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Hatfield (2004) + (In the latter part of the nineteenth centu … In the latter part of the nineteenth century, philosophers, physicists, and the newpsychologists agreed to this extent in their conceptions of the mind-body problem:they all had a healthy respect for the integrity of both the mental and the physicaldomains. Whatever their particular conunitments, whether phenomenalist, dualist,or materialist, they all aCcepted the reality of both mental and physical phenomena- where mental phenomena are, in the first instance, phenomenally characterizedand perhaps equated with the contents of consciousness, and physical phenomenaabstract from the knowing subject and sustain laws governing changes in spatiotemporallycharacterized objects. This acceptance of the mental domain held forphysicists ~uch as Ludwig Boltzmann, Ernst Mach, and Hermann Hehnholtz noless than philosopher psychologists such as Wtlhehn Wundt and W~ James(despite their other differences).~ James (despite their other differences).)
Mirkin (2018) + (In this paper, I argue that there is ''acc … In this paper, I argue that there is ''accepted'' propositional technological knowledge which appears to exhibit the same patterns of change as questions, theories, and methods in the natural, social, and formal sciences. I show that technological theories attempting to describe the construction and operation of artifacts as well as to prescribe their correct mode of operation are not merely used, but also often ''accepted'' by epistemic agents. Since technology often involves methods different from those found in science and produces normative propositions, many of which remain tacit, one may be tempted to think that changes in technological knowledge should be somehow exempt from the laws of scientific change. Indeed, it seems tacitly accepted in the scientonomic community that, while scientific communities clearly ''accept'' theories, technological communities merely ''use'' them. As a result, scientonomy currently deals with natural, social, and formal ''sciences'', and the status of technological knowledge within the scientonomic ontology remains unclear. To help elucidate the topic, I propose that the historical cases of sorting algorithms, telescopes, crop rotation, and colorectal cancer surgeries confirm that technological theories and methods are often an integral part of an epistemic agent’s mosaic and seem to exhibit the same scientonomic patterns of change typical of accepted theories therein. Thus, I suggest that propositional technological knowledge can be part of a mosaic.logical knowledge can be part of a mosaic.)
Loiselle (2017) + (In this paper, I expand upon the research … In this paper, I expand upon the research on authority delegation begun by Overgaard and myself in our 2016 paper [[Overgaard and Loiselle (2016)|''Authority Delegation'']]. I argue that ''singular authority delegation'' – in which a community delegates authority over a given topic to a single expert community – should be distinguished from cases of ''multiple authority delegation''. A community engages in multiple authority delegation ''iff'' that community delegates authority over a given topic to more than one expert community. Furthermore, multiple authority delegation can be further divided into two types: ''hierarchical'' and ''non-hierarchical''. I examine two cases of authority delegation in the art market and argue that these cases model instances of hierarchical authority delegation.nces of hierarchical authority delegation.)
Theiner, Allen, and Goldstone (2010) + (In this paper, we approach the idea of gro … In this paper, we approach the idea of group cognition from the perspective of the ‘‘extended mind’’ thesis, as a special case of the more general claim that systems larger than the individual human, but containing that human, are capable of cognition (Clark , 2008; Clark & Chalmers, 1998). Instead of deliberating about ‘‘the mark of the cognitive’’ (Adams & Aizawa, 2008), our discussion of group cognition is tied to particular cognitive capacities. We review recent studies of group problem solving and group memory which reveal that specific cognitive capacities that are commonly ascribed to individuals are also aptly ascribed at the level of groups. These case studies show how dense interactions among people within a group lead to both similarity-inducing and differentiating dynamics that affect the group’s ability to solve problems. This supports our claim that groups have organization-dependent cognitive capacities that go beyond the simple aggregation of the cognitive capacities of individuals. Group cognition is thus an emergent phenomenon in the sense ofWimsatt (1986). We further argue that anybody who rejects our strategy for showing that cognitive properties can be instantiated at multiple levels in the organizational hierarchy on a priori grounds is a ‘‘demergentist,’’ and thus incurs the burden of proof for explaining why cognitive properties are ‘‘stuck’’ at a certain level of organizational structure. Finally, we show that our analysis of group cognition escapes the ‘‘coupling-constitution’’ charge that has been leveled against the extended mind thesis (Adams & Aizawa, 2008).t the extended mind thesis (Adams & Aizawa, 2008).)
Barseghyan and Shaw (2017) + (In this paper, we demonstrate how a system … In this paper, we demonstrate how a systematic ''taxonomy of stances'' can help elucidate two classic debates of the historical turn—the Lakatos–Feyerabend debate concerning theory rejection and the Feyerabend–Kuhn debate about pluralism during normal science. We contend that Kuhn, Feyerabend, and Lakatos were often talking at cross-purposes due to the lack of an agreed upon taxonomy of stances. Specifically, we provide three distinct stances that scientists take towards theories: ''acceptance'' of a theory as the best available description of its domain, ''use'' of a theory in practical applications, and ''pursuit'' (elaboration) of a theory. We argue that in the Lakatos–Feyerabend debate, Lakatos was concerned with ''acceptance'' whereas Feyerabend was mainly concerned with ''pursuit''. Additionally, we show how Feyerabend and Kuhn’s debate on the role of pluralism/monism in normal science involved a crucial conflation of all three stances. Finally, we outline a few general lessons concerning the process of scientific change.ncerning the process of scientific change.)
Overgaard and Loiselle (2016) + (In this paper, we introduce a new concept … In this paper, we introduce a new concept to the field of scientonomy, that of ''authority delegation''. ''Authority delegation'' is, in essence, a type of relation between distinct scientific communities whereby one community both recognizes another as an expert on a particular topic and will accept the theories it is told by the expert community over the same topic. Importantly, authority delegation is not a new fundamental ontological category along with ''theory'' and ''method''. We show that authority delegation is ''reducible'' to the more basic concepts of ''theory'' and ''method''. Furthermore, we suggest that authority delegation comes in two forms: ''one-sided'' authority delegation and ''mutual'' authority delegation.ation and ''mutual'' authority delegation.)
Haldane (1905) + (In this volume Elizabeth Haldane gives a detailed account of Descartes' life, works, and historical context.)
Palermos and Pritchard (2016) + (In this volume, Sanford Goldberg (chapter … In this volume, Sanford Goldberg (chapter 1) defines his socio-epistemologicalresearch programme by noting that “social epistemology is thesystematic study of the epistemic significance of other minds” (section3).1 But what can those minds be and how do they differ from the worldaround us?Goldberg elaborates by noting that relying on others is not quite thesame as relying on the natural world for evidence—as we do, for instance,when we come to know that it’s cold outside by seeing someonereaching for their parka or when we discover that we have a mouseproblem by finding the droppings under the sink. The difference, explainsGoldberg, is that others manifest “the very results of their own epistemicsensibility” (chapter 1, section 1).temic sensibility” (chapter 1, section 1).)
Hanson (1958) + (In this work, Hanson used insights from or … In this work, Hanson used insights from ordinary language philosophy, history of science, and psychology to argue that scientific thinking and observation is always theory-laden. He maintained that science would not be as rich and versatile as it is if it were not loaded with theory and expectation. He sought to elucidate the 'open' structure of scientific frameworks, as opposed to the rigid and closed definitional networks of geometry, formal logic, and mathematics. Hanson thought to challenge the logical positivist view of observation and to illuminate the process through which new conceptual frameworks in science are constructed. He is now regarded as an important forerunner of Thomas Kuhn's 'Structure of Scientific Revolutions'.n's 'Structure of Scientific Revolutions'.)
Schlosser (2015) + (In very general terms, an agent is a being … In very general terms, an agent is a being with the capacity to act, and‘agency’ denotes the exercise or manifestation of this capacity. Thephilosophy of action provides us with a standard conception and astandard theory of action. The former construes action in terms ofintentionality, the latter explains the intentionality of action in terms of causation by the agent’s mental states and events. From this, we obtain a standard conception and a standard theory of agency. There are alternative conceptions of agency, and it has been argued that the standard theory fails to capture agency (or distinctively human agency). Further, it seems that genuine agency can be exhibited by beings that are not capable of intentional action, and it has been argued that agency can and should be explained without reference to causally efficacious mental states and events. Debates about the nature of agency have flourished over the past few decades in philosophy and in other areas of research (including psychology, cognitive neuroscience, social science, and anthropology). In philosophy, the nature of agency is an important issue in the philosophy of mind, the philosophy of psychology, the debates on free will and moral responsibility, in ethics, meta-ethics, and in the debates on the nature of reasons and practical rationality. For the most part, this entry focuses on conceptual and metaphysical questions concerning the nature of agency. In the final sections, it provides an overview of empirically informed accounts of the sense of agency and of various empirical challenges to the commonsense assumption that our reasons and our conscious intentions make a real difference to how we act.ions make a real difference to how we act.)
Barseghyan (2021b) + (Incomplete and imprecise temporal data is … Incomplete and imprecise temporal data is abundant in various branches of science and technology as well as everyday life (e.g., “''A'' began after 1066 but before 1069 and ended after 1245”, “''B'' took place no later than 156 BC”). While point-circles and lines/bars have been traditionally used to depict precise temporal points and intervals, it is unclear how imprecise and incomplete temporal data can be effectively visualized or even represented. This paper suggests an intuitive diagrammatic notation for visualizing both imprecise and incomplete temporal information. It suggests using traditional whiskers with edges to depict temporal imprecision and whiskers without edges to depict incomplete temporal entities. This notation can be easily incorporated into linear temporal visualizations, such as historical timelines, Gantt charts, and timetables, to identify gaps in temporal information. The paper lays down the diagrammatic elements of the notation and illustrates their applicability to all standard relations between temporal entities. It also shows how these elements can be combined to produce complex timelines. Some possible future directions are also outlined.sible future directions are also outlined.)
