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A
This definition aims to discern between accidental groups, i.e. the ones that don't have a collective intentionality, and actual communities, i.e. groups that do have collective intentionality. +
By allowing the discussants to suggest alternative formulations in their comments, the workflow incentivizes commenting and aids consensus building. It often happens that the discussants agree that a little tweak in the original formulation would solve the problem. This can help speed up the advancement of our communal knowledge. In contrast, when the discussants are not permitted to reformulate the original formulations, the discussants have no other choice than to write a whole new paper arguing for what is otherwise a little tweak to the original formulation. Not only is this wasteful, but it also creates a bottleneck where a consensus formation is postponed due to bureaucratic restrictions. Thus, it is important to remove this bottleneck and allow the participants to alter original formulations. +
Some facts ''ought'' to be relevant to the [[Theory Acceptance|assessment of a theory]] because the content of the theory itself implies their relevance, and others ought to be relevant simply by definition. When assessing a theory concerning scientific change, relevant facts that ought necessarily to be considered include questions pertinent to scientific change processes. For example: What [[Theory|theories]] and [[Method|methods]] were part of the [[Scientific Mosaic|scientific mosaic]] of the community in question, both before and after the instance of [[Scientific Change|scientific change]]? What modifications were proposed and what parts of the mosaic did they intend to replace? Which of these modifications became accepted into the mosaic, and how? +
The theorem states that the employment of a method is not necessarily simultaneous with the acceptance of a new theory. Being a direct logical consequence of [[The Third Law|the third law]], the theorem highlights the fact that some methods are a result of the implementation of some abstract requirements of other methods. In this way, a new method can be devised as a means of resolving a particular creative gap, and subsequently become employed long after the acceptance of the theory that led to the employment of the abstract method. +
If we consider the fact that scientific research is so specialized that no single research lab can account for all accepted theories in their discipline, we quickly recognize that there exists some form of distribution of labour among subcommunities. Authority delegation is an attempt to capture that distribution of labour, in scientonomic terms. +
The definition tweaks the [[Authority Delegation (Overgaard-Loiselle-2016)|original definition]] of the term by [[Nicholas Overgaard|Overgaard]] and [[Mirka Loiselle|Loiselle]] to ensure that the relationship of authority delegation can obtain between [[Epistemic Agent|epistemic agents]] of all types. It also substitutes [[Question|''question'']] for ''topic'', as the former is the proper scientonomic term that should be used. +
B
There is only one type of agents that can bear a mosaic - community.[[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)|pp. 43-52]] As for ''individual'' epistemic agents, their status and role in the process of scientific change is unclear; thus, the notion of an individual bearing a mosaic is problematic. +
C
One potential way of addressing the problem of closure mechanism is by introducing a “countdown” mechanism, where the community is given a three-month (90-day) discussion period for commenting on a suggested modification and, if no objections raised during this period, the proposed modification becomes accepted by default. According to Shaw and Barseghyan: +
To ensure that a suggested modification is properly evaluated and a verdict is reached, the community should be given a certain time period to discuss the modification, after which a communal vote should be taken. This vote should be offered to all members of the community, who should be given a short timeframe to decide. +
A [[Group|group]] that has a collective intentionality. +
When dealing with a community, it might be useful to analyze it in terms of its constituent subcommunities (e.g. the community of particle physicists within the community of physicists). But such an analysis is based on an assumption that a community can consist of other communities, i.e. subcommunities. This assumption is by no means trivial; indeed, there might exist a view that each community is to be treated separately as one indivisible whole and, thus, any talk of its constituents is meaningless. According to Overgaard, communities can be said to be consisting of other communities.[[CiteRef::Overgaard (2017)|p. 58]] Thus, there is such a thing as a subcommunity, i.e. a community that is part of a larger community. +
This definition of ''compatibility'' captures the main gist of the notion as it was originally intended by [[Rory Harder|Harder]] and [[Hakob Barseghyan|Barseghyan]] - the idea that two elements are compatible when they can coexist within the same mosaic. +
The corollary is meant to restate the content of [[Rory Harder|Harder]]'s [[The Zeroth Law (Harder-2015)|the zeroth law]] of scientific change. Since the corollary follows deductively from the definition of [[Compatibility (Fraser-Sarwar-2018)|''compatibility'']], it highlights that the zeroth law as it was formulated by Harder is tautologous. Since the corollary covers the same idea as the zeroth law, all the theorems that were thought to be deducible by means of the zeroth law (e.g. [[Theory Rejection theorem (Barseghyan-2015)|the theory rejection theorem]] or [[Method Rejection theorem (Barseghyan-2015)|the method rejection theorem]]) can now be considered deducible by means of the corollary. +
Like [[Demarcation Criteria|demarcation]] and [[Acceptance Criteria|acceptance criteria]], compatibility criteria can be part of a community's employed method. The community employs these criteria to determine whether two theories are mutually compatible or incompatible, i.e. whether they can be simultaneously part of the community's mosaic. Different communities can have different compatibility criteria. While some communities may opt to employ the logical law of noncontradiction as their criterion of compatibility, other communities may be more tolerant towards logical inconsistencies. According to Barseghyan, the fact that these days scientists "often simultaneously accept theories which strictly speaking logically contradict each other is a good indication that the actual criteria of compatibility employed by the scientific community might be quite different from the classical logical law of noncontradiction".[[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)|p. 11]] For example, this is apparent in … +
Like [[Demarcation Criteria|demarcation]] and [[Acceptance Criteria|acceptance criteria]], compatibility criteria can be part of an epistemic agent's employed method. An epistemic agent employs these criteria to determine whether two elements (e.g. methods, theories, questions) are mutually compatible or incompatible, i.e. whether they can be simultaneously part of the agent's mosaic. In principle, these criteria can be employed to determine the compatibility of elements present in the mosaic, as well as those outside of it (e.g. scientists often think about whether a proposed theory is compatible with the theories actually accepted at the time). [[Patrick Fraser|Fraser]] and [[Ameer Sarwar|Sarwar]] point out that [[Hakob Barseghyan|Barseghyan]]'s [[Compatibility Criteria (Barseghyan-2015)|original definition]] of the term "excludes a simple point that is assumed elsewhere in scientonomy: elements other than theories (i.e. methods and questions) may be compatible or incompatible wit… +
According to [[Patrick Fraser|Fraser]] and [[Ameer Sarwar|Sarwar]], "[[Compatibility (Fraser-Sarwar-2018)|compatibility]] is a distinct epistemic stance that agents can take towards elements".[[CiteRef::Fraser and Sarwar (2018)|p.70]] They show this by arguing that it is possible to take the stance of compatibility towards a pair of elements without taking any of the other stances towards these elements. Thus, compatibility is distinct from [[Theory Acceptance|acceptance]], since two elements need not be in the same mosaic, or even accepted by any agent to be considered, in principle, compatible. For example, an epistemic agent may consider Ptolemaic astrology compatible with Aristotelian natural philosophy without accepting either Ptolemaic astrology or Aristotelian natural philosophy. Compatibility is also different from [[Theory Use|use]], since a pair of theories can be considered compatible regardless of whether any of them is considered useful. For instance, one can consider q… +
<blockquote>The traditional version of comparativism holds that when two theories are compared it doesn’t make any difference which of the two is currently accepted. In reality, however, the starting point for every theory assessment is the current state of the mosaic. Every new theory is basically an attempt to modify the mosaic by inserting some new elements into the mosaic and, possibly, by removing some old elements from the mosaic. Therefore, what gets decided in actual theory assessment is whether a proposed modification is to be accepted. In other words, we judge two competing theories not in a vacuum, as the traditional version of ''comparativism'' suggests, but only in the context of a specific mosaic. It is this version of the comparativist view that is implicit in the laws of scientific change.[[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)|p. 184]] </blockquote> +
The core questions of a [[Discipline| discipline]] are those general questions that are essential to a discipline, having the power to define it and establish its boundaries within a hierarchy of questions. They are identified as such in the discipline's [[Delineating Theory| delineating theory]].[[CiteRef::Patton and Al-Zayadi (2021)]] The [[Scientific Mosaic| scientific mosaic]] consists of [[Theory| theories]] and [[Question| questions]].[[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)]][[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2018)]][[CiteRef::Rawleigh (2018)]][[CiteRef::Sebastien (2016)]] Questions form hierarchies in which more specific questions are [[Subquestion| subquestions]] of broader questions. Theories enter into this hierarchy as well since questions presuppose theories, and theories are answers to questions. It is the position of core questions within such hierarchies that confer upon them the power to define and establish the boundaries of a discipline by indicating which questions and theories are incl… +
