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(Originally-20published-20in-201955.)

Schantz and Seidel (Eds.) (2011) + (Over history, cognitive relativism has bee … Over history, cognitive relativism has been an unpopular viewpoint in the philosophy of knowledge. Yet relativist ideas in epistemology have experienced an unprecedented popularity in the twentieth century due thinkers such as Willard Quine, Thomas Kuhn, and Ludwig Wittgenstein. The questions of whether these ideas, in fact, support relativism, and whether or not a social constructivist view of science is logically coherent and feasible is the subject of this series of essays.e is the subject of this series of essays.)
Leary (1979) + (Over the past one hundred years psychology … Over the past one hundred years psychology has evolved into a major scientific discipline. Nonetheless, psychology is presently in a state of considerable turmoil regarding its proper subject matter and method. Is psychology a natural science, a social science, or a hybrid of the two? What relation should psychology maintain with philosophy? These general questions, currently under debate, were addressed by Wilhelm Wundt, one of the founders of modern experimental psychology. This articleis an attempt to specify Wundt’s conceptualization of psychology and to place it in its historical context. Secondarily it also traces certain major developments since the time of Wundt. The conclusion that is reached is that the apparent contemporary "crisis" in psychology is really nothing new and that, in fact, the present condition of psychology does not necessarily constitute a crisis. In its broad outline at least, present-day psychology reflects the program which Wundt espoused one hundredyears ago.hich Wundt espoused one hundred years ago.)
Feyerabend (1981b) + (Over the past thirty years Paul Feyerabend … Over the past thirty years Paul Feyerabend has developed an extremely distinctive and influential approach to problems in the philosophy of science. The most important and seminal of his published essays are collected here in two volumes, with new introductions to provide an overview and historical perspective on the discussions of each part. Volume 1 presents papers on the interpretation of scientific theories, together with papers applying the views developed to particular problems in philosophy and physics. The essays in volume 2 examine the origin and history of an abstract rationalism, as well as its consequences for the philosophy of science and methods of scientific research. Professor Feyerabend argues with great force and imagination for a comprehensive and opportunistic pluralism. In doing so he draws on extensive knowledge of scientific history and practice, and he is alert always to the wider philosophical, practical and political implications of conflicting views. These two volumes fully display the variety of his ideas, and confirm the originality and significance of his work. originality and significance of his work.)
Feyerabend (1981a) + (Over the past thirty years Paul Feyerabend … Over the past thirty years Paul Feyerabend has developed an extremely distinctive and influential approach to problems in the philosophy of science. The most important and seminal of his published essays are collected here in two volumes, with new introductions to provide an overview and historical perspective on the discussions of each part. Volume 1 presents papers on the interpretation of scientific theories, together with papers applying the views developed to particular problems in philosophy and physics. The essays in volume 2 examine the origin and history of an abstract rationalism, as well as its consequences for the philosophy of science and methods of scientific research. Professor Feyerabend argues with great force and imagination for a comprehensive and opportunistic pluralism. In doing so he draws on extensive knowledge of scientific history and practice, and he is alert always to the wider philosophical, practical and political implications of conflicting views. These two volumes fully display the variety of his ideas, and confirm the originality and significance of his work. originality and significance of his work.)
Pitt (Ed.) (1985) + (Papers related to and arising from the Fourth International Conference on History and Philosophy of Science, Blacksburg, Virginia, November 1982.)
Feyerabend (2010) + (Paul Feyerabend’s globally acclaimed work, … Paul Feyerabend’s globally acclaimed work, which sparked and continues to stimulate fierce debate, examines the deficiencies of many widespread ideas about scientific progress and the nature of knowledge. Feyerabend argues that scientific advances can only be understood in a historical context. He looks at the way the philosophy of science has consistently overemphasized practice over method, and considers the possibility that anarchism could replace rationalism in the theory of knowledge. This updated edition of the classic text includes a new introduction by Ian Hacking, one of the most important contemporary philosophers of science. Hacking reflects on both Feyerabend’s life and personality as well as the broader significance of the book for current discussions.cance of the book for current discussions.)
Feyerabend (1975a) + (Paul Feyerabend’s globally acclaimed work, … Paul Feyerabend’s globally acclaimed work, which sparked and continues to stimulate fierce debate, examines the deficiencies of many widespread ideas about scientific progress and the nature of knowledge. Feyerabend argues that scientific advances can only be understood in a historical context. He looks at the way the philosophy of science has consistently overemphasized practice over method, and considers the possibility that anarchism could replace rationalism in the theory of knowledge.ce rationalism in the theory of knowledge.)
Matilal and Charkrabarti (Eds.) (1994) + (Perspectives on testimony in Indian philosophy.)
Anstey (2011) + (Peter Anstey presents a thorough and innov … Peter Anstey presents a thorough and innovative study of John Locke's views on the method and content of natural philosophy. Focusing on Locke's Essay concerning Human Understanding, but also drawing extensively from his other writings and manuscript remains, Anstey argues that Locke was an advocate of the Experimental Philosophy: the new approach to natural philosophy championed by Robert Boyle and the early Royal Society who were opposed to speculative philosophy. On the question of method, Anstey shows how Locke's pessimism about the prospects for a demonstrative science of nature led him, in the Essay, to promote Francis Bacon's method of natural history, and to downplay the value of hypotheses and analogical reasoning in science. But, according to Anstey, Locke never abandoned the ideal of a demonstrative natural philosophy, for he believed that if we could discover the primary qualities of the tiny corpuscles that constitute material bodies, we could then establish a kind of corpuscular metric that would allow us a genuine science of nature. It was only after the publication of the Essay, however, that Locke came to realize that Newton's Principia provided a model for the role of demonstrative reasoning in science based on principles established upon observation, and this led him to make significant revisions to his views in the 1690s. On the content of Locke's natural philosophy, it is argued that even though Locke adhered to the Experimental Philosophy, he was not averse to speculation about the corpuscular nature of matter. Anstey takes us into new terrain and new interpretations of Locke's thought in his explorations of his mercurialist transmutational chymistry, his theory of generation by seminal principles, and his conventionalism about species.es, and his conventionalism about species.)
Palider (2022) + (Philosophy of science and history of scien … Philosophy of science and history of science have been unable to integrate in a meaningful fashion. The major difficulty has been the question of how the history of science can inform the philosophy of science. By making several distinctions to characterize the type of philosophy of science relevant for integrated HPS, I show how traditional approaches to integration failed. These include a top-down and a bottom-up philosophical approach to integrated HPS. I then present a more fruitful way of integrating the disciplines, that of iterations.ating the disciplines, that of iterations.)
Garber (1992) + (Physics and its foundations were central t … Physics and its foundations were central to Descartes' thought. Although today he is probably best known for his metaphysics of mind and body, or for his epistemological program, in the seventeenth century Descartes was at very least equally well known for his mechanistic physics and the mechanist world of geometrical bodies in motion which he played a large role in making acceptable to his contemporaries. In this essay I shall outline Descartes' mechanical philosophy in its historical context. After some brief remarks on the immediate background to Descartes' program for physics, and a brief outline of the historical development of his physics, we shall discuss the foundations of Descartes' physics, including his concepts of body and motion and his views on the laws of motion.otion and his views on the laws of motion.)
Fisher (2014) + (Pierre Gassendi (b. 1592, d. 1655) was a F … Pierre Gassendi (b. 1592, d. 1655) was a French philosopher, scientificchronicler, observer, and experimentalist, scholar of ancient texts anddebates, and active participant in contemporary deliberations of the firsthalf of the seventeenth century. His significance in early modern thoughthas in recent years been rediscovered and explored, towards a betterunderstanding of the dawn of modern empiricism, the mechanicalphilosophy, and relations of modern philosophy to ancient and medievaldiscussions. While Gassendi is perhaps best known in history ofphilosophy for his disputes with Descartes, his relations with other majorfigures, including Kepler, Galileo, Mersenne, Beeckman, and Hobbes,represented even more important transactions of ideas. And whileGassendi also sought to communicate anew the ideas of Epicurus, theStoics, and other earlier thinkers, his resulting amalgam of perspectivesprovides a modern view of his own making, one of the touchstones ofphilosophy and science in his times: our access to knowledge of thenatural world is dependent on the constraints and licenses that follow fromour epistemic grasp being limited to information provided by senses.limited to information provided by senses.)
Longino (2016b) + (Practice-centric and theory-centric approa … Practice-centric and theory-centric approaches in philosophy of science are described and contrasted. The contrast is developed through an examination of their different treatments of the underdetermination problem. The practice-centric approach is illustrated by a summary of comparative research on approaches in the biology of behaviour. The practice-centric approach is defended against charges that it encourages skepticism regarding the sciences.ourages skepticism regarding the sciences.)
Anagnostopoulos and Miller (Eds.) (2013) + (Preparing this homage to David Keyt has b … Preparing this homage to David Keyt has been a labor of love for the editors and contributors alike. The volume contains ﬁfteen essays by sixteen scholars including students, colleagues, and friends (the latter category being all inclusive!). All of the authors make important original contributions to the study of ancient Greek philosophy, and we wish to thank them all for agreeing to participate in this project, for their cooperation with the editing, and for the high quality of their essays. We are also grateful for their patience and good cheer throughout an unexpectedly protracted publication process. T he papers by Gerasimos Santas, Nils Rauhut, Mark McPherran, Charles Young, and Fred D. Miller, Jr. were delivered originally at a conference (aka “the Keytfest”) held at the University of Washington in Seattle in 2007 commemorating David Keyt’s ﬁ ftieth year as a professor of philosophy. Kenneth Clatterbaugh, Chair of the Department of Philosophy at the University of Washington, was very supportive of the program, and Bev Wessel provided valuable administrative assistance. Daniel Fisher, a student of David Keyt, offered generous ﬁ nancial support. Richard Parker, another former student, served as quipster and consummate master of ceremonies. W e are pleased to thank a number of people who have been very helpful with the editing and publication of this volume including Professor Stephen Hetherington, the editor of Springer’s Philosophical Studies Series; Ingrid van Laarhoven; Christi Lue; Ties Nijssen; Hendrikje Tuerlings; Professor Nicholas D. Smith, who helped to ﬁ nd a suitable publisher for the volume; and an anonymous reviewer who provided helpful comments. James Dabgotra ably assisted with the ﬁ rst round of editing, and Pamela Phillips did an excellent job copyediting the entire typescript and preparing it for the publisher. We also gratefully acknowledge ﬁnancial support from the Social Philosophy and Policy Foundation for the original conference and for the editing of the volume. Finally, we thank David Keyt for his assistance throughout the planning and preparation of the volume and especially for his willingness to contribute a fascinating memoir of his academic career which, in addition to delightful anecdotes about his encounters with notable scholars, offers illuminating insights into his own work and also into the recent history of the subdiscipline of ancient philosophy. With affection and admiration, we the editors and all the contributors dedicate this volume to David Keyt, in recognition of his major contributions to the study of ancient philosophy, and on behalf of the many students, colleagues, and friends whose lives he has touched and enriched over the past half century.d and enriched over the past half century.)
Latour (2005) + (Reassembling the social is Latour's challe … Reassembling the social is Latour's challenge to classical sociological understandings of the "social" and contends that there is not a necessary social ether which often influences human actions, but that by definition networks of human actions are the social aspect often erroneous identified. social aspect often erroneous identified.)
Barseghyan (2018) + (Recent developments in theoretical sciento … Recent developments in theoretical scientonomy coupled with a reflection on the practice of the Encyclopedia of Scientonomy all suggest that the ontology of scientific change currently accepted in scientonomy has serious flaws. The new ontology, suggested in this paper, solves some of the issues permeating the current ontology. Building on [[Modification:Sciento-2018-0002|Rawleigh’s suggestion]], it considers a ''theory'' as an attempt to answer a certain ''question''. It also introduces the category of ''definition'' as a subtype of theory. It also reveals that ''methods'' and ''methodologies'' of the currently accepted ontology do not differ from the perspective of their propositional content and, thus, belong to the same class of epistemic elements. This is captured in the new definition of ''method'' as a set of criteria for theory evaluation. It is also argued that ''methods'' are a subtype of ''normative theories''. It is shown that ''normative theories'' of all types, including methods, ethical norms, and aesthetic norms, can be both ''accepted and employed''. Finally, a new definition of ''scientific mosaic'' is suggested to fit the new ontology.ic'' is suggested to fit the new ontology.)
Intemann (2008) + (Recent feminist philosophers of science ha … Recent feminist philosophers of science have argued that feminist values can contribute to rational decisions about which scientific theories to accept. On this view, increasing the number of feminist scientists is important for ensuring rational and objective theory acceptance. The Underdetermination Thesis has played a key role in arguments for this view [Anderson (1995) Hypatia 10(3), 50–84; Hankinson Nelson (1990) Who knows? From Quine to a feminist empiricism. Temple University Press, Philadelphia; Longino (1990) Science as social knowledge. Princeton University Press, Princeton; Longino (2002) The fate of knowledge. Princeton University Press, Princeton; Kourany (2003) Philosophy of Science 70, 1–14]. This thesis is alleged to open an argumentative “gap” between evidence and theory acceptance and provide a rationale for filling the gap with feminist values. While I agree with the conclusion that feminist values can contribute to rational decisions about which theories to accept, I argue that the Underdetermination Thesis cannot support this claim. First, using earlier arguments [Laudan (1990) in: R. Giere (ed) Minnesota studies in the philosophy of science, vol 14, pp 267–297; Slezak (1991) International Studies in Philosophy of Science 5, 241–256; Pinnick (1994) Philosophy of Science 61, 664–657] I show that Underdetermination cannot, by itself, establish that feminist values should fill the gap in theory acceptance. Secondly, I argue that the very use of the Underdetermination Thesis concedes that feminist values are extra-scientific, a-rational, factors in theory acceptance. This concession denies feminists grounds to explain why their values contribute to rational scientific reasoning. Finally, I propose two alternative ways to explain how feminist values can contribute to rational theory acceptance that do not rely on Underdetermination.ce that do not rely on Underdetermination.)
Stump (2022) + (Relative, pragmatic, or dynamic theories o … Relative, pragmatic, or dynamic theories of the a priori have been considered by many philosophers of science. I present these theories as a model of how radical conceptual change occurs during a scientific revolution. When elements of a theory that are considered to be a priori or constitutive change, we have a revolutionary change that requires rethinking all of a scientific practice. Given that conceptual change is the flashpoint for discussion of the issues of incommensurability, the rationality of scientific change and relativism, by exploring theories of the a priori I show how radical conceptual change can occur and defend the rationality of scientific change. The viewpoint adopted avoids commitment to traditional a priori knowledge and to metaphysics, while still acknowledging that there is an important element in science that cannot simply be described as empirical. I present evidence to show that the model of scientific change can be applied widely.f scientific change can be applied widely.)
Newman (2014) + (René Descartes (1596–1650) is widely regar … René Descartes (1596–1650) is widely regarded as the father of modern philosophy. His noteworthy contributions extend to mathematics and physics. This entry focuses on his philosophical contributions in the theory of knowledge. Specifically, the focus is on the epistemological project of Descartes' famous work, Meditations on First Philosophy. Upon its completion, the work was circulated to other philosophers for their comments and criticisms. Descartes responded with detailed replies that provide a rich source of further information about the original work. He indeed published the first edition (1641) of the Meditations together with six sets of objections and replies, adding a seventh set with the second edition (1642).eventh set with the second edition (1642).)
Hatfield (2016) + (René Descartes (1596–1650) was a creative … René Descartes (1596–1650) was a creative mathematician of the first order, an important scientific thinker, and an original metaphysician. During the course of his life, he was a mathematician first, a natural scientist or “natural philosopher” second, and a metaphysician third. In mathematics, he developed the techniques that made possible algebraic (or “analytic”) geometry. In natural philosophy, he can be credited with several specific achievements: co-framer of the sine law of refraction, developer of an important empirical account of the rainbow, and proposer of a naturalistic account of the formation of the earth and planets (a precursor to the nebular hypothesis). More importantly, he offered a new vision of the natural world that continues to shape our thought today: a world of matter possessing a few fundamental properties and interacting according to a few universal laws. This natural world included an immaterial mind that, in human beings, was directly related to the brain; in this way, Descartes formulated the modern version of the mind–body problem. In metaphysics, he provided arguments for the existence of God, to show that the essence of matter is extension, and that the essence of mind is thought. Descartes claimed early on to possess a special method, which was variously exhibited in mathematics, natural philosophy, and metaphysics, and which, in the latter part of his life, included, or was supplemented by, a method of doubt.or was supplemented by, a method of doubt.)
Wimsatt (2006) + (Richard Levins’ distinction between aggreg … Richard Levins’ distinction between aggregate, composed and evolvedsystems acquires new significance as we recognize the importance of mechanisticexplanation. Criteria for aggregativity provide limiting cases for absence of organization,so through their failure, can provide rich detectors for organizational properties.I explore the use of failures of aggregativity for the analysis of mechanisticsystems in diverse contexts. Aggregativity appears theoretically desireable, but weare easily fooled. It may be exaggerated through approximation, conditions ofderivation, and extrapolating from some conditions of decomposition illegtimatelyto others. Evolved systems particularly may require analyses under alternativecomplementary decompositions. Exploring these conditions helps us to betterunderstand the strengths and limits of reductionistic methods.gths and limits of reductionistic methods.)
Laudan, Laudan, and Donovan (1988) + (Science is accorded high value in our cult … Science is accorded high value in our culture because, unlike many other intellectual endeavors, it appears capable of producing increasingly reliable knowledge. During the last quarter century a group of historians and philosophers of science (known variously as 'theorists of scientific change', the 'post-positivist school' or the 'historical school') has proposed theories to explain progressive change in science. Their concepts and models have received such keen attention that terms like 'paradigm' have passed from obscurity to common speech. In this volume, we subject key claims of some of the theorists of scientific change to just that kind of empirical scrutiny that has been so characteristic of science itself. Certain claims emerge unscathed - the existence and importance of large-scale theories (guiding assumptions) in the physical sciences for example. Others, such as the supposed importance of novel predictions or the alleged insignificance of anomalies, seem to be without foundation. We conclude that only by engaging in testing of this sort will the study of science be able to make progress.study of science be able to make progress.)
