptance of a Single Contender (Patton-Overgaard-Barseghyan-2017)  + (The following inferences can be drawn regarding theory assessment outcomes from the acceptance or unacceptance of a single contender theory:)
    • The First Law (Barseghyan-2015)  + (The following passage from [[Barseghyan (2015)|''The Laws of Scientific Change'']] summarizes the gist of the law:)
    • Scope of Scientonomy - Appraisal (Barseghyan-2015)  + (The goal of [[scientonomy]]The goal of [[scientonomy]] is to give a descriptive account of the process of [[Scientific Change|scientific change]]. Given this goal, it is obvious that it must describe and explain how changes in the [[Scientific Mosaic|mosaic]] of accepted scientific [[Theory|theories]] and employed [[Method|methods]] take place. Any actual instance of scientific change is the result of an appraisal. Therefore, a theory of scientific change ''must'' provide an account of how theories are actually appraised and thereby explain how changes in the mosaic occur. On the other hand, it ''can'' but is ''not required'' to account for the process of theory construction.p. 29r the process of theory construction.p. 29)
    • Scientonomic Workflow (Barseghyan et al.-2016)  + (The key stages of the workflow are:)
    • The Law of Compatibility (Fraser-Sarwar-2018)  + (The law of compatibility links the compatiThe law of compatibility links the compatibility criteria with various assessment outcomes. If [[Compatibility|compatibility]] is defined as the ability of a pair of elements to co-exist in the same mosaic, then the assessment for compatibility is essentially the process by which the epistemic agent decides whether any given pair of elements (i.e. theories, questions, methods) can be simultaneously part of their mosaic. Such an assessment can yield three possible outcomes - ''satisfied'', ''not satisfied'', and ''inconclusive''.p. 73 Accordingly, the law of compatibility states that if a pair of elements does satisfy the compatibility criteria of the time, then it is deemed as compatible. If, however, an element is taken to be incompatible with the other one, then the pair is deemed as incompatible. Finally, the assessment of compatibility may be inconclusive. In this case, the pair may be deemed compatible, incompatible, or its status may remai…compatible, or its status may remai…)
    • Non-Empty Mosaic theorem (Barseghyan-2015)  + (The non-empty [[Scientific Mosaic|mosaic]]The non-empty [[Scientific Mosaic|mosaic]] theorem asserts that in order for a process of [[Scientific Change|scientific change]] to be possible, the mosaic must necessarily contain at least one element. Scientific change is impossible in an empty mosaic. It can be deduced from the [[The Second Law (Barseghyan-2015)|second law]], which asserts that in order to become accepted into the mosaic, a [[Theory|theory]] is assessed by the [[Method|method]] actually employed at the time, and the [[The Third Law (Barseghyan-2015)|third law]], which asserts that a method becomes employed only when it is deducible from other employed methods and accepted theories of the time.p. 226s and accepted theories of the time.p. 226)
    • Epistemic Stances Towards Methods - Employment (Barseghyan-2015)  + (The only stance that an epistemic agent can take towards a method is [[Employed Method|''employment'']], i.e. a method is either employed or unemployed by an agent in theory evaluation.)