A core theory of a [[Discipline| discipline]] is a [[Theory| theory]] presupposed by the discipline's [[Core Question| core questions]].[[CiteRef::Patton and Al-Zayadi (2021)]] The [[Scientific Mosaic| scientific mosaic]] consists of [[Theory| theories]] and [[Question| questions]].[[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)]][[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2018)]][[CiteRef::Rawleigh (2018)]][[CiteRef::Sebastien (2016)]] Questions constitute hierarchies where more specific questions are [[Subquestion| subquestions]] of broader questions. Within this hierarchy, certain general questions play a special role as core questions. These questions are essential to a discipline, and have the power to identify it and determine its boundaries. For example, a core question of evolutionary biology would be 'how did living species originate as a result of evolution?'. Questions always presuppose theories, which endow them with semantic content. Those presupposed by a discipline's core questions, are that discipline's co… +
D
This somewhat simplistic definition of ''definition'' is meant to highlight that definitions are themselves theories (statements, propositions). As a result, any [[Epistemic Stances|stance]] that can be taken by [[Epistemic Agent|epistemic agents]] towards theories can also be taken towards definitions. +
According to Barseghyan, definitions are an integral part of the process of scientific change.[[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2018)]] +
According to Barseghyan, definitions are essentially a species of theories. +
One can specify a [[Discipline|discipline]] in terms of a set of its [[Core Question| core questions]]. A delineating theory is a second-order [[Theory|theory]] identifying this set of core questions, and allowing it to exist as an [[Epistemic Element| epistemic element]] within the [[Scientific Mosaic|mosaic]].[[CiteRef::Patton and Al-Zayadi (2021)]] For example, the delineating theory of modern physics might identify 'How do matter and energy behave?' as a core question of modern physics. +
[[The Law of Theory Demarcation (Sarwar-Fraser-2018)|The law of theory demarcation]] states that a theory is deemed as scientific only if it satisfies the demarcation criteria employed by the epistemic community at the time. [[Theory Acceptance (Fraser-Sarwar-2018)|The definition of theory acceptance]] suggested by [[Patrick Fraser|Fraser]] and [[Ameer Sarwar|Sarwar]] states that an accepted theory is a ''scientific'' theory that is taken to be the best available description or prescription of its object of study. It follows from these two premises that whenever a theory is accepted, it must also have satisfied the demarcation criteria of the time. After all, if it did not, then the definition of theory acceptance is contradicted. Therefore, if the definition of theory acceptance and the law of demarcation criteria are accepted, then it must also be accepted that accepted theories satisfy the criteria of demarcation. This demarcation-acceptance synchronism is presented somewhat more… +
According to [[Zoe Sebastien|Sebastien]]'s definition of the term, descriptive theories aim at ''describing'' a certain object under study, where ''describe'' is understood in the broad sense and includes ''explain'', ''predict'', etc. Thus, the term encompasses theories that attempt to describe a certain phenomenon, process, or state of affairs in the past, present, or future. All of the following propositions would qualify as ''descriptive'': +
According to Barseghyan, many theories attempt to describe something. Thus, there are descriptive theories.[[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)|p. 5]] +
A discipline ''A'' is characterized by a non-empty set of [[Core Question| core questions]] ''Q<sub>CA</sub>'' and a [[Delineating Theory| delineating theory]] stating that ''Q<sub>CA</sub>'' are the core questions of the discipline.[[CiteRef::Patton and Al-Zayadi (2021)]] +
[[Epistemic Stances Towards Theories|Theories]] and [[Epistemic Stances Towards Questions| questions]] can both be the subject of the epistemic stances of [[Epistemic Agent|epistemic agents]]. [[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2018)]][[CiteRef::Rawleigh (2018)]][[CiteRef::Patton (2019)]] [[Discipline| Disciplines]] like biology, physics, and astrology can also be the subject of such stances. For example, biology and physics are accepted by the scientific community of the modern world as disciplines, but astrology is rejected. In our definition, a discipline is said to be accepted by an epistemic agent if that agent accepts the [[Core Question| core questions]] specified in the discipline's [[Delineating Theory|delineating theory]], as well as the delineating theory itself.[[CiteRef::Patton and Al-Zayadi (2021)]] +
No [[Theory|theory]] acceptance may take place in a genuinely dogmatic [[Scientific Community|community]]. "Namely," as is noted in [[Barseghyan (2015)]], Barseghyan notes, when introducing '''the theory rejection theorem''' in [[Barseghyan (2015)]], "theory change is impossible in cases where a currently accepted theory is considered as revealing the final and absolute truth".[[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)|p. 165]] +
A '''substantive method''' is one that presupposes at least one contingent proposition; one that depends on the state of something in the external world. According to our understanding of contingent propositions, all such propositions are '''fallible'''. As such, any substantive method will necessarily presuppose at least one contingent proposition, and is therefore fallible. Thus, by the '''synchronism of method rejection''' theorem, the rejection of a theory can result in the rejection of a method, rendering all substantive methods dynamic. +
E
According to Oh, there is such a thing as element decay.[[CiteRef::Oh (2021)]] +
Element decay is not a scientonomic phenomenon and, thus, is outside of the scope of scientonomy. +
A method is said to be ''employed'' at time ''t'' if, at time ''t,'' theories became accepted only when their acceptance is permitted by the method. [[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)|p. 53]] ''The second law'' of theory acceptance is a direct consequence of ''employed method'' as it is defined. +
According to this definition of the term, ''employed method'' is nothing but the actual expectations of a certain community at a certain time. This is in tune with the actual scientonomic usage of the term. It is safe to say that this definition is tacitly used throughout Barseghyan's [[Barseghyan (2015)|''The Laws of Scientific Change'']]. For instance, when he says that the method of intuition schooled by experience was employed by the community of Aristotelian-Medieval natural philosophers, he actually means that this community expected new theories to be intuitively true.[[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)|pp. 143-145]][[CiteRef::Patton, Overgaard, and Barseghyan (2017)|p. 35]] When he says that the double-blind trial method is currently employed in drug testing, he means that "the community expects new drugs to be tested in double-blind trials".[[CiteRef::Patton, Overgaard, and Barseghyan (2017)|p. 35]][[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)|pp. 134-142]] Originally, this tacit definition of emp… +
[[Joshua Allen]] makes a case for this broad definition of the term. According to Allen:[[CiteRef::Allen (2023)|pp. 75-76]] +
According to Allen, epistemic actions are a key part of everyday epistemic practice. +
An ''epistemic agent'' acts in relation to [[Epistemic Element|epistemic elements]] such as theories, questions, and methods. The actions of an epistemic agent amount to taking [[Epistemic Stance|epistemic stances]] towards these elements, such as accepting or pursuing a theory, accepting a question, or employing a method. The stances of an epistemic agent must be ''intentional''. To be so, they must satisfy the following conditions: +
According to Barseghyan, epistemic agents are an essential part of the process of scientific change, as they take stances towards epistemic elements. +
This definition attempts to capture what is arguably the key feature of epistemic communities - their collective intentionality to study/know the world. This feature, according to the definition, distinguishes epistemic communities from [[Non-Epistemic Community|non-epistemic communities]], such as political, economic, or familial communities. To use [[Nicholas Overgaard|Overgaard]]'s own example, "it is clear that an orchestra is a community: the various musicians can be said to have a collective intentionality to play a piece of music" and yet its collective intentionality is different from that of knowing the world.[[CiteRef::Overgaard (2017)|p. 59]] +
According to [[Nicholas Overgaard|Overgaard]], communities that do not have a collective intentionality to know the world can still have sub-communities that do have such an intentionality. Overgaard illustrates this with the example of Google, a company that can be considered a [[Non-Epistemic Community|non-epistemic community]] as its collective intentionality is that to make profit. Yet, as an innovative company, Google has many sub-communities which do have a collective intentionality to know the world, such as "a research and development team trying to better know Internet technologies, or a marketing team trying to better know how to reach consumers".[[CiteRef::Overgaard (2017)|p. 59]] By [[Epistemic Community (Overgaard-2017)|definition]], these sub-communities are [[Epistemic Community|epistemic]]. Thus, argues Overgaard, it is possible for an epistemic community to be the sub-community of a non-epistemic community. +
The claim of the existence of epistemic communities can be traced back to Overgaard, who presented the distinction between epistemic and non-epistemic communities in his [[Overgaard (2017)|''A Taxonomy for the Social Agents of Scientific Change'']].[[CiteRef::Overgaard (2017)]] +
According to Barseghyan, epistemic community is an epistemic agent, i.e. it is capable of taking [[Epistemic Stance|epistemic stances]] towards [[Epistemic Element|epistemic elements]].[[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2018)]] +
TODO: Nikki add a description +
According to Barseghyan and Levesley, questions can have epistemic presuppositions. +
Fraser and Sarwar argued that, as an epistemic stance, compatibility can be taken towards epistemic elements of all types.[[CiteRef::Fraser and Sarwar (2018)|p. 70]] +
The only stance that an epistemic agent can take towards a method is [[Employed Method|''employment'']], i.e. a method is either employed or unemployed by an agent in theory evaluation. +