Winther (2016) + (Scientific inquiry has led to immense expl … Scientific inquiry has led to immense explanatory and technologicalsuccesses, partly as a result of the pervasiveness of scientific theories.Relativity theory, evolutionary theory, and plate tectonics were, andcontinue to be, wildly successful families of theories within physics,biology, and geology. Other powerful theory clusters inhabitcomparatively recent disciplines such as cognitive science, climatescience, molecular biology, microeconomics, and Geographic InformationScience (GIS). Effective scientific theories magnify understanding, helpsupply legitimate explanations, and assist in formulating predictions.Moving from their knowledge-producing representational functions totheir interventional roles (Hacking 1983), theories are integral to building technologies used within consumer, industrial, and scientific milieus. This entry explores the structure of scientific theories from the perspective of the Syntactic, Semantic, and Pragmatic Views. Each of these answers questions such as the following in unique ways. What is the bestcharacterization of the composition and function of scientific theory? How is theory linked with world? Which philosophical tools can and should be employed in describing and reconstructing scientific theory? Is an understanding of practice and application necessary for a comprehensionof the core structure of a scientific theory? Finally, and most generally,how are these three views ultimately related? are these three views ultimately related?)
Allen (1988) + (Scientists, philosophers and theologians h … Scientists, philosophers and theologians have wrestled repeatedly with the question of whether knowledge is similar or different in their various understandings of the world and God. Although agreement is still elusive, the epistemology of critical realism, associated with Ian Barbour, John Polkinghorne and Arthur Peacocke, remains widely credible. Relying on the lifetime work of philosopher Ernan McMullin, this book expands our understanding of critical realism beyond a permanent stand-off between the subjective and objective, whether in science or theology. Critical realism illuminates the subject and the objectively known simultaneously. Responding to criticisms made against it, this book defends critical realism in science and theology with a specific role to play in our understanding of God. role to play in our understanding of God.)
Yan, Tsai, and Huang (2022) + (Scientonomy is the field that aims to deve … Scientonomy is the field that aims to develop a descriptive theory of the actual process of scientific change (Barseghyan, 2015). Scientometrics is the field that aims to employ statistical methods to investigate the quantitative features of scientific research, especially the impact of scientific articles and the significance of scientific citations (Leydesdorff & Milojević, 2013). In this paper, we aim to illustrate how to methodologically integrate scientonomy with scientometrics to investigate both qualitative and quantitative changes of a scientific community. We will use a case study to achieve our aim. The case study is about a scientific community studying a physiological phenomenon called heart-rate variability (HRV). Moreover, we will argue that this methodological integration outperforms cases in which researchers only employ the resources from one of the two fields.ploy the resources from one of the two fields.)
Dechauffour (2022) + (Scientonomy seems to hold conflicting view … Scientonomy seems to hold conflicting views about the historicity of scientific method. On the one hand, it is said that scientific methods are immanent to scientific mosaics and therefore change through time. On the other hand, the distinction between substantive and procedural methods seems to suggest that there are transcendent, unchangeable methods. I argue that this contradiction can be resolved by re-evaluating the role of problems: by integrating problems as constitutive elements of scientific mosaics, scientonomy can work towards a theory of scientific change without relying on the presupposition that some normative aspects of science must not change. In that perspective, norms originate in the relation between a problem, which creates a need for theoretical innovation, and a method, which creates an actual means to solve a problem. A problem-based scientonomy would then have to build a genealogical, rather than normative, approach to the source of scientificity by describing the progression from mysteries to scientific problems. Moreover, because they do not come from nowhere but express actual interactions with the world, problems can help us understand the relation between scientific change and other kinds of change. The primacy of actual problems over rational norms points to the immanence of reason: reason should be conceived as an evolutive feature of human communities. Finally, the relation between a theory of scientific change, evolutionary epistemology, and a general theory of change is investigated. general theory of change is investigated.)
Terrall (2002) + (Self-styled adventurer, literary wit, phil … Self-styled adventurer, literary wit, philosopher, and statesman of science, Pierre-Louis Moreau de Maupertuis (1698-1759) stood at the center of Enlightenment science and culture. Offering an elegant and accessible portrait of this remarkable man, Mary Terrall uses the story of Maupertuis's life, self-fashioning, and scientific works to explore what it meant to do science and to be a man of science in eighteenth-century Europe.Beginning his scientific career as a mathematician in Paris, Maupertuis entered the public eye with a much-discussed expedition to Lapland, which confirmed Newton's calculation that the earth was flattened at the poles. He also made significant, and often intentionally controversial, contributions to physics, life science, navigation, astronomy, and metaphysics. Called to Berlin by Frederick the Great, Maupertuis moved to Prussia to preside over the Academy of Sciences there. Equally at home in salons, cafés, scientific academies, and royal courts, Maupertuis used his social connections and his printed works to enhance a carefully constructed reputation as both a man of letters and a man of science. His social and institutional affiliations, in turn, affected how Maupertuis formulated his ideas, how he presented them to his contemporaries, and the reactions they provoked.Terrall not only illuminates the life and work of a colorful and important Enlightenment figure, but also uses his story to delve into many wider issues, including the development of scientific institutions, the impact of print culture on science, and the interactions of science and government. Smart and highly readable, Maupertuis will appeal to anyone interested in eighteenth-century science and culture.“Terrall’s work is scholarship in the best sense. Her explanations of arcane 18th-century French physics, mathematics, astronomy, and biology are among the most lucid available in any language.” — ''Virginia Dawson, American Historical Review''Winner of the 2003 Pfizer Award from the History of Science Society Award from the History of Science Society)
Mill (2003) + (Since its first publication in 1859, few w … Since its first publication in 1859, few works of political philosophy have provoked such continuous controversy as John Stuart Mill's "On Liberty", a passionate argument on behalf of freedom of self-expression. This classic work is now available in this volume which also includes essays by scholars in a range of fields. The text begins with a biographical essay by David Bromwich and an interpretative essay by George Kateb. Then Jean Bethke Elshtain, Owen Fiss, Judge Richard A. Posner and Jeremy Waldron present commentaries on the pertinence of Mill's thinking to early 21st century debates. They discuss, for example, the uses of authority and tradition, the shifting legal boundaries of free speech and free action, the relation of personal liberty to market individualism, and the tension between the right to live as one pleases and the right to criticize anyone's way of life.e right to criticize anyone's way of life.)
Cohen and Smith (Eds.) (2002) + (Sir Isaac Newton (1642–1727) was one of th … Sir Isaac Newton (1642–1727) was one of the greatest scientists of all time, a thinker of extraordinary range and creativity who has left enduring legacies in mathematics and the natural sciences. In this volume a team of distinguished contributors examine all the main aspects of Newton's thought, including not only his approach to space, time, mechanics, and universal gravity in his Principia, his research in optics, and his contributions to mathematics, but also his more clandestine investigations into alchemy, theology, and prophecy, which have sometimes been overshadowed by his mathematical and scientific interests.his mathematical and scientific interests.)
Ariew (1986) + (Some philosophers of science suggest that … Some philosophers of science suggest that philosophical assumptions mustinfluence historical scholarship, because history (like science) has no neutral data andbecause the treatment of any particular historical episode is going to be influenced tosome degree by one's prior philosophical conceptions of what is important in science.However, if the history of science must be laden with philosophical assumptions, then howcan the history of science be evidence for the philosophy of science? Would not aninductivist history of science confirm an inductivist philosophy of science and aconventionalist history of science confirm a conventionalist philosophy of science? Iattempt to resolve this problem; essentially, I deny the claim that the history of sciencemust be influenced by one's conception of what is important in science - one's generalphilosophy of science. To accomplish the task I look at a specific historical episode,together with its history, and draw some metamethodological conclusions from it. Thespecific historical episode I examine is Descartes' critique of Galileo's scientific methodology.tique of Galileo's scientific methodology.)
Longino (2016a) + (Study of the social dimensions of scientif … Study of the social dimensions of scientific knowledge encompasses theeffects of scientific research on human life and social relations, the effectsof social relations and values on scientific research, and the social aspectsof inquiry itself. Several factors have combined to make these questionssalient to contemporary philosophy of science. These factors include theemergence of social movements, like environmentalism and feminism,critical of mainstream science; concerns about the social effects ofscience-based technologies; epistemological questions made salient by bigscience; new trends in the history of science, especially the move awayfrom internalist historiography; anti-normative approaches in thesociology of science; turns in philosophy to naturalism and pragmatism.This entry reviews the historical background to current research in thisarea and features of contemporary science that invite philosophicalattention. The philosophical work can roughly be classified into twocamps. One acknowledges that scientific inquiry is in fact carried out insocial settings and asks whether and how standard epistemology must besupplemented to address this feature. The other treats sociality as afundamental aspect of knowledge and asks how standard epistemologymust be modified from this broadly social perspective. Concerns in thesupplementing approach include such matters as trust and answerabilityraised by multiple authorship, the division of cognitive labor, thereliability of peer review, the challenges of privately funded science, aswell as concerns arising from the role of scientific research in society. Thereformist approach highlights the challenge to normative philosophy fromsocial, cultural, and feminist studies of science while seeking to developphilosophical models of the social character of scientific knowledge, andtreats the questions of the division of cognitive labor, expertise and authority, the interactions of science and society, etc., from the perspectiveof philosophical models of the irreducibly social character of scientificknowledge. social character of scientific knowledge.)
Longino (2015) + (Study of the social dimensions of scientif … Study of the social dimensions of scientific knowledge encompasses theeffects of scientific research on human life and social relations, the effectsof social relations and values on scientific research, and the social aspectsof inquiry itself. Several factors have combined to make these questionssalient to contemporary philosophy of science. These factors include theemergence of social movements, like environmentalism and feminism,critical of mainstream science; concerns about the social effects ofscience-based technologies; epistemological questions made salient by bigscience; new trends in the history of science, especially the move awayfrom internalist historiography; anti-normative approaches in thesociology of science; turns in philosophy to naturalism and pragmatism.This entry reviews the historical background to current research in thisarea and features of contemporary science that invite philosophicalattention.ience that invite philosophical attention.)
Longino (2019) + (Study of the social dimensions of scientif … Study of the social dimensions of scientific knowledge encompasses theeffects of scientific research on human life and social relations, the effectsof social relations and values on scientific research, and the social aspectsof inquiry itself. Several factors have combined to make these questionssalient to contemporary philosophy of science. These factors include theemergence of social movements, like environmentalism and feminism,critical of mainstream science; concerns about the social effects ofscience-based technologies; epistemological questions made salient by bigscience; new trends in the history of science, especially the move awayfrom internalist historiography; anti-normative approaches in thesociology of science; turns in philosophy to naturalism and pragmatism.This entry reviews the historical background to current research in thisarea and features of contemporary science that invite philosophicalattention.ience that invite philosophical attention.)
Héder and Nádasi (Eds.) (2019) + (Technology, in all its forms, has had and … Technology, in all its forms, has had and continues to have an indisputable impact on society and culture. Philosophy of technology seeks to understand this impact and the meaning of technology for society and culture. Although its origins can be traced back to the Greeks, it wasn’t until the late 19th century to the beginning of the 20th century that it gained ground as a philosophical discipline. Now more than ever it is considered an essential philosophical enterprise. ‘The Budapest Workshop on Philosophy of Technology’ was a lively and successful event that sort to discuss, reflect on and apply this branch of philosophical inquiry to both historical and contemporary examples. Importantly, the contributors’ methodological approaches were influenced by, although not limited to, Michael Polanyi’s term ‘post-critical’. Moving beyond the rigidity of past approaches, the selected essays were driven by two lines of inquiry, what has been the historical role of technology in social and scientific change? And, how can a ‘post-critical’ approach enhance and extend our understanding of philosophy of technology?This edited volume begins by exploring the role of technology in social and scientific developments from a historical perspective, before moving towards a discussion of philosophy of technology from a ‘Post-Critical’ epistemic stance. Free from the constraints of previous methodologies, the third part of this work engages with the term ‘Post-Critical’ in its broadest sense. The contributors to this section consider the phenomenology of the body and the influence of technology on our lives. Finally, the four concluding chapters of this book apply this philosophical approach to a wide range of contemporary problems from Decision Support Systems to Crisis Communication.n Support Systems to Crisis Communication.)
Theiner (2015) + (Th e concept of distributed cognition (DC) … Th e concept of distributed cognition (DC) fi gures prominently in contemporary discussionsof the idea that the social, cultural, and technological distribution of cognitive laborin groups can give rise to “group cognition” or “collective intelligence.” Since there arediff erent ways of understanding the notion of DC, there is much debate about what“ontological heft ” we should attach to the thesis that groups are distributed cognitivesystems. Th e goal of this chapter is to map out the conceptual terrain on which this debateis taking place. My approach is grounded in the framework of DC which has been developed,since the mid-1980s, notably by Edwin Hutchins, Donald Norman, and DavidKirsh. In particular, I borrow here as my starting point their suggestion that taking up theDC perspective is not itself an empirical thesis about a certain kind of cognition; rather,it is a methodological decision to select scales of investigation from which all of cognitioncan be analyzed as distributed. cognition can be analyzed as distributed.)
Carruthers, Stitch, and Siegal (Eds.) (2002) + (The Cognitive Basis of Science concerns th … The Cognitive Basis of Science concerns the question ''What makes science possible?'' Specifically, what features of the human mind and of human culture and cognitive development permit and facilitate the conduct of science? The essays in this volume address these questions, which are inherently interdisciplinary, requiring co-operation between philosophers, psychologists, and others in the social and cognitive sciences. They concern the cognitive, social, and motivational underpinnings of scientific reasoning in children and lay persons as well as in professional scientists. The editors’ introduction lays out the background to the debates, and the volume includes a consolidated bibliography that will be a valuable reference resource for all those interested in this area. The volume will be of great importance to all researchers and students interested in the philosophy or psychology of scientific reasoning, as well as those, more generally, who are interested in the nature of the human mind.nterested in the nature of the human mind.)
Butts and Hintikka (Eds.) (1977) + (The Fifth International Congress of Logic, … The Fifth International Congress of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science was held at the University of Western Ontario, London, Canada, 27 August to 2 September 1975. The Congress was held under the auspices of the International Union of History and Philosophy of Science, Division of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science, and was sponsored by the National Research Council of Canada and the University of Western Ontario. As those associated closely with the work of the Division over the years know well, the work undertaken by its members varies greatly and spans a number of fields not always obviously related. In addition, the volume of work done by first rate scholars and scientists in the various fields of the Division has risen enormously. For these and related reasons it seemed to the editors chosen by the Divisional officers that the usual format of publishing the proceedings of the Congress be abandoned in favour of a somewhat more flexible, and hopefully acceptable, method of presentation. Accordingly, the work of the invited participants to the Congress has been divided into four volumes appearing in the University of Western Ontario Series in Philosophy of Science. The volumes are entitled, Logic, Foundations of Mathematics and Computability Theory, Foundational Problems in the Special Sciences, Basic Problems in Methodology and Linguistics, and Historical and Philosophical Dimensions of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science.ic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science.)
Berryman (2016b) + (The Greek tradition regarded Leucippus as … The Greek tradition regarded Leucippus as the founder of atomism inancient Greek philosophy. Little is known about him, and his views arehard to distinguish from those of his associate Democritus. He issometimes said to have been a student of Zeno of Elea, and to havedevised the atomist philosophy in order to escape from the problemsraised by Parmenides and his followers.ms raised by Parmenides and his followers.)
Theiner and O'Connor (2010) + (The Group Mind Thesis—understood as the cl … The Group Mind Thesis—understood as the claim that groups as a wholecan be the subjects of mental states—was a popular idea in the intellectuallandscape of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.2 For manyscientists and philosophers of that period, it provided a succinct expressionof what they perceived to be two characteristic features of groups: on theone hand, their ability to function as collective agents who can have intentions,make decisions, and pursue their own goals; on the other hand, theidea that groups are emergent wholes which are more than the sum of itsmembers. Combine the two features, and the functional analogies betweenindividual and group behavior strongly suggest adopting an intentionalstance towards both.opting an intentional stance towards both.)
Fieser and Dowden (Ed.) (2017) + (The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (I … The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (IEP) (ISSN 2161-0002) was founded in 1995 to provide open access to detailed, scholarly information on key topics and philosophers in all areas of philosophy. The Encyclopedia receives no funding, and operates through the volunteer work of the editors, authors, volunteers, and technical advisers. At present, the IEP has over a million visitors per month, and about 20 million page views per year. The Encyclopedia is free of charge and available to all users of the Internet world-wide. The staff of 30 editors and approximately 300 authors hold doctorate degrees and are professors at universities around the world, most notably from English-speaking countries.The purpose of the IEP is to provide detailed, scholarly information on key topics and philosophers in all areas of philosophy. The Encyclopedia's articles are written with the intention that most of the article can be understood by advanced undergraduates majoring in philosophy and by other scholars who are not working in the field covered by that article. The IEP articles are written by experts but not for experts in analogy to the way the Scientific American magazine is written by scientific experts but not primarily for scientific experts. A critical feature of the IEP is its status as a freely accessible and not-for-profit resource, which the General Editors, present and future, will seek to perpetuate. As such, the IEP will not be used to make a profit in any manner, such as by re-publishing articles or by charging for access to its articles or by posting advertising. No person at the IEP will receive any financial compensation for any IEP work. No for-profit organization will have any financial stake in the IEP, nor can a for-profit organization advertise within the IEP.fit organization advertise within the IEP.)