    • Resolution to the Paradox of Normative Propositions (Sebastien-2016)  + (The paradox of normative propositions arises from the following three premises:)
    • Synchronism of Method Rejection theorem (Barseghyan-2015)  + (The principle of this theorem is first intThe principle of this theorem is first introduced in [[Barseghyan (2015)]]. We recall that "there are two somewhat distinct scenarios of method employment. In the first scenario, a method becomes employed when it strictly follows from newly accepted theories. In the second scenario, a method becomes employed when it implements the abstract requirements of some other employed method by means of other accepted theories. It can be shown that method rejection is only possible in the first scenario; no method can be rejected in the second scenario. Namely, it can be shown that method rejection can only take place when some other method becomes employed by strictly following from a new accepted theory; the employment of a method that is not a result of the acceptance of a new theory and is merely a new implementation of some already employed method cannot possibly lead to a method rejection."p. 174ossibly lead to a method rejection."p. 174)
    • Underdetermined Theory Change theorem (Barseghyan-2015)  + (The process of [[Theory Acceptance|theory assessment]]The process of [[Theory Acceptance|theory assessment]] under the TSC is underdetermined for two reasons. First, only [[Theory|theories]] that are constructed are available for assessment. Whether or not a theory is ever constructed is, at least partly a matter of creativity, and is therefore outside the scope of the TSC. Second, it is at least theoretically possible that a process of theory assessment will be inconclusive. This might be because the requirements of the method employed at the time might be vague (e.g. Aristotelian requirements of "intuition schooled by experience").p. 199-200uition schooled by experience").p. 199-200)
    • Asynchronism of Method Employment theorem (Barseghyan-2015)  + (The theorem states that the employment of The theorem states that the employment of a method is not necessarily simultaneous with the acceptance of a new theory. Being a direct logical consequence of [[The Third Law|the third law]], the theorem highlights the fact that some methods are a result of the implementation of some abstract requirements of other methods. In this way, a new method can be devised as a means of resolving a particular creative gap, and subsequently become employed long after the acceptance of the theory that led to the employment of the abstract method. to the employment of the abstract method.)
    • Theory Exists  + (Theories are part of the process of scientific change.)
    • Scope of Scientonomy - Descriptive (Barseghyan-2015)  + (There are at least three sorts of questionThere are at least three sorts of questions that we might ask about the process of [[Scientific Change|scientific change]]; Historical questions having to do with what theories and methods were accepted by a particular community at a particular point in time, theoretical questions about the mechanisms of scientific change, and methodological questions about how scientific change ought to happen and what theories and methods ought to be accepted. The first two questions are descriptive in nature, and the third is normative. pp. 12-13ure, and the third is normative. pp. 12-13)
    • Error (Machado-Marques-Patton-2021)  + (There are several different senses in whicThere are several different senses in which one might take the concept of scientific error. One is the absolute sense. From our modern perspective, we might judge the geocentric [[Aristotle| Aristotelean-Ptolemaic cosmology's]] claim that the earth is stationary at the center of the universe as an error Allchin (2001). the universe as an error Allchin (2001).)
    • Technological Knowledge as Part of Mosaic (Mirkin-2018)  + (There is accepted propositional technologiThere is accepted propositional technological knowledge which appears to exhibit the same patterns of change as questions, theories, and methods in the natural, social, and formal sciences. Technological theories attempting to describe the construction and operation of artifacts as well as to prescribe their correct mode of operation are not merely used, but also often accepted by epistemic agents. Since technology often involves methods different from those found in science and produces normative propositions, many of which remain tacit, one may be tempted to think that changes in technological knowledge should be somehow exempt from the laws of scientific change. Yet, the discussion of the historical cases of sorting algorithms, telescopes, crop rotation, and colorectal cancer surgeries show that technological theories and methods are often an integral part of an epistemic agent’s mosaic and seem to exhibit the same scientonomic patterns of change typical of accepted theories ther…e typical of accepted theories ther…)
    • Bearers of Mosaic - Communities (Barseghyan-2015)  + (There is only one type of agents that can bear a mosaic - community.pp. 43-52 As for ''individual'' epistemic agents, their status and role in the process of scientific change is unclear; thus, the notion of an individual bearing a mosaic is problematic.)
    • Explicable-Implicit (Mirkin-Barseghyan-2018)  + (This category encompasses that knowledge wThis category encompasses that knowledge which hasn't been openly formulated by the agent but can, in principle, be open formulated. As such the category is agent-relative. The definition was first suggested by [[Hakob Barseghyan]] and [[Maxim Mirkin]] in their ''[[Barseghyan and Mirkin (2019)|The Role of Technological Knowledge in Scientific Change]]''Barseghyan and Mirkin (2019) and was restated by Mirkin in his ''[[Mirkin (2018)|The Status of Technological Knowledge in the Scientific Mosaic]]''.[[Mirkin (2018)|The Status of Technological Knowledge in the Scientific Mosaic]]''.)
