Difference between revisions of "Ontology of Scientific Change"
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|Description=In the process of [[Mechanism of Scientific Change|scientific change]], we are dealing with different epistemic ''agents'', taking different epistemic ''stances'' towards different epistemic ''elements''. For instance, we can say that the Paris community of 1720 [[Theory Acceptance|accepted]] [[René Descartes|Cartesian natural philosophy]]. In this example, Paris community is the epistemic ''agent'', acceptance is their epistemic ''stance'', and Cartesian natural philosophy is the epistemic element. There are a number of important ontological questions that arise here: | |Description=In the process of [[Mechanism of Scientific Change|scientific change]], we are dealing with different epistemic ''agents'', taking different epistemic ''stances'' towards different epistemic ''elements''. For instance, we can say that the Paris community of 1720 [[Theory Acceptance|accepted]] [[René Descartes|Cartesian natural philosophy]]. In this example, Paris community is the epistemic ''agent'', acceptance is their epistemic ''stance'', and Cartesian natural philosophy is the epistemic element. There are a number of important ontological questions that arise here: | ||
* What types of [[Epistemic Agent|epistemic agents]] can there be? I.e. can epistemic agents be communal, individual and/or artificial (instruments, AI)? | * What types of [[Epistemic Agent|epistemic agents]] can there be? I.e. can epistemic agents be communal, individual and/or artificial (instruments, AI)? | ||
* What types of [[Epistemic Element|epistemic elements]] can there be in the process of scientific change? I.e. are there theories, method, values, research programmes, paradigms, etc.? | * What types of [[Epistemic Element|epistemic elements]] can there be in the process of scientific change? I.e. are there theories, method, values, research programmes, paradigms, etc.? | ||
− | * What are the different [[Epistemic Stance|epistemic stances]] that an agent can take towards an element? I.e. do these include acceptance, use, pursuit, employment, commitment, neglect, rejection, etc.? | + | * What are the different [[Epistemic Stance|epistemic stances]] that an agent can take towards an element? I.e. do these include acceptance, use, pursuit, employment, commitment, neglect, rejection, etc.? |
Addressing these questions is the main task of the ontology of scientific change. | Addressing these questions is the main task of the ontology of scientific change. | ||
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|Prehistory=Historically, theories of scientific change differed not only in their explanations of how science changes through time, but also in their views on what exactly underwent change in science. Thus, a range of different ontologies of scientific change have been suggested over the years. | |Prehistory=Historically, theories of scientific change differed not only in their explanations of how science changes through time, but also in their views on what exactly underwent change in science. Thus, a range of different ontologies of scientific change have been suggested over the years. | ||
− | In the early twentieth century, logical positivists formulated an ontology of scientific change. While they individually held varying views, we can summarize their ontology by generalizing from the overlap between authors. The positivists generally supposed that there was a single scientific [[Method|method]] that did not change through history or across disciplines so that the only epistemic elements capable of change in their ontology were [[Theory|scientific theories]].[[CiteRef::Schlick (1931)|pp.145-162]] A similar ontology was championed by many non-positivist authors, including [[Karl Popper]].[[CiteRef::Popper (1963)|pp. 62-63]] | + | In the early twentieth century, logical positivists formulated an ontology of scientific change. While they individually held varying views, we can summarize their ontology by generalizing from the overlap between authors. The positivists generally supposed that there was a single scientific [[Method|method]] that did not change through history or across disciplines so that the only epistemic elements capable of change in their ontology were [[Theory|scientific theories]].[[CiteRef::Schlick (1931)|pp.145-162]] A similar ontology was championed by many non-positivist authors, including [[Karl Popper]].[[CiteRef::Popper (1963)|pp. 62-63]] |
Despite its inherent vagueness, Kuhn’s [[Kuhn (1962a)|''Structure of Scientific Revolutions'']] can be interpreted as suggesting a number of new ontological elements, including ''methods'', ''values'', ''questions'', ''standards'', and ''problems''. It is not quite clear whether these are all meant to be independent epistemic elements in their own right. Kuhn also famously used a whole range of words denoting epistemic stances, such as ''embraced'', ''universally received'', ''acknowledged'', and ''committed'' among many others.[[CiteRef::Kuhn (1970c)|pp. 10-13]] It remains to be seen whether he meant them as synonyms, or whether he ascribed different meanings to at least some of them.[[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)|p. 30]] | Despite its inherent vagueness, Kuhn’s [[Kuhn (1962a)|''Structure of Scientific Revolutions'']] can be interpreted as suggesting a number of new ontological elements, including ''methods'', ''values'', ''questions'', ''standards'', and ''problems''. It is not quite clear whether these are all meant to be independent epistemic elements in their own right. Kuhn also famously used a whole range of words denoting epistemic stances, such as ''embraced'', ''universally received'', ''acknowledged'', and ''committed'' among many others.[[CiteRef::Kuhn (1970c)|pp. 10-13]] It remains to be seen whether he meant them as synonyms, or whether he ascribed different meanings to at least some of them.[[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)|p. 30]] | ||