In his [[Barseghyan (2018)|"Redrafting the Ontology of Scientific Change"]], Barseghyan argued that since [[Normative Theory|norms]] are a subtype of [[Theory|theory]], all the epistemic stances that can in principle be taken by an epistemic agent towards theories of all types can also be taken towards norms. In addition to these more universal stances, norms can also be [[Norm Employment|employed]], i.e. they have the capacity of constituting the actual expectations of the epistemic agent. This applies to norms of all types.[[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2018)]] +
Rawleigh argued that, just like theories, [[Question|questions]] too can be [[Question Acceptance|accepted]] or unaccepted. A question can be accepted by an agent at one period at not accepted by another. +
It is argued by Sarwar and Fraser that, in addition to the already accepted epistemic stances, the stance of ''scientificity'' can be taken towards theories.[[CiteRef::Sarwar and Fraser (2018)]] +
According to Barseghyan, acceptance as an epistemic stance can be taken towards theories.[[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)|pp. 30-32]] +
According to Barseghyan, the epistemic stance of pursuit can be taken towards theories, i.e. an epistemic agent can find a theory pursuitworthy.[[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)|pp. 30-40]] +
According to Barseghyan, the epistemic stance of use can be taken towards theories, i.e. an epistemic agent can find a theory useful.[[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)|pp. 30-40]] +
A physical object or system is an epistemic tool for an [[Epistemic Agent|epistemic agent]] ''iff'' there is a procedure by which the tool can provide an acceptable source of knowledge for answering some [[Question|question]] under the employed [[Method|method]] of that agent. Examples of epistemic tools include rulers, thermometers, the Large Hadron Collider, the Hubble Space Telescope, a written text, a computer, a blackboard and chalk, a crystal ball, etc. +
There are several different senses in which one might take the concept of scientific error. One is the absolute sense. From our modern perspective, we might judge the geocentric [[Aristotle| Aristotelean-Ptolemaic cosmology's]] claim that the earth is stationary at the center of the universe as an error [[CiteRef:: Allchin (2001)]]. +
The analysis of several several instances of scientific error by [[Sarah Machado-Marques|Machado-Marques]] and [[Paul Patton|Patton]] suggest that the handling of these instances by scientists is in accord with the theory rejection theorem. Handling of error involves, according to this view, not only a rejection of some of the propositions that are considered to be accepted erroneously but also an acceptance of some new propositions. In some cases, an erroneously accepted ''first-order'' proposition is replaced by another ''first-order'' proposition incompatible with it. In other cases, an erroneously accepted ''first-order'' proposition is replaced by a ''second-order'' proposition stating the lack of sufficient reason for accepting the first-order proposition. According to this view, the handling of erroneously accepted theories involves their replacement with other theories; the handling of scientific error is therefore in full accord with the theory rejection theorem. +
This category encompasses that knowledge which hasn't been openly formulated by the agent but can, in principle, be open formulated. As such the category is agent-relative. The definition was first suggested by [[Hakob Barseghyan]] and [[Maxim Mirkin]] in their ''[[Barseghyan and Mirkin (2019)|The Role of Technological Knowledge in Scientific Change]]''[[CiteRef::Barseghyan and Mirkin (2019)]] and was restated by Mirkin in his ''[[Mirkin (2018)|The Status of Technological Knowledge in the Scientific Mosaic]]''. +
According to this definition, knowledge is said to be ''explicit'' if it has been openly formulated by the agent in question. As such the notion of ''explicit'' is agent-relative. The definition was first suggested by [[Hakob Barseghyan]] and [[Maxim Mirkin]] in their ''[[Barseghyan and Mirkin (2019)|The Role of Technological Knowledge in Scientific Change]]''[[CiteRef::Barseghyan and Mirkin (2019)]] and was restated by Mirkin in his ''[[Mirkin (2018)|The Status of Technological Knowledge in the Scientific Mosaic]]''. +
G
Allen makes a case that while many types of epistemic actions are local, i.e. available to only ''some'' agents at ''some'' periods, there are also global epistemic actions. According to Allen, "taking a stance of acceptance (i.e., accepting) seems to be a global action, as without this epistemic action no process of scientific change seems possible". [[CiteRef::Allen (2023)|p. 79]] +
Allen makes a case that there is such a thing as a global epistemic action, (e.g. ''accepting a theory'').[[CiteRef::Allen (2023)|p. 79]] +
Allen makes a case that epistemic actions can be global or local.[[CiteRef::Allen (2023)]] +
In the scientonomic workflow, the goals of peer review are to assesses a paper for pursuitworthiness of the modifications suggested in the paper. Thus, peer reviewers should not evaluate submissions for acceptability, but only for pursuitworthiness. +
In [[Nicholas Overgaard|Overgaard]]'s taxonomy, the term ''group'' refers to the most basic societal entity - a set of two or more people. As such, it is meant to play the role of the most abstract class which has two sub-classes - [[Community (Overgaard-2017)|community]] and [[Accidental Group (Overgaard-2017)|accidental group]].[[CiteRef::Overgaard (2017)]] +
H
The editors should be granted official ''housekeeping rights'' to create and modify the necessary pages of the encyclopedia to handle ripple effects. Specific handling of ripple effects should depend on whether the additional change is ''implied'' by the modification or whether it is conceivable to accept the modification without accepting the additional change. There are two possible scenarios. +
Hierarchical authority delegation is a sub-type of [[Multiple Authority Delegation (Loiselle-2017)|multiple authority delegation]]. It describes a situation in which a community delegates authority over some [[Question|question]] to multiple communities, but at different degrees of authority. Consider a case of multiple authority delegation in which either expert A OR expert B might be consulted. If the word of expert A is always accepted over the word of expert B, we have a case of hierarchical authority delegation. +
The definition tweaks the [[Hierarchical Authority Delegation (Loiselle-2017)|original definition]] of the term by [[Mirka Loiselle|Loiselle]] to ensure that the relationship of hierarchical authority delegation can obtain between [[Epistemic Agent|epistemic agents]] of all types. It also substitutes [[Question|''question'']] for ''topic'', as the former is the proper scientonomic term that should be used. +
To reconstruct the state of a ''mosaic'' at time ''t,'' it is necessary to understand which theories were accepted at the time, and which methods were employed at the time. [[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)|p. 12]] This process is the concern of historical (empirical) questions. '''Theory of scientific change,''' although closely linked is concerned with theoretical questions. ''History of Scientific Change'' is one of the key concepts in current scientonomy. Thus, its proper definition is of great importance to recognize a descriptive theory of ''scientific change.'' +
I
Implication aims to capture the idea of one theory "following" from another. Although this idea is usually associated with that of deduction, sometimes deduction is too strict. When a theory constitutes evidence for another theory, that theory may imply the other depending on the strength of the evidence. There is no cutoff point for how strong the evidence needs to be that is shared by all agents. Instead, each agent has some ''rules of implication'' which determine when a theory ''implies'' another. This may be rules of logical entailment, of Bayesian confirmation theory, or of a detective's instinct. +
Implicit is the opposite of ''explicit'' and, thus, it doesn't require more than a very minimalist definition. This definition creates a strong link between the two concepts and won't require any changes in the definition of ''implicit'' when the respective definition of ''explicit'' happens to change. +
One putative method of learning the [[Employed Method|''employed method'']] of the time is by studying texts concerning scientific [[Methodology|''methodology'']] to learn what method was prescribed by the [[Scientific Community|community]] or advocated by ''great scientists''. However, such indicators can yield incorrect results. During the second half of the eighteenth century and the first half of the nineteenth century, the scientific community explicitly advocated the ''empiricist-inductivist'' methodology championed by [[Isaac Newton]]. This methodology held that new theories should be deduced from phenomena, and that unobservable entities should not be posited. However, the historical record actually shows that several theories positing unobservable entities did, in fact, become accepted during this period. These include Benjamin Franklin's theory of electricity, which posited an unobservable ''electric fluid'', the ''phlogiston'' theory of combustion, and the theory that li… +
''Indicators of theory acceptance'' are historical facts that provide evidence indicating that a scientific [[Theory|theory]] was accepted by some [[Scientific Community|community]] at a particular time. The opinions of [[Individual Level|individual scientists]] are not clear indicators of the acceptance of a theory by a community. Possible indicators are sources that typically indicate the opinion of an entire scientific community such as encyclopedias, textbooks, university curricula and the minutes of association meetings. [[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)| pp. 113-117]] +
According to Patton, there is such a things as an individual epistemic agents, capable of taking [[Epistemic Stance|epistemic stances]] towards [[Epistemic Element|epistemic elements]].[[CiteRef::Patton (2019)]] +
According to Patton, individuals are "capable of taking epistemic stances towards epistemic elements, with reason, based on a semantic understanding of the elements and their available alternatives, and with the goal of producing knowledge".[[CiteRef::Patton (2019)|p. 82]] +
By the ''individual level'' Barseghyan means an "individual scientist who has her own set of ideas and beliefs about the world, and employs certain methods which might be different than the accepted methods of the time".[[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)|p. 43]] +