Herring et al. (Eds.) (2019) + (Integrated History and Philosophy of Scien … Integrated History and Philosophy of Science (iHPS) is commonly understood as the study of science from a combined historical and philosophical perspective. Yet, since its gradual formation as a research field, the question of how to suitably integrate both perspectives remains open. This volume presents cutting edge research from junior iHPS scholars, and in doing so provides a snapshot of current developments within the field, explores the connection between iHPS and other academic disciplines, and demonstrates some of the topics that are attracting the attention of scholars who will help define the future of iHPS.s who will help define the future of iHPS.)
Barnes (1977) + (Intriguingly different in approach from co … Intriguingly different in approach from conventional works in the same area of inquiry, this study deals with the central problems and concerns of the sociology of knowledge as it has traditionally been conceived of. In other words, it is concerned with the relationship of knowledge, social interests and social structure, and with the various attempts which have been made to analyse the relationship.Barry Barnes takes the classic writings in the sociology of knowledge – by Marx, Lukács, Weber, Mannheim, Goldmann, Habermas and others – and uses them as resources in coming to grips with what he regards as the currently most interesting and significant questions in this area. This approach reflects one of the principal themes of the book itself. Knowledge, it is argued, is best treated as a resource available to those possessing it. This is the best perspective from which to understand its relationship to action and its historical significance; it is a perspective which avoids the problems of holding that knowledge is derivative, as well as those generated by the view that knowledge is a strong determinant of consciousness. the result is an unusual textbook, particularly valuable when read in conjunction with the original works it discusses.tion with the original works it discusses.)
Newton (1999) + (Isaac Newton; a new translation by I. Bernard Cohen and Anne Whitman, assisted by Julia Budenz; preceded by a guide to Newton's Principia by I. Bernard Cohen.)
Mandelbrote (2004) + (Isaac Newton’s Observations upon the Proph … Isaac Newton’s Observations upon the Prophecies of Daniel, and the Apocalypse of St. John, prepared for the press from his manuscripts by his nephew Benjamin Smith, was published in two editions in London and Dublin in 1733. According to Richard S. Westfall, Newton’s finest twentieth-century biographer, the author “had cleansed his Observations” and his heirs “could publish the manuscript without concern.”3 Yet one might be permitted to wonder whether either the actual or the intended reception of Newton’s posthumous work was as uncontroversial as it has seemed to late twentienth-century eyes. The book was dedicated to Peter King, baron of Ockham, the lord chancellor, who had defended Newton’s sometime disciple, William Whiston, during his trial for heresy in July 1713. Although Whiston later fell out with King, he nevertheless continued to maintain that King’s youthful writings on the primitive Church supported the Arian position for which he had himself been condemned.n for which he had himself been condemned.)
Kim (1999) + (It has been about a century and half since … It has been about a century and half since the ideas that we nowassociate with emergentism began taking shape.1 At the core ofthese ideas was the thought that as systems acquire increasinglyhigher degrees of organizational complexity they begin to exhibitnovel properties that in some sense transcend the properties of theirconstituent parts, and behave in ways that cannot be predicted onthe basis of the laws governing simpler systems. It is now standardto trace the birth of emergentism back to John Stuart Milland his distinction between “heteropathic” and “homopathic” laws,2although few of us would be surprised to learn that the sameor similar ideas had been entertained by our earlier philosophicalforebears.3 Academic philosophers – like Samuel Alexander andC.D. Broad in Britain, A.O. Lovejoy and Roy Wood Sellars inthe United States – played an important role in developing theconcept of emergence and the attendant doctrines of emergentism,but it is interesting to note that the fundamental idea seems to havehad a special appeal to scientists and those outside professionalphilosophy. These include the British biologist C. Lloyd Morgan,a leading theoretician of the emergentist movement early in thiscentury, and, more recently, the noted neurophysiologist Roger W.Sperry.e noted neurophysiologist Roger W. Sperry.)
Frigg (2006) + (It is now part and parcel of the official … It is now part and parcel of the official philosophical wisdom that models are essential to the acquisition and organisation of scientific knowledge. It is also generally accepted that most models represent their target systems in one way or another. But what does it mean for a model to represent its target system? I begin by introducing three conundrums that a theory of scientific representation has to come to terms with and then address the question of whether the semanticview of theories, which is the currently most widely accepted account of theories and models, provides us with adequate answers to these questions. After having argued in some detail that it does not, I briefly explain why other accounts of scientific modelling do not fit the bill either and conclude by pointing out in what direction a tenable account of scientific representation has to be sought.cientific representation has to be sought.)
Pandey (2023) + (It is unclear whether the first law forbid … It is unclear whether the first law forbids any conceivable scenarios or whether it is a tautology. This paper examines the first law with the goal of clarifying which scenarios it allows and which ones it forbids. I begin by highlighting a number of problems with the current formulations of the first laws for theories, methods, and questions, as well as the respective rejection theorems. New formulations for these laws and theorems are suggested to ensure their uniformity and the validity of their deductions. Next, I discuss a series of scenarios of theory replacement allowed by the first laws, such as the replacement by negation, the replacement by an answer to a different question, the replacement that involves the rejection of the question, and the replacement by a higher-order proposition. I then consider scenarios that are forbidden by the first law and show that this class only includes cases of rejection without replacement such as instances of element decay. This creates a dilemma. On the one hand, if cases of rejection without replacement are classified as non-scientonomic phenomena, the first law is a tautology. On the other hand, if such cases are classified as scientonomic phenomena, then the first law is not a tautology, but these cases stand as violations of the first law. The paper resolves this dilemma by opting for the former option: cases of rejection without replacement such as element decay due to catastrophic loss of records or destroyed communities are non-scientonomic, and should be considered as outside the scope of our discipline.ed as outside the scope of our discipline.)
Rupik (2021) + (It was commonly accepted in Goethe’s time … It was commonly accepted in Goethe’s time that plants were equipped both to propagate themselves and to play a certain role in the natural economy as a result of God’s beneficent and providential design. Goethe’s identification of sexual propagation as the “summit of nature” in The Metamorphosis of Plants (1790) might suggest that he, too, drew strongly from this theological-metaphysical tradition that had given rise to Christian Wolff’s science of teleology. Goethe, however, portrayed nature as inherently active and propagative, itself improvising into the future by multiple means, with no extrinsically pre-ordained goal or fixed end-point. Rooted in the nature philosophy of his friend and mentor Herder, Goethe’s plants exhibit their own historically and environmentally conditioned drives and directionality in The Metamorphosis of Plants. In this paper I argue that conceiving of nature as active productivity—not merely a passive product—freed Goethe of the need to tie plants’ forms and functions to a divine system of ends, and allowed him to consider possibilities for plants, and for nature, beyond the walls of teleology.for nature, beyond the walls of teleology.)
McDermid (2017) + (James Beattie was a Scottish philosopher a … James Beattie was a Scottish philosopher and poet who spent his entire academic career as Professor of Moral Philosophy and Logic at Marischal College in Aberdeen. His best known philosophical work, An Essay on The Nature and Immutability of Truth In Opposition to Sophistry and Scepticism (1770), is a rhetorical tour de force which affirmed the sovereignty of common sense while attacking David Hume (1711-1776). A smash bestseller in its day, this Essay on Truth made Beattie very famous and Hume very angry. The work's fame proved fleeting, as did Beattie’s philosophical reputation.as did Beattie’s philosophical reputation.)
Bolt (1998) + (John Herschel's natural philosophy, as sum … John Herschel's natural philosophy, as summarized in his Preliminary Discourse on the Study of Natural Philosophy , has long been considered a continuation of Francis Bacon's New Organon; commentators have frequently interpreted both as promoting a naive, inductivist methodology. I argue rather that Herschel promotes a more warranted and more sophisticated account. A careful reading of the Discourse, as well as of his more specialized essays, shows instead that Herschel explicitly encourages and defends the use of hypothetical reasoning. Such a methodology also describes his own extensive investigations that range over much of the spectrum of the physical sciences in the early nineteenth century. In developing this methodology, Herschel also drew on textual resources of Bacon, Isaac Newton, Roger Boscovich, Dugald Stewart, and others; most importantly, he was especially indebted to the investigations, views, and methods of his astronomer father, William Herschel. In particular, John Herschel applied his synthesis of these ideas to the empirical confirmation of his father's wide-ranging and speculative theories. In both the Discourse and in his other works, such as the Treatise on Astronomy, John Herschel promotes the use of hypotheses and of deductive methods as the tools used by experts, portraying inductive methods as the means by which sciences begin or as the most appropriate approach employed by amateurs. I also show how events of his life, including the socio-political context of early-nineteenth-century Britain, shaped Herschel's expression of his natural philosophy. Herschel's central role in the rise of science and of the philosophy of science in the nineteenth century make it imperative that we obtain a more accurate understanding of the doctrines he disseminated to practitioners of science and to popular audiences of the Victorian era. This volume provides the beginning of this broader taskrovides the beginning of this broader task)
Dunn (2003) + (John Locke (1632-1704) one of the greatest … John Locke (1632-1704) one of the greatest English philosophers of the late seventeenth and early eighteenth century, argued in his masterpiece, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, that our knowledge is founded in experience and reaches us principally through our senses; but its message has been curiously misunderstood. In this book John Dunn shows how Locke arrived at his theory of knowledge, and how his exposition of the liberal values of tolerationand responsible government formed the backbone of enlightened European thought of the eighteenth century.uropean thought of the eighteenth century.)
Uzgalis (2016) + (John Locke (b. 1632, d. 1704) was a Britis … John Locke (b. 1632, d. 1704) was a British philosopher, Oxford academic and medical researcher. Locke's monumental An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1689) is one of the first great defenses of empiricism and concerns itself with determining the limits of human understanding in respect to a wide spectrum of topics. It thus tells us in some detail what one can legitimately claim to know and what one cannot. Locke's association with Anthony Ashley Cooper (later the First Earl of Shaftesbury) led him to become successively a government official charged with collecting information about trade and colonies, economic writer, opposition political activist, and finally a revolutionary whose cause ultimately triumphed in the Glorious Revolution of 1688. Among Locke's political works he is most famous for The Second Treatise of Government in which he argues that sovereignty resides in the people and explains the nature of legitimate government in terms of natural rights and the social contract. He is also famous for calling for the separation of Church and State in his Letter Concerning Toleration. Much of Locke's work is characterized by opposition to authoritarianism. This is apparent both on the level of the individual person and on the level of institutions such as government and church. For the individual, Locke wants each of us to use reason to search after truth rather than simply accept the opinion of authorities or be subject to superstition. He wants us to proportion assent to propositions to the evidence for them. On the level of institutions it becomes important to distinguish the legitimate from the illegitimate functions of institutions and to make the corresponding distinction for the uses of force by these institutions. Locke believes that using reason to try to grasp the truth, and determine the legitimate functions of institutions will optimize human flourishing for the individual and society both in respect to its material and spiritual welfare. This in turn, amounts to following natural law and the fulfillment of the divine purpose for humanity.llment of the divine purpose for humanity.)