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Only [[Descriptive Theory|descriptive theories]] were included in Barseghyan's original ontology, while the status of [[Normative Theory|normative theories]] was left indeterminate due to the [[The Paradox of Normative Propositions|the paradox of normative propositions]]. Once the paradox of normative propositions was [[Resolution to the Paradox of Normative Propositions (Sebastien-2016)|resolved]], the original ontology was extended by [[Zoe Sebastien|Sebastien]] to also include [[Normative Theory Is a Subtype of Theory (Sebastien-2016)|normative theories]].[[CiteRef::Sebastien (2016)]] | Only [[Descriptive Theory|descriptive theories]] were included in Barseghyan's original ontology, while the status of [[Normative Theory|normative theories]] was left indeterminate due to the [[The Paradox of Normative Propositions|the paradox of normative propositions]]. Once the paradox of normative propositions was [[Resolution to the Paradox of Normative Propositions (Sebastien-2016)|resolved]], the original ontology was extended by [[Zoe Sebastien|Sebastien]] to also include [[Normative Theory Is a Subtype of Theory (Sebastien-2016)|normative theories]].[[CiteRef::Sebastien (2016)]] | ||
− | In 2018, [[William Rawleigh|Rawleigh]] suggested that [[Question|questions]] are to be accepted as a separate [[Question Is a Subtype of Epistemic Element (Rawleigh-2018)|type of epistemic element]]; the suggestion became accepted later that year and the ontology was modified to include theories, methods, and questions.[[CiteRef::Rawleigh (2018)]] | + | In 2018, [[William Rawleigh|Rawleigh]] suggested that [[Question|questions]] are to be accepted as a separate [[Question Is a Subtype of Epistemic Element (Rawleigh-2018)|type of epistemic element]]; the suggestion became accepted later that year and the ontology was modified to include theories, methods, and questions.[[CiteRef::Rawleigh (2018)]] |
The ontology was further modified by Barseghyan in 2018. In his [[Barseghyan (2018)|redrafted ontology]], he suggested that methods are a subtype of normative theory. He also suggested including [[Definition|definitions]] as a subtype of theory.[[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2018)]] As a result of the acceptance of [[Modification:Sciento-2018-0006|that modification]], theories and questions became the two basic subtypes of epistemic elements, with definitions, normative, and descriptive theories being subtypes of [[Theory|theory]]. | The ontology was further modified by Barseghyan in 2018. In his [[Barseghyan (2018)|redrafted ontology]], he suggested that methods are a subtype of normative theory. He also suggested including [[Definition|definitions]] as a subtype of theory.[[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2018)]] As a result of the acceptance of [[Modification:Sciento-2018-0006|that modification]], theories and questions became the two basic subtypes of epistemic elements, with definitions, normative, and descriptive theories being subtypes of [[Theory|theory]]. | ||
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The first scientonomic account of disciplines was suggested by Patton and [[Cyrus Al-Zayadi|Al-Zayadi]] in 2021.[[CiteRef::Patton and Al-Zayadi (2021)]] The [[Modification:Sciento-2021-0006|respective modification]] became accepted in early 2024, introducing the notions of [[Discipline|discipline]], [[Delineating Theory|delineating theory]], [[Core Question|core question]], and [[Core Theory|core theory]] into the scientonomic ontology. | The first scientonomic account of disciplines was suggested by Patton and [[Cyrus Al-Zayadi|Al-Zayadi]] in 2021.[[CiteRef::Patton and Al-Zayadi (2021)]] The [[Modification:Sciento-2021-0006|respective modification]] became accepted in early 2024, introducing the notions of [[Discipline|discipline]], [[Delineating Theory|delineating theory]], [[Core Question|core question]], and [[Core Theory|core theory]] into the scientonomic ontology. | ||
− | |Current View= | + | |Current View={{PrintCurrentOntologyTable}} |
|Parent Topic= | |Parent Topic= | ||
|Related Topics=Mechanism of Scientific Change | |Related Topics=Mechanism of Scientific Change |
Latest revision as of 08:06, 30 June 2024
What is the ontology of scientific change? What are the fundamental entities, processes, and relations involved in the process of scientific change?
In the process of scientific change, we are dealing with different epistemic agents, taking different epistemic stances towards different epistemic elements. For instance, we can say that the Paris community of 1720 accepted Cartesian natural philosophy. In this example, Paris community is the epistemic agent, acceptance is their epistemic stance, and Cartesian natural philosophy is the epistemic element. There are a number of important ontological questions that arise here:
- What types of epistemic agents can there be? I.e. can epistemic agents be communal, individual and/or artificial (instruments, AI)?