Annas and Barnes (Eds.) (1985) + (The Modes of Scepticism is one of the most … The Modes of Scepticism is one of the most important and influential of all ancient philosophical texts. The texts made an enormous impact on Western thought when they were rediscovered in the 16th century and they have shaped the whole future course of Western philosophy. Despite their importance, the Modes have been little discussed in recent times. This book translates the texts and supplies them with a discursive commentary, concentrating on philosophical issues but also including historical material. The book will be of interest to professional scholars and philosophers but its clear and non-technical style makes it intelligible to beginners and the interested layman.le to beginners and the interested layman.)
Aristotle (1984) + (The Oxford Translation of Aristotle was or … The Oxford Translation of Aristotle was originally published in 12 volumes between 1912 and 1954. It is universally recognized as the standard English version of Aristotle. This revised edition contains the substance of the original Translation, slightly emended in light of recent scholarship; three of the original versions have been replaced by new translations; and a new and enlarged selection of Fragments has been added. The aim of the translation remains the same: to make the surviving works of Aristotle readily accessible to English speaking readers.ly accessible to English speaking readers.)
Curd (2016) + (The Presocratics were 6th and 5th century … The Presocratics were 6th and 5th century BCE Greek thinkers whointroduced a new way of inquiring into the world and the place of humanbeings in it. They were recognized in antiquity as the first philosophersand scientists of the Western tradition. This article is a generalintroduction to the most important Presocratic philosophers and the mainthemes of Presocratic thought. More detailed discussions can be found byconsulting the articles on these philosophers (and related topics) in theSEP (listed below). The standard collection of texts for the Presocratics isthat by H. Diels revised by W. Kranz (abbreviated as DK). In it, eachthinker is assigned an identifying chapter number (e.g., Heraclitus is 22,Anaxagoras 59); then the reports from ancient authors about that thinker'slife and thought are collected in a section of “testimonies” (A) andnumbered in order, while the passages the editors take to be directquotations are collected and numbered in a section of “fragments” (B).Alleged imitations in later authors are sometimes added in a sectionlabeled C. Thus, each piece of text can be uniquely identified: DK59B12.3 identifies line 3 of Anaxagoras fragment 12; DK 22A1 identifiestestimonium 1 on Heraclitus.A1 identifies testimonium 1 on Heraclitus.)
Ludwig and Jankovic (2015) + (The Routledge Handbook of Collective Inten … The Routledge Handbook of Collective Intentionality provides a wide-ranging survey of topics in a rapidly expanding area of interdisciplinary research. It consists of 36 chapters, written exclusively for this volume, by an international team of experts. What is distinctive about the study of collective intentionality within the broader study of social interactions and structures is its focus on the conceptual and psychological features of joint or shared actions and attitudes, and their implications for the nature of social groups and their functioning. This Handbook fully captures this distinctive nature of the field and how it subsumes the study of collective action, responsibility, reasoning, thought, intention, emotion, phenomenology, decision-making, knowledge, trust, rationality, cooperation, competition, and related issues, as well as how these underpin social practices, organizations, conventions, institutions and social ontology. Like the field, the Handbook is interdisciplinary, drawing on research in philosophy, cognitive science, linguistics, legal theory, anthropology,sociology, computer science, psychology, economics, and political science. Finally, the Handbook promotes several specific goals: (1) it provides an important resource for students and researchers interested in collective intentionality; (2) it integrates work across disciplines and areas of research as it helps to define the shape and scope of an emerging area of research;(3) it advances the study of collective intentionality.es the study of collective intentionality.)
Kuhn (1962a) + (The Structure of Scientific Revolutions po … The Structure of Scientific Revolutions posited a new, historically grounded way of understanding scientific knowledge. Kuhn spoke of ''scientific paradigms'', which are shared constellations of theoretical and metaphysical beliefs, values, methods, and instrumental techniques shared by a scientific discipline. A ''scientific revolution'' occurs when one paradigm is replaced with another. Because paradigms are holistic networks of theories, methods, and values, they are ''incommensurable'' meaning that the terms and categories of the old paradigm cannot be translated into those of the new. Adoption of a new paradigm thus appears to involve something akin to a gestalt shift.involve something akin to a gestalt shift.)
Uebel (2016) + (The Vienna Circle was a group of early twe … The Vienna Circle was a group of early twentieth-century philosopherswho sought to reconceptualize empiricism by means of their interpretationof then recent advances in the physical and formal sciences. Theirradically anti-metaphysical stance was supported by an empiricist criterionof meaning and a broadly logicist conception of mathematics. They deniedthat any principle or claim was synthetic a priori. Moreover, they soughtto account for the presuppositions of scientific theories by regimentingsuch theories within a logical framework so that the important role playedby conventions, either in the form of definitions or of other analyticalframework principles, became evident. The Vienna Circle’s theories wereconstantly changing. In spite (or perhaps because) of this, they helped toprovide the blueprint for analytical philosophy of science as meta-theory—a “second-order” reflection of “first-order” sciences. While the ViennaCircle’s early form of logical empiricism (or logical positivism orneopositivism: these labels will be used interchangeably here) no longerrepresents an active research program, recent history of philosophy ofscience has unearthed much previously neglected variety and depth in thedoctrines of the Circle’s protagonists, some of whose positions retainrelevance for contemporary analytical philosophy.ce for contemporary analytical philosophy.)
Palermos (2016) + (The aim of this paper is to demonstrate th … The aim of this paper is to demonstrate that the postulation of irreducible,distributed cognitive systems (or group minds as they are also known in the literature)is necessary for the successful explanatory practice of cognitive science andsociology. Towards this end, and with an eye specifically on the phenomenon ofdistributed cognition, the debate over reductionism versus emergence is examinedfrom the perspective of Dynamical Systems Theory (DST). The motivation for thisnovel approach is threefold. Firstly, DST is particularly popular amongst cognitivescientists who work on modelling collective behaviors. Secondly, DST can delivertwo distinct arguments in support of the claim that the presence of mutual interactionsbetween group members necessitates the postulation of the correspondinggroup entity. Thirdly, DST can also provide a succinct understanding of the waygroup entities exert downward causation on their individual members. The outcomeis a naturalist account of the emergent, and thereby irreducible, nature of distributedcognitive systems that avoids the reductionists’ threat of epiphenomenalism, whilebeing well in line with materialism while being well in line with materialism)
Bird (2011) + (The article gives an overview of Thomas Ku … The article gives an overview of Thomas Kuhn's work, life, and intellectual influence on multiple fields. Kuhn began his career in physics, and acquired an interest in the history and philosophy of science through his undergraduate teaching in the history of science at Harvard. His work on a book about the Copernican revolution led him to develop a new view of science, which he published in his ''Structure of Scientific Revolutions''. The initial reception of Kuhn's work by philosophers, was hostile, although they recognized its importance. His use of historical and psychological ideas was unfamiliar to them. This hostility moderated once they gained a better understanding of them, and once he clarified some of his ideas in subsequent work. The book met a more friendly initial reception among sociologists, who saw in it a way to understand science in terms familiar to their discipline.nce in terms familiar to their discipline.)
Gooding (1985) + (The article is a collection of six essays … The article is a collection of six essays by historians of science explaining their discipline. Gooding's contribution explains that historians of science are interested in the activities of scientific practitioners, the instruments and techniques they used to investigate nature, the ways they represented their findings and communicated them to others, the institutional arrangements they made to promote and finance science, and the development of their ideas and arguments as evidenced by their published works, manuscripts, and papers. published works, manuscripts, and papers.)
Weisberg, Needham, and Hendry (2011) + (The article is about philosophical issues in chemistry.)
Finkenstaedt (1990) + (The article starts from the specific diffi … The article starts from the specific difficulties of applying quantitative analysis to the humanities and the general resistance to such analysis in the Federal Republic of Germany. It gives a survey of the attempts to apply bibliometric methods in English Studies, the only subject investigated so far. The highly individual nature of research in the humanities is stressed and differences in subfields are illustrated. There is little influence of departmental size or age on the publication behaviour of individuals. More studies of citation behaviour are needed for a reliable evaluation of the impact of research in the humanities. the impact of research in the humanities.)
Latour (1988a) + (The book is made of two parts: the first o … The book is made of two parts: the first one is a detailed exploration of the litterature around Pasteur’s rise from obscurity to fame and of the corresponding transformations of microbes from invisibility to prominence; the impossibility of a social explanation of science is then explored in a second part which provides the ontological basis for what has become known as "actor-network theory."as become known as "actor-network theory.")
Barnes, Bloor, and Henry (1996) + (The central thesis of this book is that so … The central thesis of this book is that sociological analysis is necessary for understanding scientific knowledge, though other fields, such as psychology and philosophy are also needed. Such knowledge is attained through historical case studies. The sociology of scientific knowledge is one part of a larger project to understand science itself in scientific terms.rstand science itself in scientific terms.)
Corradini and O'Connor (2010) + (The concept of emergence has seen a signif … The concept of emergence has seen a significant resurgence in philosophy and the sciences, yet debates regarding emergentist and reductionist visions of the natural world continue to be hampered by imprecision or ambiguity. Emergent phenomena are said to arise out of and be sustained by more basic phenomena, while at the same time exerting a "top-down" control upon those very sustaining processes. To some critics, this has the air of magic, as it seems to suggest a kind of circular causality. Other critics deem the concept of emergence to be objectionably anti-naturalistic. Objections such as these have led many thinkers to construe emergent phenomena instead as coarse-grained patterns in the world that, while calling for distinctive concepts, do not "disrupt" the ordinary dynamics of the finer-grained (more fundamental) levels. Yet, reconciling emergence with a (presumed) pervasive causal continuity at the fundamental level can seem to deflate emergence of its initially profound significance. This basic problematic is mirrored by similar controversy over how best to characterize the opposite systematizing impulse, most commonly given an equally evocative but vague term, "reductionism." The original essays in this volume help to clarify the alternatives: inadequacies in some older formulations and arguments are exposed and new lines of argument on behalf the two visions are advanced.nt on behalf the two visions are advanced.)
Priest, Tanaka, and Weber (2015) + (The contemporary logical orthodoxy has it … The contemporary logical orthodoxy has it that, from contradictory premises, anything can be inferred. Let ⊨ be a relation of logical consequence, defined either semantically or proof-theoretically. Call ⊨ explosive if it validates {A , ¬A} ⊨ B for every A and B (ex contradictionequodlibet (ECQ)). Classical logic, and most standard ‘non-classical’ logics too such as intuitionist logic, are explosive. Inconsistency, according to received wisdom, cannot be coherently reasoned about. Paraconsistent logic challenges this orthodoxy. A logical consequence relation, ⊨, is said to be paraconsistent if it is not explosive. Thus, if ⊨ is paraconsistent, then even if we are in certain circumstances where the available information is inconsistent, the inference relation does not explode into triviality. Thus, paraconsistent logic accommodates inconsistency in a sensible manner that treats inconsistent information as informative. The prefix ‘para’ in English has two meanings:‘quasi’ (or ‘similar to, modelled on’) or ‘beyond’. When the term ‘paraconsistent’ was coined by Miró Quesada at the Third Latin America Conference on Mathematical Logic in 1976, he seems to have had the first meaning in mind. Many paraconsistent logicians, however, have taken it to mean the second, which provided different reasons for the development of paraconsistent logic as we will see below. This article is not meant to be a complete survey of paraconsistent logic. The aim is to provide some aspects and features of the field that are philosophically salient.he field that are philosophically salient.)
Patton, Overgaard, and Barseghyan (2017) + (The current formulation of ''the second la … The current formulation of ''the second law'' is flawed since it does not specify the causal relations between the outcomes of theory assessment and the actual acceptance/unacceptance of a theory; it merely tells us that a theory was assessed by the method employed at the time. We propose a new formulation of the second law: “If a theory satisfies the acceptance criteria of the method actually employed at the time, then it becomes accepted into the mosaic; if it does not, it remains unaccepted; if it is inconclusive whether the theory satisfies the method, the theory can be accepted or not accepted.” This new formulation makes the causal connection between theory assessment outcomes and cases of theory acceptance/unacceptance explicit. Also, this new formulation is not a tautology because it forbids certain logically possible scenarios, such as a theory satisfying the method of the time yet remaining unaccepted. Finally, we outline what inferences an observational scientonomist can make regarding theory assessment outcomes from the record of accepted theories.omes from the record of accepted theories.)
Fraser and Sarwar (2018) + (The current formulation of ''the zeroth la … The current formulation of ''the zeroth law'' (the law of compatibility) is marred with a number of theoretical problems, which necessitate its reformulation. In this paper, we propose that ''compatibility'' is an independent stance that can be taken towards epistemic elements of all types. We then provide a new definition of ''compatibility criteria'' to reflect this change. We show that the content of the zeroth law is deducible from our definition of ''compatibility''. Instead of a static law of compatibility, we propose a new dynamic ''law of compatibility'' that explains how the stance of compatibility obtains. Unlike the zeroth law, this new law has empirical content, as it forbids certain conceivable scenarios. Having established these notions, we propose a classification space that exhaustively covers all the possible states a theory may occupy and all the transitions it may undergo during its lifecycle.tions it may undergo during its lifecycle.)
Barseghyan and Mirkin (2019) + (The current scientonomic discourse focuses … The current scientonomic discourse focuses largely on theories and methods of natural, social, and formal ''sciences'', while the role of ''technological'' knowledge in the process of scientific change is virtually neglected. This neglect, we argue, has to do with the scientonomic distinction between two epistemic stances – ''acceptance'' of a theory as the best available description of its domain and its ''use'' in practical applications. The view that is implicit in contemporary ''scientonomy'' is that sciences alone can produce ''accepted'' knowledge, while technologies are all about knowledge ''use''. In contrast, we argue that there is ''accepted'' propositional technological knowledge which plays an indispensable role in the process of scientific change. We demonstrate that technological disciplines do not merely ''use'' theories but also produce ''accepted'' theories, such as “''x'' is an effective treatment for medical condition ''y''”, “''z'' is a viable technology for bridge-building”, and “''p'' is a statistically valid technique for assessing public opinion about ''q''”. There are both theoretical and historical reasons to believe that changes in technological knowledge exhibit the same patterns as changes in natural, social, and formal sciences. In addition, technological knowledge is intrinsically intertwined with scientific knowledge as accepted scientific and technological theories often jointly shape employed methods.ries often jointly shape employed methods.)
Rawleigh (2018) + (The currently accepted scientonomic ontolo … The currently accepted scientonomic ontology includes two classes of epistemic elements – ''theories'' and ''methods''. However, the ontology underlying ''the Encyclopedia of Scientonomy'' includes ''questions''/''topics'' as a basic element of its semantic structure. Ideally there should be no discrepancy between the accepted ontology of theoretical scientonomy and that of the Encyclopedia. I argue that questions constitute a distinct class of epistemic elements as they are not reducible to other elements that undergo scientific change – theories or methods. I discuss and reject two attempts at reducing questions to either descriptive or normative theories. According to the descriptive-epistemic account, scientific questions can be logically reduced to descriptive propositions, while according to the normative-epistemic account, they can be reduced to normative propositions. I show that these interpretations are incapable of capturing the propositional content expressed by questions; any possible reduction is carried at the expense of losing the essential characteristic of questions. Further, I find that the attempts to reduce questions to theories introduce an infinite regress, where a theory is an attempt to answer a question, which is itself a theory which answers another question, ''ad infintum''. Instead, I propose to incorporate the question-answer semantic structure from erotetic logic in which questions constitute a distinct class of elements irreducible to propositions. An acceptance of questions into scientonomic ontology as a separate class of epistemic elements suggests a new avenue of research into the mechanism of question acceptance and rejection, i.e. how epistemic communities come to accept certain questions as legitimate and others as illegitimate. as legitimate and others as illegitimate.)
Cohen et al. (Eds.) (1976) + (The death of Imre Lakatos on February 2, 1 … The death of Imre Lakatos on February 2, 1974 was a personal and philosophical loss to the worldwide circle of his friends, colleagues and students. This volume reflects the range of his interests in mathematics, logic, politics and especially in the history and methodology of the sciences. Indeed, Lakatos was a man in search of rationality in all of its forms. He thought he had found it in the historical development of scientific knowledge, yet he also saw rationality endangered everywhere. To honor Lakatos is to honor his sharp and aggressive criticism as well as his humane warmth and his quick wit. He was a person to love and to struggle with.was a person to love and to struggle with.)
Hempel (1945) + (The defining characteristic of an empirica … The defining characteristic of an empirical statement is its capability of being tested by a confrontation with experimental findings, i.e. with the results of suitable experiments or 'focused' observations. This feature distinguishes statements which have empirical content both from the statements of the formal sciences, logic and mathematics which require no experimental tests for their validation, and from the formulations of transempirical metaphysics, which do notadmit of any.al metaphysics, which do not admit of any.)
Sarwar and Fraser (2018) + (The demarcation between science and non-sc … The demarcation between science and non-science seems to play an important role in the process of scientific change, as theories regularly transition from being considered scientific to being considered unscientific and ''vice versa''. However, theoretical scientonomy is yet to shed light on this process. The goal of this paper is to tackle the problem of demarcation from the scientonomic perspective. Specifically, we introduce ''scientificity'' as a distinct epistemic stance that an agent can take towards a theory. We contend that changes in this stance are to be traced and explained by scientonomy. Thus, we formulate a new ''law of theory demarcation'' to account for changes in scientificity within the scientonomic framework.ificity within the scientonomic framework.)