Jolley (1992) + (Jolley examines the reception of Descartes' philosophy within his contemporary scientific, academic, and religious communities.)
De Pierris and Friedman (2013) + (Kant famously attempted to “answer” what h … Kant famously attempted to “answer” what he took to be Hume's skeptical view of causality, most explicitly in the Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics (1783); and, because causality, for Kant, is a central example of a category or pure concept of the understanding, his relationship to Hume on this topic is central to his philosophy as a whole. Moreover, because Hume's famous discussion of causality and induction is equally central to his philosophy, understanding the relationship between the two philosophers on this issue is crucial for a proper understanding of modern philosophy more generally. Yet ever since Kant offered his response to Hume the topic has been subject to intense controversy. There is no consensus, of course, over whether Kant's response succeeds, but there is no more consensus about what this response is supposed to be. There has been sharp disagreement concerning Kant's conception of causality, as well as Hume's, and, accordingly, there has also been controversy over whether the two conceptions really significantly differ. There has even been disagreement concerning whether Hume's conception of causality and induction is skeptical at all. We shall not discuss these controversies in detail; rather, we shall concentrate on presenting one particularperspective on this very complicated set of issues. We shall clearlyindicate, however, where especially controversial points of interpretationarise and briefly describe some of the main alternatives.ly describe some of the main alternatives.)
Lakatos (1961) + (Lakatos's PhD Thesis.)
Laudan (1984a) + (Laudan constructs a fresh approach to a lo … Laudan constructs a fresh approach to a longtime problem for the philosopher of science: how to explain the simultaneous and widespread presence of both agreement and disagreement in science. Laudan critiques the logical empiricists and the post-positivists as he stresses the need for centrality and values and the interdependence of values, methods, and facts as prerequisites to solving the problems of consensus and dissent in science.blems of consensus and dissent in science.)
Hoyningen-Huene (2006) + (Let me begin with a convention. I will ref … Let me begin with a convention. I will refer to the distinction between the context of discovery and the context of justification as “the DJ distinction” (where I may note, for potentially misled younger readers, that this “DJ” has nothing to do with the music business). This paper is based on an older paper of mine (Hoyningen-Huene 1987). In the present paper, I will first recapitulate some of the topics of the older paper, and will contribute further considerations. Subsequently, I will discuss Thomas Kuhn’s ideas about justification in science. Thus will be clarified, in which sense precisely Kuhn opposed the DJ distinction. This is noteworthy, because in the 1960s and 1970s, many philosophers concluded from Kuhn’s opposition to the context distinction that he just did not understand what it was all about (and they inferred from this that he was just too uneducated as a philosopher to be taken seriously).d as a philosopher to be taken seriously).)
Kochiras (2014) + (Locke's philosophy of science consists lar … Locke's philosophy of science consists largely in his metaphysical and epistemological views of material substances and their powers. Locke has been widely hailed for providing an epistemological foundation for the experimental science of his day, and his thought is closely aligned with that of its practitioners, elaborating certain themes present in sparer form in Boyle and Newton. But if his epistemology helps to usher in the age of science, he still belongs to the age of natural philosophy. And if he is a devotee of the new science, he often appears an uncertain one, recognizing profound difficulties in it. In consequence, Locke's work is characterized by tensions and nuances, providing a rich source for scholarly research and debate. source for scholarly research and debate.)
Chappell (Ed.) (1994) + (Locke's philosophy, as edited by Chappell.)
Barseghyan and Shaw (2022) + (Many have struggled to identify the proper … Many have struggled to identify the proper way(s) that normative philosophical claims about science can benefit from history. The primary worry here has been that deriving philosophical ‘oughts’ from historical facts would commit the naturalistic fallacy (Schickore, 2011). The task of this paper is to introduce a novel solution to this problem. Specifically, we claim that the emerging field of scientonomy provides a promising avenue for how philosophy of science may benefit from the history of science. By taking descriptive findings and coupling them with additional normative premises, philosophers of science can draw normative methodological conclusions which can guide future scientific practices. Moreover, it is sometimes thought that philosophical claims about science are invariably local due to the diversity of scientific practices. While acknowledging this disunity, we show how a general theory of scientific change is possible and how it can be used to inform normative philosophy of science. Thus, we aim to outline a viable path for integrated history and philosophy of science that does not relinquish normativity and avoids the problem of cherry-picking which has plagued general accounts of science (Chang, 2011; Mizrahi, 2015).s of science (Chang, 2011; Mizrahi, 2015).)
Nickles (2017a) + (Many scientists, philosophers, and laypers … Many scientists, philosophers, and laypersons have regarded science as the one human enterprise that successfully escapes the contingencies of history to establish eternal truths about the universe, via a special, rational method of inquiry. Historicists oppose this view. In the 1960s several historically informed philosophers of science challenged the then-dominant accounts of scientific method advanced by the Popperians and the positivists (the logical positivists and logical empiricists) for failing to fit historical scientific practice and failing particularly to account for deep scientific change. While several strands of historicism originated in nineteenth-century historiography, this article focuses, first, on the historicist conceptions of scientific rationality that became prominent in the 1960s and 1970s, as the maturation of the field of historiography of science began to suggest competing models of scientific development, and, second, on recent approaches such as historical epistemology.pproaches such as historical epistemology.)
Longino (2008) + (Miriam Solomon's social empiricism is mark … Miriam Solomon's social empiricism is marked by emphasis on community level rationality in science and the refusal to impose a distinction between the epistemic and the non-epistemic character of factors (“decision vectors”) that incline scientists for or against a theory. While she attempts to derive some norms from the analysis of cases, her insistent naturalism undermines her effort to articulate norms for the (appropriate) distribution of decision vectors.opriate) distribution of decision vectors.)
Feyerabend (1993) + (Modern philosophy of science has paid grea … Modern philosophy of science has paid great attention to the understanding of scientific "practice", in contrast to the earlier concentration on scientific "method". This work, which has contributed to this debate, shows the deficiencies of some widespread ideas about the nature of knowledge. He argues that the only feasible explanations of scientific successes are historical explanations and that anarchism must now replace rationalism in the theory of knowledge. The third edition of this text contains a new preface and additional reflections which take account both of recent debates on science and on the impact of scientific products and practices on the human community. While disavowing populism or relativism, Feyerabend continues to insist that the voice of the inexpert must be heard. Thus many environmental perils were first identified by non-experts against prevailing assumptions in the scientific community.g assumptions in the scientific community.)
Reider (2016) + (Most philosophers agree that the world con … Most philosophers agree that the world contains epistemic subjects, the subjects of knowledge claims and other epistemic assessments. But does the world contain specifically epistemic agents? We talk as if epistemic subjects are agents -- 'His belief is irresponsible,' 'She ought to have known' -- but may on reflection wonder whether we should take the talk at face value. Are you responsible for your beliefs in anything like the way you are responsible for your actions? Does failing to know impugn your character in a way that parallels your failure to act with practical wisdom? Affirmative answers may emerge from reflection on the social dimension of knowing: from how you may come to know through others' testimony or let others know in turn. Can we make sense of such epistemic community without attributing specifically epistemic agency to its participants? Flipping our opening question on its head, should the social provenance of epistemic agency affect how we conceptualize the nature of epistemic subjects?ptualize the nature of epistemic subjects?)
Norton (2009) + (Much of what David Hume said about a wide … Much of what David Hume said about a wide range of subjectsremains of great importance today. In the first volume of his firstwork, A Treatise of Human Nature, a work in which he articulateda new “science of human nature,” Hume focused on an interrelatedset of issues in theory of knowledge, metaphysics, and philosophicalpsychology. More particularly, he explained how it is that we formsuch important conceptions as space and time, cause and effect,external objects, and personal identity. At the same time, he offeredan equally important account of how or why we believe in the objectsof these conceptions – an account of why we believe that causes arenecessarily connected to effects, that there are enduring externalobjects, and that there are enduring selves – even though the humanmind is unable to provide a satisfactory proof that these phenomenaexist. In the second volume of the Treatise Hume expanded hisaccount of human psychology, focusing on the origin and role of thepassions and the nature of human freedom. In the third and finalvolume of this work he explored the origins and nature of morality.In later works he returned to many of these philosophical issues,but he also made substantial contributions to our understanding ofpolitical theory, aesthetics, economics, and philosophy of religion.In addition, he wrote an influential, six-volume History of England,a work published in over 175 editions in the eighteenth and nineteenthcenturies, and still in print. nineteenth centuries, and still in print.)
Sarwar (2022) + (My aim in this chapter is to introduce the … My aim in this chapter is to introduce the general system theory and to provide directions for research. One of the central issues in scientonomy is that its object of study is ill-defined. I will begin to approach this question by drawing on the general system theory. In so doing, I will introduce the scientonomic community to a radically different way of thinking about explaining changes in scientific worldviews. Even if many of my ideas appear radical, I hope that by contradistinction the reader may appreciate how the scientonomic ideas may be made more precise.ientonomic ideas may be made more precise.)