- What types of epistemic elements can there be in the process of scientific change? I.e. are there theories, method, values, research programmes, paradigms, etc.?
- What are the different epistemic stances that an agent can take towards an element? I.e. do these include acceptance, use, pursuit, employment, commitment, neglect, rejection, etc.?
Addressing these questions is the main task of the ontology of scientific change.
In the scientonomic context, this question was first formulated by Hakob Barseghyan in 2015. The question is currently accepted as a legitimate topic for discussion by Scientonomy community.
In Scientonomy, the accepted answers to the question can be summarized as follows:
- The subtypes of epistemic agent are epistemic community and individual epistemic agent.
- The subtypes of epistemic element are question and theory.
- The subtypes of epistemic stance are compatibility, norm employment, question acceptance, theory acceptance, theory pursuit and theory use.
- The possible outcomes of theory assessment are satisfied, not satisfied, and inconclusive.
Broader History
Historically, theories of scientific change differed not only in their explanations of how science changes through time, but also in their views on what exactly underwent change in science. Thus, a range of different ontologies of scientific change have been suggested over the years.
In the early twentieth century, logical positivists formulated an ontology of scientific change. While they individually held varying views, we can summarize their ontology by generalizing from the overlap between authors. The positivists generally supposed that there was a single scientific method that did not change through history or across disciplines so that the only epistemic elements capable of change in their ontology were scientific theories.1 A similar ontology was championed by many non-positivist authors, including Karl Popper.2
Despite its inherent vagueness, Kuhn’s Structure of Scientific Revolutions can be interpreted as suggesting a number of new ontological elements, including methods, values, questions, standards, and problems. It is not quite clear whether these are all meant to be independent epistemic elements in their own right. Kuhn also famously used a whole range of words denoting epistemic stances, such as embraced, universally received, acknowledged, and committed among many others.3 It remains to be seen whether he meant them as synonyms, or whether he ascribed different meanings to at least some of them.4
Imre Lakatos generated a holistic account of scientific change slightly regressive to previous ontologies. Lakatos kept Kuhn’s view of the fluidity of paradigms within scientific communities however, with two small modifications. Firstly, Lakatos saw paradigms as research programmes, of which many simultaneously existed, and secondly Lakatos believed they followed a more rational model of change, i.e. modifications were judged as regressive or progressive based on certain conditions.5 With regards to regression, Paul Feyerabend criticized Lakatos for once again suggesting that theories can only be pursued. The whole system Lakatos built was a high functioning competition between research programmes.6 As such, per Lakatos, theories could never really be accepted, and thus they carried the potential to threaten science with a potentially infinite number of theories all of which are rational to pursue.
Finally, Larry Laudan paints the closest picture to the ontology scientonomy posits today. Laudan recognized values, theories, and methodologies as epistemic elements with relations to scientists as epistemic agents. Theories could be accepted under his view and methodologies could be employed. Each epistemic element under Laudan’s reticulated model could be modified. Laudan did not recognize the potential of theories to be used but not accepted but he did recognize pursued and accepted theories in contrast to Lakatos and the logical positivists.7
Scientonomic History
In Barseghyan's The Laws of Scientific Change, the question of the ontology of scientific change is discussed without being explicitly formulated. While the question has been accepted and discussed at length by the scientonomy community ever since its inception, it wasn't until the early 2017 when the question was openly formulated and documented.
Barseghyan's original ontology included:
- Theories and methods as the only two types of epistemic elements that undergo scientific change;4
- Three epistemic stances towards theories: acceptance, use, and pursuit,4 as well as one epistemic stance towards methods, employment;4
- Community as the sole type of epistemic agent capable of taking these stances towards theories and methods.4
Only descriptive theories were included in Barseghyan's original ontology, while the status of normative theories was left indeterminate due to the the paradox of normative propositions. Once the paradox of normative propositions was resolved, the original ontology was extended by Sebastien to also include normative theories.8
In 2018, Rawleigh suggested that questions are to be accepted as a separate type of epistemic element; the suggestion became accepted later that year and the ontology was modified to include theories, methods, and questions.9
The ontology was further modified by Barseghyan in 2018. In his redrafted ontology, he suggested that methods are a subtype of normative theory. He also suggested including definitions as a subtype of theory.10 As a result of the acceptance of that modification, theories and questions became the two basic subtypes of epistemic elements, with definitions, normative, and descriptive theories being subtypes of theory.
In 2019, Paul Patton suggested that epistemic agents can be of two main types - communal and individual.11 The modification became accepted in 2022.