Schickore and Steinle (Eds.) (2006) + (The distinction between the contexts of di … The distinction between the contexts of discovery and justification has had a turbulent career in philosophy of science. At times celebrated as the hallmark of philosophical approaches to science, at times condemned as ambiguous, distorting, and misleading, the distinction dominated philosophical debates from the early decades of the twentieth century to the 1980s. In recent years, the distinction has vanished from philosophers’ official agenda. However, even though it is rarely explicitly addressed, it still informs our conception of the content, domain, and goals of philosophy of science. The fact that new developments in philosophy of experimentation and history and sociology of science have been marginalized by traditional scholarship in philosophy indicates that the context distinction still pervades philosophical thinking about science. This volume helps clear the grounds for the productive and fruitful integration of these new developments into philosophy of science.We identify several focal points for the re-assessment of the distinction: the original contexts, especially the work of the Logical Empiricists, its alleged forerunners in the nineteenth century, and its evolution and dissemination throughout the twentieth centuryemination throughout the twentieth century)
Popper (1972) + (The essays in this volume represent an app … The essays in this volume represent an approach to human knowledge that has had a profound influence on many recent thinkers. Popper breaks with a traditional commonsense theory of knowledge that can be traced back to Aristotle. A realist and fallibilist, he argues closely and in simple language that scientific knowledge, once stated in human language, is no longer part of ourselves but a separate entity that grows through critical selection.ity that grows through critical selection.)
Lennon and Dea (2014) + (The expression “continental rationalism” r … The expression “continental rationalism” refers to a set of views more orless shared by a number of philosophers active on the European continentduring the latter two thirds of the seventeenth century and the beginning ofthe eighteenth. Rationalism is most often characterized as anepistemological position. On this view, to be a rationalist requires at leastone of the following: (1) a privileging of reason and intuition oversensation and experience, (2) regarding all or most ideas as innate ratherthan adventitious, (3) an emphasis on certain rather than merely probableknowledge as the goal of enquiry. While all of the continental rationalistsmeet one or more of these criteria, this is arguably the consequence of adeeper tie that binds them together—that is, a metaphysical commitmentto the reality of substance, and, in particular, to substance as an underlyingprinciple of unity.tance as an underlying principle of unity.)
McIntyre (1996) + (The first full-length defense of social sc … The first full-length defense of social scientific laws to appear in the last twenty years, this book upholds the prospect of the nomological explanation of human behavior against those who maintain that this approach is impossible, impractical, or irrelevant. By pursuing an analogy with the natural sciences, McIntyre shows that the barriers to nomological inquiry within the social sciences are not generated by factors unique to social inquiry, but arise from a largely common set of problems that face any scientific endeavor.All of the most widely supported arguments against social scientific laws have failed largely due to adherence to a highly idealized conception of nomologicality (allegedly drawn from the natural sciences themselves) and the limited doctrine of “descriptivism.” Basing his arguments upon a more realistic view of scientific theorizing that emphasizes the pivotal role of “redescription” in aiding the search for scientific laws, McIntyre is optimistic about attaining useful law-like explanations of human behavior.l law-like explanations of human behavior.)
Locke (2015d) + (The fourth book of John Locke's An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, originally published in 1689 as edited by Jonathan Bennett in 2015.)
Fleck (1936) + (The fundamental error in many discussions … The fundamental error in many discussions from the field of epistemology is the (more or less open) manipulation of the symbolic epistemological subject, known as ‘human spirit’, ‘human mind’, ‘research worker’ or simply ‘man’ (‘John’, ’Socrates’), which has no concrete living position, which does not basically undergo changes even in the course of centuries and which represents every ‘normal’ man regardless of the surroundings and the epoch. Thus it is to be absolute, unchanging and general.is to be absolute, unchanging and general.)
Bristow (2017) + (The heart of the eighteenth century Enligh … The heart of the eighteenth century Enlightenment is the loosely organized activity of prominent French thinkers of the mid-decades of the eighteenth century, the so-called “philosophes” (e.g., Voltaire, D’Alembert, Diderot, Montesquieu). The philosophes constituted an informal society of men of letters who collaborated on a loosely defined project of Enlightenment exemplified by the project of the Encyclopedia. However, there are noteworthy centers of Enlightenment outside of France as well. There is a renowned Scottish Enlightenment (key figures are Frances Hutcheson, Adam Smith, [[David Hume]], Thomas Reid), a German Enlightenment (die Aufklärung, key figures of which include Christian Wolff, Moses Mendelssohn, G.E. Lessing and [[Immanuel Kant]]), and there are also other hubs of Enlightenment and Enlightenment thinkers scattered throughout Europe and America in the eighteenth century.ope and America in the eighteenth century.)
Ruse (2003) + (The intricate forms of living things bespe … The intricate forms of living things bespeak design, and thus a creator: nearly 150 years after Darwin's theory of natural selection called this argument into question, we still speak of life in terms of design--the function of the eye, the purpose of the webbed foot, the design of the fins. Why is the "argument from design" so tenacious, and does Darwinism--itself still evolving after all these years--necessarily undo it?The definitive work on these contentious questions, Darwin and Design surveys the argument from design from its introduction by the Greeks, through the coming of Darwinism, down to the present day. In clear, non-technical language Michael Ruse, a well-known authority on the history and philosophy of Darwinism, offers a full and fair assessment of the status of the argument from design in light of both the advances of modern evolutionary biology and the thinking of today's philosophers--with special attention given to the supporters and critics of "intelligent design."The first comprehensive history and exposition of Western thought about design in the natural world, this important work suggests directions for our thinking as we move into the twenty-first century. A thoroughgoing guide to a perennially controversial issue, the book makes its own substantial contribution to the ongoing debate about the relationship between science and religion, and between evolution and its religious critics.tween evolution and its religious critics.)
Ereshefsky (2017) + (The nature of species is controversial in … The nature of species is controversial in biology and philosophy. Biologists disagree on the definition of the term ‘species,’ and philosophers disagree over the ontological status of species. Yet a proper understanding of species is important for a number of reasons. Species are the fundamental taxonomic units of biological classification. Environmental laws are framed in terms of species. Even our conception of human nature is affected by our understanding of species. In this entry, three issues concerning species are discussed. The first is the ontological status of species. The second is whether biologists should be species pluralists or species monists. The third is whether the theoretical term ‘species’ refers to a real category in nature.cies’ refers to a real category in nature.)
Mormann (2008) + (The notion of idealization has received co … The notion of idealization has received considerable attention in contemporary philosophy of science but less in philosophy of mathematics. An exception was the ‘critical idealism’ of the neo-Kantian philosopher Ernst Cassirer. According to Cassirer the methodology of idealization plays a central role for mathematics and empirical science. In this paper it is argued that Cassirer's contributions in this area still deserve to be taken into account in the current debates in philosophy of mathematics.rent debates in philosophy of mathematics.)
Patton (2019) + (The only subtype of ''epistemic agent'' cu … The only subtype of ''epistemic agent'' currently recognized within scientonomy is ''community''. The place of both ''individuals'' and ''epistemic tools'' in the scientonomic ontology is yet to be clarified. This paper extends the scientonomic ontology to include ''epistemic agents'' and ''epistemic tools'' as well as their relationship to one another. Epistemic agent is defined as an agent capable of taking epistemic stances towards epistemic elements. These stances must be taken intentionally, that is, based on a semantic understanding of the epistemic element in question and its available alternatives, with reason, and for the purpose of acquiring knowledge. I argue that there can be both ''communal'' and ''individual'' epistemic agents. Epistemic agents are linked by relationships of ''authority delegation'' based on their differing areas of expertise. Having established the role of epistemic agents in the process of scientific change, I then turn to the role of ''epistemic tools'', such as a thermometer, a text, or a particle accelerator in epistemic activities. I argue that epistemic tools play a different role in scientific change than do epistemic agents. This role is specified by an agent’s employed method. A physical object or system is an ''epistemic tool'' for some epistemic agent if there is a procedure by which the tool can provide an acceptable source of knowledge for answering some question under the employed method of the agent. An agent is said to ''rely'' on such a tool. agent is said to ''rely'' on such a tool.)
Aiton (1958) + (The paper discusses Descartes vortex theory of planetary motion, and how it fared among subsequent thinkers.)
Shan (2023) + (The paper investigates the applicability o … The paper investigates the applicability of corpus linguistics to the construction of a database of intellectual history. Working with the Royal Society Corpus (RSC), it presents a series of corpus queries that can aid with computationally identifying potential instances of communal theory acceptance in England during the period of 1665-1800. These queries allowed to identify a set of noun-adjective pairs potentially synonymous with “accepted theory” and retrieve around 1,400 excerpts potentially indicative of instances of communal theory acceptance. The paper also discusses some strategies for identifying the epistemic agent, as well as the RSC’s place within the broader historical context. Finally, I argue that, in addition to exploring corpus linguistics strategies, methodologies for interpreting computationally retrieved data should also be developed.y retrieved data should also be developed.)
Barseghyan and Levesley (2021) + (The paper presents a new scientonomic acco … The paper presents a new scientonomic account of ''question dynamics''. To explain the process of question acceptance and rejection, we begin by introducing the notion of ''epistemic presupposition'' and show how it’s different from the notion of ''logical presupposition''. With the notion of epistemic presupposition at hand, we formulate ''the law of question acceptance'', a new scientonomic axiom, which states that a question becomes accepted only if all of its epistemic presuppositions are accepted, and it is accepted that the question is answerable. We then show how the process of question rejection can be explained by means of ''the question rejection theorem'', which states that a question becomes rejected when other elements that are incompatible with the question become accepted. To deduce this theorem in the usual scientonomic fashion (from the first law and the compatibility corollary), we first ascertain that the notion of compatibility/incompatibility is applicable to questions and show that one can legitimately speak of both question-theory and question-question incompatibility. We conclude by providing a quick illustration of the historical applicability of this new framework and suggest a number of questions for future research.a number of questions for future research.)
Friesen et al. (2023) + (The paper presents the transcript of the d … The paper presents the transcript of the discussions during the first scientonomy workshop that took place on February 25, 2023. The participants discussed and voted on several modifications concerning the scientonomic workflow ([[Modification:Sciento-2019-0007|Sciento-2019-0007]], [[Modification:Sciento-2019-0001|Sciento-2019-0001]], [[Modification:Sciento-2019-0002|Sciento-2019-0002]], [[Modification:Sciento-2019-0003|Sciento-2019-0003]], [[Modification:Sciento-2019-0004|Sciento-2019-0004]], [[Modification:Sciento-2019-0005|Sciento-2019-0005]], [[Modification:Sciento-2019-0006|Sciento-2019-0006]]) as well as two modifications concerning the idea of scientificity as an epistemic stance ([[Modification:Sciento-2018-0013|Sciento-2018-0013]]) and the respective law of theory demarcation ([[Modification:Sciento-2018-0014|Sciento-2018-0014]]).[[Modification:Sciento-2018-0014|Sciento-2018-0014]]).)
Hanfling (2004) + (The paper reviews the history of logical e … The paper reviews the history of logical empiricism. The movement originated in the 1920's among the philosophers and scientists of the Vienna Circle, under the leadership of Moritz Schlick. It organized its first international conference in 1929, and obtained its own journal, Erkenntnis, in 1930. The logical empiricists sought to eliminate all metaphysics with the claim that science referred only to observations and the logical relationships between them. Some important principles include the principle of verification, which holds that only those propositions that can be verified have meaning. Observations were summarized in observation statements, thereby avoiding metaphysical questions about subjective experience. The logical empiricists sought a unitary logical language in which to express all of science. The movement met its demise due to a host of problems that proved impossible for it to solve.ms that proved impossible for it to solve.)
Wisniak (2004) + (The phlogiston theory was born around 1700 … The phlogiston theory was born around 1700 and lasted for about one hundred years. It provided for the first time a unifying approach to widely different chemical and physical phenomena and as such was adopted by the most famous European scientists, particularly the French ones. Its demise came with Lavoisier’s new insights into the phenomena of chemical reactions in general and combustion in particular, as well as about the composition of air. Lavoisier’s results disproved the phlogiston theory and established the applicability of the principle of mass conservation to chemical reactions.f mass conservation to chemical reactions.)
Anagnostopoulos (Ed.) (2009) + (The present volume does not provide a surv … The present volume does not provide a survey of all of Aristotle’s thought, and it wasnot intended to do so. Its aim is to treat some central topics of his philosophy in as muchdepth as is possible within the space of a short chapter. Ancient and later biographersand historians of philosophy attribute to Aristotle a large number of works, two-thirdsof which have not survived. Even what has survived is an astounding achievement,both in its size and scope. Aristotle’s extant works add up to more than two thousandprinted pages and range over an astonishingly large number of topics – from the highlyabstract problems of being, substance, essence, form, and matter to those relating solelyto the natural world, and especially to living things (e.g., nutrition and the otherfaculties of the soul, generation, sleep, memory, dreaming, movement, and so on),the human good and excellences, the political association and types of constitutions,rhetoric, tragedy, and so on.Clearly, not all the topics Aristotle examines in his works could be discussed in asingle volume, and choices had to be made as to which ones to include. The choiceswere guided by an intuitive consideration – e.g., the centrality a topic has in the totalityof the Aristotelian corpus (e.g., substance, essence, cause, teleology) or in a single,major work (e.g., the categories, the soul, and the generation of animals are the centraltopics in three different Aristotelian treatises). These considerations produced a first list.Still, the list was too long for a single volume, and had to be shortened. The topics thatmade the final list seemed to the editor to be the ones that any volume with the objectivesof this one has to include. Others might have come up with different lists, but theywould not be radically different from this. The overwhelming majority of the topicsdiscussed below would be on every list that was aiming to achieve the objectives of thisvolume. Individually, each one of these topics receives an extensive treatment inAristotle’s works, and the views he articulates on them, when put together, give a goodsense of the kinds of problems that exercised Aristotle’s mind and the immense andlasting contributions he made in his investigations of them.The contents of the volume are divided into five parts, with part I covering Aristotle’slife and certain issues about the number, edition, and chronology of his works. Thedivision of the remaining chapters is based on the way Aristotle frequently characterizesgroups of inquiries in terms of their goals. Thus, part II consists of a number ofchapters discussing topics from the treatises that have been traditionally called Organon,i.e., those studying the instruments or tools for reasoning, demonstrating and, ingeneral, attaining knowledge and truth. Aristotle does not label these works (Categories,On Interpretation, Prior Analytics, Posterior Analytics, Topics, On Sophistical Refutations)Organon, but in several passages in his extant works he indicates that he views themas the instruments of inquiry and knowledge. The division of the remaining chaptersinto three parts – Theoretical, Practical, and Productive Knowledge – is, of course,based on the way Aristotle himself frequently divides the various inquiries on the basisof their ultimate goals – knowledge, action, and production. The chapters included ineach one of these parts are further subdivided into groups on the basis of the subfieldof Aristotelian philosophy to which a topic or the work(s) treating it belong – Metaphysics(seven chapters), Physics (three), Psychology (three), Biology (three) in part III (theoreticalknowledge); Ethics (eight) and Politics (five) in part IV (practical knowledge);and Rhetoric (two) and Art (two) in part V (productive knowledge). Of course, severaltopics (e.g., cause, teleology, substance) are discussed in many different Aristoteliantreatises, with some of them falling into different groups with respect to their ultimategoals – e.g., substance is explored in both the Categories (Organon) and the Metaphysics(theoretical knowledge).The contributors to the volume are many, and no attempt was made to impose auniform style with respect to writing, presentation, or argumentation. Each contributorwas left free to use her/his favoured approach, except in the way references to Aristotle’sworks or citations of specific passages in them are made – a uniform system has beenadopted. Although in some instances the whole title of a work (e.g., Politics) is given,most frequently an abbreviation is used (e.g., Pol: see list of abbreviations). Citations ofpassages in the Aristotelian corpus are made by giving: (1) the title of the specific work,(e.g., Pol or An for de Anima); (2) the Book for those Aristotelian treatises that are dividedinto Books in Roman numerals (e.g., I, II) – except for Met where Books are identifiedby uppercase Greek letters (e.g., Γ, Θ) and lowercase alpha (α) for the second Book; (3)the chapter within the Book or treatise in Arabic numerals; (4) and the Bekker pageand line number – e.g., An II.1 412a3, or Met Γ.4 1008b15. Each chapter includes ashort bibliography listing the sources cited in it and in some cases additional works onthe topic discussed that might be of interest to the reader. Space limitations did notpermit the inclusion of a comprehensive bibliography on Aristotle.a comprehensive bibliography on Aristotle.)
Shapere (1980) + (The prime intellectual achievement of mode … The prime intellectual achievement of modern science is a body of views of nature at once general in their conceptions and specific and precise in their explanations. Those views have, over the course of the history of science, become increasingly coherent, in the sense both of constituting a more and more unified perspective on a larger and larger body of detailed beliefs, and of providing an intelligible picture of the world we experience.1 Although problems remain that can be expected to alter our present scientific picture, even in fundamental ways, some of its claims must qualify as knowledge and understanding of, or at least as well-grounded beliefs about, the way things are. They have been arrived at by an increasingly sophisticated and systematic process of investigating nature, a process roughly describable as being, or at least as having come to be, one of collecting evidence on the basis of observation and experiment, and of formulating hypotheses whose purpose is both to account for the observations and experimental results and to provide bases for further observation and experiment leading to new discoveries and broadened and deepened understanding. It is the responsibility of the philosophy of science to show, by an analysis which preserves the spirit of this achievement, how the achievement has been possible (allowing both for the possibility of knowledge at present and the possibility that current views might be wrong), and to interpret the processes by which that body of views has been arrived at.ch that body of views has been arrived at.)
McIntyre (2009) + (The problem of personal identity, as philo … The problem of personal identity, as philosophers understand it today, emerged from the discussion of identity that Locke added to the second edition of The Essay concerning Human Understanding, published in 1694. In the forty-five years between the publication of that work and the publication of the Treatise, the literature on the problem of personal identity mushroomed, prompting Hume to observe wryly: “We now proceed to explain the nature of personal identity, which has become so great a question in philosophy, especially of late years in England, where all the abstruser sciences arestudy’d with a peculiar ardour and application” (T 1.4.6.15). Hume’s own explanation of the nature of personal identity drew on the resources of his accounts of the imagination and the passions, and was therefore unique in many respects. Nevertheless, the debatesof the preceding decades had covered considerable ground, and the distinctive features of Hume’s own view emerge more clearly when seen in the context of what had come before.en in the context of what had come before.)