The category is agent-relative and encompasses that knowledge which cannot - even in principle - be explicated. The definition was first suggested by [[Hakob Barseghyan]] and [[Maxim Mirkin]] in their ''[[Barseghyan and Mirkin (2019)|The Role of Technological Knowledge in Scientific Change]]''[[CiteRef::Barseghyan and Mirkin (2019)]] and was restated by Mirkin in his ''[[Mirkin (2018)|The Status of Technological Knowledge in the Scientific Mosaic]]''. +
Inferring Theory Assessment Outcomes from Acceptance or Unacceptance of Two Contenders (Patton-Overgaard-Barseghyan-2017) +
The following inferences can be drawn regarding theory assessment outcomes from the acceptance or unacceptance of two contender theories: +
Inferring Theory Assessment Outcomes from Acceptance or Unacceptance of a Single Contender (Patton-Overgaard-Barseghyan-2017) +
The following inferences can be drawn regarding theory assessment outcomes from the acceptance or unacceptance of a single contender theory: +
L
Allen explains that to say that a local epistemic action is available to an epistemic agent amounts to saying that the agent employs the norm that such an action is permissible/desirable/obligatory/etc.[[CiteRef::Allen (2023)|p. 79]] +
Allen's theorem is based on the definition of ''local action availability'' that states that "the availability of local epistemic action ''A'' to an agent amounts to the employment of the norm that says “Epistemic action ''A'' is permissible/obligatory/desirable/etc.”".[[CiteRef::Allen (2023)|p. 79]] Thus, from the law of norm employment, one can argue that:[[CiteRef::Allen (2023)|p. 81]] +
Allen suggests that local actions are the ones that are not universally available but are specific to a time period and/or an agent. For example "such epistemic actions as simulating, experimenting, or modelling seem to be local actions since they need not necessarily be part of the repertoire of epistemic actions of all conceivable epistemic agents; such local actions emerge at a certain time and become available to some but not all epistemic agents".[[CiteRef::Allen (2023)|p. 79]] +
Allen points out that many epistemic actions are local (e.g. actions of simulating, experimenting, or modelling).[[CiteRef::Allen (2023)|p. 79]] +
Allen argues that many types of epistemic actions are local (e.g. simulating, modeling, experimenting).[[CiteRef::Allen (2023)|p. 79]] +
TODO: Nikki add a description +
According to Barseghyan and Levesley, question can have logical presuppositions. +
M
Any ''method'' is essentially a set of criteria which can become [[Employed Method|employed]] in theory evaluation. Different methods may have different Methods can be very general and apply to theories of a variety of types (e.g. ''the hypothetico-deductive method''), or very specific (e.g. ''the double-blind trial method'' of drug testing). [[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)|pp. 4-5]] +
This definition of ''method'' is meant to encompass the criteria of evaluation of all types, regardless of their being explicit or implicit, and thus merge what was previously separated into two classes of elements - [[Method (Barseghyan-2015)|methods]] and [[Methodology (Sebastien-2016)|methodologies]]. +
According to this definition, in a hierarchy of methods more stringent requirements take precedence over less stringent requirement. Thus, when there are theories satisfying the most stringent requirements, these theories become accepted. However, when no such theory is available, the epistemic agent in question seeks for theories that satisfy the requirements of the second - less stringent - method in the hierarchy. If such a theory is not found, the agent is then prepared to accept theories that satisfy even the even less stringent requirements of the third method in hierarchy, and so on.[[CiteRef::Mercuri and Barseghyan (2019)]] +
As argued by [[Mathew Mercuri|Mercuri]] and [[Hakob Barseghyan|Barseghyan]], it is often the case that "criteria employed by the same epistemic agent constitute a certain preference hierarchy",[[CiteRef::Mercuri and Barseghyan (2019)|p. 45]] illustrated among other things by the fact that "practitioners in different fields customarily speak of more or less reliable evidence".[[CiteRef::Mercuri and Barseghyan (2019)|p. 46]] For example, when the community of art historians attempts to establish the authenticity of a certain work of art, they often accept the position of the expert they find most reliable; if, for whatever reason, this expert doesn't have a position on the authenticity of that work of art, the community refers to their second-best expert, and so on.[[CiteRef::Loiselle (2017)]] Another example of method hierarchies comes from the field of clinical epidemiology that features "a variety of different requirements – from more stringent to more lenient".[[CiteRef::Mercuri a… +
According to Barseghyan's 2018 redrafted ontology, methods are a species of normative theories.[[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2018)]] +
According to ''the method rejection theorem'', a [[Method|method]] ceases to be employed only when other methods that are incompatible with it become employed. +
Pandey makes a case that the first law and all of its corollaries are tautological.[[CiteRef::Pandey (2023)]] +
This definition of the term confines it to the respective normative ''field'' of inquiry. Specific methodological ''theories'' are referred to as [[Method (Barseghyan-2018)|''methods'']]. +
A methodology can affect an employed method when it implements one or more abstract requirements of another employed method. Thus, the role normative methodology plays in the process of scientific change is a creative role, in which methods are changed through the implementation of other abstract requirements from some other employed method. +
According to Barseghyan (2015), for mosaics to merge, that is, to "turn into one united mosaic," there must first exist (at least) two distinct mosaics. This necessarily means that there are elements which are present in one mosaic but absent in the other. "To use the language of set theory," Barseghyan writes, "these are the elements that constitute the so-called ''symmetric difference'' of two mosaics [...] Therefore, in order for the two mosaics to merge into one, these elements should either be rejected in both or accepted in both, so that the differences between the two are resolved".[[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)|p. 214]] +
To understand what is meant by mosaic split, consider the following case. "A community initially accepts some theories and employs some methods; in other words, initially, there is one mosaic of theories and methods. Also, as a result of some events, this initially united community transforms into two different communities with two somewhat different mosaics of theories and methods."[[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)|p.202]] This is different than mere disagreement. ''Mosaic split'' only occurs if there are two communities that each present their different theories as accepted (in contexts like articles, conferences, textbooks and so on). That is, there is disagreement concerning the ''status'' of certain theories, and not just on the theories themselves.[[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)|p.203]] +
Multiple authority delegation is a sub-type of authority delegation. It describes a situation in which a community delegates authority over some topic to multiple communities. For example, in a case where a community might delegate authority to expert A OR expert B over topic X, we have a case of multiple authority delegation. +
The definition tweaks the [[Multiple Authority Delegation (Loiselle-2017)|original definition]] of the term by [[Mirka Loiselle|Loiselle]] to ensure that the relationship of multiple authority delegation can obtain between [[Epistemic Agent|epistemic agents]] of all types. It also substitutes [[Question|''question'']] for ''topic'', as the former is the proper scientonomic term that should be used. +
Overgaard and Loiselle illustrate the relationship of mutual authority delegation by a number of examples. For one, physicists acknowledge that biologists are the experts on questions concerning life, and likewise biologists acknowledge that physicists are the experts on questions concerning physical processes. Similar relationships can be found within individual scientific disciplines. Consider, for instance, the relationship between theoretical and applied physicists, where despite the differences in their methods and overall objectives, the two communities customarily delegate authority to each other on a wide array of topics. +
The definition tweaks the [[Mutual Authority Delegation (Overgaard-Loiselle-2016)|original definition]] of the term by [[Nicholas Overgaard|Overgaard]] and [[Mirka Loiselle|Loiselle]] to ensure that the relationship of multiple authority delegation can obtain between [[Epistemic Agent|epistemic agents]] of all types. It also substitutes [[Question|''question'']] for ''topic'', as the former is the proper scientonomic term that should be used. +
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According to the [[Non-Empty Mosaic theorem (Barseghyan-2015)|non-empty mosaic theorem]], there must be at least one element present in a mosaic. The Necessary Method theorem specifies that this element must be a method. That is, "one method is a must for the whole enterprise of scientific change to take off the ground".[[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)|p. 228]] +
Necessary [[Scientific Mosaic|mosaic]] split is a form of mosaic split that must happen if it is ever the case that two incompatible [[Theory|theories]] both become accepted under the employed [[Method|method]] of the time. Since the theories are incompatible, under the [[The Zeroth Law|zeroth law]], they cannot be accepted into the same mosaic, and a mosaic split must then occur, as a matter of logical necessity.[[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)|pp. 204-207]] +
The non-empty [[Scientific Mosaic|mosaic]] theorem asserts that in order for a process of [[Scientific Change|scientific change]] to be possible, the mosaic must necessarily contain at least one element. Scientific change is impossible in an empty mosaic. It can be deduced from the [[The Second Law (Barseghyan-2015)|second law]], which asserts that in order to become accepted into the mosaic, a [[Theory|theory]] is assessed by the [[Method|method]] actually employed at the time, and the [[The Third Law (Barseghyan-2015)|third law]], which asserts that a method becomes employed only when it is deducible from other employed methods and accepted theories of the time.[[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)|p. 226]] +