The first scientonomic account of disciplines was suggested by Patton and Al-Zayadi in 2021.12 The respective modification became accepted in early 2024, introducing the notions of discipline, delineating theory, core question, and core theory into the scientonomic ontology.
Acceptance Record of the Question
Community | Accepted From | Acceptance Indicators | Still Accepted | Accepted Until | Rejection Indicators |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
Scientonomy | 1 January 2016 | The question was tacitly accepted even before its explicit formulation in 2017. Thus, it has the same acceptance date as the rest of the original TSC. | Yes |
All Direct Answers
If a direct answer to this question is missing, please click here to add it.
Accepted Direct Answers
Suggested Modifications
Current View
Term | Community | Definition | Upper Class | Existence | Subtypes | Supertypes | Associations | Disjointness |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Acceptance Criteria | Scientonomy | Acceptance Criteria (Barseghyan-2015): Criteria for determining whether a theory is acceptable or unacceptable. | Endurant | Exists | An acceptance criterion is always part of some method. | |||
Accidental Group | Scientonomy | Accidental Group (Overgaard-2017): A group that does not have a collective intentionality. | Endurant | Exists | Group | |||
Authority Delegation | Scientonomy | Authority Delegation (Patton-2019): Epistemic agent A is said to be delegating authority over question x to epistemic agent B iff (1) agent A accepts that agent B is an expert on question x and (2) agent A will accept a theory answering question x if agent B says so. | Association | Exists | On the basis of cardinality: Singular Authority Delegation and Multiple Authority Delegation. On the basis of reciprocity: Mutual Authority Delegation and One-sided Authority Delegation. | |||
Community | Scientonomy | Community (Overgaard-2017): A group that has a collective intentionality. | Endurant | Exists | Group | A community can delegate authority to another community. | ||
Compatibility | Scientonomy | Compatibility (Fraser-Sarwar-2018): The ability of two elements to coexist in the same mosaic. | Perdurant | Exists | Epistemic Stance | |||
Compatibility Criteria | Scientonomy | Compatibility Criteria (Fraser-Sarwar-2018): Criteria for determining whether two elements are compatible or incompatible. | Endurant | Exists | A compatibility criterion is always part of some method. | |||
Core Question | Scientonomy | Core Question (Patton-Al-Zayadi-2021): A core question of a discipline is a question identified in the discipline’s delineating theory as definitive of the discipline. | Endurant | Exists | ||||
Core Theory | Scientonomy | Core Theory (Patton-Al-Zayadi-2021): A core theory of a discipline is a theory presupposed by the discipline’s core questions. | Endurant | Exists | ||||
Definition | Scientonomy | Definition (Barseghyan-2018): A statement of the meaning of a term. | Endurant | Exists | Theory | |||
Delineating Theory | Scientonomy | Delineating Theory (Patton-Al-Zayadi-2021): A second-order theory identifying the set of core questions of a discipline. | Endurant | Exists | A discipline has one delineating theory. | |||
Demarcation Criteria | Scientonomy | Demarcation Criteria (Barseghyan-2015): Criteria for determining whether a theory is scientific or unscientific. | Endurant | Exists | A demarcation criterion is always part of some method. | |||
Descriptive Theory | Scientonomy | Descriptive Theory (Sebastien-2016): A set of propositions that attempts to describe something. | Endurant | Exists | Theory | |||
Discipline | Scientonomy | Discipline (Patton-Al-Zayadi-2021): A discipline is characterized by (1) a non-empty set of core questions Q and (2) the delineating theory stating that Q are the core questions of the discipline. | Endurant | Exists | A discipline can have any number of theories. Each theory can be included into any number disciplines. A discipline has at least one core question. A discipline has one delineating theory. A discipline has at least one question. Each question can be included in any number disciplines. | |||
Discipline Acceptance | Scientonomy | Discipline Acceptance (Patton-Al-Zayadi-2021): A discipline is said to be accepted by an epistemic agent if that agent accepts the core questions specified in the discipline’s delineating theory as well as the delineating theory itself. | Perdurant | Exists | ||||
Element Decay | Scientonomy | Perdurant | Theory Decay | |||||
Epistemic Action | Scientonomy | Perdurant | ||||||
Epistemic Agent | Scientonomy | Epistemic Agent (Patton-2019): An agent capable of taking epistemic stances towards epistemic elements. | Endurant | Exists | Epistemic Community and Individual Epistemic Agent | An epistemic agent can delegate authority to another epistemic agent. An epistemic agent can rely on any number of epistemic tools, while an epistemic tool can be relied on by one-to-many agent. | ||
