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Adamson (2015) + (An account of Al-Kindi's life and philosophy.)

Bird (2000) + (An analysis of the work and legacy of Thomas Kuhn.)
Coady (1994) + (An argument for the central importance of testimony in establishing, and transmitting, scientific knowledge.)
Franklin (1993) + (An article in the January 8, 1986 issue of … An article in the January 8, 1986 issue of The New York Times dramatically announced, "Hints of Fifth Force in Nature Challenge Galileo's Findings". Just four years later, many of those who had worked on the concept concluded that "the Fifth Force is dead". Reading like a detective story, The Rise and Fall of the Fifth Force discloses the curious history of the quick advance and swift demise of the "Fifth Force" - a proposed modification of Newton's Law of Universal Gravitation and one of the most publicized physics hypotheses in recent memory. While discussing the origin and fate of this short-lived concept, The Rise and Fall of the Fifth Force delivers a fascinating analysis of the ways in which scientific hypotheses in general are promulgated and pursued. What leads to the formulation of a hypothesis? How and why does a hypothesis become considered worthy of further investigation? These are some of the questions that The Rise and Fall of the Fifth Force pursues while unraveling the dynamics of this scientific search. Taking aim at the "social constructivist" view of science, which posits social and professional interests as the primary engine behind hypothesis-making, Allan Franklin proposes an "evidence model" of science. He emphasizes the crucial role that experimental evidence plays in the discovery, pursuit, and justification of scientific proposals and suggests a distinction between the reasons for scientific pursuit and the reasons used to justify hypotheses. Buttressing Franklin's model, The Rise and Fall of the Fifth Force provides a unique comparison of the published record and the private e-mail correspondence of the three major authors of the Fifth Force hypothesis during the first six months following the publication of their proposal. A fascinating inquiry into a scientific hypothesis and the forces that first advanced and then rejected it, The Rise and Fall of the Fifth Force is an outstanding account for physicists, historians and philosophers of science, and all readers interested in what makes science tick.ers interested in what makes science tick.)
Bacon (1920) + (An authoritative critical edition, based o … An authoritative critical edition, based on fresh collation of the seventeenth century texts and documented in an extensive textual apparatus, of Francis Bacon's The Advancement of Learning, the principal philosophical work in English announcing his comprehensive programme to restore and advance learning programme to restore and advance learning)
Williams (2002) + (An examination of the ethics of knowing.)
Porter (1995) + (An examination of the use of numbers to create trust in expert testimony.)
Wimsatt (2007) + (Analytic philosophers once pantomimed phys … Analytic philosophers once pantomimed physics: they tried to understand the world by breaking it down into the smallest possible bits. Thinkers from the Darwinian sciences now pose alternatives to this simplistic reductionism.In this intellectual tour--essays spanning thirty years--William Wimsatt argues that scientists seek to atomize phenomena only when necessary in the search to understand how entities, events, and processes articulate at different levels. Evolution forms the natural world not as Laplace's all-seeing demon but as a backwoods mechanic fixing and re-fashioning machines out of whatever is at hand. W. V. Quine's lost search for a "desert ontology" leads instead to Wimsatt's walk through a tropical rain forest.This book offers a philosophy for error-prone humans trying to understand messy systems in the real world. Against eliminative reductionism, Wimsatt pits new perspectives to deal with emerging natural and social complexities. He argues that our philosophy should be rooted in heuristics and models that work in practice, not only in principle. He demonstrates how to do this with an analysis of the strengths, the limits, and a recalibration of our reductionistic and analytic methodologies. Our aims are changed and our philosophy is transfigured in the process.philosophy is transfigured in the process.)
Chang (2022) + (Any database project needs to be based on … Any database project needs to be based on an ontology that is suitable for its subject matter. For the scientonomy project, it is important to conceive a good ontology of the human actions that constitute scientific practice, which allows rigorously conceived activity-based analyses of science. Mainstream philosophers of science have offered very precise analyses of scientific knowledge, but only in terms of beliefs and their assessments. Recent historians of science have been more attentive to the activities undertaken by scientists, but only offered imprecise analyses of them. Scientonomers have a chance to get the ontology right from this early stage of their enterprise. In this paper I make some programmatic proposals on the ontology of scientific work, in terms of epistemic activities and systems of practice. I also offer a framework for conceptualizing epistemic agents, and some clues on the ontology of the processes of inquiry. Scientonomy as the general “science of science” should not have an overly limited ontology. In particular, I suggest that the “scientific mosaic” should include a diverse array of elements and consider other aspects of methodology in addition to theory-assessment.hodology in addition to theory-assessment.)
Popper (1959) + (Arguing the shortcomings of inductive reasoning and verification, Popper instead argues for a hypothetico-deductive methodology for science based on falsifiability.)
Shields (2016b) + (Aristotle (384–322 BC) was born in Macedon … Aristotle (384–322 BC) was born in Macedon, in what is now northern Greece, but spent most of his adult life in Athens. His life in Athens divides into two periods, first as a member of Plato’s Academy (367–347) and later as director of his own school, the Lyceum (334–323). The intervening years were spent mainly in Assos and Lesbos, and briefly back in Macedon. His years away from Athens were predominantly taken up with biological research and writing. Judged on the basis of their content, Aristotle’s most important psychological writings probably belong to his second residence in Athens, and so to his most mature period. His principal work in psychology, De Anima, reflects in different ways his pervasive interest in biological taxonomy and his most sophisticated physical and metaphysical theory.sticated physical and metaphysical theory.)
Miller (2013) + (Aristotle is “the master of them that know … Aristotle is “the master of them that know” in Dante’s ''Divine Comedy'' (I.4.31). His ''Metaphysics'' begins with the stirring declaration that “All men by nature desire to know” (A.1 980a21). As Werner Jaeger ( 1962, p. 68) observes, “Knowledge has never been understood more purely, more earnestly, or more sublimely.” Aristotle agrees with Plato that knowledge is superior to belief: “He who has beliefs is, in comparison with the man who knows, not in a healthy state as far as the truth is concerned” (Met Γ.4 1008b27-31; cf. Plato Rep. VI 508d4-9). Aristotle’s remarks concerning belief are scattered throughout his works, none of which contains a systematic discussion of this topic. Not surprisingly, commentators have tended to give his account of belief short shrift.o give his account of belief short shrift.)
McMullin (2001) + (As the seventeenth century progressed, the … As the seventeenth century progressed, there was a growing realization among those who reflected on the kind of knowledge the new sciences could afford (among them Kepler, Bacon, Descartes, Boyle, Huygens) that hypothesis would have to be conceded a much more significant place in natural philosophy than the earlier ideal of demon- stration allowed. Then came the mechanics of Newton's Principia, which seemed to manage quite well without appealing to hypothesis (though much would depend on how exactly terms like "force" and "attraction" were construed). If the science of motion could dispense with causal hypothesis and the attendant uncertainty, why should this not serve as the goal of natural philosophy generally? The apparent absence of causal hypothesis from the highly successful new science of motion went far towards shaping, in different ways, the account of scientific knowledge given by many of the philosophers of the century following, notable among them Berkeley, Hume, Reid, and Kant. This "Newtonian" interlude in the history of the philosophy of science would today be accounted on the whole a byway. The Principia, despite its enormous achievement in shaping subsequent work in mechanics, was from the beginning too idiosyncratic from an epistemic standpoint to serve as model for the natural sciences generally. model for the natural sciences generally.)
Faye (2014) + (As the theory of the atom, quantum mechani … As the theory of the atom, quantum mechanics is perhaps the most successful theory in the history of science. It enables physicists, chemists, and technicians to calculate and predict the outcome of a vast number of experiments and to create new and advanced technology based on the insight into the behavior of atomic objects. But it is also a theory that challenges our imagination. It seems to violate some fundamental principles of classical physics, principles that eventually have become a part of western common sense since the rise of the modern worldview in the Renaissance. The aim of any metaphysical interpretation of quantum mechanics is to account for these violations.The Copenhagen interpretation was the first general attempt to understand the world of atoms as this is represented by quantum mechanics. The founding father was mainly the Danish physicist Niels Bohr, but also Werner Heisenberg, Max Born and other physicists made important contributions to the overall understanding of the atomic world that is associated with the name of the capital of Denmark.In fact Bohr and Heisenberg never totally agreed on how to understand the mathematical formalism of quantum mechanics, and neither of them ever used the term “the Copenhagen interpretation” as a joint name for their ideas. In fact, Bohr once distanced himself from what he considered to be Heisenberg's more subjective interpretation (APHK, p.51). The term is rather a label introduced by people opposing Bohr's idea of complementarity, to identify what they saw as the common features behind the Bohr-Heisenberg interpretation as it emerged in the late 1920s. Today the Copenhagen interpretation is mostly regarded as synonymous with indeterminism, Bohr's correspondence principle, Born's statistical interpretation of the wave function, and Bohr's complementarity interpretation of certain atomic phenomena.nterpretation of certain atomic phenomena.)
Bacon (2000d) + (Bacon’s essays reflect the experience and … Bacon’s essays reflect the experience and wide reading of a Renaissance man – philosopher, historian, judge, politician, adviser to the Prince – above all, astute observer of human nature. With uncompromising candour, he exposes man as he is, not as he ought to be, examining such givens of Renaissance power as negotiating for position, expediting a personal suit, speaking effectively, and the role of dissimulation in social and political situations. He scrutinizes judicial prerogatives and probes the causes and dangers of atheism and superstition. Even such topics as boldness or love or deformity have a practical bent. In Bacon’s own phrase, these essays ‘come home to Mens Businesse and Bosomes.’ It is especially through their matchless style that they come home–with imaginative vigour, concrete language, and the colloquial force of individual sentences. An introduction places the essays in their original context, examines their evolution over Bacon’s lifetime, and elucidates their form and prose style; a commentary examines his sources and relates essays to his other writings; a glossary and index are also included.s; a glossary and index are also included.)
Latour (2009) + (Belief is not a state of mind, but a resul … Belief is not a state of mind, but a result of the relationships between peoples; this has been known since Montaigne. The visitor knows, the visited believes; or quite the opposite, the visitor knew, the visited makes him understand that he only thought he knew. Let us apply this principle to the case of the Moderns. Everywhere they drop anchor they soon put up fetishes, that is to say that in all the peoples they encounter, they see worshippers of objects that are nothing. Since of course the Moderns have to explain away the strangeness of a worship that cannot be justified objectively, they endow the savages with a mental state that has internal instead of external references. As the wave of colonization advances, so does the world fill with believers. He who is modern believes what others believe. On the contrary, the agnostic does not ask himself whether to believe or not, but why the Moderns need belief so much before they can have a relationship with others. they can have a relationship with others.)
Clark (2017) + (Biological brains are increasingly cast as … Biological brains are increasingly cast as ‘prediction machines’: evolved organswhose core operating principle is to learn about the world by trying to predict theirown patterns of sensory stimulation. This, some argue, should lead us to embracea brain-bound ‘neurocentric’ vision of the mind. The mind, such views suggest,consists entirely in the skull-bound activity of the predictive brain. In this paper Ireject the inference from predictive brains to skull-bound minds. Predictive brains,I hope to show, can be apt participants in larger cognitive circuits. The path isthus cleared for a new synthesis in which predictive brains act as entry-points for‘extended minds’, and embodiment and action contribute constitutively to knowingcontact with the world.utively to knowing contact with the world.)