This definition is meant to highlight the key difference between [[Epistemic Community|epistemic]] and non-epistemic communities. The former are said to have a collective intentionality to know the world, while the latter lack such an intentionality. A typical example of a non-epistemic community, according to [[Nicholas Overgaard|Overgaard]], is an orchestra that has a collective intentionality to play music but lack the intentionality of knowing the world.[[CiteRef::Overgaard (2017)|p. 59]] Another example of a non-epistemic community, according to Overgaard, is a political party. While a political party might have some accepted theories, such as ideas concerning, for instance, effective governance, "a political party would be considered a non-epistemic community because it lacks a collective intentionality to know the world".[[CiteRef::Overgaard (2017)|p. 59]] +
Non-hierarchical authority delegation is a sub-type of multiple authority delegation. It describes a situation in which a community delegates authority over some topic to multiple communities, and treat each community as being at the same level of authority. Consider a case of multiple authority delegation in which either expert A OR expert B might be consulted. If the word of expert A is valued as equally as the word of expert B, we have a case of non-hierarchical authority delegation. +
The definition tweaks the [[Non-hierarchical Authority Delegation (Loiselle-2017)|original definition]] of the term by [[Mirka Loiselle|Loiselle]] to ensure that the relationship of non-hierarchical authority delegation can obtain between [[Epistemic Agent|epistemic agents]] of all types. It also substitutes [[Question|''question'']] for ''topic'', as the former is the proper scientonomic term that should be used. +
This definition is meant to ensure that the notion of employment is applicable not only to methods but to norms of all types, as is the case in the ontology of epistemic elements suggested by [[Hakob Barseghyan|Barseghyan]] in 2018. According to that ontology, the capacity of being employed can be ascribed not only to norms of theory evaluation (i.e. methods), but to [[Epistemic Stances Towards Normative Theories - Norm Employment (Barseghyan-2018)|norms of all types]], including ethical norm and aesthetic norms.[[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2018)]] +
Pandey makes a case that the first law and all of its corollaries are tautological.[[CiteRef::Pandey (2023)]] +
Whereas [[Implication (Palider-2019)]] is an analytic relation between theories, inferences are taken to be the "movements of thought" that lead to belief revision. As argued for by Palider (2019) inferences, unlike implications, necessarily involve a normative component.[[CiteRef::Palider (2019)|p. 22]] An implication alone is insufficient for an agent to revise their beliefs, or accepted theories, what is needed is that the agent take the normative stance that they should accept the theory. A '''normative inference''' is what leads an agent to taking such a normative stance. +
While not explicitly stated, the definition assumes that normative propositions involve evaluation, i.e. they "say how something ''ought'' to be, what's good or bad, what's right or wrong".[[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)|p. 12]] In contrast with [[Descriptive Theory|''descriptive propositions'']], normative propositions do not aim to tell how things are, were, or will be, but rather what is good or bad, desirable or undesirable, permissible or impermissible. +
According to Sebastien, "normative propositions are relevant to the process of scientific change", i.e. "they "can be part of the scientific mosaic".[[CiteRef::Sebastien (2016)|p. 2]] +
According to Sebastien, norms, such as those of ethics, aesthetics, or methodology, are normative theories.[[CiteRef::Sebastien (2016)]] +
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One-sided authority delegation is a sub-type of authority delegation. It describes a situation where one community delegates authority over some topic to another community, but the other community does not delegate any authority back. +
The definition tweaks the [[Mutual Authority Delegation (Overgaard-Loiselle-2016)|original definition]] of the term by [[Nicholas Overgaard|Overgaard]] and [[Mirka Loiselle|Loiselle]] to ensure that the relationship of one-sided authority delegation can obtain between [[Epistemic Agent|epistemic agents]] of all types. It also substitutes [[Question|''question'']] for ''topic'', as the former is the proper scientonomic term that should be used. +
To say that the theory acceptance outcome ''accept'' obtained as a result of a theory's assessment by a method is the same as to say that it is prescribed that the theory must be accepted. +
To say that the theory acceptance outcome ''inconclusive'' obtained as a result of a theory's assessment by a method is the same as to say that the theory ''can'' but ''shouldn't necessarily'' be accepted. +
To say that a theory's assessment by a method produced the outcome "inconclusive" is the same as to say that the community itself couldn't tell whether the requirements of the method were conclusively met. +
To say that the theory acceptance outcome ''not accept'' obtained as a result of a theory's assessment by a method is the same as to say that it is prescribed that the theory must not be accepted. +
To say that a theory's assessment by a method produced the outcome "not satisfied" is the same as to say that the theory conclusively failed to meet the requirements of the method. +
To say that a theory's assessment by a method produced the outcome "satisfied" is the same as to say that the theory conclusively met the requirements of the method. +
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Possible [[Scientific Mosaic|mosaic]] split is a form of mosaic split that can happen if it is ever the case that [[Theory|theory]] assessment reaches an inconclusive result. In this case, a mosaic split can, but need not necessarily, result.[[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)|pp. 208-213]] That is, "the sufficient condition for this second variety of mosaic split is an element of inconclusiveness in the assessment outcome of at least one of the contender theories".[[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)|p. 208]] +
The definition assumes that it is possible to conceive of methods that do not presuppose any substantive knowledge about the world. If a method doesn't presuppose any accepted theories other than definitions, the method is procedural.[[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)|p. 219]] As a possible example of a procedural method, [[Hakob Barseghyan|Barseghyan]] mentions what he calls the ''deductive acceptance method'', according to which "if a proposition is deductively inferred from other accepted propositions, it is to be accepted".[[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)|p. 221]] This method, according to Barseghyan presupposes only some definition of ''deductive inference'' as well as some very abstract method such as "only accept the best available theories".[[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)|p. 220-221]] The latter is another possible instance of a procedural method, as it too doesn't seem to presuppose any substantive knowledge of the world. +
In the scientonomic workflow, the discussions concerning suggested modifications should be published once a communal consensus is reached and the respective verdict is recorded in the encyclopedia. The discussions are to be published in the journal as special commentary articles co-authored by all participants of the discussion or in special edited collections. While it might be tempting to only publish those discussions that caused significant disagreement in the community, such an approach alternative solution may inadvertently incentivize dissent and disagreement for the sake of getting published. In contrast, by publishing ''all'' discussions, we incentivize all commenting without skewing the incentive towards disagreement. +
As a distinct epistemic stance, [[Theory Pursuit|theory pursuit]] is not reducible to [[Theory Acceptance|acceptance]]. +
Q
A ''question'' is a subject or area of inquiry into which epistemic communities can investigate. They are usually given in the form of an interrogative. Questions vary in their specificity and scope, from very wide (what are the properties of the universe?) to very narrow (why are there no instances of CP-violation observed in quantum chromodynamics?). +
''Question Acceptance'' refers to one of the two stances that [[Epistemic Community|epistemic communities]] can take towards [[Question (Rawleigh-2018)|questions]], with the opposite stance being ''unacceptance''. A question is said to be accepted by an epistemic community if and only if said epistemic community takes the question to be a legitimate topic of inquiry. +
Rawleigh emphasized that the process of scientific change involves not only theories and methods but also questions.[[CiteRef::Rawleigh (2018)]] +
A question can be a subquestion of another question. A question ''Q'' is a subquestion of another question ''P'', if a direct answer to ''Q'' is also a partial answer to ''P''. +
Rawleigh argued that questions are an integral part of the process of scientific change.[[CiteRef::Rawleigh (2018)]] +
A study of the process of scientific change reveals many cases when a question that was considered legitimate in a certain time-period became illegitimate in another period. For example, the questions such as “what is the weight of phlogiston?” or “why does some matter gain mass as it loses phlogiston?” were accepted as legitimate topics of inquiry for the most part of the 18th century. Yet, once the phlogiston theory was rejected, these questions became illegitimate. Another examples is the question “what is the distance from the earth to the sphere of stars?” that was once considered legitimate by astronomers, but is no longer accepted.[[CiteRef::Rawleigh (2018)|p. 4]] +
TODO: Add the description +
TODO: Nikki add a description +
Pandey makes a case that the first law and all of its corollaries are tautological.[[CiteRef::Pandey (2023)]] +
Pandey makes a case that the first law and all of its corollaries are tautological.[[CiteRef::Pandey (2023)]] +
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A '''Reason''' is a theory that is potentially hypothetical, i.e. not accepted, that may serve serve, if accepted, as a [[Sufficient Reason (Palider-2019)]] for accepting another theory. For example, one may say that a double-blind trial will constitute a reason for accepting a drug's efficacy, even if the double-blind trial has not yet been done. +
The paradox of normative propositions arises from the following three premises: +
Although both the theories and methods of science have changed over history and differ across disciplines, the nothing permanent thesis is denied. Instead, the fixed and stable features of science can take the form of dynamics or laws that govern changes in science through a piecemeal approach. A theory of scientific change is possible by positing laws that describe transitions in science and its constituent elements. +