Paley (1809) + (Natural Theology or Evidences of the Exist … Natural Theology or Evidences of the Existence and Attributes of the Deity is an 1802 work of Christian apologetics and philosophy of religion by the English clergyman William Paley (July 1743 – 25 May 1805). The book expounds his arguments from natural theology, making a teleological argument for the existence of God, notably beginning with the watchmaker analogy.The book was written in the context of the natural theology tradition. In earlier centuries, theologians such as John Ray and William Derham, as well as philosophers of classical times such as Cicero, argued for the existence and goodness of God from the general well-being of living things and the physical world.Paley's Natural Theology is an extended argument, constructed around a series of examples including finding a watch; comparing the eye to a telescope; and the existence of finely adapted mechanical structures in animals, such as joints which function like hinges or manmade ball and socket joints. Paley argues that these all lead to an intelligent Creator, and that a system is more than the sum of its parts. The last chapters are more theological in character, arguing that the attributes of God must be sufficient for the extent of his operations, and that God must be good because designs seen in nature are beneficial.The book was many times republished and remains in print. It continues to be consulted by creationists. Charles Darwin took its arguments seriously and responded to them; evolutionary biologists like Stephen Jay Gould and Richard Dawkins continue to discuss Paley's book to respond to modern proponents with similar ideas.d to modern proponents with similar ideas.)
Rescher (2000b) + (Nature and Understanding explores the pros … Nature and Understanding explores the prospect of looking from a scientific point of view at such central ideas of traditional metaphysics as the simplicity of nature, its comprehensibility, or its systematic integrity. Rescher seeks to describe - in a way accessible to philosophers and nonphilosophers alike - the metaphysical situation that characterizes the process of inquiry in natural science. His principal aim is to see what light can be shed on reality by examining the modus operandi of natural science itself, focusing as much on its findings as on its conceptual and methodological presuppositions. This is the culmination of many years of penetrating work in this area of philosophy by one of its most eminent exponents. It is the definitive presentation of some of Rescher's key ideas.esentation of some of Rescher's key ideas.)
Smith (2009) + (No work of science has drawn more attentio … No work of science has drawn more attention from philosophers than Newton's Principia. The reasons for this, however, and consequently the focus of the attention have changed significantly from one century to the next. During the 20th Century philosophers have viewed the Principia in the context of Einstein's new theory of gravity in his theory of general relativity. The main issues have concerned the relation between Newton'sand Einstein's theories of gravity and what the need to replace the former with the latter says about the nature, scope, and limits of scientific knowledge. During most of the 18th Century, by contrast, Newton's theory of gravity remained under dispute, especially because of the absence of a mechanism — in particular, a contact mechanism — producing gravitational forces. The philosophic literature correspondingly endeavored to clarify and to resolve, one way or the other, the dispute over whether the Principia should or should not be viewed as methodologically well founded. By the 1790s Newton's theory of gravity had become established among those engaged in research in orbital mechanics and physical geodesy, leading to the Principia becoming the exemplar of science at its most successful. Philosophic interest in the Principia during the 19th Century therefore came to focus on how Newton had achieved this success, in part to characterize the knowledge that had been achieved and in part to pursue comparable knowledge in other areas of research. Unfortunately, a very large fraction of the philosophic literature in all three centuries has suffered from a quite simplistic picture of the Principia itself. The main goal of this entry is to replace that simplistic picture with one that does more justice to the richness of both the content and the methodology of the Principiantent and the methodology of the Principia)
Thijssen (2003) + (On March 7, 1277, the Bishop of Paris, Ste … On March 7, 1277, the Bishop of Paris, Stephen Tempier, prohibited the teaching of 219 philosophical and theological theses that were being discussed and disputed in the faculty of arts under his jurisdiction. Tempier’s condemnation has gained great symbolic meaning in the minds of modern intellectual historians, and possibly for this reason, there is still considerable disagreement about what motivated Tempier to promulgate his prohibition, what exactly was condemned, and who the targets were. In addition, the effects of Tempier’s action on the course of medieval thought in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, and even beyond, has been the subject of much debate. The lack of a commonly accepted standard account of Tempier’s actions plus the enormous amount of literature and of textual evidence that either directly or indirectly bears on the events of 1277, puts specific limitations to the present entry. It will be confined to presenting those historical facts that are uncontroversial and to indicating the main issues of current debate with respect to Tempier’s condemnation.te with respect to Tempier’s condemnation.)
Abbott et al. (2016) + (On September 14, 2015 at 09:50:45 UTC the … On September 14, 2015 at 09:50:45 UTC the two detectors of the Laser Interferometer Gravitational-Wave Observatory simultaneously observed a transient gravitational-wave signal. The signal sweeps upwards in frequency from 35 to 250 Hz with a peak gravitational-wave strain of 1.0 × 10−21. It matches the waveform predicted by general relativity for the inspiral and merger of a pair of black holes and the ringdown of the resulting single black hole. These observations demonstrate the existence of binary stellar-mass black hole systems. This is the first direct detection of gravitational waves and the first observation of a binary black hole merger.observation of a binary black hole merger.)
Castelvecchi and Witze (2016) + (One hundred years after Albert Einstein predicted the existence of gravitational waves, scientists have finally spotted these elusive ripples in space-time.)
Fraser (2022) + (One of the most salient lessons from HPS a … One of the most salient lessons from HPS as a discipline is that science is a living, breathing endeavor; one whose rules and values are constantly changing. As such, there is an essential tension between the hope for a coherent, unified conception of scientific rationality on the one hand, and the recognition of the diversity of perspectives which fit into the framework called science. The big question, of which I hope to answer a small part, is: how can rationality and relativism be reconciled with one another? To do this, I present a rational reconstruction of a theory of scientific change which resembles Barseghyan’s theory of scientific change. I interpret scientific knowledge modally; the scientific mosaic of a community at a particular time is taken to represent the actual instantiation of a collection of possible scientific changes, all linked to one another through a Kripkean semantics of possible worlds. I then draw a correspondence between accepted scientific theories and employed methods with logical axioms and rules of inference respectively and use this to construct a logical framework for studying the modality of scientific knowledge. I use this framework to obtain a notion of scientific rationality which is contextually localized, but still presents a clear direction of scientific development at every individual time step.development at every individual time step.)
Sarton (1987) + (Originally Published 1931.)
Sarton (2011) + (Originally published by Harvard University Press in 1952.)
Sarton (1957a) + (Originally published in 1936 by Harvard University Press.)
Sarton (2007) + (Originally published in 1948.)
Sarton (2017) + (Originally published in 1955.)
Ruse (1999) + (Originally published in 1979, The Darwinia … Originally published in 1979, The Darwinian Revolution was the first comprehensive and readable synthesis of the history of evolutionary thought. Though the years since have seen an enormous flowering of research on Darwin and other nineteenth-century scientists concerned with evolution, as well as the larger social and cultural responses to their work, The Darwinian Revolution remains remarkably current and stimulating.emains remarkably current and stimulating.)

(Originally-20published-20in-201955.)

Schantz and Seidel (Eds.) (2011) + (Over history, cognitive relativism has bee … Over history, cognitive relativism has been an unpopular viewpoint in the philosophy of knowledge. Yet relativist ideas in epistemology have experienced an unprecedented popularity in the twentieth century due thinkers such as Willard Quine, Thomas Kuhn, and Ludwig Wittgenstein. The questions of whether these ideas, in fact, support relativism, and whether or not a social constructivist view of science is logically coherent and feasible is the subject of this series of essays.e is the subject of this series of essays.)
Leary (1979) + (Over the past one hundred years psychology … Over the past one hundred years psychology has evolved into a major scientific discipline. Nonetheless, psychology is presently in a state of considerable turmoil regarding its proper subject matter and method. Is psychology a natural science, a social science, or a hybrid of the two? What relation should psychology maintain with philosophy? These general questions, currently under debate, were addressed by Wilhelm Wundt, one of the founders of modern experimental psychology. This articleis an attempt to specify Wundt’s conceptualization of psychology and to place it in its historical context. Secondarily it also traces certain major developments since the time of Wundt. The conclusion that is reached is that the apparent contemporary "crisis" in psychology is really nothing new and that, in fact, the present condition of psychology does not necessarily constitute a crisis. In its broad outline at least, present-day psychology reflects the program which Wundt espoused one hundredyears ago.hich Wundt espoused one hundred years ago.)
Feyerabend (1981b) + (Over the past thirty years Paul Feyerabend … Over the past thirty years Paul Feyerabend has developed an extremely distinctive and influential approach to problems in the philosophy of science. The most important and seminal of his published essays are collected here in two volumes, with new introductions to provide an overview and historical perspective on the discussions of each part. Volume 1 presents papers on the interpretation of scientific theories, together with papers applying the views developed to particular problems in philosophy and physics. The essays in volume 2 examine the origin and history of an abstract rationalism, as well as its consequences for the philosophy of science and methods of scientific research. Professor Feyerabend argues with great force and imagination for a comprehensive and opportunistic pluralism. In doing so he draws on extensive knowledge of scientific history and practice, and he is alert always to the wider philosophical, practical and political implications of conflicting views. These two volumes fully display the variety of his ideas, and confirm the originality and significance of his work. originality and significance of his work.)
Feyerabend (1981a) + (Over the past thirty years Paul Feyerabend … Over the past thirty years Paul Feyerabend has developed an extremely distinctive and influential approach to problems in the philosophy of science. The most important and seminal of his published essays are collected here in two volumes, with new introductions to provide an overview and historical perspective on the discussions of each part. Volume 1 presents papers on the interpretation of scientific theories, together with papers applying the views developed to particular problems in philosophy and physics. The essays in volume 2 examine the origin and history of an abstract rationalism, as well as its consequences for the philosophy of science and methods of scientific research. Professor Feyerabend argues with great force and imagination for a comprehensive and opportunistic pluralism. In doing so he draws on extensive knowledge of scientific history and practice, and he is alert always to the wider philosophical, practical and political implications of conflicting views. These two volumes fully display the variety of his ideas, and confirm the originality and significance of his work. originality and significance of his work.)
Pitt (Ed.) (1985) + (Papers related to and arising from the Fourth International Conference on History and Philosophy of Science, Blacksburg, Virginia, November 1982.)