Arabatzis (2006) + (Both a history and a metahistory, Represen … Both a history and a metahistory, Representing Electrons focuses on the development of various theoretical representations of electrons from the late 1890s to 1925 and the methodological problems associated with writing about unobservable scientific entities.Using the electron - or rather its representation - as a historical actor, Theodore Arabatzis illustrates the emergence and gradual consolidation of its representation in physics, its career throughout old quantum theory, and its appropriation and reinterpretation by chemists. As Arabatzis develops this novel biographical approach, he portrays scientific representations as partly autonomous agents with lives of their own. Furthermore, he argues that the considerable variance in the representation of the electron does not undermine its stable identity or existence.Raising philosophical issues of contentious debate in the history and philosophy of science - namely, scientific realism and meaning change - Arabatzis addresses the history of the electron across disciplines, integrating historical narrative with philosophical analysis in a book that will be a touchstone for historians and philosophers of science and scientists alike.losophers of science and scientists alike.)
Bloor (1999) + (Bruno Latour is a vehement critic of the s … Bruno Latour is a vehement critic of the sociology of knowledge in general, and the Strong Program in particular. For those who are familiar with his books Science in Action (Latour, 1987), The Pasteurization of France (Latour, 1988) and We Have Never Been Modern (Latour, 1993) the pivotal role played by these criticisms in Latour's writing will be evident. To those who only know his work by repute, or who have only read the first edition of Latour and Woolgar's Laboratory Life (Latour and Woolgar, 1979), presenting him as a critic of the sociology of knowledge may seem surprising. Latour's work and the Strong Program in the sociology of knowledge are frequently classed together under the label of ‘social constructivism', and this creates the impression that the two enterprises must be fundamentally similar. This is reinforced by the fact that Latour wants to go further than sociologists of knowledge, whose work is said to represent something of a half-way house. He thinks sociologists are insufficiently radical in their critique of science (Latour, 1992, p. 273). Nevertheless, in reality, the two approaches are deeply opposed. In Latour's eyes the sociology of knowledge has been a failure, and it will continue to fail unless it adopts an entirely new approach which will qualitatively change its characterch will qualitatively change its character)
Owen (2009) + (By the time Hume started to work on his Tr … By the time Hume started to work on his Treatise, the notion of an idea as the primary, most general sort of mental item dominated European philosophy. Although Descartes noted that, strictly speaking, only those “thoughts that are as it were images of things” were appropriately described as ideas, in practice he used “the word ‘idea’ to refer to whatever is immediately perceived by the mind.” Not only do we have ideas of trees and the sun, but we also have ideas of our own activities of thinking and willing. Locke characterizes “idea” as “being that Term, which, I think, serves best to stand for whatsoever is the Object of the Understanding when a Man thinks.” Locke also thinks that we not only have ideas that derive from things or objects in the world (ideas of sensation), but also of the activities and operations of our own minds (ideas of reflection). Ideas of sensation are acquired through the operation of external objects on our sense organs, while ideas of reflection come from introspection, from thinking about what happens within our own minds. He also thinks that these ideas of reflection are of two basic sorts of mental activity, perception and willing, that correspond to two faculties of mind: the understanding (or the power of thinking) and the will (or the power of volition).) and the will (or the power of volition).)
List and Pettit (2006) + (Can groups be rationa’l agents over and ab … Can groups be rationa’l agents over and above their individualmembers? We argue that group agents are distinguished by theircapacity to mimic the way in which individual agents act and that thiscapacity must “supervene” on the group members’ contributions. Butwhat is the nature of this supervenience relation? Focusing on groupjudgments, we argue that, for a group to be rational, its judgment on aparticular proposition cannot generally be a function of the members’individual judgments on that proposition. Rather, it must be a functionof their individual sets of judgments across many propositions. Soknowing what the group members individually think about someproposition does not generally tell us how the group collectivelyadjudicates that proposition: the supervenience relation must be “setwise,”not “proposition-wise.” Our account preserves the individualisticview that group agency is nothing mysterious but also suggests that agroup agent may hold judgments that are not directly continuous withits members’ corresponding individual judgments.mbers’ corresponding individual judgments.)
Barseghyan (2022b) + (Canonical discussions in the philosophy of … Canonical discussions in the philosophy of science distinguish between acceptance and pursuit as epistemic stances that are customarily taken towards theories by epistemic agents (Laudan 1977; Wykstra 1980; Whitt 1990; Achinstein 1993; Barseghyan & Shaw 2017). Since a theory can be conceived as an attempt to answer a question (Jardine 2000; Rescher 2000; Rawleigh 2018) it is reasonable to inquire into the types of stances that epistemic agents can take towards questions. This paper explores the notion of ''question pursuit'' by differentiating it from related epistemic stances of ''theory pursuit'' and ''question acceptance''. The analysis of the extant academic literature reveals that in most cases the phrase ‘question pursuit’ and its cognates refer to a search for an answer to a question. The paper provides a definition of the term that reflects this common usage and draws five conclusions. First, question pursuit is different from question acceptance, for it is possible for an epistemic agent to accept a question without finding it pursuitworthy. Second, question pursuit and question acceptance are related semi-orthogonally: in order to be considered pursuitworthy a question must, at minimum, be accepted, but not all accepted questions are pursuitworthy. Third, question pursuit is irreducible to theory pursuit; finding a question pursuitworthy is not expressible in terms of finding some theory pursuitworthy. Fourth, a pursuit of a theory cannot be expressed as a pursuit of a same-order question, but only as a pursuit of a question about that theory, i.e. a higher-level question. Fifth, to have a chance to be considered pursuitworthy by an agent, a question must meet some minimal necessary preconditions: it should be accepted by that agent and the agent should either lack an accepted answer to the question or have reasons to suspect that the accepted answer might be improved upon.at the accepted answer might be improved upon.)
Sagan (1979) + (Carl Sagan, writer and scientist, returns … Carl Sagan, writer and scientist, returns from the frontier to tell us about how the world works. In his delightfully down-to-earth style, he explores and explains a mind-boggling future of intelligent robots, extraterrestrial life and its consquences, and other provocative, fascinating quandries of the future that we want to see today.s of the future that we want to see today.)
Bloor (1984) + (Comprehensive perspective on scientific change from a sociological perspective.)
Popper (1963) + (Conjectures and Refutations is one of Karl … Conjectures and Refutations is one of Karl Popper's most wide-ranging and popular works, notable not only for its acute insight into the way scientific knowledge grows, but also for applying those insights to politics and to history. It provides one of the clearest and most accessible statements of the fundamental idea that guided his work: not only our knowledge, but our aims and our standards, grow through an unending process of trial and error.gh an unending process of trial and error.)
Ritson (2016) + (Controversies over string theory (collecti … Controversies over string theory (collectively termed the ‘string wars’) intensified in 2005. Also in that year, the open-access preprint publisher arXiv instituted a new feature called a ‘trackback’. This new feature enabled authors of blog posts discussing a paper on arXiv to leave a trackback (a link) to the post on the paper’s abstract page on arXiv. The determination of which specific bloggers would have access to the feature generated a public controversy that was played out in the blogosphere. Although the community was in almost unanimous agreement that so-called ‘crackpots’ should not have access to the trackback feature, it was unable to reach a consensus as to how to define a ‘crackpot’ or an ‘active researcher’. Blogs may provide a window into science in the making, yet this study shows that blogs confound categorization as permanent or ephemeral scholarly communication. The trackback feature was originally conceived to develop certain blog discourse as an alternative or complementary form of peer review. However, the high-energy physics community as a whole questions the ongoing function of the blog.uestions the ongoing function of the blog.)
Longino (1990) + (Conventional wisdom has it that the scienc … Conventional wisdom has it that the sciences, properly pursued, constitute a pure, value-free method of obtaining knowledge about the natural world. In light of the social and normative dimensions of many scientific debates, Helen Longino finds that general accounts of scientific methodology cannot support this common belief. Focusing on the notion of evidence, the author argues that a methodology powerful enough to account for theories of any scope and depth is incapable of ruling out the influence of social and cultural values in the very structuring of knowledge. The objectivity of scientific inquiry can nevertheless be maintained, she proposes, by understanding scientific inquiry as a social rather than an individual process. Seeking to open a dialogue between methodologists and social critics of the sciences, Longino develops this concept of "contextual empiricism" in an analysis of research programs that have drawn criticism from feminists. Examining theories of human evolution and of prenatal hormonal determination of "gender-role" behavior, of sex differences in cognition, and of sexual orientation, the author shows how assumptions laden with social values affect the description, presentation, and interpretation of data. In particular, Longino argues that research on the hormonal basis of "sex-differentiated behavior" involves assumptions not only about gender relations but also about human action and agency. She concludes with a discussion of the relation between science, values, and ideology, based on the work of Habermas, Foucault, Keller, and Haraway.f Habermas, Foucault, Keller, and Haraway.)
Baigrie (Ed.) (2003) + (Covering physics, astronomy, chemistry, th … Covering physics, astronomy, chemistry, the various branches of biology, and geology, this book is the perfect introduction to the history of science. A compilation of interesting readings, Scientific Revolutions reflects the richness and diversity of scientific culture and practice. Its primary focus is on the extraordinary bursts of scientific activity that propel science in new and different directions. Useful as a reference work for readers interested in the sciences.rk for readers interested in the sciences.)
Berryman (2016c) + (Democritus, known in antiquity as the ‘lau … Democritus, known in antiquity as the ‘laughing philosopher’ because ofhis emphasis on the value of ‘cheerfulness,’ was one of the two foundersof ancient atomist theory. He elaborated a system originated by his teacher Leucippus into a materialist account of the natural world. The atomists held that there are smallest indivisible bodies from which everything else is composed, and that these move about in an infinite void. Of the ancient materialist accounts of the natural world which did not rely on some kind of teleology or purpose to account for the apparent order and regularity found in the world, atomism was the most influential. Even its chief critic, Aristotle, praised Democritus for arguing from sound considerations appropriate to natural philosophy.rations appropriate to natural philosophy.)
Peirce (1958) + (Descartes is the father of modern philosop … Descartes is the father of modern philosophy, and the spirit of Cartesianism that which principally distinguishes it from the scholasticism, which it displaced may be compendiously stated as follows: 1. It teaches that philosophy must begin with universal doubt; whereas scholasticism had never questioned fundamentals. 2. It teaches that the ultimate test of certainty is to be found in the individual consciousness; whereas scholasticism had rest ed on the testimony of sages and of the Catholic Church. 3. The multiform argumentation of the middle ages is replaced by a single thread of inference depending often upon inconspicuous premises. 4. Scholasticism had its mysteries of faith, but undertook to explain all created things. But there are many facts which Cartesianism not only does not explain, but renders absolutely inexplicable, unless to say that 'God makes them so' is to be regarded as an explanation. In some, or all of these respects, most modern philosophers have been, in effect, Cartesians. Now without wishing to return to scholasticism, it seems to me that modern science and modern logic require us to stand upon a very different platform from this. upon a very different platform from this.)
Hatfield (1992) + (Descartes understood the subject matter of … Descartes understood the subject matter of physics to encompass the whole of nature, including living things. It therefore comprised not only nonvital phenomena, including those we would now denominate as physical, chemical, minerological, magnetic, and atmospheric; it also extended to the world of plants and animals, including the human animal (with the exception of those aspects of human psychology that Descartes assigned solely to thinking substance). In the 1630s and 1640s Descartes formulated extensive accounts of the principal manifestations of animal life, including reproduction, growth, nutrition, the circulation of the blood, and especially sense-induced motion. In connection with the latter he discussed at length the bodily conditions for psychological phenomena, including sense perception, imagination, memory, and the passions. He also examined the mental aspects of these phenomena, sometimes by way of complementing his physiological discussions and sometimes as part of his investigation into the grounds of human knowledge.ation into the grounds of human knowledge.)