    • Accidental Group (Overgaard-2017)  + (This definition aims to discern between accidental groups, i.e. the ones that don't have a collective intentionality, and actual communities, i.e. groups that do have collective intentionality.)
    • Epistemic Community (Overgaard-2017)  + (This definition attempts to capture what iThis definition attempts to capture what is arguably the key feature of epistemic communities - their collective intentionality to study/know the world. This feature, according to the definition, distinguishes epistemic communities from [[Non-Epistemic Community|non-epistemic communities]], such as political, economic, or familial communities. To use [[Nicholas Overgaard|Overgaard]]'s own example, "it is clear that an orchestra is a community: the various musicians can be said to have a collective intentionality to play a piece of music" and yet its collective intentionality is different from that of knowing the world.p. 59erent from that of knowing the world.p. 59)
    • Theory Acceptance (Sebastien-2016)  + (This definition expands on [[Theory Acceptance (Barseghyan-2015)|the original definition of the term]]This definition expands on [[Theory Acceptance (Barseghyan-2015)|the original definition of the term]] proposed by [[Hakob Barseghyan|Barseghyan]] to ensure that the term is applicable not only to ''descriptive'' theories but also to ''normative'' theories. It assumes that descriptive theories attempt to provide descriptions of their respective objects, while normative theories attempt to prescribe a certain object, the latter being understood as a certain state of affairs. understood as a certain state of affairs.)
    • Norm Employment (Barseghyan-2018)  + (This definition is meant to ensure that thThis definition is meant to ensure that the notion of employment is applicable not only to methods but to norms of all types, as is the case in the ontology of epistemic elements suggested by [[Hakob Barseghyan|Barseghyan]] in 2018. According to that ontology, the capacity of being employed can be ascribed not only to norms of theory evaluation (i.e. methods), but to [[Epistemic Stances Towards Normative Theories - Norm Employment (Barseghyan-2018)|norms of all types]], including ethical norm and aesthetic norms.Barseghyan (2018)norm and aesthetic norms.Barseghyan (2018))
    • Non-Epistemic Community (Overgaard-2017)  + (This definition is meant to highlight the This definition is meant to highlight the key difference between [[Epistemic Community|epistemic]] and non-epistemic communities. The former are said to have a collective intentionality to know the world, while the latter lack such an intentionality. A typical example of a non-epistemic community, according to [[Nicholas Overgaard|Overgaard]], is an orchestra that has a collective intentionality to play music but lack the intentionality of knowing the world.p. 59 Another example of a non-epistemic community, according to Overgaard, is a political party. While a political party might have some accepted theories, such as ideas concerning, for instance, effective governance, "a political party would be considered a non-epistemic community because it lacks a collective intentionality to know the world".p. 59ve intentionality to know the world".p. 59)
    • Compatibility (Fraser-Sarwar-2018)  + (This definition of ''compatibility'' captures the main gist of the notion as it was originally intended by [[Rory Harder|Harder]] and [[Hakob Barseghyan|Barseghyan]] - the idea that two elements are compatible when they can coexist within the same mosaic.)
    • Method (Barseghyan-2018)  + (This definition of ''method'' is meant to This definition of ''method'' is meant to encompass the criteria of evaluation of all types, regardless of their being explicit or implicit, and thus merge what was previously separated into two classes of elements - [[Method (Barseghyan-2015)|methods]] and [[Methodology (Sebastien-2016)|methodologies]].[[Methodology (Sebastien-2016)|methodologies]].)
    • Theory Acceptance (Fraser-Sarwar-2018)  + (This definition of ''theory acceptance'' mThis definition of ''theory acceptance'' makes it explicit that any accepted theory is a ''scientific'' theory. It assumes that the question of whether a theory is accepted is meaningless without the theory being scientific. The point here is that no scientist would ask whether they should accept a theory without believing, if only implicitly, that the theory is indeed scientific. Since only scientific theories have the potential to become accepted, and because only some of these do in fact become accepted, it follows that all of the accepted theories are scientific.l of the accepted theories are scientific.)