Epistemic Community | Scientonomy | Endurant | Exists | Epistemic Agent | ||||
Epistemic Element | Scientonomy | Endurant | Exists | Question and Theory | ||||
Epistemic Presupposition | Scientonomy | Epistemic Presupposition (Barseghyan-Levesley-2021): A theory is said to be an epistemic presupposition of a question for some agent, iff the agent accepts that accepting any direct answer to the question will necessitate accepting the theory. | Association | Exists | ||||
Epistemic Stance | Scientonomy | Perdurant | Exists | Theory Use, Theory Pursuit, Question Acceptance, Norm Employment, Compatibility and Theory Acceptance | ||||
Epistemic Tool | Scientonomy | Epistemic Tool (Patton-2019): A physical object or system is an epistemic tool for an epistemic agent iff there is a procedure by which the tool can provide an acceptable source of knowledge for answering some question under the employed method of that agent. | Endurant | Exists | An epistemic agent can rely on any number of epistemic tools, while an epistemic tool can be relied on by one-to-many agent. | |||
Error | Scientonomy | Error (Machado-Marques-Patton-2021): An epistemic agent is said to commit an error if the agent accepts a theory that should not have been accepted given that agent’s employed method. | Perdurant | Exists | ||||
Explicable-Implicit | Scientonomy | Explicable-Implicit (Mirkin-Barseghyan-2018): Propositional knowledge that hasn’t been openly formulated by the agent. | Quality | Implicit | ||||
Explicit | Scientonomy | Explicit (Mirkin-Barseghyan-2018): Propositional knowledge that has been openly formulated by the agent. | Quality | |||||
Global Epistemic Action | Scientonomy | Perdurant | ||||||
Group | Scientonomy | Group (Overgaard-2017): Two or more people who share any characteristic. | Endurant | Exists | Community and Accidental Group | |||
Hierarchical Authority Delegation | Scientonomy | Hierarchical Authority Delegation (Patton-2019): A sub-type of multiple authority delegation where different epistemic agents are delegated different degrees of authority over question x. | Association | Exists | Multiple Authority Delegation | |||
History of Scientific Change | Scientonomy | History of Scientific Change (Barseghyan-2015): A descriptive discipline that attempts to trace and explain individual changes in the scientific mosaic. | Endurant | |||||
Implicit | Scientonomy | Implicit (Mirkin-Barseghyan-2018): Not explicit. | Quality | Explicable-Implicit and Inexplicable | ||||
Individual Epistemic Agent | Scientonomy | Endurant | Exists | Epistemic Agent | ||||
Individual Level | Scientonomy | Individual Level (Barseghyan-2015): The level of the beliefs of the individual scientist about the world and the rules she employs in theory assessment. | Endurant | |||||
Inexplicable | Scientonomy | Inexplicable (Mirkin-Barseghyan-2018): Non-propositional knowledge, i.e. knowledge that cannot, even in principle, be formulated as a set of propositions. | Quality | Implicit | ||||
Local Action Availability | Scientonomy | Endurant | ||||||
Local Epistemic Action | Scientonomy | Perdurant | ||||||
Logical Presupposition | Scientonomy | Logical Presupposition (Barseghyan-Levesley-2021): A theory is said to be a logical presupposition of a question, iff the theory is logically entailed by any direct answer to the question. | Association | Exists | ||||
Method | Scientonomy | Method (Barseghyan-2018): A set of criteria for theory evaluation. | Endurant | Exists | Substantive Method and Procedural Method | Normative Theory | An acceptance criterion is always part of some method. A compatibility criterion is always part of some method. A demarcation criterion is always part of some method. | |
Method Hierarchy | Scientonomy | Endurant | ||||||
Methodology | Scientonomy | Methodology (Barseghyan-2018): A normative discipline that formulates the rules which ought to be employed in theory assessment. | Endurant | Exists | ||||
Model | Scientonomy | Endurant | ||||||
Mosaic Merge | Scientonomy | Mosaic Merge (Barseghyan-2015): A scientific change where two mosaics turn into one united mosaic. | Endurant | Exists | ||||
Mosaic Split | Scientonomy | Mosaic Split (Barseghyan-2015): A scientific change where one mosaic transforms into two or more mosaics. | Perdurant | Exists | ||||
Multiple Authority Delegation | Scientonomy | Multiple Authority Delegation (Patton-2019): Epistemic agent A is said to engage in a relationship of multiple authority delegation over question x iff A delegates authority over question x to more than one epistemic agent. | Association | Exists | Hierarchical Authority Delegation and Non-Hierarchical Authority Delegation | Authority Delegation | ||