Shaw and Donhauser (2022) + (The purpose of this paper is to show that … The purpose of this paper is to show that historical advances in theoretical ecology do not conform to the conventional scientonomic ontology. As a result, we suggest some revisions of that ontology. We claim that three famous episodes, including the development of three kinds of models (Lotka-Volterra models, broken stick models, and exergy models), demonstrate the need for a few modifications. Specifically, they highlight the need to refine the scientonomic category of use into two distinct kinds: epistemic use and practical use. Moreover, we suggest introducing the notion of abstract theory. We go on to argue that these historical findings support the recent changes in the definition of acceptance.t changes in the definition of acceptance.)
Palider (2019) + (The question of how we come to accept new … The question of how we come to accept new theories is a central area of inquiry in scientonomic discourse. However, there has yet to be a formal discussion of the subjective ''reasons'' an agent may have for accepting theories. This paper explores these epistemic reasons and constructs a historically sensitive definition of ''reason''. This formulation takes an abstractionist stance towards the ontology of reasons and makes use of a composite basing relation. The descriptive and normative components of reasons are fully formulated in scientonomic terms through the application of the newly introduced notion of ''implication'', and its separation from the notion of ''inference''. In addition, the paper provides scientonomic definitions for ''sufficient reason'', ''support'', and ''normative inference''. The fruitfulness of this formulation of reasons is illustrated by a few examples. reasons is illustrated by a few examples.)
Patton and Al-Zayadi (2021) + (The role of categories of knowledge, or '' … The role of categories of knowledge, or ''disciplines'', in science has not previously been explored in scientonomy. While disciplinary communities devoted to the production of knowledge are a modern phenomenon, the practice of dividing knowledge into categories is a universal feature of science. Although at any moment of time, many questions and theories can be part of a given discipline, not all of these are essential to the discipline. We show that two components are essential to a discipline: the discipline’s ''core questions'' as well as the discipline’s ''delineating theory'', a second-order theory that identifies these questions as essential to the discipline. If the questions of one discipline are a proper subset of the questions of another discipline, the former discipline is a subdiscipline of the latter. Since a discipline is a complex entity consisting of questions and a theory, epistemic agents can take epistemic stances towards disciplines. A discipline is said to be ''accepted'' if its core questions and its delineating theory are all accepted. To illustrate the applicability of these new concepts, the transition from physical to biological anthropology is discussed.l to biological anthropology is discussed.)
Sebastien (2016) + (The scope of the Theory of Scientific Chan … The scope of the Theory of Scientific Change (TSC) encompasses any and all changes that occur in a given scientific mosaic, the set of all methods employed and theories accepted at a given time by a given scientific community. Currently, a theory is defined as a set of propositions that attempts to describe something. This definition excludes normative propositions from the scope of the TSC. Normative theories, such as those of methodology or ethics, have been excluded since including them appears to give rise to a destructive paradox first identified by Joel Burkholder. There are many historical cases where employed scientific methods are known to conflict with professed methodologies. This seems to violate the third and zeroth laws of scientific change. By the third law, employed methods are deducible from accepted theories. But, this seems impossible in cases where methodologies and methods conflict. Under the zeroth law, all elements in the scientific mosaic are compatible with one another. But, that seems to be clearly not the case if methodologies and methods conflict with one another. In this paper, I argue that normative propositions such as methodologies can be included in the scientific mosaic as accepted theories without generating a paradox and that neither the third nor zeroth laws of scientific change need be violated. I outline my solution to the paradox and conclude by describing some new and exciting avenues for future research that are now open.ues for future research that are now open.)
Patton (2022) + (The sociotechnical domain is the realm of … The sociotechnical domain is the realm of scientists, the communities and institutions they form, and the tools and instruments they use to create, disseminate, and preserve knowledge. This paper reviews current scientonomic theory concerning this domain. A core scientonomic concept is that of an epistemic agent. Generally, an agent is an entity capable of intentional action—action that has content or meaning due to its purposeful direction towards a goal. An epistemic agent is one whose actions are the taking of epistemic stances, such as acceptance or rejection, towards epistemic elements, like theories or questions. An epistemic agent must semantically understand the propositions in question, and their alternatives, and choose among them with reason, with the motive of acquiring knowledge. The most obvious example of an epistemic agent is an individual human being. Rejecting the network of practitioners view, current scientonomic theory argues that appropriately organized communities of scientists can also function as epistemic agents. Communal epistemic agents are of particular scientonomic importance. Whereas the methods of theory assessment of individual scientists can be idiosyncratic, scientonomic theory contends that the taking of epistemic stances by scientific communities is a lawful, rule-governed process. A second concept of central importance is that of an epistemic tool. A physical object or system is an epistemic tool for some epistemic agent if there is a procedure by which the tool can provide an acceptable source of knowledge under the method employed by that agent. The agent is then said to rely on the tool.he agent is then said to rely on the tool.)
Vosniadou (Ed.) (2008) + (The study of conceptual change traces its … The study of conceptual change traces its heritage to the notions of paradigm (networks of shared beliefs, concepts, practices) and paradigm shift made famous by Thomas Kuhn in his book, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Kuhn’s work was quickly linked to developmental psychology (how knowledge develops) and to science education (teaching big, new ideas). This book is the first comprehensive review of the conceptual change movement and of the impressive research it has spawned on how knowledge develops and can be taught in different content areas. Because of its interdisciplinary focus chapter authors were instructed to write in a manner comprehensible to researchers and students from different fields.The International Handbook of Research on Conceptual Change consists of twenty-seven chapters that clarify the nature of conceptual change research, describes its most important findings and demonstrates their importance for education. It is organized into six sections that include detailed discussions of key theoretical and methodological issues, the roots of conceptual change research in the philosophy and history of science, mechanisms of conceptual change, and learner characteristics. It also contains chapters that describe conceptual change research in the content areas such as physics, astronomy, biology, medicine and health, and history. A particular focus is given to students’ difficulties in learning more advanced and counter-intuitive concepts.e advanced and counter-intuitive concepts.)
Longino (1979) + (The subject of this essay is the dependenc … The subject of this essay is the dependence of evidential relations on background beliefs and assumptions. In Part I, two ways in which the relation between evidence and hypothesis is dependent on such assumptions are discussed and it is shown how in the context of appropriately differing background beliefs what is identifiable as the same state of affairs can be taken as evidence for conflicting hypotheses. The dependence of evidential relations on background beliefs is illustrated by discussions of the Michelson-Morley experiment and the discovery of oxygen. In Part II, Hempel's analysis of confirmation and the contrasting model of theory acceptance provided by philosophers such as Kuhn and Feyerabend are discussed. It is argued that both are inadequate (on different grounds) and the problems addressed by each are shown to be more satisfactorily approached by means of the analysis developed in Part I. In Part III, it is argued that if there are objective criteria for deciding between competing theories, these cannot be simply that one theory has greater evidential support than another. Finally, some further methodological questions arising from the analysis are mentioned.s arising from the analysis are mentioned.)
Locke (2015c) + (The third book of John Locke's An Essay Concerning Human Understanding originally published in 1689 as edited by Johnathan Bennett in 2015)
Cat (2014) + (The topic of unity in the sciences include … The topic of unity in the sciences includes the following questions: Is thereone privileged, most basic kind of material, and if not, how are thedifferent kinds of material in the universe related? Can the various naturalsciences (physics, astronomy, chemistry, biology) be unified into a singleoverarching theory, and can theories within a single science (e.g., generalrelativity and quantum theory in physics) be unified? Does the unificationof these parts of science involve only matters of fact or are matters ofvalue involved as well? What about matters of method, material,institutional, ethical and other aspects of intellectual cooperation?Moreover, what kinds of unity in the sciences are there, and is unificationmerely a relation between concepts or terms (i.e., a matter of semantics),or is it also a relation between the theories, people, objects, or objectivesthat they are part of? And is the relation one of reduction, translation,explanation, logical inference, collaboration or something else?nference, collaboration or something else?)
Warren (2005) + (The view that perception is direct holds t … The view that perception is direct holds that a perceiver is aware of or in contactwith ordinary mind-independent objects, rather than mind-dependent surrogatesthereof. In this paper I try to articulate an account of direct perception from aGibsonian point of view, located within the wider terrain of cognitive science andpsychology. James Gibson's ecological theory proposes that perception is a relationin which an active agent is in contact with behaviorally relevant features and properties of its environment; this relation is causally supported by perceptual systemsthat are attuned to information which specifies those features and properties. I willargue that the theory offers the means to resist the main lines of attack on directperception, including the Arguments from Illusion,-Hallucination, Appearances,and Underspecification. In so doing, it also suggests a positive account of illusionsand hallucinations, as well as the intentional (object-directed) and perspectival(from here) aspects of perception.ectival (from here) aspects of perception.)
Spath (2007) + (The volume contains articles that focus on … The volume contains articles that focus on the interface between linguistic and conceptual knowledge. The issues addressed in the volume include the preconditions of every level of the language system that are required for the transformation of linguistic information into conceptual representations. In accordance with Chomsky’s Minimalist language model, the language system is embedded into the performative systems where language is a part of the cognitive competence of human beings, i.e. system of articulation and perception (A/P) and the conceptual-intentional system (C/I). During the formation of linguistic structures, every performative system obtains well-formed representations as its input information. The articles of the volume show how interface conditions determine the linguistic representations on each level of the linguistic system. Interface conditions result in requirements for the ordering of linguistic elements. The syntactic transformation achieves a point, where the linguistic structure formation branches to two distinct representational levels. Both levels deliver instructions for the systems of performance A/P and C/I. Linearization takes place on the syntactic surface of a sentence. The linearization of linguistic elements is manifest at the derivational point of Spell-out and also on the level of the phonological form (PF). This means that on the one hand, linearization is relevant to the phonetic aspect of linguistic expressions, and on the other hand, the interpretation of linguistic utterances is based on hierarchical structures. On the level of Logical Form (LF) all operations apply which don’t have any influence on the linear order in overt syntax. In addition they affect the generation of hierarchical structures. The structure obtained on LF is the representational format of the semantic form of a sentence.format of the semantic form of a sentence.)
Motterlini (Ed.) (1999) + (The work that helped to determine Paul Fey … The work that helped to determine Paul Feyerabend's fame and notoriety, Against Method, stemmed from Imre Lakatos's challenge: "In 1970 Imre cornered me at a party. 'Paul,' he said, 'you have such strange ideas. Why don't you write them down? I shall write a reply, we publish the whole thing and I promise you—we shall have a lot of fun.' " Although Lakatos died before he could write his reply, ''For and Against Method'' reconstructs his original counter-arguments from lectures and correspondence previously unpublished in English, allowing us to enjoy the "fun" two of this century's most eminent philosophers had, matching their wits and ideas on the subject of the scientific method. ''For and Against Method'' opens with an imaginary dialogue between Lakatos and Feyerabend, which Matteo Motterlini has constructed, based on their published works, to synthesize their positions and arguments. Part one presents the transcripts of the last lectures on method that Lakatos delivered. Part two, Feyerabend's response, consists of a previously published essay on anarchism, which began the attack on Lakatos's position that Feyerabend later continued in Against Method. The third and longest section consists of the correspondence Lakatos and Feyerabend exchanged on method and many other issues and ideas, as well as the events of their daily lives, between 1968 and Lakatos's death in 1974. The delight Lakatos and Feyerabend took in philosophical debate, and the relish with which they sparred, come to life again in ''For and Against Method'', making it essential and lively reading for anyone interested in these two fascinating and controversial thinkers and their immense contributions to philosophy of science. "The writings in this volume are of considerable intellectual importance, and will be of great interest to anyone concerned with the development of the philosophical views of Lakatos and Feyerabend, or indeed with the development of philosophy of science in general during this crucial period." - Donald Gillies, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science (on the Italian edition)osophy of Science (on the Italian edition))
Garfield (1985) + (The year 1984 marked the centennial of the … The year 1984 marked the centennial of the birth of George Alfred Leon Sarton, thefather of the history of science. Sarton was the author of numerous major works in thefield, including the three-volume, 4,236-page opus Introduction to the History ofScience, which many still consider one of the field’s most definitive and ambitiousworks. Sarton also founded the field’s primary journal, Isis, which he edited for forty years. But in spite of the importance Sarton placed on the history of science, he considered the discipline a means, not an end. Sarton’s ultimate goal was an integrated philosophy of science that bridged the gap between the sciences and thehumanities-an ideal he called “the new humanism.” The forces and ideas thatmolded this idealistic scholar were a unique confluence of his Old World bourgeois upbringing and the experiences under German occupation during World War I thatforced him to seek refuge in the United Statesed him to seek refuge in the United States)
Fatigati (2017) + (There are good reasons to think that there … There are good reasons to think that there was a body of truths generally accepted by the scientific community under Abbasid rule during the middle ages. However, the indicators initially established by the scientonomy community to guide us in reconstructing past mosaics are not applicable in the case of the medieval Arabic scientific mosaic. Instead, by attending to the particular way that knowledge was disseminated in this community, we can see the primacy of the concepts passed down in authoritative texts. It is proposed here that a good way of determining which texts, and therefore theories, were widely accepted would be by tracking the unique record of licenses to teach [''ʾijāzāt''] particular texts that exist from this period.ticular texts that exist from this period.)
Oppy (1996) + (There seems to be a widespread conviction … There seems to be a widespread conviction - evidenced, for example, in the work ofMackie, Dawkins and Sober - that it is Darwinian rather than Humean considerations which deal the fatal logical blow to arguments for intelligent design. I argue that this conviction cannot be well-founded. If there are current logically decisive objections to design arguments, they must be Humean - for Darwinian considerations count not at all against design arguments based upon apparent cosmological fine-tuning. I argue, further, that there are good Humean reasons for atheists and agnostics to resist the suggestion that apparent design - apparent biological design and/or apparent cosmological fine-tuning - establishes (or even strongly supports) the hypothesis of intelligent design.rts) the hypothesis of intelligent design.)
Andersen and Hepburn (2015) + (This Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy a … This Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy article provides an historical overview of philosophical conceptions of the methods of science. The first section covers scientific methods, focusing on avowed methodologies prior to the twentieth century, from Plato and Aristotle to William Whewell and John Stuart Mill Mostly avowed methodologies are discussed. The logical positivists and their critics are then covered, including Popper's falsificationism.ered, including Popper's falsificationism.)
Scharff and Dusek (Eds.) (2003) + (This anthology brings together, for the first time, a collection of both seminal historical and contemporary essays on the nature of technology and its relation to humanity.)
Babich (2003) + (This article argues that the limited influ … This article argues that the limited influence of Ludwik Fleck's ideas on philosophy of science is due not only to their indirect dissemination by way of Thomas Kuhn, but also to an incommensurability between the standard conceptual framework of history and philosophy of science and Fleck's own more integratedly historico-social and praxis-oriented approach to understanding the evolution of scientific discovery. What Kuhn named "paradigm" offers a periphrastic rendering or oblique translation of Fleck's Denkstil/Denkkollektiv , a derivation that may also account for the lability of the term "paradigm". This was due not to Kuhn's unwillingness to credit Fleck but rather to the cold war political circumstances surrounding the writing of The Structure of Scientific Revolutions . Following a discussion of Fleck's anatomical allusions, I include a brief discussion of Aristotle (on menstruation and darkened mirrors) and conclude with a reference to the productivity of error in Mach and Nietzsche.oductivity of error in Mach and Nietzsche.)
Douglas (2016) + (This article is a brief summary of the his … This article is a brief summary of the history of the Philosophy of Science Association from its founding until 1970. The Philosophy of Science Association began in 1933 and published a quarterly called 'Philosophy of Science'. In the late 1950's the association underwent a major reorganization due to declining membership. Its early meetings were held in association with the American Society for the Advancement of Science, but it began to hold independent meetings in 1968.egan to hold independent meetings in 1968.)
History of Science Society (2016) + (This article provides a brief summary of t … This article provides a brief summary of the history of the History of Science Society. The society was founded by George Sarton in 1924 to secure the future of the journal 'Isis' that was founded in Belgium in 1918 it also currently publishes the journal 'Osiris'. Although its membership is international, it primarily represents North American historians of science. The article also summarizes the work of HSS's executive office.arizes the work of HSS's executive office.)
Miller (2012) + (This articles main thesis is that there ar … This articles main thesis is that there are two different 'brands' of science study. One is intellectual history of science. Intellectual historians of science tend to interact with philosophers and largely ignore non-science historians. On the other hand, social historians of science treat science as a social undertaking, and tend to interact with other historians and with sociologists and to ignore philosophers and intellectual historians of science. This division, the author contends has been imposed for practical reasons, as the first group sought support from philosophy departments and the latter from mainstream history departments. The divisions, the author contends derive from larger ideological divisions within historical studies.gical divisions within historical studies.)
Laudan (1981a) + (This book consists of a collection of essa … This book consists of a collection of essays written between 1965 and 1981. Some have been published elsewhere; others appear here for the first time. Although dealing with different figures and different periods, they have a common theme: all are concerned with examining how the method of hy pothesis came to be the ruling orthodoxy in the philosophy of science and the quasi-official methodology of the scientific community. It might have been otherwise. Barely three centuries ago, hypothetico deduction was in both disfavor and disarray. Numerous rival methods for scientific inquiry - including eliminative and enumerative induction, analogy and derivation from first principles - were widely touted. The method of hypothesis, known since antiquity, found few proponents between 1700 and 1850. During the last century, of course, that ordering has been inverted and - despite an almost universal acknowledgement of its weaknesses - the method of hypothesis (usually under such descriptions as 'hypothetico deduction' or 'conjectures and refutations') has become the orthodoxy of the 20th century. Behind the waxing and waning of the method of hypothesis, embedded within the vicissitudes of its fortunes, there is a fascinating story to be told. It is a story that forms an integral part of modern science and its philosophy.part of modern science and its philosophy.)