    • Methodology (Barseghyan-2018)  + (This definition of the term confines it to the respective normative ''field'' of inquiry. Specific methodological ''theories'' are referred to as [[Method (Barseghyan-2018)|''methods'']].)
    • Theory Acceptance (Barseghyan-2018)  + (This definition of the term makes it possiThis definition of the term makes it possible to apply the notion of theory acceptance to any subtype of [[Theory|theory]]. Unlike the previous definitions of the term, it doesn't imply any specific subtypes of theory, but explicitly states the relation between theories and [[Question|questions]] they attempt to answer.[[Question|questions]] they attempt to answer.)
    • The Law of Method Employment (Rawleigh-2022)  + (This law of method employment is a corollaThis law of method employment is a corollary of [[The Law of Norm Employment (Rawleigh-2022)|Rawleigh's law of norm employment]]. It implies that, just like the norms of all other types, methods become employed when they are derivable from other elements of the agent's mosaic (such as other theories, other methods, and perhaps even questions). As such, the law preserves most of the content of [[The Third Law (Sebastien-2016)|Sebastien's third law]] by solving some of the issues inherent in it.solving some of the issues inherent in it.)
    • Definition (Barseghyan-2018)  + (This somewhat simplistic definition of ''dThis somewhat simplistic definition of ''definition'' is meant to highlight that definitions are themselves theories (statements, propositions). As a result, any [[Epistemic Stances|stance]] that can be taken by [[Epistemic Agent|epistemic agents]] towards theories can also be taken towards definitions.ies can also be taken towards definitions.)
    • Closure Mechanism - Time Limit and Communal Vote (Shaw-Barseghyan-2019)  + (To ensure that a suggested modification isTo ensure that a suggested modification is properly evaluated and a verdict is reached, the community should be given a certain time period to discuss the modification, after which a communal vote should be taken. This vote should be offered to all members of the community, who should be given a short timeframe to decide.ould be given a short timeframe to decide.)
    • History of Scientific Change (Barseghyan-2015)  + (To reconstruct the state of a ''mosaic'' aTo reconstruct the state of a ''mosaic'' at time ''t,'' it is necessary to understand which theories were accepted at the time, and which methods were employed at the time. p. 12 This process is the concern of historical (empirical) questions. '''Theory of scientific change,''' although closely linked is concerned with theoretical questions. ''History of Scientific Change'' is one of the key concepts in current scientonomy. Thus, its proper definition is of great importance to recognize a descriptive theory of ''scientific change.''scriptive theory of ''scientific change.'')
    • Outcome Not Satisfied (Patton-Overgaard-Barseghyan-2017)  + (To say that a theory's assessment by a method produced the outcome "not satisfied" is the same as to say that the theory conclusively failed to meet the requirements of the method.)
    • Outcome Inconclusive (Patton-Overgaard-Barseghyan-2017)  + (To say that a theory's assessment by a method produced the outcome "inconclusive" is the same as to say that the community itself couldn't tell whether the requirements of the method were conclusively met.)
    • Outcome Satisfied (Patton-Overgaard-Barseghyan-2017)  + (To say that a theory's assessment by a method produced the outcome "satisfied" is the same as to say that the theory conclusively met the requirements of the method.)
    • Outcome Inconclusive (Barseghyan-2015)  + (To say that the theory acceptance outcome ''inconclusive'' obtained as a result of a theory's assessment by a method is the same as to say that the theory ''can'' but ''shouldn't necessarily'' be accepted.)
    • Outcome Accept (Barseghyan-2015)  + (To say that the theory acceptance outcome ''accept'' obtained as a result of a theory's assessment by a method is the same as to say that it is prescribed that the theory must be accepted.)