Feyerabend (2010) + (Paul Feyerabend’s globally acclaimed work, … Paul Feyerabend’s globally acclaimed work, which sparked and continues to stimulate fierce debate, examines the deficiencies of many widespread ideas about scientific progress and the nature of knowledge. Feyerabend argues that scientific advances can only be understood in a historical context. He looks at the way the philosophy of science has consistently overemphasized practice over method, and considers the possibility that anarchism could replace rationalism in the theory of knowledge. This updated edition of the classic text includes a new introduction by Ian Hacking, one of the most important contemporary philosophers of science. Hacking reflects on both Feyerabend’s life and personality as well as the broader significance of the book for current discussions.cance of the book for current discussions.)
Feyerabend (1975a) + (Paul Feyerabend’s globally acclaimed work, … Paul Feyerabend’s globally acclaimed work, which sparked and continues to stimulate fierce debate, examines the deficiencies of many widespread ideas about scientific progress and the nature of knowledge. Feyerabend argues that scientific advances can only be understood in a historical context. He looks at the way the philosophy of science has consistently overemphasized practice over method, and considers the possibility that anarchism could replace rationalism in the theory of knowledge.ce rationalism in the theory of knowledge.)
Matilal and Charkrabarti (Eds.) (1994) + (Perspectives on testimony in Indian philosophy.)
Anstey (2011) + (Peter Anstey presents a thorough and innov … Peter Anstey presents a thorough and innovative study of John Locke's views on the method and content of natural philosophy. Focusing on Locke's Essay concerning Human Understanding, but also drawing extensively from his other writings and manuscript remains, Anstey argues that Locke was an advocate of the Experimental Philosophy: the new approach to natural philosophy championed by Robert Boyle and the early Royal Society who were opposed to speculative philosophy. On the question of method, Anstey shows how Locke's pessimism about the prospects for a demonstrative science of nature led him, in the Essay, to promote Francis Bacon's method of natural history, and to downplay the value of hypotheses and analogical reasoning in science. But, according to Anstey, Locke never abandoned the ideal of a demonstrative natural philosophy, for he believed that if we could discover the primary qualities of the tiny corpuscles that constitute material bodies, we could then establish a kind of corpuscular metric that would allow us a genuine science of nature. It was only after the publication of the Essay, however, that Locke came to realize that Newton's Principia provided a model for the role of demonstrative reasoning in science based on principles established upon observation, and this led him to make significant revisions to his views in the 1690s. On the content of Locke's natural philosophy, it is argued that even though Locke adhered to the Experimental Philosophy, he was not averse to speculation about the corpuscular nature of matter. Anstey takes us into new terrain and new interpretations of Locke's thought in his explorations of his mercurialist transmutational chymistry, his theory of generation by seminal principles, and his conventionalism about species.es, and his conventionalism about species.)
Palider (2022) + (Philosophy of science and history of scien … Philosophy of science and history of science have been unable to integrate in a meaningful fashion. The major difficulty has been the question of how the history of science can inform the philosophy of science. By making several distinctions to characterize the type of philosophy of science relevant for integrated HPS, I show how traditional approaches to integration failed. These include a top-down and a bottom-up philosophical approach to integrated HPS. I then present a more fruitful way of integrating the disciplines, that of iterations.ating the disciplines, that of iterations.)
Garber (1992) + (Physics and its foundations were central t … Physics and its foundations were central to Descartes' thought. Although today he is probably best known for his metaphysics of mind and body, or for his epistemological program, in the seventeenth century Descartes was at very least equally well known for his mechanistic physics and the mechanist world of geometrical bodies in motion which he played a large role in making acceptable to his contemporaries. In this essay I shall outline Descartes' mechanical philosophy in its historical context. After some brief remarks on the immediate background to Descartes' program for physics, and a brief outline of the historical development of his physics, we shall discuss the foundations of Descartes' physics, including his concepts of body and motion and his views on the laws of motion.otion and his views on the laws of motion.)
Fisher (2014) + (Pierre Gassendi (b. 1592, d. 1655) was a F … Pierre Gassendi (b. 1592, d. 1655) was a French philosopher, scientificchronicler, observer, and experimentalist, scholar of ancient texts anddebates, and active participant in contemporary deliberations of the firsthalf of the seventeenth century. His significance in early modern thoughthas in recent years been rediscovered and explored, towards a betterunderstanding of the dawn of modern empiricism, the mechanicalphilosophy, and relations of modern philosophy to ancient and medievaldiscussions. While Gassendi is perhaps best known in history ofphilosophy for his disputes with Descartes, his relations with other majorfigures, including Kepler, Galileo, Mersenne, Beeckman, and Hobbes,represented even more important transactions of ideas. And whileGassendi also sought to communicate anew the ideas of Epicurus, theStoics, and other earlier thinkers, his resulting amalgam of perspectivesprovides a modern view of his own making, one of the touchstones ofphilosophy and science in his times: our access to knowledge of thenatural world is dependent on the constraints and licenses that follow fromour epistemic grasp being limited to information provided by senses.limited to information provided by senses.)
Longino (2016b) + (Practice-centric and theory-centric approa … Practice-centric and theory-centric approaches in philosophy of science are described and contrasted. The contrast is developed through an examination of their different treatments of the underdetermination problem. The practice-centric approach is illustrated by a summary of comparative research on approaches in the biology of behaviour. The practice-centric approach is defended against charges that it encourages skepticism regarding the sciences.ourages skepticism regarding the sciences.)
Anagnostopoulos and Miller (Eds.) (2013) + (Preparing this homage to David Keyt has b … Preparing this homage to David Keyt has been a labor of love for the editors and contributors alike. The volume contains ﬁfteen essays by sixteen scholars including students, colleagues, and friends (the latter category being all inclusive!). All of the authors make important original contributions to the study of ancient Greek philosophy, and we wish to thank them all for agreeing to participate in this project, for their cooperation with the editing, and for the high quality of their essays. We are also grateful for their patience and good cheer throughout an unexpectedly protracted publication process. T he papers by Gerasimos Santas, Nils Rauhut, Mark McPherran, Charles Young, and Fred D. Miller, Jr. were delivered originally at a conference (aka “the Keytfest”) held at the University of Washington in Seattle in 2007 commemorating David Keyt’s ﬁ ftieth year as a professor of philosophy. Kenneth Clatterbaugh, Chair of the Department of Philosophy at the University of Washington, was very supportive of the program, and Bev Wessel provided valuable administrative assistance. Daniel Fisher, a student of David Keyt, offered generous ﬁ nancial support. Richard Parker, another former student, served as quipster and consummate master of ceremonies. W e are pleased to thank a number of people who have been very helpful with the editing and publication of this volume including Professor Stephen Hetherington, the editor of Springer’s Philosophical Studies Series; Ingrid van Laarhoven; Christi Lue; Ties Nijssen; Hendrikje Tuerlings; Professor Nicholas D. Smith, who helped to ﬁ nd a suitable publisher for the volume; and an anonymous reviewer who provided helpful comments. James Dabgotra ably assisted with the ﬁ rst round of editing, and Pamela Phillips did an excellent job copyediting the entire typescript and preparing it for the publisher. We also gratefully acknowledge ﬁnancial support from the Social Philosophy and Policy Foundation for the original conference and for the editing of the volume. Finally, we thank David Keyt for his assistance throughout the planning and preparation of the volume and especially for his willingness to contribute a fascinating memoir of his academic career which, in addition to delightful anecdotes about his encounters with notable scholars, offers illuminating insights into his own work and also into the recent history of the subdiscipline of ancient philosophy. With affection and admiration, we the editors and all the contributors dedicate this volume to David Keyt, in recognition of his major contributions to the study of ancient philosophy, and on behalf of the many students, colleagues, and friends whose lives he has touched and enriched over the past half century.d and enriched over the past half century.)
Latour (2005) + (Reassembling the social is Latour's challe … Reassembling the social is Latour's challenge to classical sociological understandings of the "social" and contends that there is not a necessary social ether which often influences human actions, but that by definition networks of human actions are the social aspect often erroneous identified. social aspect often erroneous identified.)
Barseghyan (2018) + (Recent developments in theoretical sciento … Recent developments in theoretical scientonomy coupled with a reflection on the practice of the Encyclopedia of Scientonomy all suggest that the ontology of scientific change currently accepted in scientonomy has serious flaws. The new ontology, suggested in this paper, solves some of the issues permeating the current ontology. Building on [[Modification:Sciento-2018-0002|Rawleigh’s suggestion]], it considers a ''theory'' as an attempt to answer a certain ''question''. It also introduces the category of ''definition'' as a subtype of theory. It also reveals that ''methods'' and ''methodologies'' of the currently accepted ontology do not differ from the perspective of their propositional content and, thus, belong to the same class of epistemic elements. This is captured in the new definition of ''method'' as a set of criteria for theory evaluation. It is also argued that ''methods'' are a subtype of ''normative theories''. It is shown that ''normative theories'' of all types, including methods, ethical norms, and aesthetic norms, can be both ''accepted and employed''. Finally, a new definition of ''scientific mosaic'' is suggested to fit the new ontology.ic'' is suggested to fit the new ontology.)
Intemann (2008) + (Recent feminist philosophers of science ha … Recent feminist philosophers of science have argued that feminist values can contribute to rational decisions about which scientific theories to accept. On this view, increasing the number of feminist scientists is important for ensuring rational and objective theory acceptance. The Underdetermination Thesis has played a key role in arguments for this view [Anderson (1995) Hypatia 10(3), 50–84; Hankinson Nelson (1990) Who knows? From Quine to a feminist empiricism. Temple University Press, Philadelphia; Longino (1990) Science as social knowledge. Princeton University Press, Princeton; Longino (2002) The fate of knowledge. Princeton University Press, Princeton; Kourany (2003) Philosophy of Science 70, 1–14]. This thesis is alleged to open an argumentative “gap” between evidence and theory acceptance and provide a rationale for filling the gap with feminist values. While I agree with the conclusion that feminist values can contribute to rational decisions about which theories to accept, I argue that the Underdetermination Thesis cannot support this claim. First, using earlier arguments [Laudan (1990) in: R. Giere (ed) Minnesota studies in the philosophy of science, vol 14, pp 267–297; Slezak (1991) International Studies in Philosophy of Science 5, 241–256; Pinnick (1994) Philosophy of Science 61, 664–657] I show that Underdetermination cannot, by itself, establish that feminist values should fill the gap in theory acceptance. Secondly, I argue that the very use of the Underdetermination Thesis concedes that feminist values are extra-scientific, a-rational, factors in theory acceptance. This concession denies feminists grounds to explain why their values contribute to rational scientific reasoning. Finally, I propose two alternative ways to explain how feminist values can contribute to rational theory acceptance that do not rely on Underdetermination.ce that do not rely on Underdetermination.)