Popper (2002a) + (Described by the philosopher A.J. Ayer as … Described by the philosopher A.J. Ayer as a work of 'great originality and power', this book revolutionized contemporary thinking on science and knowledge. Ideas such as the now legendary doctrine of 'falsificationism' electrified the scientific community, influencing even working scientists, as well as post-war philosophy. This astonishing work ranks alongside ''The Open Society and Its Enemies'' as one of Popper's most enduring books and contains insights and arguments that demand to be read to this day.uments that demand to be read to this day.)
Barseghyan (2022a) + (Despite a growing body of literature that … Despite a growing body of literature that attempts to draw a line between legitimate and illegitimate forms of presentism in academic history, ‘avoid presentism’ is still often preached as the first rule of historiography. Distinct from other forms of presentism is ''selective presentism'' – the practice of taking some present-day activity, event, idea, or problem as a starting point in our selection of historical facts. Throughout the paper I examine the relation of some of the most popular selection criteria – ''selection by actor intentionality'', ''selection by later effect'', and ''selection by problem'' – to presentist practices and draw three conclusions. First, each of these selection criteria can produce presentist or non-presentist histories depending on the past of which specific activity, idea, or problem the historian is interested in. Second, the historiographic legitimacy of these selection criteria is independent from their presentist or non-presentist applications; importantly, selective presentism is not among the ‘bad’ forms of presentism and is not to be avoided. Finally, various selection criteria are best understood as complementary; pluralist history invites a variety of selection criteria that help shed light on different aspects of the past, and thus – collectively – enrich our understanding of it.ectively – enrich our understanding of it.)
Hume (2007) + (Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion is a … Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion is a philosophical work by the Scottish philosopher David Hume. Through dialogue, three philosophers named Demea, Philo, and Cleanthes debate the nature of God's existence. Whether or not these names reference specific philosophers, ancient or otherwise, remains a topic of scholarly dispute. While all three agree that a god exists, they differ sharply in opinion on God's nature or attributes and how, or if, humankind can come to knowledge of a deity. In the Dialogues, Hume's characters debate a number of arguments for the existence of God, and arguments whose proponents believe through which we may come to know the nature of God. Such topics debated include the argument from design—for which Hume uses a house—and whether there is more suffering or good in the world (argument from evil). Hume started writing the Dialogues in 1750 but did not complete them until 1776, shortly before his death. They are based partly on Cicero's De Natura Deorum. The Dialogues were published posthumously in 1779, originally with neither the author's nor the publisher's name.[1] the author's nor the publisher's name.[1])
Kitcher (1993) + (During the last three decades, reflections … During the last three decades, reflections on the growth of scientific knowledge have inspired historians, sociologists, and some philosophers to contend that scientific objectivity is a myth. In this book, Kitcher attempts to resurrect the notions of objectivity and progress in science by identifying both the limitations of idealized treatments of growth of knowledge and the overreactions to philosophical idealizations. Recognizing that science is done not by logically omniscient subjects working in isolation, but by people with a variety of personal and social interests, whocooperate and compete with one another, he argues that, nonetheless, we may conceive the growth of science as a process in which both our vision of nature and our ways of learning more about nature improve. Offering a detailed picture of the advancement of science, he sets a new agenda for the philosophy of science and for other "science studies" disciplines.d for other "science studies" disciplines.)
Wykstra (1980) + (During the past two decades, much philosop … During the past two decades, much philosophy of science has been focused on issues about the norms and methods by which scientific theories are rationally appraised; and increasingly, philosophers have turned to history of science as a touchstone for assessing normative methodologies purporting to elucidate scientific rationality. But even among such historical methodologists, there is much disagreement and unclarity about how historical study of science can arbitrate between rival methodological theories; and until progress is made at this meta-methodological level, the very legitimacy of this role for history will remain controversial. (Keynotes in the controversy aresounded in Kuhn (1970b, pp. 235-41); Lakatos (1971); Giere (1973); McMullin (1976); Burian (1977); and Laudan (1977, pp. 158-63).) This paper begins by arguing that the meta-method implicit in much historical methodology is different from the explicit meta-methodology most often touted. This implicit meta-method - involving the rationability principle - appears to lead almost inevitably to the methodological anarchism of Feyerabend, and (in mitigated forms) of Lakatos and Kuhn. Hence the main aim of this paper: to redeem the rationability principle by arguing that this specter of anarchism can be exorcized from it, provided that we avoid several misconceptions about the nature of rational norms. ?he most serious of these is a Robinson Crusoe fallacy which, having originally misled Kuhn to anarchistic conclusions, has more recently confounded a dispute between Gruünbaum and Worrall.d a dispute between Gruünbaum and Worrall.)
Barseghyan et al. (Eds.) (2022) + (During the so-called ‘historical turn’ in … During the so-called ‘historical turn’ in the philosophy of science, philosophers and historians boldly argued for general patterns throughout the history of science. From Kuhn’s landmark ''Structure of Scientific Revolutions'' until the ''Scrutinizing Science'' project led by Larry Laudan, there was optimism that there could be a general theoretical approach to understanding the process of scientific change. This optimism gradually faded as historians and philosophers began to focus on the details of specific case studies located within idiosyncratic historical, cultural, and political contexts, and abandoned attempts to uncover general patterns of how scientific theories and methods change through time. Recent research has suggested that while we have learned a great deal about the diversity and complexity of scientific practices across history, the push to abandon hope for a broader understanding of scientific change was premature. Because of this, philosophers, historians, and social scientists have become interested in reviving the project of understanding the mechanism of scientific change while respecting the diversity and complexity that has been unveiled by careful historical research over the past few decades.The chapters in this volume consider a particular proposal for a general theory of how scientific theories and methods change over time, first articulated by Hakob Barseghyan in ''The Laws of Scientific Change'' and since developed in a series of papers by a variety of members of the scientonomy community. The chapters consider a wide range of issues, from conceptual and historical challenges to the posited intellectual patterns in the history of science, to the possibility of constructing a general theory of scientific change, to begin with. Offering a new take on the project of constructing a theory of scientific change and integrating historical, philosophical, and social studies of science, this volume will be of interest to historians, philosophers, and sociologists of science.philosophers, and sociologists of science.)
Norton and Taylor (Eds.) (2009) + (Each Cambridge Companion to a philosophica … Each Cambridge Companion to a philosophical figure is made up of specially commissioned essays by an international team of scholars, providing students and nonspecialists with an introductionto a major philosopher. The series aims to dispel the intimidation that readers may feel when faced with the work of a challenging thinker. David Hume is now considered one of the most important philosophers of the Western world. Although best known for his contributions to the theory of knowledge, metaphysics, and philosophy of religion, Hume also influenced developments in the philosophy of mind, psychology, ethics, political and economic theory, political and social history, and aesthetic theory. The fifteen essays in this volume address all aspects of Hume’s thought. The picture of him that emerges is that of a thinker who, though often critical to the point of skepticism, was nonetheless able to build on that skepticism a constructive, viable, and profoundly important view of the world. Also included in this volume are Hume’s two brief autobiographies and a bibliography suited to those beginning their study of Hume. This second edition of one of our most popular Companionsincludes six new essays and a new introduction; the remaining essays have all been revised and updated. essays have all been revised and updated.)
Berkeley (1957) + (Edited by Colin Murray Turbayne in 1957. Originally published 1710. In this book, Berkeley defends idealism by attacking the materialist alternative.)
Locke (2015b) + (Edited by Jonathan Bennett in 2015. Originally published in 1689. A presentation of the ideas and arguments in the second book of Locke's ''An Essay Concerning Human Understanding'', where he offers a new method of humans' information acquisition.)
Locke (2015a) + (Edited by Jonathan Bennett in 2015. Originally published in 1689. A presentation of the ideas and arguments of the first book in Locke's ''Essay Concerning Human Understanding'', where he rejects the concept of innate notions.)
O'Connor and Yu Wong (2015) + (Emergence is a notorious philosophical ter … Emergence is a notorious philosophical term of art. A variety of theorists have appropriated it for their purposes ever since George Henry Lewes gave it a philosophical sense in his 1875 Problems of Life and Mind. We might roughly characterize the shared meaning thus: emergent entities (properties or substances) ‘arise’ out of more fundamental entities and yet are ‘novel’ or ‘irreducible’ with respect to them. (For example, it is sometimes said that consciousness is an emergent property of the brain.) Each of the quoted terms is slippery in its own right, and their specifications yield the varied notions of emergence that we discuss below. There has been renewed interest in emergence within discussions of the behavior of complex systems and debates over the reconcilability of mental causation, intentionality, or consciousness with physicalism.nality, or consciousness with physicalism.)
Encyclopedia Britannica (2016) + (Encyclopaedia Britannica is the oldest English language encyclopedia still in production.)
Rescher (2000a) + (Epistemology is more than the theory of kn … Epistemology is more than the theory of knowledge. Its range of concern includes not only knowledge proper but also rational belief, probability, plausibility, evidentiation, and not least, erotetics, the business of raising and resolving questions. Aristotle indicated that human inquiry is grounded in wonder; when matters are so out of the ordinary we puzzle about the reason why and seek for an explanation. With increasing sophistication, the ordinary as well as the extraordinary excites the intellect, so that questions gain an increasing prominence within epistemology. Inquiry Dynamics focuses on the phenomena and theory of rational inquiry, focusing on its concern for questions and their management.An introductory chapter lays the groundwork of the book's deliberations, followed by chapter 2, explaining the basic concepts involved in the abstract logic of questions and answers and sets out the generic fundamentals of the domain. Chapters 3 and 4 expound the theoretical principles that characterize the field of question epistemology in general, clarifying the fundamental themes and theses of the subject. Chapters 5 through 9 then explore the landscape of question epistemology within science. Rescher seeks to show that there are limits-restrictions of basic principle-to our ability to resolve scientific questions. The concluding chapter argues in particular that the grand goal of an ultimate theory, one resolving all explanatory questions, has to be approached with great caution.Throughout Rescher emphasizes that a question-oriented approach to the process of inquiry serves to highlight the inherent limitations of the cognitive project. Rescher's question-oriented treatment of epistemology proceeds in the tradition of Kant and stands in decided contrast to the dominant knowledge-oriented approach originating with Descartes. He demonstrates that a concern for the issue of plausible question resolution is a necessary component of the epistemological enterprise. Inquiry Dynamics will be of interest to philosophers, scientists, and social scientists.ophers, scientists, and social scientists.)
Machado-Marques and Patton (2021) + (Error is a common part of scientific pract … Error is a common part of scientific practice, which must be accounted for by scientonomy. A scientific error occurs when an agent accepts a theory that should not have been accepted given that agent’s employed method. One might suspect that the handling of scientific error seems to violate the ''theory rejection theorem'' according to which a theory becomes rejected only when other theories that are incompatible with the theory become accepted, because it appears as though a theory is replaced in the mosaic with nothing. Here, we analyze several instances of scientific error and show that scientific error handling, when properly analyzed, is fully consistent with the theory rejection theorem. We show that instances of scientific error typically involve the rejection of one or more of the premises of the argument that leads to the erroneous conclusion as well as the conclusion itself. In most cases, first-order propositions of the original erroneously accepted theory are replaced by other first-order propositions incompatible with them. In some cases, however, first-order propositions are replaced by second-order propositions asserting the lack of sufficient reason for accepting these first-order propositions. In both cases, such a replacement is fully consistent with the theory rejection theorem.sistent with the theory rejection theorem.)