Mutual Authority Delegation | Scientonomy | Mutual Authority Delegation (Patton-2019): Epistemic agents A and B are said to be in a relationship of mutual authority delegation iff A delegates authority over question x to B, and B delegates authority over question y to A. | Association | Exists | Authority Delegation | |||
Non-Epistemic Community | Scientonomy | Endurant | ||||||
Non-Hierarchical Authority Delegation | Scientonomy | Non-Hierarchical Authority Delegation (Patton-2019): A sub-type of multiple authority delegation where different epistemic agents are delegated the same degree of authority over question x. | Association | Exists | Multiple Authority Delegation | |||
Norm Employment | Scientonomy | Norm Employment (Barseghyan-2018): A norm is said to be employed if its requirements constitute the actual expectations of an epistemic agent. | Perdurant | Exists | Epistemic Stance | |||
Normative Theory | Scientonomy | Normative Theory (Sebastien-2016): A set of propositions that attempts to prescribe something. | Endurant | Exists | Method | Theory | ||
One-sided Authority Delegation | Scientonomy | One-sided Authority Delegation (Patton-2019): Epistemic agents A and B are said to be in a relationship of one-sided authority delegation iff A delegates authority over question x to B, but B doesn’t delegate any authority to A. | Association | Exists | Authority Delegation | |||
Outcome Inconclusive | Scientonomy | Outcome Inconclusive (Patton-Overgaard-Barseghyan-2017): It is unclear whether or not the requirements of the method employed at the time are met. | Quality | |||||
Outcome Not Satisfied | Scientonomy | Outcome Not Satisfied (Patton-Overgaard-Barseghyan-2017): The theory is deemed to conclusively not meet the requirements of the method employed at the time. | Quality | |||||
Outcome Satisfied | Scientonomy | Outcome Satisfied (Patton-Overgaard-Barseghyan-2017): The theory is deemed to conclusively meet the requirements of the method employed at the time. | Quality | |||||
Procedural Method | Scientonomy | Procedural Method (Barseghyan-2015): A method which doesn't presuppose any contingent propositions. | Endurant | Exists | Method | |||
Question | Scientonomy | Question (Rawleigh-2018): A topic of inquiry. | Endurant | Exists | Epistemic Element | A discipline has at least one core question. A discipline has at least one question. Each question can be included in any number disciplines. A question can have subquestions. A question can presuppose theories. A theory is an answer to a question. | ||
Question Acceptance | Scientonomy | Question Acceptance (Rawleigh-2018): A question is said to be accepted if it is taken as a legitimate topic of inquiry. | Perdurant | Exists | Epistemic Stance | |||
Question Pursuit | Scientonomy | Perdurant | ||||||
Reason | Scientonomy | Endurant | ||||||
Scientific Change | Scientonomy | Scientific Change (Barseghyan-2015): Any change in the scientific mosaic, i.e. a transition from one accepted theory to another or from one employed method to another. | Perdurant | Exists | ||||
Scientific Community | Scientonomy | Endurant | Exists | |||||
Scientific Mosaic | Scientonomy | Scientific Mosaic (Rawleigh-2022): A model of all epistemic elements accepted or employed by the epistemic agent. | Endurant | Exists | ||||
Singular Authority Delegation | Scientonomy | Singular Authority Delegation (Patton-2019): Epistemic agent A is said to engage in a relationship of singular authority delegation over question x iff A delegates authority over question x to exactly one epistemic agent. | Association | Exists | Authority Delegation | |||
Social Level | Scientonomy | Social Level (Barseghyan-2015): The level of the scientific community and its mosaic of accepted theories and employed methods. | Endurant | |||||
Sociocultural Factors | Scientonomy | Endurant | Exists | |||||
Subdiscipline | Scientonomy | Subdiscipline (Patton-Al-Zayadi-2021): A discipline A is a subdiscipline of another discipline B, iff the set of questions of A, QA, is a proper subset of the questions of B, QB, i.e. QA ⸦ QB. | Endurant | Exists | ||||
Subquestion | Scientonomy | Subquestion (Patton-Al-Zayadi-2021): A question Q is a subquestion of another question Q’, iff any direct answer to Q is also a partial answer to Q’. | Association | Exists | ||||
Substantive Method | Scientonomy | Substantive Method (Barseghyan-2015): A method which presupposes at least one contingent proposition. | Endurant | Exists | Method | |||
Theory | Scientonomy | Theory (Sebastien-2016): A set of propositions. | Endurant | Exists | Normative Theory, Descriptive Theory and Definition | Epistemic Element | A discipline can have any number of theories. Each theory can be included into any number disciplines. A question can presuppose theories. A theory is an answer to a question. | |
Theory Acceptance | Scientonomy | Theory Acceptance (Barseghyan-2018): A theory is said to be accepted by an epistemic agent if it is taken as the best available answer to its respective question. | Perdurant | Exists | Epistemic Stance | |||