Stump (2022) + (Relative, pragmatic, or dynamic theories o … Relative, pragmatic, or dynamic theories of the a priori have been considered by many philosophers of science. I present these theories as a model of how radical conceptual change occurs during a scientific revolution. When elements of a theory that are considered to be a priori or constitutive change, we have a revolutionary change that requires rethinking all of a scientific practice. Given that conceptual change is the flashpoint for discussion of the issues of incommensurability, the rationality of scientific change and relativism, by exploring theories of the a priori I show how radical conceptual change can occur and defend the rationality of scientific change. The viewpoint adopted avoids commitment to traditional a priori knowledge and to metaphysics, while still acknowledging that there is an important element in science that cannot simply be described as empirical. I present evidence to show that the model of scientific change can be applied widely.f scientific change can be applied widely.)
Newman (2014) + (René Descartes (1596–1650) is widely regar … René Descartes (1596–1650) is widely regarded as the father of modern philosophy. His noteworthy contributions extend to mathematics and physics. This entry focuses on his philosophical contributions in the theory of knowledge. Specifically, the focus is on the epistemological project of Descartes' famous work, Meditations on First Philosophy. Upon its completion, the work was circulated to other philosophers for their comments and criticisms. Descartes responded with detailed replies that provide a rich source of further information about the original work. He indeed published the first edition (1641) of the Meditations together with six sets of objections and replies, adding a seventh set with the second edition (1642).eventh set with the second edition (1642).)
Hatfield (2016) + (René Descartes (1596–1650) was a creative … René Descartes (1596–1650) was a creative mathematician of the first order, an important scientific thinker, and an original metaphysician. During the course of his life, he was a mathematician first, a natural scientist or “natural philosopher” second, and a metaphysician third. In mathematics, he developed the techniques that made possible algebraic (or “analytic”) geometry. In natural philosophy, he can be credited with several specific achievements: co-framer of the sine law of refraction, developer of an important empirical account of the rainbow, and proposer of a naturalistic account of the formation of the earth and planets (a precursor to the nebular hypothesis). More importantly, he offered a new vision of the natural world that continues to shape our thought today: a world of matter possessing a few fundamental properties and interacting according to a few universal laws. This natural world included an immaterial mind that, in human beings, was directly related to the brain; in this way, Descartes formulated the modern version of the mind–body problem. In metaphysics, he provided arguments for the existence of God, to show that the essence of matter is extension, and that the essence of mind is thought. Descartes claimed early on to possess a special method, which was variously exhibited in mathematics, natural philosophy, and metaphysics, and which, in the latter part of his life, included, or was supplemented by, a method of doubt.or was supplemented by, a method of doubt.)
Wimsatt (2006) + (Richard Levins’ distinction between aggreg … Richard Levins’ distinction between aggregate, composed and evolvedsystems acquires new significance as we recognize the importance of mechanisticexplanation. Criteria for aggregativity provide limiting cases for absence of organization,so through their failure, can provide rich detectors for organizational properties.I explore the use of failures of aggregativity for the analysis of mechanisticsystems in diverse contexts. Aggregativity appears theoretically desireable, but weare easily fooled. It may be exaggerated through approximation, conditions ofderivation, and extrapolating from some conditions of decomposition illegtimatelyto others. Evolved systems particularly may require analyses under alternativecomplementary decompositions. Exploring these conditions helps us to betterunderstand the strengths and limits of reductionistic methods.gths and limits of reductionistic methods.)
Laudan, Laudan, and Donovan (1988) + (Science is accorded high value in our cult … Science is accorded high value in our culture because, unlike many other intellectual endeavors, it appears capable of producing increasingly reliable knowledge. During the last quarter century a group of historians and philosophers of science (known variously as 'theorists of scientific change', the 'post-positivist school' or the 'historical school') has proposed theories to explain progressive change in science. Their concepts and models have received such keen attention that terms like 'paradigm' have passed from obscurity to common speech. In this volume, we subject key claims of some of the theorists of scientific change to just that kind of empirical scrutiny that has been so characteristic of science itself. Certain claims emerge unscathed - the existence and importance of large-scale theories (guiding assumptions) in the physical sciences for example. Others, such as the supposed importance of novel predictions or the alleged insignificance of anomalies, seem to be without foundation. We conclude that only by engaging in testing of this sort will the study of science be able to make progress.study of science be able to make progress.)
Winther (2016) + (Scientific inquiry has led to immense expl … Scientific inquiry has led to immense explanatory and technologicalsuccesses, partly as a result of the pervasiveness of scientific theories.Relativity theory, evolutionary theory, and plate tectonics were, andcontinue to be, wildly successful families of theories within physics,biology, and geology. Other powerful theory clusters inhabitcomparatively recent disciplines such as cognitive science, climatescience, molecular biology, microeconomics, and Geographic InformationScience (GIS). Effective scientific theories magnify understanding, helpsupply legitimate explanations, and assist in formulating predictions.Moving from their knowledge-producing representational functions totheir interventional roles (Hacking 1983), theories are integral to building technologies used within consumer, industrial, and scientific milieus. This entry explores the structure of scientific theories from the perspective of the Syntactic, Semantic, and Pragmatic Views. Each of these answers questions such as the following in unique ways. What is the bestcharacterization of the composition and function of scientific theory? How is theory linked with world? Which philosophical tools can and should be employed in describing and reconstructing scientific theory? Is an understanding of practice and application necessary for a comprehensionof the core structure of a scientific theory? Finally, and most generally,how are these three views ultimately related? are these three views ultimately related?)
Allen (1988) + (Scientists, philosophers and theologians h … Scientists, philosophers and theologians have wrestled repeatedly with the question of whether knowledge is similar or different in their various understandings of the world and God. Although agreement is still elusive, the epistemology of critical realism, associated with Ian Barbour, John Polkinghorne and Arthur Peacocke, remains widely credible. Relying on the lifetime work of philosopher Ernan McMullin, this book expands our understanding of critical realism beyond a permanent stand-off between the subjective and objective, whether in science or theology. Critical realism illuminates the subject and the objectively known simultaneously. Responding to criticisms made against it, this book defends critical realism in science and theology with a specific role to play in our understanding of God. role to play in our understanding of God.)
Yan, Tsai, and Huang (2022) + (Scientonomy is the field that aims to deve … Scientonomy is the field that aims to develop a descriptive theory of the actual process of scientific change (Barseghyan, 2015). Scientometrics is the field that aims to employ statistical methods to investigate the quantitative features of scientific research, especially the impact of scientific articles and the significance of scientific citations (Leydesdorff & Milojević, 2013). In this paper, we aim to illustrate how to methodologically integrate scientonomy with scientometrics to investigate both qualitative and quantitative changes of a scientific community. We will use a case study to achieve our aim. The case study is about a scientific community studying a physiological phenomenon called heart-rate variability (HRV). Moreover, we will argue that this methodological integration outperforms cases in which researchers only employ the resources from one of the two fields.ploy the resources from one of the two fields.)
Dechauffour (2022) + (Scientonomy seems to hold conflicting view … Scientonomy seems to hold conflicting views about the historicity of scientific method. On the one hand, it is said that scientific methods are immanent to scientific mosaics and therefore change through time. On the other hand, the distinction between substantive and procedural methods seems to suggest that there are transcendent, unchangeable methods. I argue that this contradiction can be resolved by re-evaluating the role of problems: by integrating problems as constitutive elements of scientific mosaics, scientonomy can work towards a theory of scientific change without relying on the presupposition that some normative aspects of science must not change. In that perspective, norms originate in the relation between a problem, which creates a need for theoretical innovation, and a method, which creates an actual means to solve a problem. A problem-based scientonomy would then have to build a genealogical, rather than normative, approach to the source of scientificity by describing the progression from mysteries to scientific problems. Moreover, because they do not come from nowhere but express actual interactions with the world, problems can help us understand the relation between scientific change and other kinds of change. The primacy of actual problems over rational norms points to the immanence of reason: reason should be conceived as an evolutive feature of human communities. Finally, the relation between a theory of scientific change, evolutionary epistemology, and a general theory of change is investigated. general theory of change is investigated.)
Terrall (2002) + (Self-styled adventurer, literary wit, phil … Self-styled adventurer, literary wit, philosopher, and statesman of science, Pierre-Louis Moreau de Maupertuis (1698-1759) stood at the center of Enlightenment science and culture. Offering an elegant and accessible portrait of this remarkable man, Mary Terrall uses the story of Maupertuis's life, self-fashioning, and scientific works to explore what it meant to do science and to be a man of science in eighteenth-century Europe.Beginning his scientific career as a mathematician in Paris, Maupertuis entered the public eye with a much-discussed expedition to Lapland, which confirmed Newton's calculation that the earth was flattened at the poles. He also made significant, and often intentionally controversial, contributions to physics, life science, navigation, astronomy, and metaphysics. Called to Berlin by Frederick the Great, Maupertuis moved to Prussia to preside over the Academy of Sciences there. Equally at home in salons, cafés, scientific academies, and royal courts, Maupertuis used his social connections and his printed works to enhance a carefully constructed reputation as both a man of letters and a man of science. His social and institutional affiliations, in turn, affected how Maupertuis formulated his ideas, how he presented them to his contemporaries, and the reactions they provoked.Terrall not only illuminates the life and work of a colorful and important Enlightenment figure, but also uses his story to delve into many wider issues, including the development of scientific institutions, the impact of print culture on science, and the interactions of science and government. Smart and highly readable, Maupertuis will appeal to anyone interested in eighteenth-century science and culture.“Terrall’s work is scholarship in the best sense. Her explanations of arcane 18th-century French physics, mathematics, astronomy, and biology are among the most lucid available in any language.” — ''Virginia Dawson, American Historical Review''Winner of the 2003 Pfizer Award from the History of Science Society Award from the History of Science Society)
Mill (2003) + (Since its first publication in 1859, few w … Since its first publication in 1859, few works of political philosophy have provoked such continuous controversy as John Stuart Mill's "On Liberty", a passionate argument on behalf of freedom of self-expression. This classic work is now available in this volume which also includes essays by scholars in a range of fields. The text begins with a biographical essay by David Bromwich and an interpretative essay by George Kateb. Then Jean Bethke Elshtain, Owen Fiss, Judge Richard A. Posner and Jeremy Waldron present commentaries on the pertinence of Mill's thinking to early 21st century debates. They discuss, for example, the uses of authority and tradition, the shifting legal boundaries of free speech and free action, the relation of personal liberty to market individualism, and the tension between the right to live as one pleases and the right to criticize anyone's way of life.e right to criticize anyone's way of life.)