Knorr Cetina (1999) + (Ethnographic study of two scientific communities - high energy physics and molecular biology.)
Kanschik (2009) + (Explains Newton's entire experiment to prove it is possible to induct a general hypothesis without evidence.)
Nelson and Nelson (1996) + (Feminism, Science, and the Philosophy of S … Feminism, Science, and the Philosophy of Science brings together original essays by both feminist and mainstream philosophers of science that examine issues at the intersections of feminism, science, and the philosophy of science. Contributors explore parallels and tensions between feminist approaches to science and other approaches in the philosophy of science and more general science studies. In so doing, they explore notions at the heart of the philosophy of science, including the nature of objectivity, truth, evidence, cognitive agency, scientific method, and the relationship between science and values.e relationship between science and values.)
Feyerabend (1973) + (Feyerabend formulated these theses in roug … Feyerabend formulated these theses in rough draft for a conference planned for 20 March 1973, where he was to criticize Lakatos's defense of "Law and Order" from an anarchist point of view. The theses were enclosed with a letter to Lakatos dated February 1973. A slightly revised form of these theses has appeared as [[Feyerabend (1975d)]], pp. 176-81.[[Feyerabend (1975d)]], pp. 176-81.)
Biro (2009) + (For Hume, understanding the workings of th … For Hume, understanding the workings of the mind is the key to understanding everything else. There is a sense, therefore, in which to write about Hume’s philosophy of mind is to write about all of his philosophy. With that said, I shall nonetheless focus here on those specific doctrines that belong to what we today call the philosophy of mind, given our somewhat narrower conception of that subject. It should also be remembered that Hume describes his inquiry into the nature and workings of the mind as a science. This is an important clue to understanding both the goals and the results of that inquiry, as well as the methods Hume uses in pursuing it. As we will see, there is a thread running from Hume’s project of founding a science of the mind to that of the so-called cognitive sciences of the late twentieth century. For both, the study of the mind is in important respects just like the study of any other natural phenomenon. While it would be an overstatement to say that Hume’s entire interest lies in the construction of a science in this sense – he has other, more traditionally “philosophical,” concerns – recognizing the centrality of this scientific aim is essential for understanding him.ic aim is essential for understanding him.)
Lakatos (1970) + (For centuries knowledge meant proven knowl … For centuries knowledge meant proven knowledge - proven either by the power of the intellect or by the evidence of the senses. Wisdom and intellectual integrity demanded that one must desist from unproven utterances and minimize, even in thought, the gap between speculation and established knowledge. The proving power of the intellect or the senses was questioned by the sceptics more than two thousand years ago; but they were browbeaten into confusion by the glory of Newtonian physics. Einstein’s results again turned the tables and now very few philosophers or scientists still think that scientific knowledge is, or can be, proven knowledge. But few realize that with this the whole classical structure of intellectual values falls in ruins and has to be replaced: one cannot simply water down the ideal of proven truth - as some logical empiricists do - to the ideal of ''probable truth'' or - as some sociologists of knowledge do - to ''truth by (changing) consensus''.do - to ''truth by (changing) consensus''.)
Boole (2003) + (Formal logic descriptions and application.)
Hutchins (1995) + (Formulation of distributed cognition based on a study of navigation of a US Navy ship.)
Bacon (2007) + (Francis Bacon (1561-1626) was a genuine mi … Francis Bacon (1561-1626) was a genuine midwife of modernity. He was one of the first thinkers to visualise a future which would be guided by a cooperative science-based vision of bettering human welfare. In this the first critical edition of his greatest philosophical work since the nineteenth-century, we find facing-page Latin translations and a thorough and detailed Introduction to the text. The text includes the original Latin with a facing-page translation, and has been edited in accordance with the highest standards of modern textual-critical principles, with a detailed and thorough introduction.with a detailed and thorough introduction.)
Christianson (1984) + (From dust jacket notes: "...In the first m … From dust jacket notes: "...In the first major popular biography of Sir Isaac Newton in 50 years, historian Gale E. Christianson paints a compelling portrait of this seminal thinker -- a towering genius who, in the words of Albert Einstein, 'stands before us, strong, certain, and alone.' Drawing on the full body of Newton papers (nearly four million words), this majestic work details Newton's life in its entirety: from an introspective boyhood in rural Lincolnshire, to Cambridge, where he came to question the very order of things, to the heretical religious ideas that would ultimately absorb him more than science itself, to celebrity as leonine Master of the Mint and President of the Royal Society. Throughout, Newton emerges as a passionate recluse, given to sleepless nights working alone with little more nourishment than bread and wine. As the legend unfolds, so , too, do Newton's epoch-making discoveries in mathematics, physics, optics, and astronomy. At 23 he had already established the elements of differential calculus. Soon after he created the reflecting telescope and described the properties of light. At 45 Newton secured his reputation by publishing the Principia Mathematica, a treatise on universal gravitation that would alter forever man's vision of the cosmos...."er forever man's vision of the cosmos....")
Zalta (Ed.) (2016) + (From its inception, the SEP was designed s … From its inception, the SEP was designed so that each entry is maintained and kept up-to-date by an expert or group of experts in the field. All entries and substantive updates are refereed by the members of a distinguished Editorial Board before they are made public. Consequently, our dynamic reference work maintains academic standards while evolving and adapting in response to new research. You can cite fixed editions that are created on a quarterly basis and stored in our Archives (every entry contains a link to its complete archival history, identifying the fixed edition the reader should cite). The Table of Contents lists entries that are published or assigned. The Projected Table of Contents also lists entries which are currently unassigned but nevertheless projected.tly unassigned but nevertheless projected.)
Zalta (Ed.) (2017) + (From its inception, the SEP was designed s … From its inception, the SEP was designed so that each entry is maintained and kept up-to-date by an expert or group of experts in the field. All entries and substantive updates are refereed by the members of a distinguished Editorial Board before they are made public. Consequently, our dynamic reference work maintains academic standards while evolving and adapting in response to new research. You can cite fixed editions that are created on a quarterly basis and stored in our Archives (every entry contains a link to its complete archival history, identifying the fixed edition the reader should cite). The Table of Contents lists entries that are published or assigned. The Projected Table of Contents also lists entries which are currently unassigned but nevertheless projected.tly unassigned but nevertheless projected.)
Garber (1993) + (Garber discusses the role of experimentati … Garber discusses the role of experimentation in the wider context of Descartes' philosophical system; the epistemic justification for propositions discovered by experimentation, the methodology of experimentation, and the role of empiricism within Cartesian apriorism. of empiricism within Cartesian apriorism.)
Morris and Brown (2016) + (Generally regarded as one of the most impo … Generally regarded as one of the most important philosophers to write inEnglish, David Hume (b. 1711, d. 1776) was also well known in his owntime as an historian and essayist. A master stylist in any genre, his majorphilosophical works—A Treatise of Human Nature (1739–1740), theEnquiries concerning Human Understanding (1748) and concerning thePrinciples of Morals (1751), as well as his posthumously publishedDialogues concerning Natural Religion (1779)—remain widely anddeeply influential.779)—remain widely and deeply influential.)
Downing (2013) + (George Berkeley, Bishop of Cloyne, was one … George Berkeley, Bishop of Cloyne, was one of the great philosophers ofthe early modern period. He was a brilliant critic of his predecessors,particularly Descartes, Malebranche, and Locke. He was a talentedmetaphysician famous for defending idealism, that is, the view that realityconsists exclusively of minds and their ideas. Berkeley's system, while itstrikes many as counter-intuitive, is strong and flexible enough to counter most objections. His most-studied works, the Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge (Principles, for short) and Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous (Dialogues), are beautifully written and dense with the sort of arguments that delight contemporaryphilosophers. He was also a wide-ranging thinker with interests in religion (which were fundamental to his philosophical motivations), the psychology of vision, mathematics, physics, morals, economics, and medicine. Although many of Berkeley's first readers greeted him with incomprehension, he influenced both Hume and Kant, and is much read (if little followed) in our own day. read (if little followed) in our own day.)
Giere (2012) + (Giere argues for a reconciliation between … Giere argues for a reconciliation between history of science and philosophy of science on the grounds that philosophy of science must become theory of science, that is, a naturalized theory of how science works. Normative claims about how science should work can flow from a descriptive understanding of how it does work. Giere believes that such a theory of science can emerge from melding cognitive science with sociology of science.gnitive science with sociology of science.)
Golinski (1998) + (Golinski argues for a social constructivis … Golinski argues for a social constructivist view of scientific knowledge. Thomas Kuhn's landmark ''The Structure of Scientific Revolutions'' made science more approachable to sociological methods and naturalistic explanation. The social institutions responsible for the production of scientific knowledge, such as the professionalization of science, the research laboratory, and the scientific use of language and persuasion.scientific use of language and persuasion.)
Cook (2013) + (Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716) was … Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716) was one of the great thinkers of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and is known as the last “universal genius”. He made deep and important contributions to the fields of metaphysics, epistemology, logic, philosophy of religion, as well as mathematics, physics, geology, jurisprudence, and history. The aim of this entry is primarily to introduce Leibniz's life and summarize and explicate his views in the realms of metaphysics, epistemology, and philosophical theology. epistemology, and philosophical theology.)
Look (2017) + (Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716) was … Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716) was one of the great thinkers of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and is known as the last “universal genius”. He made deep and important contributions to the fields of metaphysics, epistemology, logic, philosophy of religion, as well as mathematics, physics, geology, jurisprudence, and history. Even the eighteenth-century French atheist and materialist Denis Diderot, whose views were very often at odds with those of Leibniz, could not help being awed by his achievement, writing in his entry on Leibniz in the Encyclopedia, “Perhaps never has a man read as much, studied as much, meditated more, and written more than Leibniz… What he has composed on the world, God, nature, and the soul is of the most sublime eloquence. If his ideas had been expressed with the flair of Plato, the philosopher of Leipzig would cede nothing to the philosopher of Athens.” (Oeuvres complètes, vol. 7, p. 709) Indeed, Diderot was almost moved to despair inthis piece: “When one compares the talents one has with those of a Leibniz, one is tempted to throw away one's books and go die quietly in the dark of some forgotten corner.” (Oeuvres complètes, vol. 7, p. 678) More than a century later, Gottlob Frege, who fortunately did not cast his books away in despair, expressed similar admiration, declaring that “in his writings, Leibniz threw out such a profusion of seeds of ideas that in this respect he is virtually in a class of his own.” (“Boole's logical Calculus and the Concept-script” in Posthumous Writings, p. 9) The aim of this entry is primarily to introduce Leibniz's life and summarize and explicatehis views in the realms of metaphysics, epistemology, and philosophical theology. epistemology, and philosophical theology.)
Russell (1945) + (Hailed as “lucid and magisterial” by The O … Hailed as “lucid and magisterial” by The Observer, this book is universally acclaimed as the outstanding one-volume work on the subject of Western philosophy.Considered to be one of the most important philosophical works of all time, the History of Western Philosophy is a dazzlingly unique exploration of the ideologies of significant philosophers throughout the ages—from Plato and Aristotle through to Spinoza, Kant and the twentieth century. Written by a man who changed the history of philosophy himself, this is an account that has never been rivaled since its first publication over sixty years ago.Since its first publication in 1945, Lord Russell’s A History of Western Philosophy is still unparalleled in its comprehensiveness, its clarity, its erudition, its grace, and its wit. In seventy-six chapters he traces philosophy from the rise of Greek civilization to the emergence of logical analysis in the twentieth century.Among the philosophers considered are: Pythagoras, Heraclitus, Parmenides, Empedocles, Anaxagoras, the Atomists, Protagoras, Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, the Cynics, the Sceptics, the Epicureans, the Stoics, Plotinus, Ambrose, Jerome, Augustine, Benedict, Gregory the Great, John the Scot, Aquinas, Duns Scotus, William of Occam, Machiavelli, Erasmus, More, Bacon, Hobbes, Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, Locke, Berkeley, Hume, Rousseau, Kant, Hegel, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, the Utilitarians, Marx, Bergson, James, Dewey, and lastly the philosophers with whom Lord Russell himself is most closely associated—Cantor, Frege, and Whitehead, coauthor with Russell of the monumental Principia Mathematica.l of the monumental Principia Mathematica.)