In The Laws of Scientific Change (2015), Hakob Barseghyan argues that none of the social constructivist theses preclude the possibility of a general theory of scientific change. He provides different reasons to invalidate each of the respective social constructivist theses. The general theory is that the argument from social construction does not undermine the possibility of the theory of scientific change (TSC). Barseghyan shows that each of the theses lead to bizarre implications that form threats not only to the scientonomic project but to all other disciplines that constitute descriptive propositions. +
S
The [[Scientific Mosaic|scientific mosaic]] is in a process of perpetual change. Most of the theories that we accept nowadays didn’t even exist two or three hundred years ago. Similarly, at least some of the methods that we employ in theory assessment nowadays have nothing to do with the methods employed in the 17th century. Thus, it is safe to say that the process of scientific change involves both theories and methods.[[CiteRef::Barseghyan(2015)|p.9]] Changes in the scientific mosaic can be viewed as a series of successive frames, where each frame represents a state of that mosaic at a given point of time. Obviously, such a frame would include all accepted theories and all employed methods of the time. [[CiteRef::Barseghyan(2015)|p. 9]] +
According to this definition, scientific mosaic encompasses all [[Theory Acceptance|accepted]] theories and [[Employed Method|employed]] methods.[[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)|p. 5]] The definition assumes that theories and methods are the only two fundamental entities that undergo scientific change.[[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)|pp. 5-7]] The reason the set of theories and methods is called a “mosaic” and not, say, “system” is that the elements of the mosaic may or may not be tightly adjusted; there may be considerable gaps between the elements of the mosaic. For instance, nowadays we realize that there is a considerable gap between general relativity and quantum mechanics and, yet, we do not hesitate to accept both. [[CiteRef::Barseghyan(2015)|p. 5]] +
According to this definition, scientific mosaic encompasses all accepted and employed epistemic elements. The definition is compatible with the ontology of epistemic elements that considers [[Question Is a Subtype of Epistemic Element (Rawleigh-2018)|questions]] and [[Theory Is a Subtype of Epistemic Element (Barseghyan-2015)|theories]] (including [[Method Is a Subtype of Normative Theory (Barseghyan-2018)|methods as a sub-type of normative theories]]) as the only two fundamental [[Subtypes of Epistemic Element|types of epistemic elements]]. In addition, by not referring to any epistemic element explicitly, the definition also purports to be compatible with any future ontology of epistemic elements insofar as that ontology assumes that elements can be accepted and employed. +
Rather than conceiving a scientific mosaic as a simple set-theoretic unity of epistemic elements, this definition is model-theoretic: it replaces the explicitly set-theoretic wording “set of all epistemic elements” with a semantic “model of all accepted elements”.[[CiteRef::Rawleigh (2022)|p. 91]] The definition considers a scientific mosaic to be a model for interpreting all natural language sentences, whether those be observational, theoretical, or simply ordinary conversational sentences. +
Scientific underdetermination is the thesis that the process of [[Scientific Change|scientific change]] is not deterministic, and science could have evolved differently than it did. Hypothetically, two [[Scientific Community|scientific communities]] developing separately could experience an entirely different sequence of successive states of their respective [[Scientific Mosaic|scientific mosaics.]] Even without the TSC, the implausibility of scientific determinism can be seen by considering the process of [[Theory|theory]] construction, which is outside the present scope of the TSC. Theory construction requires creative imagination, and the formulation of a given theory is therefore not inevitable. Still, underdetermination can also be inferred as a theorem from the axioms of the TSC.[[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)|pp. 196-198]] +
Sarwar and Fraser argued that in addition to other epistemic stances, there is also the stance of scientificity. Thus, epistemic agents can consider a theory scientific or unscientific regardless of whether they accept, use, or pursue it. As such, they argue, scientificity is a distinct epistemic stance.[[CiteRef::Sarwar and Fraser (2018)]] +
The key stages of the workflow are: +
'''Scientonomy''' is defined as an academic discipline that aims to describe and explain the process of [[Scientific Change|scientific change]]. While still very much in the process of inception, it is conceived to have two major branches - ''theoretical scientonomy'' and ''observational scientonomy''. Theoretical scientonomy attempts to shed light on the ontology and dynamics of the process of scientific change. Observational scientonomy attempts to trace and explain historical and contemporary instances of scientific change. +
Scientonomy currently recognizes several different [[Epistemic Stances Towards Theories|stances]] that an [[Epistemic Community|epistemic community]] might take towards a theory. The community might [[Theory Acceptance|accept]] the theory as the best currently available description of the world, it might regard a theory as worthy of [[Theory Pursuit|pursuit]] and further development, or it might regard the theory as adequate for [[Theory Use|use]] for some practical purpose, while not the best description of the world. [[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)|pp. 30-42]] These stances, and their opposites (i.e. that a theory is unaccepted, neglected, or unused)together constitute the range of stances that a community might take towards a theory. The concept of a [[Scientific Mosaic|scientific mosaic]] consisting of the set of all theories accepted, and all methods employed by the community [[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)|pp.1-11]] is central to scientonomy, as is the goal of explaining all changes… +
It is a task of scientonomy to trace and explain all changes in a mosaic, regardless of which field (discipline) the change concerns. This applies to all fields of inquiry considered scientific by the respective community. For instance, if theology or astrology were parts of the mosaic under study, then a transition from one accepted theological or astrological theory to another during that time period should be explained by scientonomy. +
Any change in a mosaic is within the scope of scientonomy. Scientonomy should explain not only ''major'' transitions in the mosaic such as those from the Aristotelian-Medieval set of theories to those of Descartes and his followers, but also relatively ''minor'' transitions, such as a transition from "the Solar system has 7 planets" to "the Solar system has 8 planets". +
Scientonomy ought not to limit its applicability to a restricted time period. If a scientific mosaic can be identified at a certain period in time, then it is a task of scientonomy to explain any and all changes in that mosaic at that time period. Similarly, an observational scientonomists ought not exclude any time period from their domain. +
The goal of [[scientonomy]] is to give a descriptive account of the process of [[Scientific Change|scientific change]]. Given this goal, it is obvious that it must describe and explain how changes in the [[Scientific Mosaic|mosaic]] of accepted scientific [[Theory|theories]] and employed [[Method|methods]] take place. Any actual instance of scientific change is the result of an appraisal. Therefore, a theory of scientific change ''must'' provide an account of how theories are actually appraised and thereby explain how changes in the mosaic occur. On the other hand, it ''can'' but is ''not required'' to account for the process of theory construction.[[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)|p. 29]] +
There are at least three sorts of questions that we might ask about the process of [[Scientific Change|scientific change]]; Historical questions having to do with what theories and methods were accepted by a particular community at a particular point in time, theoretical questions about the mechanisms of scientific change, and methodological questions about how scientific change ought to happen and what theories and methods ought to be accepted. The first two questions are descriptive in nature, and the third is normative. [[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)|pp. 12-13]] +
The [[Method|methods]] employed in [[Theory Assessment Outcomes|theory assessment]] do not always correspond to the professed scientific [[Methodology|methodology]], and may be purely implicit. Thus, a scientonomic theory ought to distinguish between accepted methodologies and employed methods. Because of their role in theory assessment, and thus in determining the contents of the [[Scientific Mosaic|scientific mosaic]], a scientonomic theory ought to include employed methods, whether they are explicit or implicit. [[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015) |pp. 52-61]] +
Scientonomy focuses on the [[Scientific Mosaic|scientific mosaic]] of accepted [[Theory|theories]] and employed [[Method|methods]]. In their daily work, individual scientists rely on and formulate theories about the object of their research, and use methods to appraise their theories. Both the theories they believe and the criteria they use to assess them may change over time. Although historians of science have often focused on individual scientists, often those deemed great, like Galileo or Einstein, and the changes in their beliefs as they constructed and assessed theories, [[Scientific Change|changes to the scientific mosaic itself]] happen at the level of the community. Scientonomy thus seeks to focus efforts on the social level of the scientific community rather than on the individual. +
Singular authority delegation is a sub-type of authority delegation. It describes a situation in which a community delegates authority over some topic to a single community. +
The definition tweaks the [[Singular Authority Delegation (Loiselle-2017)|original definition]] of the term by [[Mirka Loiselle|Loiselle]] to ensure that the relationship of singular authority delegation can obtain between [[Epistemic Agent|epistemic agents]] of all types. It also substitutes [[Question|''question'']] for ''topic'', as the former is the proper scientonomic term that should be used. +