Basu et al. (Eds.) (2021) + (This book constitutes the refereed proceed … This book constitutes the refereed proceedings of the 12th International Conference on the Theory and Application of Diagrams, Diagrams 2021, held virtually in September 2021.The 16 full papers and 25 short papers presented together with 16 posters were carefully reviewed and selected from 94 submissions. The papers are organized in the following topical sections: design of concrete diagrams; theory of diagrams; diagrams and mathematics; diagrams and logic; new representation systems; analysis of diagrams; diagrams and computation; cognitive analysis; diagrams as structural tools; formal diagrams; and understanding thought processes.rams; and understanding thought processes.)
Kuhn (2022) + (This book contains the text of Thomas S. K … This book contains the text of Thomas S. Kuhn’s unfinished book, ''The Plurality of Worlds: An Evolutionary Theory of Scientific Development'', which Kuhn himself described as a return to the central claims of ''The Structure of Scientific Revolutions'' and the problems that it raised but did not resolve. ''The Plurality of Worlds'' is preceded by two related texts that Kuhn publicly delivered but never published in English: his paper “Scientific Knowledge as Historical Product” and his Shearman Memorial Lectures, “The Presence of Past Science.” An introduction by the editor describes the origins and structure of ''The Plurality of Worlds'' and sheds light on its central philosophical problems. Kuhn’s aims in his last writings are bold. He sets out to develop an empirically grounded theory of meaning that would allow him to make sense of both the possibility of historical understanding and the inevitability of incommensurability between past and present science. In his view, incommensurability is fully compatible with a robust notion of the real world that science investigates, the rationality of scientific change, and the idea that scientific development is progressive.hat scientific development is progressive.)
Harper (2011) + (This book examines Newton’s argument for u … This book examines Newton’s argument for universal gravity and hisapplication of it to resolve the problem of deciding between geocentric and heliocentric world systems by measuring masses of the sun and planets. Newton’s inferences from phenomena realize an ideal of empirical success that is richer than prediction. To achieve this rich sort of empirical success a theory needs, not only to accurately predict the phenomena it purports to explain, but also, to have those phenomena accurately measure the parameters which explain them. Newton’s method aims to turn theoretical questions into ones which can be empirically answered by measurement from phenomena. Newtonemploys theory-mediated measurements to turn data into far moreinformative evidence than can be achieved by confirmation fromprediction alone. Propositions inferred from phenomena are provisionally accepted as guides to further research. This methodology, guided by its rich ideal of empirical success, supports a conception of scientific progress that does not require construing it as progress toward Laplace’s ideal limit of a final theory of everything and is not threatened by the classic argument against convergent realism. Newton’s method endorses the radical theoretical transformation from his theory to Einstein’s. It is strikingly realized in the development and application of testing frameworks for relativistic theories of gravity. In addition, it is very much at work in cosmology today.t is very much at work in cosmology today.)
Wiśniewski (1995) + (This book is a study in the logic of quest … This book is a study in the logic of questions (sometimes called erotetic logic). The central topics in erotetic logic have been the structure of questions and the question-answer relationship. This book doesn't neglect these problems, but much of it is focused on other issues. The main subject is the logical analysis of certain relations between questions and the contexts of their appearance. And our aim is to elaborate the conceptual apparatus of the inferential approach to the logic of questions. Questions are asked for many reasons and for different purposes. Yet, before a question is asked or posed, a questioner must arrive at it. In many cases arriving at a question resembles coming to a conclusion: there are some premises involved and some inferential thought processes take place. If we agree that a conclusion need not be "conclusive", we may say that sometimes questions can play the role of conclusions. But questions can also perform the role of premises: we often pass from some "initial" question to another question. In other words, there are inferential thought processes - we shall call them erotetic inferences - in which questions play the roles of conclusions or conclusions and premises. The inferential approach to the logic of questions focusses its attention on the analysis of erotetic inferences. This book consists of eight chapters.ces. This book consists of eight chapters.)
Preston (1997) + (This book is the first comprehensive criti … This book is the first comprehensive critical study of the work of Paul Feyerabend, one of the foremost twentieth-century philosophers of science.The book traces the evolution of Feyerabend's thought, beginning with his early attempt to graft insights from Wittgenstein's conception of meaning onto Popper's falsificationist philosophy. The key elements of Feyerabend's model of the acquisition of knowledge are identified and critically evaluated. Feyerabend's early work emerges as a continuation of Popper's philosophy of science, rather than as a contribution to the historical approach to science with which he is usually associated.In his more notorious later work, Feyerabend claimed that there was, and should be, no such thing as the scientific method. The roots of Feyerabend's 'epistemological anarchism' are exposed and the weaknesses of his cultural relativism are brought out.Throughout the book, Preston discusses the influence of Feyerabend's thought on contemporary philosophers and traces his stimulating but divided legacy. The book will be of interest to students of philosophy, methodology, and the social sciences.phy, methodology, and the social sciences.)
Van Fraassen (1980) + (This book presents an empiricist alternati … This book presents an empiricist alternative (‘constructive empiricism’) to both logical positivism and scientific realism. Against the former, it insists on a literal understanding of the language of science and on an irreducibly pragmatic dimension of theory acceptance. Against scientific realism, it insists that the central aim of science is empirical adequacy (‘saving the phenomena’) and that even unqualified acceptance of a theory involves no more belief than that this goal is met. Beginning with a critique of the metaphysical arguments that typically accompany scientific realism, a new characterization of empirical adequacy is presented, together with an interpretation of probability in both modern and contemporary physics and a pragmatic theory of explanation.ics and a pragmatic theory of explanation.)
Lund (2010) + (This book provides both an extended biogra … This book provides both an extended biographical treatment of Norwood Russell Hanson, and a nuanced and historical approach to his central philosophical concerns. These included the relation of theory to observation, normative and descriptive analysis of science, objectivity, and the logic of discovery. Hanson is noted for his attempts to turn the history and philosophy of science into an integrated field.sophy of science into an integrated field.)
Barseghyan (2015) + (This book systematically creates a general … This book systematically creates a general descriptive theory of scientific change that explains the mechanics of changes in both scientific theories and the methods of their assessment. It was once believed that, while scientific theories change through time, their change itself is governed by a fixed method of science. Nowadays we know that there is no such thing as an unchangeable method of science; the criteria employed by scientists in theory evaluation also change through time. But if that is so, how and why do theories and methods change? Are there any general laws that govern this process, or is the choice of theories and methods completely arbitrary and random?Contrary to the widespread opinion, the book argues that scientific change is indeed a law-governed process and that there can be a general descriptive theory of scientific change. It does so by first presenting meta-theoretical issues, divided into chapters on the scope, possibility and assessment of theory of scientific change. It then builds a theory about the general laws that govern the process of scientific change, and goes into detail about the axioms and theorems of the theory.out the axioms and theorems of the theory.)
Milton (1994) + (This chapter summarizes the life of John Locke.)
Bschir and Shaw (Eds.) (2021) + (This collection of new essays interprets a … This collection of new essays interprets and critically evaluates the philosophy of Paul Feyerabend. It offers innovative historical scholarship on Feyerabend's take on topics such as realism, empiricism, mimesis, voluntarism, pluralism, materialism, and the mind-body problem, as well as certain debates in the philosophy of physics. It also considers the ways in which Feyerabend's thought can contribute to contemporary debates in science and public policy, including questions about the nature of scientific methodology, the role of science in society, citizen science, scientism, and the role of expertise in public policy. The volume will provide readers with a comprehensive overview of the topics which Feyerabend engaged with throughout his career, showing both the breadth and the depth of his thought. the breadth and the depth of his thought.)
Feigl and Maxwell (Eds.) (1961) + (This collection of six symposia, with 24 p … This collection of six symposia, with 24 prominent philosophers and scientists participating, concentrates on many of the most significant issues and controversies at the frontiers of philosophical and scientific enlightenment. The discussions clarify basic issues and problems and go on to suggest new avenues for their resolution. Each contribution is original; none has been published before. These fascinating give-and-take sessions among eminent thinkers simulate the reader to do his own thinking about fundamental problems in the logic and methodology of science. Among the problems discussed are the epistemological foundations of science, the logic of quantum theory, philosophy of space and time, and methodology of psychology. - from dust jacket.odology of psychology. - from dust jacket.)
Feyerabend (2015) + (This collection of the writings of Paul Fe … This collection of the writings of Paul Feyerabend is focused on his philosophy of quantum physics, the hotbed of the key issues of his most debated ideas. Written between 1948 and 1970, these writings come from his first and most productive period. These early works are important for two main reasons. First, they document Feyerabend's deep concern with the philosophical implications of quantum physics and its interpretations. These ideas were paid less attention in the following two decades. Second, the writings provide the crucial background for Feyerabend's critiques of Karl Popper and Thomas Kuhn. Although rarely considered by scholars, Feyerabend's early work culminated in the first version of Against Method. These writings guided him on all the key issues of his most well-known and debated theses, such as the incommensurability thesis, the principles of proliferation and tenacity, and his particular version of relativism, and more specifically on quantum mechanics.nd more specifically on quantum mechanics.)
Mauskopf and Schmaltz (2012) + (This contribution introduces an edited wor … This contribution introduces an edited work which includes a series of essays on the integration of philosophy of science with history of science. The authors note that the joint field of history and philosophy of science began, for US citizens at least, when the US National Science Foundation began funding studies in the history and philosophy of science and Princeton University and Indiana University founded history and philosophy of science programs in 1960. The authors stress the early role of Norwood Hanson in founding the field, and the role of Thomas Kuhn's ''Structure of Scientific Revolutions'' in calling philosophers' attention to the field of history. Scholars have since struggled to forge a unified discipline that is both historical and philosophical at the same time.orical and philosophical at the same time.)
Mauskopf and Schmaltz (Eds.) (2012) + (This edited volume presents a series of contributions on the topic of how historians and philosophers of science can forge a unified discipline dedicated to the naturalistic understanding of the production and assessment of scientific knowledge.)
Longino (1992a) + (This essay sets human reproductive technol … This essay sets human reproductive technologies in the context of biological research exploiting the discovery of the structure of the DNA molecule in the early 1950s. By setting these technological developments in this research context and then setting the research in the framework of a philosophical analysis of the role of social values in scientific inquiry, it is possible to develop a perspective on these technologies and the aspirations they represent that is relevant to the concerns of their social critics.t to the concerns of their social critics.)
Longino (2010) + (This essay surveys twenty-five years of fe … This essay surveys twenty-five years of feminist epistemology in the pages of Hypatia. Feminist contributions have addressed the affective dimensions of knowledge; the natures of justification, rationality, and the cognitive agent; and the nature of truth. They reflect thinking from both analytic and continental philosophical traditions and offer a rich tapestry of ideas from which to continue challenging tradition and forging analytical tools for the problems aheadng analytical tools for the problems ahead)
Latour and Woolgar (1979) + (This highly original work presents laborat … This highly original work presents laboratory science in a deliberately skeptical way: as an anthropological approach to the culture of the scientist. Drawing on recent work in literary criticism, the authors study how the social world of the laboratory produces papers and other "texts", and how the scientific vision of reality becomes that set of statements considered, for the time being, too expensive to change. The book is based on field work done by Bruno Latour in Roger Guillemin's laboratory at the Salk Institute and provides an important link between the sociology of modern sciences and laboratory studies in the history of science.oratory studies in the history of science.)
Cottingham (Ed.) (1992) + (This is a further volume in a series of co … This is a further volume in a series of companions to major philosophers. Each volume contains specially commissioned essays by an international team of scholars together with a substantial bibliography and will serve as a reference work for students and nonspecialists. One aim of the series is to dispel the intimidation such readers often feel when faced with the work of a difficult and challenging thinker.Descartes occupies a position of pivotal importance as one of the founding fathers of modern philosophy; he is, perhaps, the most widely studied of all philosophers. In this authoritative collection an international team of leading scholars in Cartesian studies present the full range of Descartes' extraordinary philosophical achievement. His life and the development of his thought, as well as the intellectual background to and reception of his work, are treated at length. At the core of the volume are a group of chapters on his metaphysics: the celebrated "Cogito" argument, the proofs of God's existence, the "Cartesian circle" and the dualistic theory of the mind and its relation to his theological and scientific views. Other chapters cover the philosophical implications of his work in algebra, his place in the seventeenth-century scientific revolution, the structure of his physics, and his work on physiology, psychology, and ethics.New readers and nonspecialists will find this the most comprehensive and accessible guide to Descartes currently available. Advanced students and specialists will find a conspectus of recent developments in the interpretation of Descartes.pments in the interpretation of Descartes.)
Wright and Potter (Eds.) (2000) + (This is a multi-disciplinary exploration o … This is a multi-disciplinary exploration of the history of understanding of the human mind or soul and its relationship to the body, through the course of more than two thousand years. Thirteen specially commissioned chapters, each written by a recognized expert, discuss such figures as the doctors Hippocrates and Galen, the theologians St Paul, Augustine, and Aquinas, and philosophers from Plato to Leibniz.s, and philosophers from Plato to Leibniz.)
Tresch (2013) + (This is a review, or preview, in the form … This is a review, or preview, in the form of an interview, of Bruno Latour’s forthcoming book, ''An Inquiry into Modes of Existence''. We discuss his intellectual trajectory leading up to actor–network theory and the pluralistic philosophy underlying his new, ‘positive’ anthropology of modernity.new, ‘positive’ anthropology of modernity.)
Newton (1687) + (This is a work in three books by Issac Newton, published on July 5, 1687. The Principia states Newton's three laws of motion and his law of universal gravitation. It is considered one of the most important works in the history of science.)
Harris (2015) + (This is the first book to provide a compre … This is the first book to provide a comprehensive overview of the entire career of one of Britain's greatest men of letters. It sets in biographical and historical context all of Hume's works, from A Treatise of Human Nature to The History of England, bringing to light the major influences on the course of Hume's intellectual development, and paying careful attention to the differences between the wide variety of literary genres with which Hume experimented. The major events in Hume's life are fully described, but the main focus is on Hume's intentions as a philosophical analyst of human nature, politics, commerce, English history, and religion. Careful attention is paid to Hume's intellectual relations with his contemporaries. The goal is to reveal Hume as a man intensely concerned with the realization of an ideal of open-minded, objective, rigorous, dispassionate dialogue about all the principal questions faced by his age. the principal questions faced by his age.)
Bacon (2000b) + (This is the first critical edition since t … This is the first critical edition since the nineteenth century of Bacon’s principal philosophical work in English, The Twoo Bookes of Francis Bacon. Of the proficience and advancement of Learning, divine and humane – traditionally known as The Advancement of Learning. This authoritative critical edition is based upon the collation and analysis of the original editions. Its comprehensive introduction examines Bacon’s appraisal of the current state of learning and his efforts to involve his contemporaries in his programme to reform and advance learning. Extensive commentary explores Bacon’s sources and early modern contexts for Bacon’s most important philosophical work in English.t important philosophical work in English.)
Lindberg (1992) + (This landmark book represents the first at … This landmark book represents the first attempt in two decades to survey the science of the ancient world, the first attempt in four decades to write a comprehensive history of medieval science, and the first attempt ever to present a full, unified account of both ancient and medieval science in a single volume. In ''The Beginnings of Western Science'', David C. Lindberg provides a rich chronicle of the development of scientific ideas, practices, and institutions from the pre-Socratic Greek philosophers to the late-medieval scholastics.Lindberg surveys all the most important themes in the history of ancient and medieval science, including developments in cosmology, astronomy, mechanics, optics, alchemy, natural history, and medicine. He synthesizes a wealth of information in superbly organized, clearly written chapters designed to serve students, scholars, and nonspecialists alike. In addition, Lindberg offers an illuminating account of the transmission of Greek science to medieval Islam and subsequently to medieval Europe. And throughout the book he pays close attention to the cultural and institutional contexts within which scientific knowledge was created and disseminated and to the ways in which the content and practice of science were influenced by interaction with philosophy and religion. Carefully selected maps, drawings, and photographs complement the text.Lindberg's story rests on a large body of important scholarship produced by historians of science, philosophy, and religion over the past few decades. However, Lindberg does not hesitate to offer new interpretations and to hazard fresh judgments aimed at resolving long-standing historical disputes. Addressed to the general educated reader as well as to students, his book will also appeal to any scholar whose interests touch on the history of the scientific enterprise. the history of the scientific enterprise.)
Friesen and Patton (2023) + (This paper applies Patton and Al-Zayadi’s … This paper applies Patton and Al-Zayadi’s scientonomic framework for understanding disciplines to a case study of the development of the chemical discipline ("chymistry") from the 17th century through the early 18th century in Western Europe. Using evidence from the tradition of textbook publication that emerged in the seventeenth-century chymistry, we reconstruct the top-level of the question hierarchy of chymistry. Analyzing how these questions and their associated theories were received, we first show how, starting in the 1660s, alchemy transitioned from a synonym of chymistry to chymistry’s subdiscipline with a more limited scope. We identify that the rejection of alchemy's core questions occurred in the 1720s based on the reception of these questions in scientific publications and by academic institutions. Hence, we conclude that the subdiscipline of alchemy became rejected in the 1720s. In order to conduct our case-study, we closely follow Newman and Principe's research on early modern alchemy and chymistry in our reconstruction of the episode. However, using the scientonomic framework in analyzing this case study reveals the specific dynamics of this instance of sub-discipline rejection. Our deepened understanding of this hallmark historical episode of disciplinary rejection indicates the value of Patton and Al-Zayadi’s theoretical framework for observational scientonomic research.k for observational scientonomic research.)