Cohen and Smith (Eds.) (2002) + (Sir Isaac Newton (1642–1727) was one of th … Sir Isaac Newton (1642–1727) was one of the greatest scientists of all time, a thinker of extraordinary range and creativity who has left enduring legacies in mathematics and the natural sciences. In this volume a team of distinguished contributors examine all the main aspects of Newton's thought, including not only his approach to space, time, mechanics, and universal gravity in his Principia, his research in optics, and his contributions to mathematics, but also his more clandestine investigations into alchemy, theology, and prophecy, which have sometimes been overshadowed by his mathematical and scientific interests.his mathematical and scientific interests.)
Ariew (1986) + (Some philosophers of science suggest that … Some philosophers of science suggest that philosophical assumptions mustinfluence historical scholarship, because history (like science) has no neutral data andbecause the treatment of any particular historical episode is going to be influenced tosome degree by one's prior philosophical conceptions of what is important in science.However, if the history of science must be laden with philosophical assumptions, then howcan the history of science be evidence for the philosophy of science? Would not aninductivist history of science confirm an inductivist philosophy of science and aconventionalist history of science confirm a conventionalist philosophy of science? Iattempt to resolve this problem; essentially, I deny the claim that the history of sciencemust be influenced by one's conception of what is important in science - one's generalphilosophy of science. To accomplish the task I look at a specific historical episode,together with its history, and draw some metamethodological conclusions from it. Thespecific historical episode I examine is Descartes' critique of Galileo's scientific methodology.tique of Galileo's scientific methodology.)
Longino (2016a) + (Study of the social dimensions of scientif … Study of the social dimensions of scientific knowledge encompasses theeffects of scientific research on human life and social relations, the effectsof social relations and values on scientific research, and the social aspectsof inquiry itself. Several factors have combined to make these questionssalient to contemporary philosophy of science. These factors include theemergence of social movements, like environmentalism and feminism,critical of mainstream science; concerns about the social effects ofscience-based technologies; epistemological questions made salient by bigscience; new trends in the history of science, especially the move awayfrom internalist historiography; anti-normative approaches in thesociology of science; turns in philosophy to naturalism and pragmatism.This entry reviews the historical background to current research in thisarea and features of contemporary science that invite philosophicalattention. The philosophical work can roughly be classified into twocamps. One acknowledges that scientific inquiry is in fact carried out insocial settings and asks whether and how standard epistemology must besupplemented to address this feature. The other treats sociality as afundamental aspect of knowledge and asks how standard epistemologymust be modified from this broadly social perspective. Concerns in thesupplementing approach include such matters as trust and answerabilityraised by multiple authorship, the division of cognitive labor, thereliability of peer review, the challenges of privately funded science, aswell as concerns arising from the role of scientific research in society. Thereformist approach highlights the challenge to normative philosophy fromsocial, cultural, and feminist studies of science while seeking to developphilosophical models of the social character of scientific knowledge, andtreats the questions of the division of cognitive labor, expertise and authority, the interactions of science and society, etc., from the perspectiveof philosophical models of the irreducibly social character of scientificknowledge. social character of scientific knowledge.)
Longino (2015) + (Study of the social dimensions of scientif … Study of the social dimensions of scientific knowledge encompasses theeffects of scientific research on human life and social relations, the effectsof social relations and values on scientific research, and the social aspectsof inquiry itself. Several factors have combined to make these questionssalient to contemporary philosophy of science. These factors include theemergence of social movements, like environmentalism and feminism,critical of mainstream science; concerns about the social effects ofscience-based technologies; epistemological questions made salient by bigscience; new trends in the history of science, especially the move awayfrom internalist historiography; anti-normative approaches in thesociology of science; turns in philosophy to naturalism and pragmatism.This entry reviews the historical background to current research in thisarea and features of contemporary science that invite philosophicalattention.ience that invite philosophical attention.)
Longino (2019) + (Study of the social dimensions of scientif … Study of the social dimensions of scientific knowledge encompasses theeffects of scientific research on human life and social relations, the effectsof social relations and values on scientific research, and the social aspectsof inquiry itself. Several factors have combined to make these questionssalient to contemporary philosophy of science. These factors include theemergence of social movements, like environmentalism and feminism,critical of mainstream science; concerns about the social effects ofscience-based technologies; epistemological questions made salient by bigscience; new trends in the history of science, especially the move awayfrom internalist historiography; anti-normative approaches in thesociology of science; turns in philosophy to naturalism and pragmatism.This entry reviews the historical background to current research in thisarea and features of contemporary science that invite philosophicalattention.ience that invite philosophical attention.)
Héder and Nádasi (Eds.) (2019) + (Technology, in all its forms, has had and … Technology, in all its forms, has had and continues to have an indisputable impact on society and culture. Philosophy of technology seeks to understand this impact and the meaning of technology for society and culture. Although its origins can be traced back to the Greeks, it wasn’t until the late 19th century to the beginning of the 20th century that it gained ground as a philosophical discipline. Now more than ever it is considered an essential philosophical enterprise. ‘The Budapest Workshop on Philosophy of Technology’ was a lively and successful event that sort to discuss, reflect on and apply this branch of philosophical inquiry to both historical and contemporary examples. Importantly, the contributors’ methodological approaches were influenced by, although not limited to, Michael Polanyi’s term ‘post-critical’. Moving beyond the rigidity of past approaches, the selected essays were driven by two lines of inquiry, what has been the historical role of technology in social and scientific change? And, how can a ‘post-critical’ approach enhance and extend our understanding of philosophy of technology?This edited volume begins by exploring the role of technology in social and scientific developments from a historical perspective, before moving towards a discussion of philosophy of technology from a ‘Post-Critical’ epistemic stance. Free from the constraints of previous methodologies, the third part of this work engages with the term ‘Post-Critical’ in its broadest sense. The contributors to this section consider the phenomenology of the body and the influence of technology on our lives. Finally, the four concluding chapters of this book apply this philosophical approach to a wide range of contemporary problems from Decision Support Systems to Crisis Communication.n Support Systems to Crisis Communication.)
Theiner (2015) + (Th e concept of distributed cognition (DC) … Th e concept of distributed cognition (DC) fi gures prominently in contemporary discussionsof the idea that the social, cultural, and technological distribution of cognitive laborin groups can give rise to “group cognition” or “collective intelligence.” Since there arediff erent ways of understanding the notion of DC, there is much debate about what“ontological heft ” we should attach to the thesis that groups are distributed cognitivesystems. Th e goal of this chapter is to map out the conceptual terrain on which this debateis taking place. My approach is grounded in the framework of DC which has been developed,since the mid-1980s, notably by Edwin Hutchins, Donald Norman, and DavidKirsh. In particular, I borrow here as my starting point their suggestion that taking up theDC perspective is not itself an empirical thesis about a certain kind of cognition; rather,it is a methodological decision to select scales of investigation from which all of cognitioncan be analyzed as distributed. cognition can be analyzed as distributed.)
Carruthers, Stitch, and Siegal (Eds.) (2002) + (The Cognitive Basis of Science concerns th … The Cognitive Basis of Science concerns the question ''What makes science possible?'' Specifically, what features of the human mind and of human culture and cognitive development permit and facilitate the conduct of science? The essays in this volume address these questions, which are inherently interdisciplinary, requiring co-operation between philosophers, psychologists, and others in the social and cognitive sciences. They concern the cognitive, social, and motivational underpinnings of scientific reasoning in children and lay persons as well as in professional scientists. The editors’ introduction lays out the background to the debates, and the volume includes a consolidated bibliography that will be a valuable reference resource for all those interested in this area. The volume will be of great importance to all researchers and students interested in the philosophy or psychology of scientific reasoning, as well as those, more generally, who are interested in the nature of the human mind.nterested in the nature of the human mind.)
Butts and Hintikka (Eds.) (1977) + (The Fifth International Congress of Logic, … The Fifth International Congress of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science was held at the University of Western Ontario, London, Canada, 27 August to 2 September 1975. The Congress was held under the auspices of the International Union of History and Philosophy of Science, Division of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science, and was sponsored by the National Research Council of Canada and the University of Western Ontario. As those associated closely with the work of the Division over the years know well, the work undertaken by its members varies greatly and spans a number of fields not always obviously related. In addition, the volume of work done by first rate scholars and scientists in the various fields of the Division has risen enormously. For these and related reasons it seemed to the editors chosen by the Divisional officers that the usual format of publishing the proceedings of the Congress be abandoned in favour of a somewhat more flexible, and hopefully acceptable, method of presentation. Accordingly, the work of the invited participants to the Congress has been divided into four volumes appearing in the University of Western Ontario Series in Philosophy of Science. The volumes are entitled, Logic, Foundations of Mathematics and Computability Theory, Foundational Problems in the Special Sciences, Basic Problems in Methodology and Linguistics, and Historical and Philosophical Dimensions of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science.ic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science.)