Sociocultural factors can impact the process of a theory's acceptance when the employed method of the community allows for such factors to affect the process. This is derived by the Second Law alone. For example, a community which ascribes infallible power to a leader or a group of leaders is in a position to accept a theory in virtue of the leaders. Furthermore, such factors can guide a scientific community to reject a theory based on the acceptance of another social theory with which it is at odds. +
Split due to inconclusiveness can occur when two mutually incompatible theories are accepted simultaneously by the same community. +
A [[Procedural Method|procedural method]] is a method which doesn't presuppose any contingent propositions; it can only presuppose necessary truths such as those of mathematics or logic. Given the nature of necessary truths, it is impossible for one such truth to contradict another necessary truth since it must be true in all possible worlds. Therefore, it follows from the '''Method Rejection''' theorem that, since there can be no elements at odds with a necessary truth, any procedural method is, in principle, static. +
A more specialized [[Discipline| discipline]] ''A'' is a subdiscipline of another, more general discipline ''B'', if and only if the set of [[Question| questions]] ''Q<sub>A</sub>'' of ''A'' is a proper subset of the questions ''Q<sub>B</sub>''of ''B'' [[CiteRef::Patton and Al-Zayadi (2021)]]. For example, cellular neurobiology, the discipline which deals with the cellular properties of nerve cells, is a subdiscipline of neuroscience, which deals with the properties and functions of nervous systems. +
A [[Question| question]] is a topic of inquiry. [[CiteRef::Rawleigh (2018)]] Questions can constitute hierarchies where more specific questions are subquestions of broader questions. For example, 'Was Peter the Great an emperor of Russia?' is a subquestion of 'Who were the emperors of Russia?' since by answering the former, we are also providing a partial answer to the latter. The latter is, in turn, a subquestion of the broader question 'Who were the rulers of European countries?'. [[CiteRef::Patton and Al-Zayadi (2021)]] A partial answer to a question is a complete, or direct, answer to one of its subquestions.[[CiteRef::Beck and Sharvit (2002)]][[CiteRef::Sharvit and Beck (2001)]][[CiteRef::Eckardt (2007)]] +
A '''Sufficient Reason''' is an agent's ''actual'' reason for accepting a theory. It is sufficient as it guarantees, by the [[Sufficient Reason theorem (Palider-2019)]], that an agent accept the theory for which there is a sufficient reason. A sufficient reason aims to separate the components by which an agent accepts a theory: into acceptance of the theory that serves as a reason, the acceptance of [[Implication (Palider-2019)]], the employment of a method, and the acceptance of [[Normative Inference (Palider-2019)]]. A sufficient reason is to be contrasted with a [[Reason (Palider-2019)]] as it further involves the acceptance of the reason. Some questions surrounding acceptance without a sufficient reason remain to be explored ([[Theory Acceptance without Sufficient Reason]]). +
The '''Sufficient Reason theorem''' shows how a sufficient reason leads to acceptance. This theorem follows from the definition of a [[Sufficient Reason (Palider-2019)]] and from [[The Second Law (Patton-Overgaard-Barseghyan-2017)]]. By the second law, if a theory satisfies the acceptance criteria of the method employed at the time, it becomes accepted. The claim of this theorem is that if there is a sufficient reason for a theory, then that theory satisfies the acceptance criteria of the time. This claim is justified as follows. +
When one theory is said to follow from another, then that theory is supported by the other theory. This notion of support relies on that of [[Implication (Palider-2019)]], where support requires that one theory ''implies'' the other. Support, just like implication, is not equated to logical deduction, but just means that there is some rule-governed (or logical) connection between the supported theory and its support for the agent. As such, generally, if an agent considers one theory as evidence for another theory, then that evidence is said to support the theory, regardless of how (in)conclusive the evidence is. +
The principle of this theorem is first introduced in [[Barseghyan (2015)]]. We recall that "there are two somewhat distinct scenarios of method employment. In the first scenario, a method becomes employed when it strictly follows from newly accepted theories. In the second scenario, a method becomes employed when it implements the abstract requirements of some other employed method by means of other accepted theories. It can be shown that method rejection is only possible in the first scenario; no method can be rejected in the second scenario. Namely, it can be shown that method rejection can only take place when some other method becomes employed by strictly following from a new accepted theory; the employment of a method that is not a result of the acceptance of a new theory and is merely a new implementation of some already employed method cannot possibly lead to a method rejection."[[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)|p. 174]] +
T
There is accepted propositional technological knowledge which appears to exhibit the same patterns of change as questions, theories, and methods in the natural, social, and formal sciences. Technological theories attempting to describe the construction and operation of artifacts as well as to prescribe their correct mode of operation are not merely used, but also often accepted by epistemic agents. Since technology often involves methods different from those found in science and produces normative propositions, many of which remain tacit, one may be tempted to think that changes in technological knowledge should be somehow exempt from the laws of scientific change. Yet, the discussion of the historical cases of sorting algorithms, telescopes, crop rotation, and colorectal cancer surgeries show that technological theories and methods are often an integral part of an epistemic agent’s mosaic and seem to exhibit the same scientonomic patterns of change typical of accepted theories ther… +
The following passage from [[Barseghyan (2015)|''The Laws of Scientific Change'']] summarizes the gist of the law: +
Pandey provides the following summary of the argument: +
Formulated for [[method]]s, the first law states that the implicit expectations employed in theory assessment will continue to be employed until they are replaced by some alternate expectations. +
Pandey makes a case that the first law and all of its corollaries are tautological.[[CiteRef::Pandey (2023)]] +
Pandey makes a case that the first law and all of its corollaries are tautological.[[CiteRef::Pandey (2023)]] +
Pandey makes a case that the first law and all of its corollaries are tautological.[[CiteRef::Pandey (2023)]] +
According to this formulation of the first law for theories, an accepted [[theory]] remains accepted unless replaced by other theories, even though sometimes that replacement may simply be the negation of the theory. That is, "if for some reason scientists of a particular field stop pursuing new theories, the last accepted theory will safely continue to maintain its position in the mosaic," with no further confirmation of the theory required.[[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)|p. 122]] There is no specification of what sort of theory might replace an accepted theory. Barseghyan notes that, in the most minimal case, a theory may simply be replaced by its own negation.[[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)|p. 122]] +
Pandey makes a case that the first law and all of its corollaries are tautological.[[CiteRef::Pandey (2023)]] +
Pandey makes a case that the first law and all of its corollaries are tautological.[[CiteRef::Pandey (2023)]] +
The law of compatibility links the compatibility criteria with various assessment outcomes. If [[Compatibility|compatibility]] is defined as the ability of a pair of elements to co-exist in the same mosaic, then the assessment for compatibility is essentially the process by which the epistemic agent decides whether any given pair of elements (i.e. theories, questions, methods) can be simultaneously part of their mosaic. Such an assessment can yield three possible outcomes - ''satisfied'', ''not satisfied'', and ''inconclusive''.[[CiteRef::Fraser and Sarwar (2018)|p. 73]] Accordingly, the law of compatibility states that if a pair of elements does satisfy the compatibility criteria of the time, then it is deemed as compatible. If, however, an element is taken to be incompatible with the other one, then the pair is deemed as incompatible. Finally, the assessment of compatibility may be inconclusive. In this case, the pair may be deemed compatible, incompatible, or its status may remai… +
According to Fraser and Sarwar, their formulation of the law of compatibility "is non-tautological, as it prohibits certain logical possibilities."[[CiteRef::Fraser and Sarwar (2018)|p. 73]] +
This law of method employment is a corollary of [[The Law of Norm Employment (Rawleigh-2022)|Rawleigh's law of norm employment]]. It implies that, just like the norms of all other types, methods become employed when they are derivable from other elements of the agent's mosaic (such as other theories, other methods, and perhaps even questions). As such, the law preserves most of the content of [[The Third Law (Sebastien-2016)|Sebastien's third law]] by solving some of the issues inherent in it. +
[[The Third Law (Sebastien-2016)|Sebastien's law of method employment]] faces several problems. Foremost among these is that it is based on an outdated ontology that assumes that methods of theory evaluation are a fundamental epistemic element. After the acceptance of [[Modification:Sciento-2018-0006|Barseghyan’s proposal]] that methods be subsumed under the category of normative theories, the third law no longer exhaustively covers all situations cases of employment. In its present form it is limited to methods, though there is no reason to think that the mechanism by which a method is employed is any different than the mechanism by which any other norm is employed. +
TODO: Nikki add a description +
The ''law of theory demarcation'' tries to provide a mechanism of how the scientific status of theories changes overtime. The assessment outcomes of the law (satisfied, unsatisfied, and inconclusive) are ''logically'' separated from their consequences. In particular, the assessment outcome of conclusively satisfying the demarcation criteria leads to a theory being scientific, the assessment outcome of consclusively not satisfying the criteria lead to the theory being unscientific, and the final inconclusive outcome can lead to the theory being scientific, unscientific, or uncertain.[[CiteRef::Sarwar and Fraser (2018)]] +