Alliksaar (2019) + (This paper argues that the traditional sci … This paper argues that the traditional scientonomic portrayal of theories of classical physics (e.g. Newtonian mechanics, thermodynamics) as merely ''used'' but no longer ''accepted'' is too simplistic. To that end, I consider the current status of the meteorological theory, which is accepted as the best available description of atmospheric phenomenon despite the fact that it is founded on the principles of classical physics, including those of Newtonian mechanics. This apparent paradox is resolved if the distinction between a theory’s ''ontology'' and its ''phenomenological'' laws is properly appreciated. The phenomenological laws of meteorology are accepted by the scientific community as the best available description of atmospheric phenomena. Yet, this acceptance does not imply that the classical ''ontology'' implicit in the current meteorological theory is also accepted. Thus, the modern meteorological theory (as well as many tenets of classical physics) can be said to be accepted as the best available description of the observable atmospheric phenomena even though its classical ontology is no longer accepted. classical ontology is no longer accepted.)
Oh (2021) + (This paper attempts to establish the exist … This paper attempts to establish the existence of ''element decay'' by making an historical case for the existence of ''theory decay'', a phenomenon where theories leave an agent’s mosaic without any re-evaluation or decision on the agent’s part. The phenomenon of theory decay is to be theoretically distinguished from ''rejection without replacement''; while the latter is a result of an agent’s deliberation, the former is a result of an agent’s inaction. To locate historical instances of theory decay, there should be evidence that the agent under study existed continuously throughout the period under study, that the theory was accepted at some point and unaccepted at some later point, and that the theory left the mosaic without any decision on the part of the agent. With these indicators at hand, I discuss five potentially promising historical cases: Poisson distribution, the Aharonov-Bohm effect, Damascus steel, Greek fire, and Cremonese violins. I argue that there is solid historical evidence to interpret the latter as an instance of element decay, which is sufficient to establish the existence of the phenomenon. I show that element decay is best seen as a ''non-scientonomic'' phenomenon; its existence highlights that individual and communal agents have limited capacities of knowledge retention and transmission and, when these limits are reached, element decay often takes place. This suggests that sufficient epistemic capacity to retain and transmit knowledge is a necessary precondition for the existence of scientonomic patterns, which emerge and hold only when the agent has measures in place to counteract potential element decay.ace to counteract potential element decay.)
Longino (1983b) + (This paper develops an account of scientif … This paper develops an account of scientific objectivity for a relativist theory of evidence. It briefly reviews the character and shortcomings of empiricist and wholist treatments of theory acceptance and objectivity and argues that the relativist account of evidence developed by the author in an earlier essay offers a more satisfactory framework within which to approach questions of justification and intertheoretic comparison. The difficulty with relativism is that it seems to eliminate objectivity from scientific method. Reconceiving objectivity as a function of the social character of science, rather than of individually practiced methods, allows us to claim that science is objective even if relativism is true, and provides a more realistic account of scientific objectivity than is possible on either the empiricist or the wholist accounts.er the empiricist or the wholist accounts.)
Longino (1987) + (This paper explores a number of recent pro … This paper explores a number of recent proposals regarding “feminist science” and rejects a content-based approach in favour of a process-based approach to characterizing feminist science. Philosophy of science can yield models of scientific reasoning that illuminate the interaction between cultural values and ideology and scientific inquiry. While we can use these models to expose masculine and other forms of bias, we can also use them to defend the introduction of assumptions grounded in feminist political values.ons grounded in feminist political values.)
Castino (2023) + (This paper explores the process of the ass … This paper explores the process of the assessment and eventual acceptance of the existence of dark matter by the Western astronomy community in the period between 1930s and 1980s. By applying the framework of theoretical scientonomy, I trace the acceptance of two anomalous phenomena: the high mass-to-light ratio observed in galactic clusters, first documented by Swiss astronomer Fritz Zwicky in 1933, and the flat rotation curves of galaxies first observed by American astronomers Vera Rubin and Kent Ford in 1970. I also highlight how the community accepted two second-order propositions stating the inconsistency of these phenomena with the rest of the astronomical mosaic. I show that the acceptance of the existence of dark matter resulted from the acceptance of the existence of these anomalous phenomena and took place between 1982-1985, rather than in the mid-1970s as was previously assumed.n the mid-1970s as was previously assumed.)
Garcia (2022) + (This paper explores the relationship betwe … This paper explores the relationship between pluralism and scientonomy, i.e., the ways in which scientonomy is or is not pluralist. Scientonomy claims by its zeroth law (the compatibility law) that the elements of the mosaic must be mutually compatible at any time. However, when Harder (2013) proposed to change the law of compatibility, he did it by answering the question of whether two or more elements can coexist in the same mosaic. He said that they can. However, this answer requires a detailed analysis of compatibility’s meaning and its relation to the nature of the mosaic. That detailed analysis leads us to assess scientonomy by contrasting its pluralist and monist aspects. We will argue that Scientonomy embraces some aspects of monism, as well as some aspects of pluralism. As a result, we argue that an adequate form of pluralism is the so-called compatible pluralism of theories, seen from a perspective internal to a scientific mosaic. A second form of pluralism becomes evident from a perspective outside any particular mosaic. It is what we will call the pluralism of incompatible mosaics. To explore these topics, after a brief description of the problem, we will review the main features of the zeroth law. In section three, we will briefly review some forms of pluralism to argue why one of them fits scientonomy better. In the end, in section four, will discuss the variety of monist and pluralist features of scientonomy, focusing on pluralism.res of scientonomy, focusing on pluralism.)
Golinski (2012) + (This paper explores the thesis that Thomas … This paper explores the thesis that Thomas Kuhn's work had the paradoxical effect of driving apart the fields history of science and philosophy of science. Although it served as a common reference point, scholars in different fields pursued its implications in very different directions. Although his work was popular with sociologists and post-modern cultural theorists, it did not win acceptance among the philosophers that he wished to appeal to, and historians were moving away from large scale overarching frameworks towards more specialized projects.meworks towards more specialized projects.)
Palider et al. (2021) + (This paper presents a diagrammatic notatio … This paper presents a diagrammatic notation for visualizing epistemic entities and relations. The notation was created during the ''Visualizing Worldviews'' project funded by the University of Toronto’s ''Jackman Humanities Institute'' and has been further developed by the scholars participating in the university’s ''Research Opportunity Program''. Since any systematic diagrammatic notation should be based on a solid ontology of the respective domain, we first outline the current state of the scientonomic ontology. We then proceed to providing diagrammatic tools for visualizing the epistemic entities and relations of this ontology. These basic diagramming techniques allow us to construct diagrams of various types for both ''synchronic'' and ''diachronic'' visualizations. The paper concludes by highlighting some future research directions. As the notation presented here is ''de facto'' accepted and used in scientonomy, the paper suggests no modifications.nomy, the paper suggests no modifications.)
Beck and Sharvit (2002) + (This paper proposes a novel semantic analy … This paper proposes a novel semantic analysis of the quantificational variability data discovered by Berman (1991). We suggest that the adverb of quantification in those data quantifies over semantic questions. Its domain is a division of the original question into subquestions, where a legitimate division into subquestions is one in which each member contributes towards the answer to the original question, and together the answers to all subquestions provide the complete answer to the original question. Thus the question itself is associated with a part/whole structure, based on information. We show that there are quantificational variability effects in which the matrix verb is exclusively question‐embedding. These data pose a problem for other theories of quantificational variability in questions (specifically Berman 1991 and Lahiri 2002) and motivate our analysis. There are other desirable consequences of our theory, including flexibility in what counts as a subquestion and flexibility in what counts as a complete answer. Beyond quantificational variability, associating questions with a part/whole structure receives independent motivation from questions that occur in collective and cumulative embedded contexts.llective and cumulative embedded contexts.)
Wright (2012) + (This paper replies to Peter Millican (Mind … This paper replies to Peter Millican (Mind, 2009), who argues that Hume deniesthe possible existence of causal powers which underlie the regularities that weobserve in nature. I argue that Hume’s own philosophical views on causal powercannot be considered apart from his mitigated skepticism. His account of theorigin of the idea of causal power, which traces it to a subjective impression, onlyleads to what he calls ‘Pyrrhonian scepticism’. He holds that we can only escapesuch excessive skepticism by way of a natural judgment based on the associationof ideas, which forms the basis of what he calls ‘a legitimate ground of Assent’. he calls ‘a legitimate ground of Assent’.)
Barseghyan, Overgaard, and Rupik (2018) + (This resource provides a comprehensive int … This resource provides a comprehensive introduction to the key issues in the history and philosophy of science. How do scientific theories and method change through time? Is there a universal and unchangeable method of science? What demarcates science from non-science? Can scientific theories provide true descriptions of the world? Is there scientific progress? What are the major worldviews in the history of science? This first half of this text considers pivotal questions of the philosophy of science, while the latter half of the text traces the genealogy of contemporary scientific worldview through key historical questions.orldview through key historical questions.)
Westfall (1980) + (This richly detailed 1981 biography captur … This richly detailed 1981 biography captures both the personal life and the scientific career of Isaac Newton, presenting a fully rounded picture of Newton the man, the scientist, the philosopher, the theologian, and the public figure. Professor Westfall treats all aspects of Newton's career, but his account centres on a full description of Newton's achievements in science. Thus the core of the work describes the development of the calculus, the experimentation that altered the direction of the science of optics, and especially the investigations in celestial dynamics that led to the law of universal gravitation.t led to the law of universal gravitation.)
Arabatzis and Schickore (2012) + (This special issue presents selected contr … This special issue presents selected contributions to the conference “Integrated History and Philosophy of Science” (&HPS3) held at Indiana University in September 2010. The introduction revisits a previous special issue on History and Philosophy of Science, published in Perspectives on Science (2002), and reflects on the recent development of HPS as a field. Ten years ago, scholars expressed concern about the growing distance between mainstream history of science and mainstream philosophy of science. Today, we have good reason to be optimistic. The papers assembled in this special issue demonstrate that we now have a whole spectrum of combinations of historical, philosophical, and other perspectives to study science, ranging from augmenting historical studies by philosophical perspectives and vice versa to historicist reflection on methodological, epistemological, or scientific concepts and practices. This plurality of approaches to combining the historical and the philosophical perspectives on science is a hopeful sign that integrated HPS is here to stay.eful sign that integrated HPS is here to stay.)
Feyerabend (1999) + (This third volume of Paul Feyerabend's phi … This third volume of Paul Feyerabend's philosophical papers, which gathers together work originally published between 1960 and 1980, offers a range of his characteristically exciting treatments of classic questions in the philosophy of science, including theoretical pluralism, the relationship between theory and observation, the distinction between science and myth, the role of science in society, and the vexed question of the nature of scientific method. The volume is completed by a substantial introduction and a comprehensive list of Feyerabend's works. comprehensive list of Feyerabend's works.)
Bacon (2011) + (This volume belongs to the critical editio … This volume belongs to the critical edition of the complete works of Francis Bacon (1561-1626), an edition that presents the works in broadly chronological order and in accordance with the principles of modern textual scholarship. This volume contains critical editions of five varied works Bacon composed during the 1620s. The most significant and substantial of these five works is his biography of Henry VII (The historie of the raigne of King Henry the seventh) but the volume testifies as well to Bacon’s continuing robust allegiance to his youthful vaunt that all knowledge was his province, for it also includes his sketch for a biography of Henry VIII, An advertisement touching an holy war (a thoughtful debate over the prospect of holy war in his own time), Apophthegmes (a lively collection of witty anecdotes, classical to early modern), and his select verse translations from the psalms. In each case an authoritative text has been established based upon fresh collation of the relevant manuscripts and of multiple copies of the seventeenth editions, and subjected to a thorough bibliographical analysis of the treatment of Bacon’s texts in the early modern printing-house. The Introductions discuss the occasion and context for each work, evaluate his creative transmutation of his sources, and weigh their contemporary reception. A comprehensive commentary identifies and parses Bacon’s use of source material, from his refinement of published literary and historical sources and contemporary MSS to the political white papers composed while he served as counsellor to King James. An extensive glossary is integrated into this commentary. An Appendix provides full bibliographical descriptions of all of the textual witnesses, manuscript and printed edition.witnesses, manuscript and printed edition.)
Bacon (2000c) + (This volume belongs to the first new criti … This volume belongs to the first new critical edition of the works of Francis Bacon (1561-1626) to have been produced since the nineteenth century. The edition presents the works in broadly chronological order and according to the best principles of modern textual scholarship. The seven works in the present volume belong to the final completed stages (Parts III-V) of Bacon’s hugely ambitious six-part sequence of philosophical works, collectively entitled Instauratio magna (1620-6). All are presented in the original Latin with new facing-page translations. Three of the seven texts (substantial works in two cases, and all sharing a startlingly improbable textual history) are published and translated here for the first time: these are an early version of the Historia densi, the ‘lost’ Abecedarium, and the Historia de animato & inanimato. Another – the Prodromi sive anticipationes philosophiae secundae – has likewise never been translated before. Together with their commentaries and the introduction they open the way to important new understandings of Bacon’s mature philosophical thought.dings of Bacon’s mature philosophical thought.)
Bacon (1996b) + (This volume inaugurates a new critical edi … This volume inaugurates a new critical edition of the writings of the great English philosopher and sage Francis Bacon (1561-1626) – the first such complete edition for more than a hundred years. It contains six of Bacon’s Latin scientific works, each accompanied by entirely new facing-page translations which, together with the extensive introduction and commentaries, offer fresh insights into one of the great minds of the early seventeenth century. Volume VI includes Bacon’s speculative writings between c. 1611-c. 1619, including his Phaenomena universi, Descriptio globi intellectuali, Thema coeli, De principiis atque originibus.ema coeli, De principiis atque originibus.)
Hickney (2016) + (This web site, Twentieth-Century Philosoph … This web site, Twentieth-Century Philosophy of Science: A History, is a revised and enlarged edition of a 1995 print book titled History of Twentieth-Century Philosophy of Science, which is now out of print. This web site is also published as an e-book with the same title as the site, and is available at most Internet booksellers. The greatly expanded “Introduction” chapter set forth herein as “BOOK I” summarizes the fundamental principles of the contemporary pragmatist philosophy of science, and includes discussion of the recently emergent specialty “computational philosophy of science”. Each of the remaining chapters, BOOK II through BOOK VIII, focuses upon writers who have influenced the evolution of twentieth-century philosophy of science.f twentieth-century philosophy of science.)
Giere (Ed.) (1992) + (This work resulted from a workshop on the … This work resulted from a workshop on the implications of the cognitive sciences for the philosophy of science held under the auspices of the Minnesota Center for Philosophy of Science. The workshop's theme was that the cognitive sciences - identified for the purposes of this project with three disciplinary clusters: artificial intelligence, cognitive psychology, and cognitive neuroscience - have reached sufficient maturity that they are now a valuable resource for philosophers of science who are developing general theories of science as a human activity. The emergence of cognitive science has by no means escaped the notice of philosophers or philosophers of science. Within the philosophy of science one can detect an emerging speciality, the philosophy of cognitive science, which would be parallel to such specialities as the philosophy of physics or the philosophy of biology. But the reverse is also happening. That is, the cognitive sciences are beginning to have a considerable impact on the content and methods of philosophy, particularly the philosophy of language and the philosophy of mind, but also on epistemology. The underlying hope is that the cognitive sciences might now come to play the sort of role within the philosophy of science that formal logic played for logical empiricism or that history of science played for the historical school. This development might permit the philosophy of science as a whole finally to move beyond the opposition between "logical" and "historical" approaches that has characterized the field since the 1960s.s characterized the field since the 1960s.)
Nichols and Yaffe (2016) + (Thomas Reid (1710–1796) is a Scottish phil … Thomas Reid (1710–1796) is a Scottish philosopher best known for his philosophical method, his theory of perception and its wide implications on epistemology, and as the developer and defender of an agent-causal theory of free will. In these and other areas he offers perceptive and important criticisms of the philosophy of Locke, Berkeley and especially Hume. He is also well known for his criticisms of Locke's view of personal identity and Hume's view of causation. Reid also made influential contributions to philosophical topics including ethics, aesthetics and the philosophy of mind. The legacy of Thomas Reid's philosophical work is found in contemporary theories of perception, free will, philosophy of religion, and widely in epistemology.y of religion, and widely in epistemology.)
Reid (2007) + (Thomas Reid's Inquiry has long been recogn … Thomas Reid's Inquiry has long been recognized as a classic philosophical text. Since its first publication in 1764, there have followed no less than forty editions. The proliferation of secondary literature further indicates that Reid's work is flourishing as never before. Yet Reid scholars have been acutely aware of proceeding without the full textual evidence. There exist thousands of unpublished manuscript pages in Reid's hand, many of which relate directly to the composition of Inquiry. Furthermore, no account has been taken of the successive alterations made to the four editions published in Reid's lifetime.our editions published in Reid's lifetime.)
Longino (1989) + (Three strategies in feminist critiques of … Three strategies in feminist critiques of rationality are examined: one proceeding via a critique of science, one via a critique of the methods/philosophy of science, one via a critique of the modern bureaucratization/industrialization of science. While each of these moves from an important initial insight about contemporary science, each also has distinctive weaknesses. This paper explores their strengths and problems and their roots in standard philosophical approaches to science. The second half of the paper explores the implications of our alternative approach to the problem of rationality. This approach, which treats the cognitive process of scientific inquiry as social processes, enables us to see how social values and ideology can be expressed in so-called “good science” as well as in methodologically deficient inquiry. It thus provides a basis for thinking about feminism in science that avoids the problems identified in the earlier part of the paper.entified in the earlier part of the paper.)