Hardwig (1991) + (Hardwig argues for the central importance of testimony in the acquisition of scientific knowledge.)
Siegel (2011) + (Harvey Siegel discusses the question of wh … Harvey Siegel discusses the question of whether epistemologicalrelativism is an incoherent position. After rehearsing Plato’s case for incoherence he examines the position of the proponents of the Strong Programme in the sociology of scientific knowledge. Siegel distinguishes between innocuous and more contentious claims to be found in their writings and examines their arguments for the latter. He focuses on the‘no transcendence, therefore relativism’-argument; arguing that from acceptance of the impossibility to achieve a ‘perspectiveless perspective’relativism does not follow. Despite such an impossibility, so Siegel claims,there is a sense in which we can transcend our own, actual perspective. Furthermore, drawing on the possibility of sociological accounts of the causes of the credibility of belief that conflict with the account favoured by Strong Programmers, he concludes that the Programme’s relativism is at odds with its avowed scientific status and finally falls prey to the charge of incoherence.y falls prey to the charge of incoherence.)
Baigrie (1988) + (Harvey Siegel's (1985) attempts to revive … Harvey Siegel's (1985) attempts to revive the traditional epistemological formulation of the rationality of science. Contending that "a general commitment to evidence" is constitutive of method and rationality in science, Siegel advances its compatibility with specific, historically attuned formulations of principles of evidential support as a virtue of his aprioristic candidate for science's rationality. In point of fact, this account is compatible with virtually any formulation of evidential support, which runs afoul of Siegel's claim that scientific beliefs must be evaluated with respect to their rationality. The unwelcome consequence of Siegel's view is that most any belief, scientific or pseudoscientific, can be defended as rational. Indeed, if we want to furnish a warrant for rational choice, we must turn to the very historically informed principles of evidential support that are dismissed by Siegel as providing a misleading portrait of science's rationality.leading portrait of science's rationality.)
Longino (2002) + (Helen Longino seeks to break the current d … Helen Longino seeks to break the current deadlock in the ongoing wars between philosophers of science and sociologists of science--academic battles founded on disagreement about the role of social forces in constructing scientific knowledge. While many philosophers of science downplay social forces, claiming that scientific knowledge is best considered as a product of cognitive processes, sociologists tend to argue that numerous noncognitive factors influence what scientists learn, how they package it, and how readily it is accepted. Underlying this disagreement, however, is a common assumption that social forces are a source of bias and irrationality. Longino challenges this assumption, arguing that social interaction actually assists us in securing firm, rationally based knowledge. This important insight allows her to develop a durable and novel account of scientific knowledge that integrates the social and cognitive.Longino begins with a detailed discussion of a wide range of contemporary thinkers who write on scientific knowledge, clarifying the philosophical points at issue. She then critically analyzes the dichotomous understanding of the rational and the social that characterizes both sides of the science studies stalemate and the social account that she sees as necessary for an epistemology of science that includes the full spectrum of cognitive processes. Throughout, her account is responsive both to the normative uses of the term knowledge and to the social conditions in which scientific knowledge is produced.Building on ideas first advanced in her influential book Science as Social Knowledge, Longino brings her account into dialogue with current work in social epistemology and science studies and shows how her critical social approach can help solve a variety of stubborn problems. While the book focuses on epistemological concerns related to the sociality of inquiry, Longino also takes up its implications for scientific pluralism. The social approach, she concludes, best allows us to retain a meaningful concept of knowledge in the face of theoretical plurality and uncertainty. of theoretical plurality and uncertainty.)
Kuhn (1996) + (History, if viewed as a repository for mor … History, if viewed as a repository for more than anecdote or chronology, could produce a decisive transformation in the image of science by which we are now possessed. That image has previously been drawn, even by scientists themselves, mainly from the study of finished scientific achievements as these are recorded in the classics and, more recently, in the textbooks from which each new scientific generation learns to practice its trade. Inevitably, however, the aim of such books is persuasive and pedagogic; a concept of science drawn from them is no more likely to fit the enterprise that produced them than an image of a national culture drawn from a tourist brochure or a language text. This essay attempts to show that we have been misled by them in fundamental ways. Its aim is a sketch of the quite different concept of science that can emerge from the historical record of the research activity itself.al record of the research activity itself.)
Osler (1970) + (How John Locke's views on scientific knowledge was shaped by theorists who came before him, specifically Boyle and Newton.)
Allchin (2001) + (How do scientists know—and justify—that th … How do scientists know—and justify—that they have erred? The question virtuallybristles with paradox. Error seems the very antithesis of knowledge. How could one justify such a "negative" discovery? Oddly perhaps, to know that a claim deemed right in one context is wrong requires justification. I focus here on this dimension of the scientific enterprise, the ascertaining of error, and its relation to the general problem of characterizing reliable knowledge.blem of characterizing reliable knowledge.)
Shapin (1994) + (How do we come to trust our knowledge of t … How do we come to trust our knowledge of the world? What are the means by which we distinguish true from false accounts? Why do we credit one observational statement over another?In ''A Social History of Truth'', Shapin engages these universal questions through an elegant recreation of a crucial period in the history of early modern science: the social world of gentlemen-philosophers in seventeenth-century England. Steven Shapin paints a vivid picture of the relations between gentlemanly culture and scientific practice. He argues that problems of credibility in science were practically solved through the codes and conventions of genteel conduct: trust, civility, honor, and integrity. These codes formed, and arguably still form, an important basis for securing reliable knowledge about the natural world.Shapin uses detailed historical narrative to argue about the establishment of factual knowledge both in science and in everyday practice. Accounts of the mores and manners of gentlemen-philosophers are used to illustrate Shapin's broad claim that trust is imperative for constituting every kind of knowledge. Knowledge-making is always a collective enterprise: people have to know whom to trust in order to know something about the natural world.to know something about the natural world.)
Thompson (2007) + (How is life related to the mind? The quest … How is life related to the mind? The question has long confounded philosophers and scientists, and it is this so-called explanatory gap between biological life and consciousness that Evan Thompson explores in Mind in Life.Thompson draws upon sources as diverse as molecular biology, evolutionary theory, artificial life, complex systems theory, neuroscience, psychology, Continental Phenomenology, and analytic philosophy to argue that mind and life are more continuous than has previously been accepted, and that current explanations do not adequately address the myriad facets of the biology and phenomenology of mind. Where there is life, Thompson argues, there is mind: life and mind share common principles of self-organization, and the self-organizing features of mind are an enriched version of the self-organizing features of life. Rather than trying to close the explanatory gap, Thompson marshals philosophical and scientific analyses to bring unprecedented insight to the nature of life and consciousness. This synthesis of phenomenology and biology helps make Mind in Life a vital and long-awaited addition to his landmark volume The Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science and Human Experience (coauthored with Eleanor Rosch and Francisco Varela). with Eleanor Rosch and Francisco Varela).)
De Pierris (2006) + (Hume follows Newton in replacing the mecha … Hume follows Newton in replacing the mechanical philosophy's demonstrative ideal of science by the Principia's ideal of inductive proof(especially as formulated in Newton's Rule Ill); in this respect, Hume differs sharply from Locke. Hume is also guided by Newton's own criticisms of the mechanical philosophers' hypotheses. The first stage of Hume's skeptical argument concerning causation targets central tenets of the mechanical philosophers' (in particular, Locke's) conception of causation, all of whichrely on the a priori postulation of a hidden configuration of primary qualities. The skeptical argument concerning the causal inductive inference (with its implicit principle that nature is, in Newton's words, "ever consonant with itself") then raises doubts about what Hume himself regards as our very best inductive method. Hume's own "Rules" (T 1.3.15) further substantiate his reliance on Newton. Finally, Locke's distinction between "Knowledge" and "Probability" ("Opinion") does not leave room for Hume's Newtonian notion of inductive proof.ume's Newtonian notion of inductive proof.)
Bell (2009) + (Hume’s theory of causation is one of the m … Hume’s theory of causation is one of the most famous and influential parts of his philosophy. When compared with the accounts provided by earlier philosophers whom Hume studied, such as Rene Descartes (1596–1650), John Locke (1632–1704), and Nicolas Malebranche(1638–1715), his theory is revolutionary. It is also controversial, and has been interpreted in a number of different ways. This is not surprising, because Hume’s ideas about causation are not only challenging in themselves, but also lie at the heart of much of the rest of his thought. As a result, interpretations of Hume on causation influence, and are influenced by, interpretations of his general philosophical aims, methods, and purposes.philosophical aims, methods, and purposes.)
Lakatos (1978b) + (Imre Lakatos' philosophical and scientific … Imre Lakatos' philosophical and scientific papers are published here in two volumes. Volume II presents his work on the philosophy of mathematics (much of it unpublished), together with some critical essays on contemporary philosophers of science and some famous polemical writings on political and educational issues. Imre Lakatos had an influence out of all proportion to the length of his philosophical career. This collection exhibits and confirms the originality, range and the essential unity of his work. It demonstrates too the force and spirit he brought to every issue with which he engaged, from his most abstract mathematical work to his passionate 'Letter to the director of the LSE'. Lakatos' ideas are now the focus of widespread and increasing interest, and these volumes should make possible for the first time their study as a whole and their proper assessment.dy as a whole and their proper assessment.)
Lakatos (1978a) + (Imre Lakatos' philosophical and scientific … Imre Lakatos' philosophical and scientific papers are published here in two volumes. Volume I brings together his very influential but scattered papers on the philosophy of the physical sciences, and includes one important unpublished essay on the effect of Newton's scientific achievement. Imre Lakatos had an influence out of all proportion to the length of his philosophical career. This collection exhibits and confirms the originality, range and the essential unity of his work. It demonstrates too the force and spirit he brought to every issue with which he engaged, from his most abstract mathematical work to his passionate 'Letter to the director of the LSE'. Lakatos' ideas are now the focus of widespread and increasing interest, and these volumes should make possible for the first time their study as a whole and their proper assessment.dy as a whole and their proper assessment.)
Harwood (1986) + (In 1935 a Polish physician named Ludwik Fl … In 1935 a Polish physician named Ludwik Fleck published a monograph in German entitled Genesis and Development of a Scientific Fact. Although it addressed central issues in the philosophy of science, the book made virtually no impact. Most of the reviews it received appeared in medical journals or popular magazines. After the war it languished in obscurity, despite Kuhn's passing reference to it in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, until a German scholar rediscovered it in the early 1970s.Recently, however, Fleck's work has been granted much more attention. In 1979 an English translation of his book was published, quickly followed by a reissue of the German edition, a dissertation on his life and work, a collection of his essays on sociology of knowledge, and a conference devoted to him. The explanation for this sudden interest is clear: Fleck anticipated fifty years ago many of the current arguments for a sociology of scientific knowledge, arguments which in Anglo-Saxon (and quite possibly German) scholarship have been derived largely from Kuhn.In an essay of this scope it is impossible to do expository justice to the works under review. I will, therefore, draw upon these works in order to venture a judgement of Fleck's significance. My question is: how are we to welcome this prescient latecomer? Is he largely of historical interest? Or is his writing still of heuristic value for the sociology of knowledge?stic value for the sociology of knowledge?)