Theory Decay | Scientonomy | Perdurant | Element Decay | |||||
Theory Pursuit | Scientonomy | Theory Pursuit (Barseghyan-2015): A theory is said to be pursued if it is considered worthy of further development. | Perdurant | Exists | Epistemic Stance | |||
Theory Use | Scientonomy | Theory Use (Barseghyan-2015): A theory is said to be used if it is taken as an adequate tool for practical application. | Perdurant | Exists | Epistemic Stance | |||
Tool Reliance | Scientonomy | Tool Reliance (Patton-2019): An epistemic agent is said to rely on an epistemic tool iff there is a procedure through which the tool can provide an acceptable source of knowledge for answering some question under the employed method of that agent. | Association | Exists |
In Scientonomy, the accepted answers to the question are Epistemic Community Is a Subtype of Epistemic Agent (Barseghyan-2018), Individual Epistemic Agent Is a Subtype of Epistemic Agent (Patton-2019), Question Is a Subtype of Epistemic Element (Rawleigh-2018), Theory Is a Subtype of Epistemic Element (Barseghyan-2015), Theory Acceptance Is a Subtype of Epistemic Stance (Barseghyan-2015), Norm Employment Is a Subtype of Epistemic Stance (Barseghyan-2018), Question Acceptance Is a Subtype of Epistemic Stance (Rawleigh-2018), Compatibility Is a Subtype of Epistemic Stance (Fraser-Sarwar-2018), Theory Use Is a Subtype of Epistemic Stance (Barseghyan-2015), Theory Pursuit Is a Subtype of Epistemic Stance (Barseghyan-2015) and Theory Assessment Outcomes (Patton-Overgaard-Barseghyan-2017).
Subtypes of Epistemic Agent
Epistemic Community Is a Subtype of Epistemic Agent (Barseghyan-2018) states: "Epistemic Community is a subtype of Epistemic Agent, i.e. epistemic agent is a supertype of epistemic community."
According to Barseghyan, epistemic community is an epistemic agent, i.e. it is capable of taking epistemic stances towards epistemic elements.10
Individual Epistemic Agent Is a Subtype of Epistemic Agent (Patton-2019) states: "Individual Epistemic Agent is a subtype of Epistemic Agent, i.e. epistemic agent is a supertype of individual epistemic agent."
According to Patton, individuals are "capable of taking epistemic stances towards epistemic elements, with reason, based on a semantic understanding of the elements and their available alternatives, and with the goal of producing knowledge".11
Subtypes of Epistemic Element
Question Is a Subtype of Epistemic Element (Rawleigh-2018) states: "Question is a subtype of Epistemic Element, i.e. epistemic element is a supertype of question."
A study of the process of scientific change reveals many cases when a question that was considered legitimate in a certain time-period became illegitimate in another period. For example, the questions such as “what is the weight of phlogiston?” or “why does some matter gain mass as it loses phlogiston?” were accepted as legitimate topics of inquiry for the most part of the 18th century. Yet, once the phlogiston theory was rejected, these questions became illegitimate. Another examples is the question “what is the distance from the earth to the sphere of stars?” that was once considered legitimate by astronomers, but is no longer accepted.9
Similarly, there are questions which are considered legitimate these days but weren't accepted even a few centuries ago. An example of this is the question “what’s the underlying mechanics of the evolution of species?” - a perfectly legitimate topic of biological research nowadays that would have been deemed illegitimate three hundred years ago.9
These examples suggest that questions are part of the process of scientific changes. More specifically, they are a subtype of epistemic element.
Theory Is a Subtype of Epistemic Element (Barseghyan-2015) states: "Theory is a subtype of Epistemic Element, i.e. epistemic element is a supertype of theory."
According to this theory, theories are a subtype of epistemic element. Among other things, this assumes that epsitemic stances can be taken by epistemic agents towards theories.
Subtypes of Epistemic Stance
Theory Acceptance Is a Subtype of Epistemic Stance (Barseghyan-2015) states: "Theory Acceptance is a subtype of Epistemic Stance, i.e. epistemic stance is a supertype of theory acceptance."
Norm Employment Is a Subtype of Epistemic Stance (Barseghyan-2018) states: "Norm Employment is a subtype of Epistemic Stance, i.e. epistemic stance is a supertype of norm employment."
Question Acceptance Is a Subtype of Epistemic Stance (Rawleigh-2018) states: "Question Acceptance is a subtype of Epistemic Stance, i.e. epistemic stance is a supertype of question acceptance."
Compatibility Is a Subtype of Epistemic Stance (Fraser-Sarwar-2018) states: "Compatibility is a subtype of Epistemic Stance, i.e. epistemic stance is a supertype of compatibility."