Anagnostopoulos (2009) + (To many, Aristotle is the last great fi gu … To many, Aristotle is the last great fi gure in the distinguished philosophical traditionof Greece that is thought to begin with Thales (ca. 600 BCE). Of course, Greek philosophydid not end with Aristotle; it continued for several centuries in the various schools –those of the Epicureans, Skeptics, and Stoics as well as Plato’s Academy and Aristotle’sown Peripatetic School – that fl ourished in Athens and elsewhere up to the early centuriesof the Byzantine Empire. Yet there is considerable truth in the opinion of themany, if viewed as a claim about great individual fi gures in the Greek philosophicaltradition. For Aristotle was the last great individual philosopher of ancient times, oneof the three thinkers – the others being Socrates (470–399 BCE) and Plato (427–347BCE) – that comprise what many consider to be the greatest philosophical trio of all time.Their philosophical careers span more than a hundred years, and all three were majorfi gures in the lively philosophical scene of fi fth- and fourth-century Athens. It was aunique moment in the history of philosophy, one that saw Socrates engaging in discussionswith Plato – by far the most distinguished of his followers – and Plato instructingand debating with Aristotle – by far the most eminent student to graduate from and doresearch in his own school, the Academy.o research in his own school, the Academy.)
Descartes (2009) + (Tr./Ed. Jonathan Bennett. Originally produced between 1643 and 1649. A collection of translated text and summaries of the correspondences between Rene Descartes and Princess Elizabeth of Bohemia between 1643 and 1649.)
Descartes (2004) + (Tr./Ed. Jonathan Bennett. Originally published in 1641. Written as a series of reflections over several days, Descartes elaborates on his epistemological and metaphysical system first laid out in Discourse on the Method in 1637.)
Descartes (2007) + (Tr./Ed. Jonathan Bennett. Originally publi … Tr./Ed. Jonathan Bennett. Originally published in 1637.If this discourse seems too long to be read at a sitting you may divide it into six parts. In 1 you will find various considerations regarding the sciences; in 2 the main rules of the method that the author has sought; in 3 some of the moral rules he has derived from this method; in 4 the arguments by which he proves the existence of God and the human soul, on which his metaphysics is based; in 5 the order of the questions in physics that he has investigated, particularly the explanation of the movement of the heart and of some other problems in the medical sphere, and also the difference between our soul and that of the lower animals; and in 6 the things he believes are needed if we are to go further than he has in the investigation of nature, and his reasons for writing this discourseand his reasons for writing this discourse)
Longino (1995) + (Traits like simplicity and explanatory pow … Traits like simplicity and explanatory power have traditionally been treated as values internal to the sciences, constitutive rather than contextual. As such they are cognitive virtues. This essay contrasts a traditional set of such virtues with a set of alternative virtues drawn from feminist writings about the sciences. In certain theoretical contexts, the only reasons for preferring a traditional or an alternative virtue are socio-political. This undermines the notion that the traditional virtues can be considered purely cognitive.irtues can be considered purely cognitive.)
Lakatos and Musgrave (Eds.) (1970) + (Two books have been particularly influenti … Two books have been particularly influential in contemporary philosophy of science: [[Karl Popper]]'s ''Logic of Scientific Discovery'', and [[Thomas Kuhn]]'s ''Structure of Scientific Revolutions''. Both agree upon the importance of revolutions in science, but differ about the role of criticism in science's revolutionary growth. This volume arose out of a symposium on Kuhn's work, with Popper in the chair, at an international colloquium held in London in 1965. The book begins with Kuhn's statement of his position followed by seven essays offering criticism and analysis, and finally by Kuhn's reply. The book will interest senior undergraduates and graduate students of the philosophy and history of science, as well as professional philosophers, philosophically inclined scientists, and some psychologists and sociologists., and some psychologists and sociologists.)
Longino (1996) + (Underdetermination arguments support the c … Underdetermination arguments support the conclusion that no amount of empiricaldata can uniquely determine theory choice. The full content of a theory outreachesthose elements of it (the observational elements) that can be shown to be true (or inagreement with actual observations).2 A number of strategies have been developedto minimize the threat such arguments pose to our aspirations to scientific knowledge.I want to focus on one such strategy: the invocation of additional criteriadrawn from a pool of cognitive or theoretical values, such as simplicity or generality,to bolster judgements about the worth of models, theories, and hypotheses.What is the status of such criteria? Larry Laudan, in Science and Values, arguedthat cognitive values could not be treated as self-validating, beyond justification,but are embedded in a three-way reticulational system containing theories,methods, and aims or values, which are involved in mutually supportive relationships(Laudan, 1984). My interest in this paper is not the purportedly selfvalidatingnature of cognitive values, but their cognitive nature. Although Laudanrejects the idea that what he calls cognitive values are exempt from rational criticismand disagreement, he does seem to think that the reticulational system heidentifies is independent of non-cognitive considerations. It is this cognitive/non-cognitive distinction that I wish to query in this paper. Let me begin by summarizingthose of my own views about inquiry in which this worry about thedistinction arises.h this worry about the distinction arises.)
Fleck (1935a) + (Until quite lately the following convictio … Until quite lately the following conviction prevailed among scientists, expressed in Poincaré’s sentence: “if a research worker had infinite time at his disposal, it would suffice to tell him: Look, but look well”. Our entire knowledge would allegedly emerge out of the description of his observations of all events.ription of his observations of all events.)
Goldman and Blanchard (2016) + (Until recently, epistemology - the study o … Until recently, epistemology - the study of knowledge and justified belief - was heavily individualistic in focus. The emphasis was on evaluating doxastic attitudes (beliefs and disbeliefs) of individuals in abstraction from their social environment. The result is a distorted picture of the human epistemic situation, which is largely shaped by social relationships and institutions. Social epistemology seeks to redress this imbalance by investigating the epistemic effects of social interactions and social systems.of social interactions and social systems.)
Longino (1992b) + (Using the author's social analysis of scie … Using the author's social analysis of scientific knowledge, two ways of understanding the importance of gender to the philosophy of science are offered. Given a requirement of openness to multiple critical perspectives, the gender, race and class structure of a scientific community are an important ingredient of its epistemic reliability. Secondly, one can ask whether a gender sensitive scientific community might prefer certain evaluative criteria (or virtues of theory or practice) to others. Six such criteria (several of which are at odds with criteria accepted in mainstream science) are discussed. Their articulation prompts a series of philosophical questions, the answering of which would constitute one program (or more) of a gender sensitive philosophy of science. a gender sensitive philosophy of science.)
Bacon (2004) + (Volume XI of The Oxford Francis Bacon comp … Volume XI of The Oxford Francis Bacon comprises the first new critical edition of Bacon’s most important philosophical work, the Novum Organum, for a hundred years. One of the foundation documents of early-modern philosophy, Novum Organum is edited in accordance with modern textual-critical principles for the first time. Graham Rees presents the only edition ever to include the original Latin text with a brand new, facing-page translation, and a thorough Introduction and detailed commentary of the text. The edition represents a major step towards the reinstatement of Bacon as a central figure in the history of early-modern philosophy, and will be essential reading for anyone studying the history of science and ideas in the seventeenth-century.ence and ideas in the seventeenth-century.)
DiMarco and Khalifa (2019) + (We offer a new account of the role of valu … We offer a new account of the role of values in theory choice that captures a temporal dimension to the values themselves.We argue that nonepistemic values sometimes serve as “inquiry tickets,” justifying scientists’ pursuit of certain questions in the short run, while the answers to those questions mitigate transient underdetermination in the long run. Our account of inquiry tickets shows that the role of nonepistemic values need not be restricted to belief or acceptance in order to be relevant to hypothesis choice: the relevance of nonepistemic values to a particular cognitive attitude with respect to ''h'' varies over time.de with respect to ''h'' varies over time.)
Carnielli and Marcos (2001) + (We summarize here the main arguments, basi … We summarize here the main arguments, basic research lines, and results on the foundations of the logics of formal inconsistency. These involve, in particular, some classes of well-known paraconsistent systems. We also present their semantical interpretations by way of possible-translations semantics and their applications to human reasoning and machine reasoning.1to human reasoning and machine reasoning.1)
Bedau (2003) + (Weak emergence has been offered as an expl … Weak emergence has been offered as an explanation of the ubiquitous notion of emergence used in complexity science. After outlining the problem of emergence and comparing weak emergence with the tow other main objectivist approaches to emergence, this paper explains a version of weak emergence an illustrates it with cellular automata. Then it explains the sort of downward causation and explanatory autonomy involved in weak emergence.atory autonomy involved in weak emergence.)
Chalmers (1996) + (What is consciousness? How do physical pro … What is consciousness? How do physical processes in the brain give rise to the self-aware mind and to feelings as profoundly varied as love or hate, aesthetic pleasure or spiritual yearning? These questions today are among the most hotly debated issues among scientists and philosophers, and we have seen in recent years superb volumes by such eminent figures as Francis Crick, Daniel C. Dennett, Gerald Edelman, and Roger Penrose, all firing volleys in what has come to be called the consciousness wars. Now, in The Conscious Mind, philosopher David J. Chalmers offers a cogent analysis of this heated debate as he unveils a major new theory of consciousness, one that rejects the prevailing reductionist trend of science, while offering provocative insights into the relationship between mind and brain.Writing in a rigorous, thought-provoking style, the author takes us on a far-reaching tour through the philosophical ramifications of consciousness. Chalmers convincingly reveals how contemporary cognitive science and neurobiology have failed to explain how and why mental events emerge from physiological occurrences in the brain. He proposes instead that conscious experience must be understood in an entirely new light--as an irreducible entity (similar to such physical properties as time, mass, and space) that exists at a fundamental level and cannot be understood as the sum of its parts. And after suggesting some intriguing possibilities about the structure and laws of conscious experience, he details how his unique reinterpretation of the mind could be the focus of a new science. Throughout the book, Chalmers provides fascinating thought experiments that trenchantly illustrate his ideas. For example, in exploring the notion that consciousness could be experienced by machines as well as humans, Chalmers asks us to imagine a thinking brain in which neurons are slowly replaced by silicon chips that precisely duplicate their functions--as the neurons are replaced, will consciousness gradually fade away? The book also features thoughtful discussions of how the author's theories might be practically applied to subjects as diverse as artificial intelligence and the interpretation of quantum mechanics.All of us have pondered the nature and meaning of consciousness. Engaging and penetrating, The Conscious Mind adds a fresh new perspective to the subject that is sure to spark debate about our understanding of the mind for years to come.derstanding of the mind for years to come.)
Chang (2004) + (What is temperature, and how can we measur … What is temperature, and how can we measure it correctly? These may seem like simple questions, but the most renowned scientists struggled with them throughout the 18th and 19th centuries. In Inventing Temperature, Chang examines how scientists first created thermometers; how they measured temperature beyond the reach of standard thermometers; and how they managed to assess the reliability and accuracy of these instruments without a circular reliance on the instruments themselves.In a discussion that brings together the history of science with the philosophy of science, Chang presents the simple yet challenging epistemic and technical questions about these instruments, and the complex web of abstract philosophical issues surrounding them. Chang's book shows that many items of knowledge that we take for granted now are in fact spectacular achievements, obtained only after a great deal of innovative thinking, painstaking experiments, bold conjectures, and controversy. Lurking behind these achievements are some very important philosophical questions about how and when people accept the authority of science.en people accept the authority of science.)
Lindberg (2007) + (When it was first published in 1992, the b … When it was first published in 1992, the book was lauded as the first successful attempt ever to present a unified account of both ancient and medieval science in a single volume. Chronicling the development of scientific ideas, practices, and institutions from pre-Socratic Greek philosophy to late-Medieval scholasticism, [[David Lindberg]] surveyed all the most important themes in the history of science, including developments in cosmology, astronomy, mechanics, optics, alchemy, natural history, and medicine. In addition, he offered an illuminating account of the transmission of Greek science to medieval Islam and subsequently to medieval Europe.''The Beginnings of Western Science'' was, and remains, a landmark in the history of science, shaping the way students and scholars understand these critically formative periods of scientific development. It reemerges here in a second edition that includes revisions on nearly every page, as well as several sections that have been completely rewritten. For example, the section on Islamic science has been thoroughly retooled to reveal the magnitude and sophistication of medieval Muslim scientific achievement. And the book now reflects a sharper awareness of the importance of Mesopotamian science for the development of Greek astronomy. In all, the second edition of the book captures the current state of our understanding of more than two millennia of science and promises to continue to inspire both students and general readers.inspire both students and general readers.)
Shaw and Barseghyan (2019) + (While the scientonomic workflow guiding th … While the scientonomic workflow guiding the development of a general theory of scientific change has been practiced for nearly four years, it has yet to be formally evaluated. The goal of this paper is to fill this gap with a critical appraisal of the practice and theoretical underpinnings of the workflow currently used in scientonomy. First, we consider the traditional workflow which uses publications as the primary vehicle for substantive epistemic change and find that it fails to be sufficiently transparent or inclusive and is ambiguous at decisive points. Conversely, as we argue, the scientonomic workflow has the potential to succeed where the traditional workflow fails and thus provides a promising alternative workflow. We then go on to note a number of practical and theoretical problems that have arisen upon reflection on the scientonomic workflow and suggest some modifications to the workflow and to our practices. This paper takes the first steps in improving the workflow to reach its maximum potential.e workflow to reach its maximum potential.)
Tollefsen (2004) + (Who Knows? According to contemporary analy … Who Knows? According to contemporary analytic epistemology only individuals do. This individualistic bias is present in standard analyses of knowledge. The “S” of “S knows that p” is always an individual cognizer. The idea that collectives could be genuine knowers has received little, if any, serious consideration.1 This form of epistemic individualism, call it epistemic agent individualism, seems to be motivated by the view that epistemology is about things that go on inside the head. As one prominent analytic epistemologist puts it, “Knowers are individuals, and knowledge is generated by mental processes and lodged in the mind-brain” (Goldman, 1987).In this paper I challenge epistemic agent individualism by arguing that certain groups can be epistemic agents. In section I, I develop an account of epistemic agency based on the work of Tyler Burge. In section II, I extend this account of epistemic agency to groups. In section III, I consider whether my thesis supports the view, put forth by some feminist epistemologists, that social groups or communities are the primary epistemic agents.munities are the primary epistemic agents.)
Peirce (1878) + (Whoever has looked into a modern treatise … Whoever has looked into a modern treatise on logic of the common sort, will doubtless remember the two distinctions between clear and obscure conceptions, and between distinct and confused conceptions. They have lain in the books now for nigh two centuries, unimproved and unmodified, and are generally reckoned by logicians as among the gems of their doctrine. A clear idea is defined as one which is so apprehended that it will be recognized wherever it is met with,and so that no other will be mistaken for it. If it fails of this clearness, it is said to be obscure. this clearness, it is said to be obscure.)
Ayala (2003) + (William Paley (Natural Theology, 1802) dev … William Paley (Natural Theology, 1802) developed the argument-from-design. The complex structure of the human eye evinces that it was designed by an intelligent Creator. The argument is based on the irreducible complexity (“relation”) of multiple interacting parts, all necessary for function. Paley adduces a wealth of biological examples leading to the same conclusion; his knowledge of the biology of his time was profound and extensive. Charles Darwin’s ''Origin of Species'' is an extended argument demonstrating that the “design” of organisms can be explained by natural selection. Moreover, the dysfunctions, defects, waste, and cruelty that prevail in the living world are incompatible with a benevolent and omnipotent Creator. They come about by a process that incorporates chance and necessity, mutation and natural selection. In addition to science, there are other ways of knowing, such as art, literature, philosophy, and religion. Matters of value, meaning, and purpose transcend science.e, meaning, and purpose transcend science.)
Laudan (1996) + (With the decline of logical positivism aft … With the decline of logical positivism after 1950, much work in the philosophy of science has careened toward an uncritical relativistic approach. Many scholars, faced with a choice between a narrowly restrictive positivism and an “anything goes” relativism, have sought to find a middle path in the debate.In this collection of papers, several of which appear here for the first time, Larry Laudan argues that resolving this dilemma involves not some centrist compromise position but rather a conception of scientific knowledge that goes beyond both positivism and relativism. This conception must begin with the rejection of assumptions about knowledge that these apparently opposed positions hold in common. Relativism, for Laudan, is a particularly self-defeating form of neopositivism.In showing the connections between these two approaches and clarifying the positions of such influential philosophers as Thomas Kuhn and Paul Feyerabend, Laudan does the great service of laying the foundation for an account of science that rejects the errors of positivism without providing aid and comfort to the enemies of reason. He also takes a fresh look at many other central issues of scientific philosophy, including the science/non-science demarcation, the underdetermination of theory by evidence, and the contested role of social factors in the legitimation of scientific knowledge. Beyond Positivism and Relativism is a major statement about the nature of science and evidence that will command the interest of philosophers of science, epistemologists, sociologists of knowledge, and all who are seriously concerned about science, scientific progress, and the implications for knowledge in many other fields.ations for knowledge in many other fields.)
Cohen and Schnelle (Eds.) (1986) + (Within the last ten years, the interest of … Within the last ten years, the interest of historians and philosophers of science in the epistemological writings of the Polish medical microbiologist Ludwik Fleck (1896-1961), who had up to then been almost completely unknown, has advanced with great strides. His main writings on epistemological questions were published in the mid-1930's, but they remained almost unnoticed. Today, however, one may rightly call Fleck a 'classical' figure both of episte mology and of the historical sociology of science, one whose works are comparable with Popper's Logic of Scientific Discovery or Merton's pioneer ing study of the relations among economics, Puritanism, and natural science, both also originally published in the mid-1930's. The story of this book of 'materials on Ludwik Fleck' is also the story of the reception of Ludwik Fleck. In this volume, some essential materials which have been produced by that reception have been gathered together. We will sketch both the reception and the materials.etch both the reception and the materials.)
Latour (1987) + (Written for a large public interested in r … Written for a large public interested in renewing the understanding of scientific practice and its connection with the rest of society this book uses anecdotes, case studies, examples from many different periods and disciplines, to define rules of methods which can be used in following scientists around; the key role is given to non-humans, that is to associations that cut across the former divide between nature and society. It can be used as a general introduction to science studies.a general introduction to science studies.)
Popper (1945c) + (`)

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