Deming (2016) + (In 1979 astronomer Carl Sagan popularized … In 1979 astronomer Carl Sagan popularized the aphorism "extraordinaryclaims require extraordinary evidence" (ECREE). But Sagan never defined the term"extraordinary". Ambiguity in what constitutes "extraordinary" has led to misuse of theaphorism. ECREE is commonly invoked to discredit research dealing with scientificanomalies, and has even been rhetorically employed in attempts to raise doubtsconcerning mainstream scientific hypotheses that have substantive empirical support.The origin of ECREE lies in eighteenth-century Enlightenment criticisms of miracles.The most important of these was Hume’s essay On Miracles. Hume precisely definedan extraordinary claim as one that is directly contradicted by a massive amount ofexisting evidence. For a claim to qualify as extraordinary there must exist overwhelmingempirical data of the exact antithesis. Extraordinary evidence is not a separatecategory or type of evidence–it is an extraordinarily large number of observations.Claims that are merely novel or those which violate human consensus are not properlycharacterized as extraordinary. Science does not contemplate two types of evidence.The misuse of ECREE to suppress innovation and maintain orthodoxy should beavoided as it must inevitably retard the scientific goal of establishing reliableknowledge.c goal of establishing reliable knowledge.)
Crasnow (1993) + (In Science as Social Knowledge, Helen Long … In Science as Social Knowledge, Helen Longino offers a contextual analysis ofevidential relevance. She claims that this "contextual empiricism" reconciles the objectivity of science with the claim that science is socially constructed. I argue that while her account does offer key insights into the role that values play in science, her claim that science is nonetheless objective is problematic.e is nonetheless objective is problematic.)
Martin (Ed.) (2007) + (In The Cambridge Companion to Atheism, eig … In The Cambridge Companion to Atheism, eighteen of the world’s leading scholars present original essays on various aspects of atheism: its history, both ancient and modern, defense, and implications. The topic is examined in terms of its implications for a wide range of disciplines, including philosophy, religion, feminism, postmodernism, sociology, and psychology. In its defense, both classical and contemporary theistic arguments are criticized, and the argument from evil and impossibility arguments, along with a nonreligious basis for morality, are defended. These essays give a broad understanding of atheism and a lucid introduction to this controversial topic. introduction to this controversial topic.)
Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen (1935) + (In a complete theory there is an element c … In a complete theory there is an element corresponding to each element of reality. A sufficient condition for the reality of a physical quantity is the possibility of predicting it with certainty, without disturbing the system. In quantum mechanics in the case of two physical quantities described by non-commuting operators, the knowledge of one precludes the knowledge of the other. Then either (1)the description of reality given by the wave function in quantum mechanics is not complete or (2) these two quantities cannot have simultaneous reality. Consideration of the problem of making predictions concerning a system on the basis of measurements made on another system that had previously interacted with it leads to the result that if (1) is false then (2) is also false. One is thus led to conclude that the description of reality as given by a wave function is not complete. given by a wave function is not complete.)
Allen (2023) + (In a series of publications, [[Hasok Chang]] … In a series of publications, [[Hasok Chang]] makes the case that activities carried out by epistemic agents form the basis of the scientific enterprise. This paper provides an action-based scientonomic perspective of scientific practice. I define ''epistemic action'' as an action of an epistemic agent that involves an epistemic element and highlight the difference between global and local actions. The availability of a local action to an epistemic agent amounts to the agent employing the norm that the local action is permissible/desirable. To unearth the mechanism by which local actions become available to epistemic agents, I derive ''the local action availability theorem'', according to which, a local epistemic action becomes available to an agent only when its permissibility is derivable from a non-empty subset of other elements of the agent’s mosaic, i.e., from that agent’s employed norms and accepted theories. This framework is then applied to the emergence of the local action of determining the composition of chemical substances by weighing as practiced by Lavoisier and his followers; it is shown that the respective norm became employed in accord with the local action availability theorem.ith the local action availability theorem.)
Voss (Ed.) (1993) + (In his philosophy and science, Rene Descar … In his philosophy and science, Rene Descartes was able to construct a world so capacious that anyone who studies his ideas well can live there—can acquire a unique understanding of our common world by examining it from his perspective. The community of scholars inhabiting the Cartesian world is now more than 350 years old. Each generation, in its distinctive way, discovers new resources in Descartes's world and makes its own contribution to our understanding of it. The present book is rich with such contributions, at once expressive of the present moment in scholarship and of the immutable natures specified by the Cartesian text.e natures specified by the Cartesian text.)
Forman (1971) + (In perhaps the most original and suggestiv … In perhaps the most original and suggestive section of his book on The Conceptual Development of Quantum Mechanics Max Jammer contended "that certain philosophical ideas of the late nineteenth century not only prepared the intellectual climate for, but contributed decisively to, the formation of the new conceptions of the modern quantum theory"; specifically, "contingentism, existentialism, pragmatism, and logical empiricism, rose in reaction to traditional rationalism and conventional metaphysics. . . . Their affirmation of a concrete conception of life and their rejection of an abstract intellectualism culminated in their doctrine of free will, their denial of mechanical determinism or of metaphysical causality. United in rejecting causality though on different grounds, these currents of thought prepared, so to speak, the philosophical background for modern quantum mechanics. They contributed with suggestions to the formative stage of the new conceptual scheme and subsequently promoted its acceptance."and subsequently promoted its acceptance.")
Fine (2013) + (In the May 15, 1935 issue of Physical Revi … In the May 15, 1935 issue of Physical Review Albert Einstein co-authored a paper with his two postdoctoral research associates at the Institute for Advanced Study, Boris Podolsky and Nathan Rosen. The article was entitled “Can Quantum Mechanical Description of Physical Reality Be Considered Complete?” (Einstein et al. 1935). Generally referred to as “EPR”, this paper quickly became a centerpiece in the debate over theinterpretation of the quantum theory, a debate that continues today. The paper features a striking case where two quantum systems interact in such a way as to link both their spatial coordinates in a certain direction and also their linear momenta (in the same direction). As a result of this “entanglement”, determining either position or momentum for one system would fix (respectively) the position or the momentum of the other. EPR use this case to argue that one cannot maintain both an intuitive condition of local action and the completeness of the quantum description by means of the wave function. This entry describes the argument of that 1935 paper, considers several different versions and reactions, and explores the ongoing significance of the issues they raise.ing significance of the issues they raise.)
Cottingham (1992) + (In the introduction to the Cambridge Companion to Descartes editor John Cottingham reviews the highlights of Descartes' life and philosophy.)
Hatfield (2004) + (In the latter part of the nineteenth centu … In the latter part of the nineteenth century, philosophers, physicists, and the newpsychologists agreed to this extent in their conceptions of the mind-body problem:they all had a healthy respect for the integrity of both the mental and the physicaldomains. Whatever their particular conunitments, whether phenomenalist, dualist,or materialist, they all aCcepted the reality of both mental and physical phenomena- where mental phenomena are, in the first instance, phenomenally characterizedand perhaps equated with the contents of consciousness, and physical phenomenaabstract from the knowing subject and sustain laws governing changes in spatiotemporallycharacterized objects. This acceptance of the mental domain held forphysicists ~uch as Ludwig Boltzmann, Ernst Mach, and Hermann Hehnholtz noless than philosopher psychologists such as Wtlhehn Wundt and W~ James(despite their other differences).~ James (despite their other differences).)
Mirkin (2018) + (In this paper, I argue that there is ''acc … In this paper, I argue that there is ''accepted'' propositional technological knowledge which appears to exhibit the same patterns of change as questions, theories, and methods in the natural, social, and formal sciences. I show that technological theories attempting to describe the construction and operation of artifacts as well as to prescribe their correct mode of operation are not merely used, but also often ''accepted'' by epistemic agents. Since technology often involves methods different from those found in science and produces normative propositions, many of which remain tacit, one may be tempted to think that changes in technological knowledge should be somehow exempt from the laws of scientific change. Indeed, it seems tacitly accepted in the scientonomic community that, while scientific communities clearly ''accept'' theories, technological communities merely ''use'' them. As a result, scientonomy currently deals with natural, social, and formal ''sciences'', and the status of technological knowledge within the scientonomic ontology remains unclear. To help elucidate the topic, I propose that the historical cases of sorting algorithms, telescopes, crop rotation, and colorectal cancer surgeries confirm that technological theories and methods are often an integral part of an epistemic agent’s mosaic and seem to exhibit the same scientonomic patterns of change typical of accepted theories therein. Thus, I suggest that propositional technological knowledge can be part of a mosaic.logical knowledge can be part of a mosaic.)
Loiselle (2017) + (In this paper, I expand upon the research … In this paper, I expand upon the research on authority delegation begun by Overgaard and myself in our 2016 paper [[Overgaard and Loiselle (2016)|''Authority Delegation'']]. I argue that ''singular authority delegation'' – in which a community delegates authority over a given topic to a single expert community – should be distinguished from cases of ''multiple authority delegation''. A community engages in multiple authority delegation ''iff'' that community delegates authority over a given topic to more than one expert community. Furthermore, multiple authority delegation can be further divided into two types: ''hierarchical'' and ''non-hierarchical''. I examine two cases of authority delegation in the art market and argue that these cases model instances of hierarchical authority delegation.nces of hierarchical authority delegation.)
Theiner, Allen, and Goldstone (2010) + (In this paper, we approach the idea of gro … In this paper, we approach the idea of group cognition from the perspective of the ‘‘extended mind’’ thesis, as a special case of the more general claim that systems larger than the individual human, but containing that human, are capable of cognition (Clark , 2008; Clark & Chalmers, 1998). Instead of deliberating about ‘‘the mark of the cognitive’’ (Adams & Aizawa, 2008), our discussion of group cognition is tied to particular cognitive capacities. We review recent studies of group problem solving and group memory which reveal that specific cognitive capacities that are commonly ascribed to individuals are also aptly ascribed at the level of groups. These case studies show how dense interactions among people within a group lead to both similarity-inducing and differentiating dynamics that affect the group’s ability to solve problems. This supports our claim that groups have organization-dependent cognitive capacities that go beyond the simple aggregation of the cognitive capacities of individuals. Group cognition is thus an emergent phenomenon in the sense ofWimsatt (1986). We further argue that anybody who rejects our strategy for showing that cognitive properties can be instantiated at multiple levels in the organizational hierarchy on a priori grounds is a ‘‘demergentist,’’ and thus incurs the burden of proof for explaining why cognitive properties are ‘‘stuck’’ at a certain level of organizational structure. Finally, we show that our analysis of group cognition escapes the ‘‘coupling-constitution’’ charge that has been leveled against the extended mind thesis (Adams & Aizawa, 2008).t the extended mind thesis (Adams & Aizawa, 2008).)