    • Outcome Not Accept (Barseghyan-2015)  + (To say that the theory acceptance outcome ''not accept'' obtained as a result of a theory's assessment by a method is the same as to say that it is prescribed that the theory must not be accepted.)
    • Mosaic Split (Barseghyan-2015)  + (To understand what is meant by mosaic spliTo understand what is meant by mosaic split, consider the following case. "A community initially accepts some theories and employs some methods; in other words, initially, there is one mosaic of theories and methods. Also, as a result of some events, this initially united community transforms into two different communities with two somewhat different mosaics of theories and methods."p.202 This is different than mere disagreement. ''Mosaic split'' only occurs if there are two communities that each present their different theories as accepted (in contexts like articles, conferences, textbooks and so on). That is, there is disagreement concerning the ''status'' of certain theories, and not just on the theories themselves.p.203 not just on the theories themselves.p.203)
    • Response to the Argument from Changeability of Scientific Method (Barseghyan-2015)  + (ToDo)
    • Theory (Sebastien-2016)  + (Unlike Barseghyan's [[Theory (Barseghyan-2015)|original definition]]Unlike Barseghyan's [[Theory (Barseghyan-2015)|original definition]] of ''theory'', this definition is deliberately ''neutral'' with respect to the descriptive/prescriptive divide. Thus, it allows for the existence of theories of various types and is not limited to descriptive theories.nd is not limited to descriptive theories.)
    • Community Can Have Subcommunities (Overgaard-2017)  + (When dealing with a community, it might beWhen dealing with a community, it might be useful to analyze it in terms of its constituent subcommunities (e.g. the community of particle physicists within the community of physicists). But such an analysis is based on an assumption that a community can consist of other communities, i.e. subcommunities. This assumption is by no means trivial; indeed, there might exist a view that each community is to be treated separately as one indivisible whole and, thus, any talk of its constituents is meaningless. According to Overgaard, communities can be said to be consisting of other communities.p. 58 Thus, there is such a thing as a subcommunity, i.e. a community that is part of a larger community.munity that is part of a larger community.)
    • Support (Palider-2019)  + (When one theory is said to follow from anoWhen one theory is said to follow from another, then that theory is supported by the other theory. This notion of support relies on that of [[Implication (Palider-2019)]], where support requires that one theory ''implies'' the other. Support, just like implication, is not equated to logical deduction, but just means that there is some rule-governed (or logical) connection between the supported theory and its support for the agent. As such, generally, if an agent considers one theory as evidence for another theory, then that evidence is said to support the theory, regardless of how (in)conclusive the evidence is.ess of how (in)conclusive the evidence is.)
    • Normative Inference (Palider-2019)  + (Whereas [[Implication (Palider-2019)]]Whereas [[Implication (Palider-2019)]] is an analytic relation between theories, inferences are taken to be the "movements of thought" that lead to belief revision. As argued for by Palider (2019) inferences, unlike implications, necessarily involve a normative component.p. 22 An implication alone is insufficient for an agent to revise their beliefs, or accepted theories, what is needed is that the agent take the normative stance that they should accept the theory. A '''normative inference''' is what leads an agent to taking such a normative stance.n agent to taking such a normative stance.)
    • Normative Theory (Sebastien-2016)  + (While not explicitly stated, the definitioWhile not explicitly stated, the definition assumes that normative propositions involve evaluation, i.e. they "say how something ''ought'' to be, what's good or bad, what's right or wrong".p. 12 In contrast with [[Descriptive Theory|''descriptive propositions'']], normative propositions do not aim to tell how things are, were, or will be, but rather what is good or bad, desirable or undesirable, permissible or impermissible.undesirable, permissible or impermissible.)