According to Fraser and Sarwar, "compatibility is a distinct epistemic stance that agents can take towards elements".13 They show this by arguing that it is possible to take the stance of compatibility towards a pair of elements without taking any of the other stances towards these elements. Thus, compatibility is distinct from acceptance, since two elements need not be in the same mosaic, or even accepted by any agent to be considered, in principle, compatible. For example, an epistemic agent may consider Ptolemaic astrology compatible with Aristotelian natural philosophy without accepting either Ptolemaic astrology or Aristotelian natural philosophy. Compatibility is also different from use, since a pair of theories can be considered compatible regardless of whether any of them is considered useful. For instance, one can consider quantum mechanics and evolutionary biology compatible, while finding only the former useful. Finally, compatibility is also distinct from pursuit, since an agent can consider a pair of theories compatible with or without pursuing either. An agent, for instance, may find two alternative quantum theories pursuitworthy while clearly realizing that the two are incompatible.
Theory Use Is a Subtype of Epistemic Stance (Barseghyan-2015) states: "Theory Use is a subtype of Epistemic Stance, i.e. epistemic stance is a supertype of theory use."
Theory Pursuit Is a Subtype of Epistemic Stance (Barseghyan-2015) states: "Theory Pursuit is a subtype of Epistemic Stance, i.e. epistemic stance is a supertype of theory pursuit."
Theory Assessment Outcomes
Theory Assessment Outcomes (Patton-Overgaard-Barseghyan-2017) states: "The possible outcomes of theory assessment are satisfied, not satisfied, and inconclusive."
According to this ontology of theory assessment outcomes, when a theory is assessed by a method, one of the three following outcomes can obtain:4
- Satisfied: the theory is deemed to conclusively meet the requirements of the method employed at the time.
- Not Satisfied: the theory is deemed to conclusively not meet the requirements of the method employed at the time.
- Inconclusive: it is unclear whether or not the requirements of the method employed at the time are met.
While the first two assessment outcomes are conclusive, the third outcome is inconclusive, as it permits more than one possible course of action. Thus, in this view, a theory's assessment outcome is not necessarily conclusive; an inconclusive outcome is also conceivable.
This ontology is assumed by the second law of scientific change as formulated by Patton, Overgaard, and Barseghyan in 2017.
Related Topics
It has the following sub-topic(s):
- Bearers of Mosaic
- Existence of Method Hierarchies
- Hierarchy of Theories
- Status of Multiple Mutual Delegation
- Status of Non-Hierarchical Authority Delegation
- Subtypes of Epistemic Agent
- Subtypes of Epistemic Element
- Subtypes of Epistemic Stance
- Theory Assessment Outcomes
This topic is also related to the following topic(s):
References
- ^ Schlick, Moritz. (1931) Die Kausalität in der Gegenwärtigen Physik. Die Naturwissenschaften 19, 145-162.
- ^ Popper, Karl. (1963) Conjectures and Refutations. Routledge.
- ^ Kuhn, Thomas. (1970) The Structure of Scientific Revolutions: Second Edition, Enlarged. University of Chicago Press.
- a b c d e f Barseghyan, Hakob. (2015) The Laws of Scientific Change. Springer.
- ^ Lakatos, Imre. (1970) Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes. In Lakatos (1978a), 8-101.
- ^ Feyerabend, Paul. (1970) Against Method: Outline of an Anarchistic Theory of Knowledge. Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 4 (2), 17-129.
- ^ Laudan, Larry. (1984) Science and Values. University of California Press.
- ^ Sebastien, Zoe. (2016) The Status of Normative Propositions in the Theory of Scientific Change. Scientonomy 1, 1-9. Retrieved from https://www.scientojournal.com/index.php/scientonomy/article/view/26947.
- a b c Rawleigh, William. (2018) The Status of Questions in the Ontology of Scientific Change. Scientonomy 2, 1-12. Retrieved from https://scientojournal.com/index.php/scientonomy/article/view/29651.
- a b Barseghyan, Hakob. (2018) Redrafting the Ontology of Scientific Change. Scientonomy 2, 13-38. Retrieved from https://scientojournal.com/index.php/scientonomy/article/view/31032.
- a b Patton, Paul. (2019) Epistemic Tools and Epistemic Agents in Scientonomy. Scientonomy 3, 63-89. Retrieved from https://scientojournal.com/index.php/scientonomy/article/view/33621.
- ^ Patton, Paul and Al-Zayadi, Cyrus. (2021) Disciplines in the Scientonomic Ontology. Scientonomy 4, 59-85. Retrieved from https://scientojournal.com/index.php/scientonomy/article/view/37123.
- ^ Fraser, Patrick and Sarwar, Ameer. (2018) A Compatibility Law and the Classification of Theory Change. Scientonomy 2, 67-82. Retrieved from https://scientojournal.com/index.php/scientonomy/article/view/31278.