Barseghyan and Shaw (2017) + (In this paper, we demonstrate how a system … In this paper, we demonstrate how a systematic ''taxonomy of stances'' can help elucidate two classic debates of the historical turn—the Lakatos–Feyerabend debate concerning theory rejection and the Feyerabend–Kuhn debate about pluralism during normal science. We contend that Kuhn, Feyerabend, and Lakatos were often talking at cross-purposes due to the lack of an agreed upon taxonomy of stances. Specifically, we provide three distinct stances that scientists take towards theories: ''acceptance'' of a theory as the best available description of its domain, ''use'' of a theory in practical applications, and ''pursuit'' (elaboration) of a theory. We argue that in the Lakatos–Feyerabend debate, Lakatos was concerned with ''acceptance'' whereas Feyerabend was mainly concerned with ''pursuit''. Additionally, we show how Feyerabend and Kuhn’s debate on the role of pluralism/monism in normal science involved a crucial conflation of all three stances. Finally, we outline a few general lessons concerning the process of scientific change.ncerning the process of scientific change.)
Overgaard and Loiselle (2016) + (In this paper, we introduce a new concept … In this paper, we introduce a new concept to the field of scientonomy, that of ''authority delegation''. ''Authority delegation'' is, in essence, a type of relation between distinct scientific communities whereby one community both recognizes another as an expert on a particular topic and will accept the theories it is told by the expert community over the same topic. Importantly, authority delegation is not a new fundamental ontological category along with ''theory'' and ''method''. We show that authority delegation is ''reducible'' to the more basic concepts of ''theory'' and ''method''. Furthermore, we suggest that authority delegation comes in two forms: ''one-sided'' authority delegation and ''mutual'' authority delegation.ation and ''mutual'' authority delegation.)
Haldane (1905) + (In this volume Elizabeth Haldane gives a detailed account of Descartes' life, works, and historical context.)
Palermos and Pritchard (2016) + (In this volume, Sanford Goldberg (chapter … In this volume, Sanford Goldberg (chapter 1) defines his socio-epistemologicalresearch programme by noting that “social epistemology is thesystematic study of the epistemic significance of other minds” (section3).1 But what can those minds be and how do they differ from the worldaround us?Goldberg elaborates by noting that relying on others is not quite thesame as relying on the natural world for evidence—as we do, for instance,when we come to know that it’s cold outside by seeing someonereaching for their parka or when we discover that we have a mouseproblem by finding the droppings under the sink. The difference, explainsGoldberg, is that others manifest “the very results of their own epistemicsensibility” (chapter 1, section 1).temic sensibility” (chapter 1, section 1).)
Hanson (1958) + (In this work, Hanson used insights from or … In this work, Hanson used insights from ordinary language philosophy, history of science, and psychology to argue that scientific thinking and observation is always theory-laden. He maintained that science would not be as rich and versatile as it is if it were not loaded with theory and expectation. He sought to elucidate the 'open' structure of scientific frameworks, as opposed to the rigid and closed definitional networks of geometry, formal logic, and mathematics. Hanson thought to challenge the logical positivist view of observation and to illuminate the process through which new conceptual frameworks in science are constructed. He is now regarded as an important forerunner of Thomas Kuhn's 'Structure of Scientific Revolutions'.n's 'Structure of Scientific Revolutions'.)
Schlosser (2015) + (In very general terms, an agent is a being … In very general terms, an agent is a being with the capacity to act, and‘agency’ denotes the exercise or manifestation of this capacity. Thephilosophy of action provides us with a standard conception and astandard theory of action. The former construes action in terms ofintentionality, the latter explains the intentionality of action in terms of causation by the agent’s mental states and events. From this, we obtain a standard conception and a standard theory of agency. There are alternative conceptions of agency, and it has been argued that the standard theory fails to capture agency (or distinctively human agency). Further, it seems that genuine agency can be exhibited by beings that are not capable of intentional action, and it has been argued that agency can and should be explained without reference to causally efficacious mental states and events. Debates about the nature of agency have flourished over the past few decades in philosophy and in other areas of research (including psychology, cognitive neuroscience, social science, and anthropology). In philosophy, the nature of agency is an important issue in the philosophy of mind, the philosophy of psychology, the debates on free will and moral responsibility, in ethics, meta-ethics, and in the debates on the nature of reasons and practical rationality. For the most part, this entry focuses on conceptual and metaphysical questions concerning the nature of agency. In the final sections, it provides an overview of empirically informed accounts of the sense of agency and of various empirical challenges to the commonsense assumption that our reasons and our conscious intentions make a real difference to how we act.ions make a real difference to how we act.)
Barseghyan (2021b) + (Incomplete and imprecise temporal data is … Incomplete and imprecise temporal data is abundant in various branches of science and technology as well as everyday life (e.g., “''A'' began after 1066 but before 1069 and ended after 1245”, “''B'' took place no later than 156 BC”). While point-circles and lines/bars have been traditionally used to depict precise temporal points and intervals, it is unclear how imprecise and incomplete temporal data can be effectively visualized or even represented. This paper suggests an intuitive diagrammatic notation for visualizing both imprecise and incomplete temporal information. It suggests using traditional whiskers with edges to depict temporal imprecision and whiskers without edges to depict incomplete temporal entities. This notation can be easily incorporated into linear temporal visualizations, such as historical timelines, Gantt charts, and timetables, to identify gaps in temporal information. The paper lays down the diagrammatic elements of the notation and illustrates their applicability to all standard relations between temporal entities. It also shows how these elements can be combined to produce complex timelines. Some possible future directions are also outlined.sible future directions are also outlined.)
Herring et al. (Eds.) (2019) + (Integrated History and Philosophy of Scien … Integrated History and Philosophy of Science (iHPS) is commonly understood as the study of science from a combined historical and philosophical perspective. Yet, since its gradual formation as a research field, the question of how to suitably integrate both perspectives remains open. This volume presents cutting edge research from junior iHPS scholars, and in doing so provides a snapshot of current developments within the field, explores the connection between iHPS and other academic disciplines, and demonstrates some of the topics that are attracting the attention of scholars who will help define the future of iHPS.s who will help define the future of iHPS.)
Barnes (1977) + (Intriguingly different in approach from co … Intriguingly different in approach from conventional works in the same area of inquiry, this study deals with the central problems and concerns of the sociology of knowledge as it has traditionally been conceived of. In other words, it is concerned with the relationship of knowledge, social interests and social structure, and with the various attempts which have been made to analyse the relationship.Barry Barnes takes the classic writings in the sociology of knowledge – by Marx, Lukács, Weber, Mannheim, Goldmann, Habermas and others – and uses them as resources in coming to grips with what he regards as the currently most interesting and significant questions in this area. This approach reflects one of the principal themes of the book itself. Knowledge, it is argued, is best treated as a resource available to those possessing it. This is the best perspective from which to understand its relationship to action and its historical significance; it is a perspective which avoids the problems of holding that knowledge is derivative, as well as those generated by the view that knowledge is a strong determinant of consciousness. the result is an unusual textbook, particularly valuable when read in conjunction with the original works it discusses.tion with the original works it discusses.)
Newton (1999) + (Isaac Newton; a new translation by I. Bernard Cohen and Anne Whitman, assisted by Julia Budenz; preceded by a guide to Newton's Principia by I. Bernard Cohen.)
Mandelbrote (2004) + (Isaac Newton’s Observations upon the Proph … Isaac Newton’s Observations upon the Prophecies of Daniel, and the Apocalypse of St. John, prepared for the press from his manuscripts by his nephew Benjamin Smith, was published in two editions in London and Dublin in 1733. According to Richard S. Westfall, Newton’s finest twentieth-century biographer, the author “had cleansed his Observations” and his heirs “could publish the manuscript without concern.”3 Yet one might be permitted to wonder whether either the actual or the intended reception of Newton’s posthumous work was as uncontroversial as it has seemed to late twentienth-century eyes. The book was dedicated to Peter King, baron of Ockham, the lord chancellor, who had defended Newton’s sometime disciple, William Whiston, during his trial for heresy in July 1713. Although Whiston later fell out with King, he nevertheless continued to maintain that King’s youthful writings on the primitive Church supported the Arian position for which he had himself been condemned.n for which he had himself been condemned.)
Kim (1999) + (It has been about a century and half since … It has been about a century and half since the ideas that we nowassociate with emergentism began taking shape.1 At the core ofthese ideas was the thought that as systems acquire increasinglyhigher degrees of organizational complexity they begin to exhibitnovel properties that in some sense transcend the properties of theirconstituent parts, and behave in ways that cannot be predicted onthe basis of the laws governing simpler systems. It is now standardto trace the birth of emergentism back to John Stuart Milland his distinction between “heteropathic” and “homopathic” laws,2although few of us would be surprised to learn that the sameor similar ideas had been entertained by our earlier philosophicalforebears.3 Academic philosophers – like Samuel Alexander andC.D. Broad in Britain, A.O. Lovejoy and Roy Wood Sellars inthe United States – played an important role in developing theconcept of emergence and the attendant doctrines of emergentism,but it is interesting to note that the fundamental idea seems to havehad a special appeal to scientists and those outside professionalphilosophy. These include the British biologist C. Lloyd Morgan,a leading theoretician of the emergentist movement early in thiscentury, and, more recently, the noted neurophysiologist Roger W.Sperry.e noted neurophysiologist Roger W. Sperry.)
Frigg (2006) + (It is now part and parcel of the official … It is now part and parcel of the official philosophical wisdom that models are essential to the acquisition and organisation of scientific knowledge. It is also generally accepted that most models represent their target systems in one way or another. But what does it mean for a model to represent its target system? I begin by introducing three conundrums that a theory of scientific representation has to come to terms with and then address the question of whether the semanticview of theories, which is the currently most widely accepted account of theories and models, provides us with adequate answers to these questions. After having argued in some detail that it does not, I briefly explain why other accounts of scientific modelling do not fit the bill either and conclude by pointing out in what direction a tenable account of scientific representation has to be sought.cientific representation has to be sought.)
Pandey (2023) + (It is unclear whether the first law forbid … It is unclear whether the first law forbids any conceivable scenarios or whether it is a tautology. This paper examines the first law with the goal of clarifying which scenarios it allows and which ones it forbids. I begin by highlighting a number of problems with the current formulations of the first laws for theories, methods, and questions, as well as the respective rejection theorems. New formulations for these laws and theorems are suggested to ensure their uniformity and the validity of their deductions. Next, I discuss a series of scenarios of theory replacement allowed by the first laws, such as the replacement by negation, the replacement by an answer to a different question, the replacement that involves the rejection of the question, and the replacement by a higher-order proposition. I then consider scenarios that are forbidden by the first law and show that this class only includes cases of rejection without replacement such as instances of element decay. This creates a dilemma. On the one hand, if cases of rejection without replacement are classified as non-scientonomic phenomena, the first law is a tautology. On the other hand, if such cases are classified as scientonomic phenomena, then the first law is not a tautology, but these cases stand as violations of the first law. The paper resolves this dilemma by opting for the former option: cases of rejection without replacement such as element decay due to catastrophic loss of records or destroyed communities are non-scientonomic, and should be considered as outside the scope of our discipline.ed as outside the scope of our discipline.)
Rupik (2021) + (It was commonly accepted in Goethe’s time … It was commonly accepted in Goethe’s time that plants were equipped both to propagate themselves and to play a certain role in the natural economy as a result of God’s beneficent and providential design. Goethe’s identification of sexual propagation as the “summit of nature” in The Metamorphosis of Plants (1790) might suggest that he, too, drew strongly from this theological-metaphysical tradition that had given rise to Christian Wolff’s science of teleology. Goethe, however, portrayed nature as inherently active and propagative, itself improvising into the future by multiple means, with no extrinsically pre-ordained goal or fixed end-point. Rooted in the nature philosophy of his friend and mentor Herder, Goethe’s plants exhibit their own historically and environmentally conditioned drives and directionality in The Metamorphosis of Plants. In this paper I argue that conceiving of nature as active productivity—not merely a passive product—freed Goethe of the need to tie plants’ forms and functions to a divine system of ends, and allowed him to consider possibilities for plants, and for nature, beyond the walls of teleology.for nature, beyond the walls of teleology.)