[[The Law of Theory Demarcation (Sarwar-Fraser-2018)|The law of theory demarcation]] tries to provide a mechanism of how the scientific status of theories changes overtime. The assessment outcomes of the law (satisfied, unsatisfied, and inconclusive) are ''logically'' separated from their consequences. In particular, the assessment outcome of conclusively satisfying the demarcation criteria leads to a theory being scientific, the assessment outcome of conclusively not satisfying the criteria lead to the theory being unscientific, and the final inconclusive outcome can lead to the theory being scientific, unscientific, or uncertain.[[CiteRef::Sarwar and Fraser (2018)]] +
According to Barseghyan's original formulation of the second law, "theories become accepted only when they satisfy the requirements of the methods actually employed at the time. In other words there is only one way for a theory to become accepted – it must meet the implicit expectations of the scientific community".[[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)|p. 129]] +
According to Barseghyan's initial position, "the second law is not a law in the traditional sense, for normally a law is supposed to have some empirical content, i.e. its opposite should be conceivable at least in principle. Obviously, the second law is a ''tautology'', since it follows from the definition of ''employed method''".[[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)|p. 129, footnote]] +
According to this formulation of the second law, if a theory satisfies the acceptance criteria of the method actually employed at the time, then it becomes accepted into the mosaic; if it does not, it remains unaccepted; if it is inconclusive whether the theory satisfies the method, the theory can be accepted or not accepted. +
The Second Law (Patton-Overgaard-Barseghyan-2017) is Not Tautological (Patton-Overgaard-Barseghyan-2017) +
[[The Second Law (Patton-Overgaard-Barseghyan-2017)|The reformulation of the second law]] by Patton, Overgaard, and Barseghyan makes it explicit that the law is ''not'' a tautology as it clearly forbids certain logically conceivable courses of events.[[CiteRef::Patton, Overgaard, and Barseghyan (2017)|pp. 33-34]] +
Barseghyan's formulation of the third law states that a [[Method|method]] becomes [[Employed Method|employed]] only when it is deducible from other employed methods and accepted [[Theory|theories]] of the time. "Essentially," Barseghyan writes, "the third law stipulates that our accepted theories shape our employed methods".[[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)|p. 132]] +
The [[The Third Law (Barseghyan-2015)|initial formulation]] of the law, proposed by Barseghyan in [[Barseghyan (2015)|''The Laws of Scientific Change'']], stated that a [[Method|method]] becomes [[Employed Method|employed]] only when it is deducible from other employed methods and accepted theories of the time.[[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)|p.132]] In that formulation, it wasn't clear whether employed methods follow from ''all'' or only ''some'' of the accepted theories and employed methods of the time. This led to a logical paradox which this reformulation attempts to solve.[[CiteRef::Sebastien (2016)]] +
Harder's reformulation of the Zeroth Law states that “at any moment of time, the elements of the mosaic are compatible with each other”. ''Compatibility'' is a broader concept than strict logical ''consistency'', and is determined by the compatibility criteria of each mosaic. +
According to Fraser and Sarwar, [[The Zeroth Law (Harder-2015)|Harder's formulation of the zeroth law]] "does not have any empirical content, because it follows directly from the notion of compatibility".[[CiteRef::Fraser and Sarwar (2018)|p. 69]] +
At any moment of the history of science, there are certain ''theories'' that the scientific community of the time accepts as the best available descriptions of their respective domains. According to the original definition of the term suggested in [[Barseghyan (2015)|''The Laws of Scientific Change'']], the class of ''theory'' includes only those propositions which attempt to describe a certain object under study. A theory may refer to any set of propositions that attempt to describe something. Theories may be empirical (e.g. theories in natural or social science) or formal (e.g. logic, mathematics). Theories may be of different levels of complexity and elaboration, for they may consist of hundreds of systematically linked propositions, or of a few loosely connected propositions. They may or may not be axiomatized, formalized, or mathematized. It encompasses all proposition which attempt to tell us how things were, are or will be, i.e. substantive propositions of empirical and forma… +
Unlike Barseghyan's [[Theory (Barseghyan-2015)|original definition]] of ''theory'', this definition is deliberately ''neutral'' with respect to the descriptive/prescriptive divide. Thus, it allows for the existence of theories of various types and is not limited to descriptive theories. +
TODO: Description here +
This definition of the term makes it possible to apply the notion of theory acceptance to any subtype of [[Theory|theory]]. Unlike the previous definitions of the term, it doesn't imply any specific subtypes of theory, but explicitly states the relation between theories and [[Question|questions]] they attempt to answer. +
This definition of ''theory acceptance'' makes it explicit that any accepted theory is a ''scientific'' theory. It assumes that the question of whether a theory is accepted is meaningless without the theory being scientific. The point here is that no scientist would ask whether they should accept a theory without believing, if only implicitly, that the theory is indeed scientific. Since only scientific theories have the potential to become accepted, and because only some of these do in fact become accepted, it follows that all of the accepted theories are scientific. +
This definition expands on [[Theory Acceptance (Barseghyan-2015)|the original definition of the term]] proposed by [[Hakob Barseghyan|Barseghyan]] to ensure that the term is applicable not only to ''descriptive'' theories but also to ''normative'' theories. It assumes that descriptive theories attempt to provide descriptions of their respective objects, while normative theories attempt to prescribe a certain object, the latter being understood as a certain state of affairs. +
According to this ''ontology'' of theory assessment outcomes, when a theory is assessed by a method, one of the three following outcomes can obtain:[[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)|p. 199]] +
According to this ''ontology'' of theory assessment outcomes, when a theory is assessed by a method, one of the three following outcomes can obtain:[[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)|p. 199]] +
According to Oh, there is some historical evidence for theory decay.[[CiteRef::Oh (2021)]] +
Theories are part of the process of scientific change. +
According to this theory, theories are a subtype of epistemic element. Among other things, this assumes that epsitemic stances can be taken by epistemic agents towards theories. +
A theory is said to be pursued if it is considered worthy of further development. [[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)|pp. 30-42]] An example is provided by mid-seventeenth century science. Throughout this period, the Aristotelian natural philosophy, with its geocentric cosmology, four elements, and four causes remained [[Theory Acceptance|accepted]] by the scientific community of Europe as evidenced, for example, by its central place in university curricula. The theories from this period that we are most familiar with from modern popular and professional literature, like Copernicus's heliocentric cosmology, and Galileo's theories of motion, were not accepted, but pursued theories. More generally these included the mechanical natural philosophy championed by a community which included [[Rene Descartes|Descartes]], Huygens, Boyle, and many others, and the magnetical natural philosophy, espoused by Gilbert, Kepler, Stevin, Wilkins and others. In our modern world, the major accepted physical t… +
According to '''the theory rejection theorem''', a [[Theory|theory]] becomes '''rejected''' only when other theories that are incompatible with the theory become accepted. +
Pandey makes a case that the first law and all of its corollaries are tautological.[[CiteRef::Pandey (2023)]] +
According to Pandey's new formulation of '''the theory rejection theorem''', a [[Theory|theory]] becomes '''rejected''' only when other [[Epistemic Element|epistemic elements]] that are incompatible with the theory become accepted. This formulation differs from Barseghyan's [[Theory Rejection theorem (Barseghyan-2015)|original formulation]] in that it allows a theory to be replaced by an epistemic element of ''any'' type, not just by other theories. In other respects, Pandey's formulation is similar to Barseghyan's. +
Pandey makes a case that the first law and all of its corollaries are tautological.[[CiteRef::Pandey (2023)]] +
TODO: Description here +
An [[Epistemic Agent|epistemic agent]] is said to rely on an [[Epistemic Tool|epistemic tool]] ''iff'' there is a procedure through which the tool can provide an acceptable source of knowledge for answering some [[Question|question]] under the employed [[Method|method]] of that agent. Note that tool reliance, like [[Authority Delegation|authority delegation]], is reducible to the theories and methods of an agent. +
U
The [[The Third Law|third law]] allows for two distinct scenarios of method employment. A [[Method|method]] may become employed because it follows strictly from accepted [[Theory|theories]] or employed methods, or it may the abstract requirements of some other employed method. This second scenario allows for creative ingenuity and depends on the technology of the times, therefore it may be fulfilled in many ways and allows underdeterminism [[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)|p. 198]]. +
The process of [[Theory Acceptance|theory assessment]] under the TSC is underdetermined for two reasons. First, only [[Theory|theories]] that are constructed are available for assessment. Whether or not a theory is ever constructed is, at least partly a matter of creativity, and is therefore outside the scope of the TSC. Second, it is at least theoretically possible that a process of theory assessment will be inconclusive. This might be because the requirements of the method employed at the time might be vague (e.g. Aristotelian requirements of "intuition schooled by experience").[[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)|p. 199-200]] +