    • Response to the Argument from Bad Track Record (Barseghyan-2015)  + (XXXX)
    • Discipline Acceptance (Patton-Al-Zayadi-2021)  + ([[Epistemic Stances Towards Theories|Theor[[Epistemic Stances Towards Theories|Theories]] and [[Epistemic Stances Towards Questions| questions]] can both be the subject of the epistemic stances of [[Epistemic Agent|epistemic agents]]. Barseghyan (2018)Rawleigh (2018)Patton (2019) [[Discipline| Disciplines]] like biology, physics, and astrology can also be the subject of such stances. For example, biology and physics are accepted by the scientific community of the modern world as disciplines, but astrology is rejected. In our definition, a discipline is said to be accepted by an epistemic agent if that agent accepts the [[Core Question| core questions]] specified in the discipline's [[Delineating Theory|delineating theory]], as well as the delineating theory itself.Patton and Al-Zayadi (2021) theory itself.Patton and Al-Zayadi (2021))
    • Epistemic Action (Allen-2023)  + ([[Joshua Allen]] makes a case for this broad definition of the term. According to Allen:pp. 75-76)
    • Demarcation-Acceptance Synchronism (Fraser-Sarwar-2018)  + ([[The Law of Theory Demarcation (Sarwar-Fr[[The Law of Theory Demarcation (Sarwar-Fraser-2018)|The law of theory demarcation]] states that a theory is deemed as scientific only if it satisfies the demarcation criteria employed by the epistemic community at the time. [[Theory Acceptance (Fraser-Sarwar-2018)|The definition of theory acceptance]] suggested by [[Patrick Fraser|Fraser]] and [[Ameer Sarwar|Sarwar]] states that an accepted theory is a ''scientific'' theory that is taken to be the best available description or prescription of its object of study. It follows from these two premises that whenever a theory is accepted, it must also have satisfied the demarcation criteria of the time. After all, if it did not, then the definition of theory acceptance is contradicted. Therefore, if the definition of theory acceptance and the law of demarcation criteria are accepted, then it must also be accepted that accepted theories satisfy the criteria of demarcation. This demarcation-acceptance synchronism is presented somewhat more…chronism is presented somewhat more…)
    • The Law of Theory Demarcation (Sarwar-Fraser-2018) is Not Tautological (Sarwar-Fraser-2018)  + ([[The Law of Theory Demarcation (Sarwar-Fr[[The Law of Theory Demarcation (Sarwar-Fraser-2018)|The law of theory demarcation]] tries to provide a mechanism of how the scientific status of theories changes overtime. The assessment outcomes of the law (satisfied, unsatisfied, and inconclusive) are ''logically'' separated from their consequences. In particular, the assessment outcome of conclusively satisfying the demarcation criteria leads to a theory being scientific, the assessment outcome of conclusively not satisfying the criteria lead to the theory being unscientific, and the final inconclusive outcome can lead to the theory being scientific, unscientific, or uncertain.Sarwar and Fraser (2018)fic, or uncertain.Sarwar and Fraser (2018))
    • The Second Law (Patton-Overgaard-Barseghyan-2017) is Not Tautological (Patton-Overgaard-Barseghyan-2017)  + ([[The Second Law (Patton-Overgaard-Barsegh[[The Second Law (Patton-Overgaard-Barseghyan-2017)|The reformulation of the second law]] by Patton, Overgaard, and Barseghyan makes it explicit that the law is ''not'' a tautology as it clearly forbids certain logically conceivable courses of events.pp. 33-34ly conceivable courses of events.pp. 33-34)
    • The Law of Norm Employment (Rawleigh-2022)  + ([[The Third Law (Sebastien-2016)|Sebastien[[The Third Law (Sebastien-2016)|Sebastien's law of method employment]] faces several problems. Foremost among these is that it is based on an outdated ontology that assumes that methods of theory evaluation are a fundamental epistemic element. After the acceptance of [[Modification:Sciento-2018-0006|Barseghyan’s proposal]] that methods be subsumed under the category of normative theories, the third law no longer exhaustively covers all situations cases of employment. In its present form it is limited to methods, though there is no reason to think that the mechanism by which a method is employed is any different than the mechanism by which any other norm is employed.anism by which any other norm is employed.)