Berryman (2016b) + (The Greek tradition regarded Leucippus as … The Greek tradition regarded Leucippus as the founder of atomism inancient Greek philosophy. Little is known about him, and his views arehard to distinguish from those of his associate Democritus. He issometimes said to have been a student of Zeno of Elea, and to havedevised the atomist philosophy in order to escape from the problemsraised by Parmenides and his followers.ms raised by Parmenides and his followers.)
Theiner and O'Connor (2010) + (The Group Mind Thesis—understood as the cl … The Group Mind Thesis—understood as the claim that groups as a wholecan be the subjects of mental states—was a popular idea in the intellectuallandscape of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.2 For manyscientists and philosophers of that period, it provided a succinct expressionof what they perceived to be two characteristic features of groups: on theone hand, their ability to function as collective agents who can have intentions,make decisions, and pursue their own goals; on the other hand, theidea that groups are emergent wholes which are more than the sum of itsmembers. Combine the two features, and the functional analogies betweenindividual and group behavior strongly suggest adopting an intentionalstance towards both.opting an intentional stance towards both.)
Fieser and Dowden (Ed.) (2017) + (The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (I … The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (IEP) (ISSN 2161-0002) was founded in 1995 to provide open access to detailed, scholarly information on key topics and philosophers in all areas of philosophy. The Encyclopedia receives no funding, and operates through the volunteer work of the editors, authors, volunteers, and technical advisers. At present, the IEP has over a million visitors per month, and about 20 million page views per year. The Encyclopedia is free of charge and available to all users of the Internet world-wide. The staff of 30 editors and approximately 300 authors hold doctorate degrees and are professors at universities around the world, most notably from English-speaking countries.The purpose of the IEP is to provide detailed, scholarly information on key topics and philosophers in all areas of philosophy. The Encyclopedia's articles are written with the intention that most of the article can be understood by advanced undergraduates majoring in philosophy and by other scholars who are not working in the field covered by that article. The IEP articles are written by experts but not for experts in analogy to the way the Scientific American magazine is written by scientific experts but not primarily for scientific experts. A critical feature of the IEP is its status as a freely accessible and not-for-profit resource, which the General Editors, present and future, will seek to perpetuate. As such, the IEP will not be used to make a profit in any manner, such as by re-publishing articles or by charging for access to its articles or by posting advertising. No person at the IEP will receive any financial compensation for any IEP work. No for-profit organization will have any financial stake in the IEP, nor can a for-profit organization advertise within the IEP.fit organization advertise within the IEP.)
Annas and Barnes (Eds.) (1985) + (The Modes of Scepticism is one of the most … The Modes of Scepticism is one of the most important and influential of all ancient philosophical texts. The texts made an enormous impact on Western thought when they were rediscovered in the 16th century and they have shaped the whole future course of Western philosophy. Despite their importance, the Modes have been little discussed in recent times. This book translates the texts and supplies them with a discursive commentary, concentrating on philosophical issues but also including historical material. The book will be of interest to professional scholars and philosophers but its clear and non-technical style makes it intelligible to beginners and the interested layman.le to beginners and the interested layman.)
Aristotle (1984) + (The Oxford Translation of Aristotle was or … The Oxford Translation of Aristotle was originally published in 12 volumes between 1912 and 1954. It is universally recognized as the standard English version of Aristotle. This revised edition contains the substance of the original Translation, slightly emended in light of recent scholarship; three of the original versions have been replaced by new translations; and a new and enlarged selection of Fragments has been added. The aim of the translation remains the same: to make the surviving works of Aristotle readily accessible to English speaking readers.ly accessible to English speaking readers.)
Curd (2016) + (The Presocratics were 6th and 5th century … The Presocratics were 6th and 5th century BCE Greek thinkers whointroduced a new way of inquiring into the world and the place of humanbeings in it. They were recognized in antiquity as the first philosophersand scientists of the Western tradition. This article is a generalintroduction to the most important Presocratic philosophers and the mainthemes of Presocratic thought. More detailed discussions can be found byconsulting the articles on these philosophers (and related topics) in theSEP (listed below). The standard collection of texts for the Presocratics isthat by H. Diels revised by W. Kranz (abbreviated as DK). In it, eachthinker is assigned an identifying chapter number (e.g., Heraclitus is 22,Anaxagoras 59); then the reports from ancient authors about that thinker'slife and thought are collected in a section of “testimonies” (A) andnumbered in order, while the passages the editors take to be directquotations are collected and numbered in a section of “fragments” (B).Alleged imitations in later authors are sometimes added in a sectionlabeled C. Thus, each piece of text can be uniquely identified: DK59B12.3 identifies line 3 of Anaxagoras fragment 12; DK 22A1 identifiestestimonium 1 on Heraclitus.A1 identifies testimonium 1 on Heraclitus.)
Ludwig and Jankovic (2015) + (The Routledge Handbook of Collective Inten … The Routledge Handbook of Collective Intentionality provides a wide-ranging survey of topics in a rapidly expanding area of interdisciplinary research. It consists of 36 chapters, written exclusively for this volume, by an international team of experts. What is distinctive about the study of collective intentionality within the broader study of social interactions and structures is its focus on the conceptual and psychological features of joint or shared actions and attitudes, and their implications for the nature of social groups and their functioning. This Handbook fully captures this distinctive nature of the field and how it subsumes the study of collective action, responsibility, reasoning, thought, intention, emotion, phenomenology, decision-making, knowledge, trust, rationality, cooperation, competition, and related issues, as well as how these underpin social practices, organizations, conventions, institutions and social ontology. Like the field, the Handbook is interdisciplinary, drawing on research in philosophy, cognitive science, linguistics, legal theory, anthropology,sociology, computer science, psychology, economics, and political science. Finally, the Handbook promotes several specific goals: (1) it provides an important resource for students and researchers interested in collective intentionality; (2) it integrates work across disciplines and areas of research as it helps to define the shape and scope of an emerging area of research;(3) it advances the study of collective intentionality.es the study of collective intentionality.)
Kuhn (1962a) + (The Structure of Scientific Revolutions po … The Structure of Scientific Revolutions posited a new, historically grounded way of understanding scientific knowledge. Kuhn spoke of ''scientific paradigms'', which are shared constellations of theoretical and metaphysical beliefs, values, methods, and instrumental techniques shared by a scientific discipline. A ''scientific revolution'' occurs when one paradigm is replaced with another. Because paradigms are holistic networks of theories, methods, and values, they are ''incommensurable'' meaning that the terms and categories of the old paradigm cannot be translated into those of the new. Adoption of a new paradigm thus appears to involve something akin to a gestalt shift.involve something akin to a gestalt shift.)
Uebel (2016) + (The Vienna Circle was a group of early twe … The Vienna Circle was a group of early twentieth-century philosopherswho sought to reconceptualize empiricism by means of their interpretationof then recent advances in the physical and formal sciences. Theirradically anti-metaphysical stance was supported by an empiricist criterionof meaning and a broadly logicist conception of mathematics. They deniedthat any principle or claim was synthetic a priori. Moreover, they soughtto account for the presuppositions of scientific theories by regimentingsuch theories within a logical framework so that the important role playedby conventions, either in the form of definitions or of other analyticalframework principles, became evident. The Vienna Circle’s theories wereconstantly changing. In spite (or perhaps because) of this, they helped toprovide the blueprint for analytical philosophy of science as meta-theory—a “second-order” reflection of “first-order” sciences. While the ViennaCircle’s early form of logical empiricism (or logical positivism orneopositivism: these labels will be used interchangeably here) no longerrepresents an active research program, recent history of philosophy ofscience has unearthed much previously neglected variety and depth in thedoctrines of the Circle’s protagonists, some of whose positions retainrelevance for contemporary analytical philosophy.ce for contemporary analytical philosophy.)
Palermos (2016) + (The aim of this paper is to demonstrate th … The aim of this paper is to demonstrate that the postulation of irreducible,distributed cognitive systems (or group minds as they are also known in the literature)is necessary for the successful explanatory practice of cognitive science andsociology. Towards this end, and with an eye specifically on the phenomenon ofdistributed cognition, the debate over reductionism versus emergence is examinedfrom the perspective of Dynamical Systems Theory (DST). The motivation for thisnovel approach is threefold. Firstly, DST is particularly popular amongst cognitivescientists who work on modelling collective behaviors. Secondly, DST can delivertwo distinct arguments in support of the claim that the presence of mutual interactionsbetween group members necessitates the postulation of the correspondinggroup entity. Thirdly, DST can also provide a succinct understanding of the waygroup entities exert downward causation on their individual members. The outcomeis a naturalist account of the emergent, and thereby irreducible, nature of distributedcognitive systems that avoids the reductionists’ threat of epiphenomenalism, whilebeing well in line with materialism while being well in line with materialism)
Bird (2011) + (The article gives an overview of Thomas Ku … The article gives an overview of Thomas Kuhn's work, life, and intellectual influence on multiple fields. Kuhn began his career in physics, and acquired an interest in the history and philosophy of science through his undergraduate teaching in the history of science at Harvard. His work on a book about the Copernican revolution led him to develop a new view of science, which he published in his ''Structure of Scientific Revolutions''. The initial reception of Kuhn's work by philosophers, was hostile, although they recognized its importance. His use of historical and psychological ideas was unfamiliar to them. This hostility moderated once they gained a better understanding of them, and once he clarified some of his ideas in subsequent work. The book met a more friendly initial reception among sociologists, who saw in it a way to understand science in terms familiar to their discipline.nce in terms familiar to their discipline.)
Gooding (1985) + (The article is a collection of six essays … The article is a collection of six essays by historians of science explaining their discipline. Gooding's contribution explains that historians of science are interested in the activities of scientific practitioners, the instruments and techniques they used to investigate nature, the ways they represented their findings and communicated them to others, the institutional arrangements they made to promote and finance science, and the development of their ideas and arguments as evidenced by their published works, manuscripts, and papers. published works, manuscripts, and papers.)
Weisberg, Needham, and Hendry (2011) + (The article is about philosophical issues in chemistry.)

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