McDermid (2017) + (James Beattie was a Scottish philosopher a … James Beattie was a Scottish philosopher and poet who spent his entire academic career as Professor of Moral Philosophy and Logic at Marischal College in Aberdeen. His best known philosophical work, An Essay on The Nature and Immutability of Truth In Opposition to Sophistry and Scepticism (1770), is a rhetorical tour de force which affirmed the sovereignty of common sense while attacking David Hume (1711-1776). A smash bestseller in its day, this Essay on Truth made Beattie very famous and Hume very angry. The work's fame proved fleeting, as did Beattie’s philosophical reputation.as did Beattie’s philosophical reputation.)
Bolt (1998) + (John Herschel's natural philosophy, as sum … John Herschel's natural philosophy, as summarized in his Preliminary Discourse on the Study of Natural Philosophy , has long been considered a continuation of Francis Bacon's New Organon; commentators have frequently interpreted both as promoting a naive, inductivist methodology. I argue rather that Herschel promotes a more warranted and more sophisticated account. A careful reading of the Discourse, as well as of his more specialized essays, shows instead that Herschel explicitly encourages and defends the use of hypothetical reasoning. Such a methodology also describes his own extensive investigations that range over much of the spectrum of the physical sciences in the early nineteenth century. In developing this methodology, Herschel also drew on textual resources of Bacon, Isaac Newton, Roger Boscovich, Dugald Stewart, and others; most importantly, he was especially indebted to the investigations, views, and methods of his astronomer father, William Herschel. In particular, John Herschel applied his synthesis of these ideas to the empirical confirmation of his father's wide-ranging and speculative theories. In both the Discourse and in his other works, such as the Treatise on Astronomy, John Herschel promotes the use of hypotheses and of deductive methods as the tools used by experts, portraying inductive methods as the means by which sciences begin or as the most appropriate approach employed by amateurs. I also show how events of his life, including the socio-political context of early-nineteenth-century Britain, shaped Herschel's expression of his natural philosophy. Herschel's central role in the rise of science and of the philosophy of science in the nineteenth century make it imperative that we obtain a more accurate understanding of the doctrines he disseminated to practitioners of science and to popular audiences of the Victorian era. This volume provides the beginning of this broader taskrovides the beginning of this broader task)
Dunn (2003) + (John Locke (1632-1704) one of the greatest … John Locke (1632-1704) one of the greatest English philosophers of the late seventeenth and early eighteenth century, argued in his masterpiece, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, that our knowledge is founded in experience and reaches us principally through our senses; but its message has been curiously misunderstood. In this book John Dunn shows how Locke arrived at his theory of knowledge, and how his exposition of the liberal values of tolerationand responsible government formed the backbone of enlightened European thought of the eighteenth century.uropean thought of the eighteenth century.)
Uzgalis (2016) + (John Locke (b. 1632, d. 1704) was a Britis … John Locke (b. 1632, d. 1704) was a British philosopher, Oxford academic and medical researcher. Locke's monumental An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1689) is one of the first great defenses of empiricism and concerns itself with determining the limits of human understanding in respect to a wide spectrum of topics. It thus tells us in some detail what one can legitimately claim to know and what one cannot. Locke's association with Anthony Ashley Cooper (later the First Earl of Shaftesbury) led him to become successively a government official charged with collecting information about trade and colonies, economic writer, opposition political activist, and finally a revolutionary whose cause ultimately triumphed in the Glorious Revolution of 1688. Among Locke's political works he is most famous for The Second Treatise of Government in which he argues that sovereignty resides in the people and explains the nature of legitimate government in terms of natural rights and the social contract. He is also famous for calling for the separation of Church and State in his Letter Concerning Toleration. Much of Locke's work is characterized by opposition to authoritarianism. This is apparent both on the level of the individual person and on the level of institutions such as government and church. For the individual, Locke wants each of us to use reason to search after truth rather than simply accept the opinion of authorities or be subject to superstition. He wants us to proportion assent to propositions to the evidence for them. On the level of institutions it becomes important to distinguish the legitimate from the illegitimate functions of institutions and to make the corresponding distinction for the uses of force by these institutions. Locke believes that using reason to try to grasp the truth, and determine the legitimate functions of institutions will optimize human flourishing for the individual and society both in respect to its material and spiritual welfare. This in turn, amounts to following natural law and the fulfillment of the divine purpose for humanity.llment of the divine purpose for humanity.)
Jolley (1992) + (Jolley examines the reception of Descartes' philosophy within his contemporary scientific, academic, and religious communities.)
De Pierris and Friedman (2013) + (Kant famously attempted to “answer” what h … Kant famously attempted to “answer” what he took to be Hume's skeptical view of causality, most explicitly in the Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics (1783); and, because causality, for Kant, is a central example of a category or pure concept of the understanding, his relationship to Hume on this topic is central to his philosophy as a whole. Moreover, because Hume's famous discussion of causality and induction is equally central to his philosophy, understanding the relationship between the two philosophers on this issue is crucial for a proper understanding of modern philosophy more generally. Yet ever since Kant offered his response to Hume the topic has been subject to intense controversy. There is no consensus, of course, over whether Kant's response succeeds, but there is no more consensus about what this response is supposed to be. There has been sharp disagreement concerning Kant's conception of causality, as well as Hume's, and, accordingly, there has also been controversy over whether the two conceptions really significantly differ. There has even been disagreement concerning whether Hume's conception of causality and induction is skeptical at all. We shall not discuss these controversies in detail; rather, we shall concentrate on presenting one particularperspective on this very complicated set of issues. We shall clearlyindicate, however, where especially controversial points of interpretationarise and briefly describe some of the main alternatives.ly describe some of the main alternatives.)
Lakatos (1961) + (Lakatos's PhD Thesis.)
Laudan (1984a) + (Laudan constructs a fresh approach to a lo … Laudan constructs a fresh approach to a longtime problem for the philosopher of science: how to explain the simultaneous and widespread presence of both agreement and disagreement in science. Laudan critiques the logical empiricists and the post-positivists as he stresses the need for centrality and values and the interdependence of values, methods, and facts as prerequisites to solving the problems of consensus and dissent in science.blems of consensus and dissent in science.)
Hoyningen-Huene (2006) + (Let me begin with a convention. I will ref … Let me begin with a convention. I will refer to the distinction between the context of discovery and the context of justification as “the DJ distinction” (where I may note, for potentially misled younger readers, that this “DJ” has nothing to do with the music business). This paper is based on an older paper of mine (Hoyningen-Huene 1987). In the present paper, I will first recapitulate some of the topics of the older paper, and will contribute further considerations. Subsequently, I will discuss Thomas Kuhn’s ideas about justification in science. Thus will be clarified, in which sense precisely Kuhn opposed the DJ distinction. This is noteworthy, because in the 1960s and 1970s, many philosophers concluded from Kuhn’s opposition to the context distinction that he just did not understand what it was all about (and they inferred from this that he was just too uneducated as a philosopher to be taken seriously).d as a philosopher to be taken seriously).)
Kochiras (2014) + (Locke's philosophy of science consists lar … Locke's philosophy of science consists largely in his metaphysical and epistemological views of material substances and their powers. Locke has been widely hailed for providing an epistemological foundation for the experimental science of his day, and his thought is closely aligned with that of its practitioners, elaborating certain themes present in sparer form in Boyle and Newton. But if his epistemology helps to usher in the age of science, he still belongs to the age of natural philosophy. And if he is a devotee of the new science, he often appears an uncertain one, recognizing profound difficulties in it. In consequence, Locke's work is characterized by tensions and nuances, providing a rich source for scholarly research and debate. source for scholarly research and debate.)
Chappell (Ed.) (1994) + (Locke's philosophy, as edited by Chappell.)
Barseghyan and Shaw (2022) + (Many have struggled to identify the proper … Many have struggled to identify the proper way(s) that normative philosophical claims about science can benefit from history. The primary worry here has been that deriving philosophical ‘oughts’ from historical facts would commit the naturalistic fallacy (Schickore, 2011). The task of this paper is to introduce a novel solution to this problem. Specifically, we claim that the emerging field of scientonomy provides a promising avenue for how philosophy of science may benefit from the history of science. By taking descriptive findings and coupling them with additional normative premises, philosophers of science can draw normative methodological conclusions which can guide future scientific practices. Moreover, it is sometimes thought that philosophical claims about science are invariably local due to the diversity of scientific practices. While acknowledging this disunity, we show how a general theory of scientific change is possible and how it can be used to inform normative philosophy of science. Thus, we aim to outline a viable path for integrated history and philosophy of science that does not relinquish normativity and avoids the problem of cherry-picking which has plagued general accounts of science (Chang, 2011; Mizrahi, 2015).s of science (Chang, 2011; Mizrahi, 2015).)
Nickles (2017a) + (Many scientists, philosophers, and laypers … Many scientists, philosophers, and laypersons have regarded science as the one human enterprise that successfully escapes the contingencies of history to establish eternal truths about the universe, via a special, rational method of inquiry. Historicists oppose this view. In the 1960s several historically informed philosophers of science challenged the then-dominant accounts of scientific method advanced by the Popperians and the positivists (the logical positivists and logical empiricists) for failing to fit historical scientific practice and failing particularly to account for deep scientific change. While several strands of historicism originated in nineteenth-century historiography, this article focuses, first, on the historicist conceptions of scientific rationality that became prominent in the 1960s and 1970s, as the maturation of the field of historiography of science began to suggest competing models of scientific development, and, second, on recent approaches such as historical epistemology.pproaches such as historical epistemology.)
Longino (2008) + (Miriam Solomon's social empiricism is mark … Miriam Solomon's social empiricism is marked by emphasis on community level rationality in science and the refusal to impose a distinction between the epistemic and the non-epistemic character of factors (“decision vectors”) that incline scientists for or against a theory. While she attempts to derive some norms from the analysis of cases, her insistent naturalism undermines her effort to articulate norms for the (appropriate) distribution of decision vectors.opriate) distribution of decision vectors.)
Feyerabend (1993) + (Modern philosophy of science has paid grea … Modern philosophy of science has paid great attention to the understanding of scientific "practice", in contrast to the earlier concentration on scientific "method". This work, which has contributed to this debate, shows the deficiencies of some widespread ideas about the nature of knowledge. He argues that the only feasible explanations of scientific successes are historical explanations and that anarchism must now replace rationalism in the theory of knowledge. The third edition of this text contains a new preface and additional reflections which take account both of recent debates on science and on the impact of scientific products and practices on the human community. While disavowing populism or relativism, Feyerabend continues to insist that the voice of the inexpert must be heard. Thus many environmental perils were first identified by non-experts against prevailing assumptions in the scientific community.g assumptions in the scientific community.)
Reider (2016) + (Most philosophers agree that the world con … Most philosophers agree that the world contains epistemic subjects, the subjects of knowledge claims and other epistemic assessments. But does the world contain specifically epistemic agents? We talk as if epistemic subjects are agents -- 'His belief is irresponsible,' 'She ought to have known' -- but may on reflection wonder whether we should take the talk at face value. Are you responsible for your beliefs in anything like the way you are responsible for your actions? Does failing to know impugn your character in a way that parallels your failure to act with practical wisdom? Affirmative answers may emerge from reflection on the social dimension of knowing: from how you may come to know through others' testimony or let others know in turn. Can we make sense of such epistemic community without attributing specifically epistemic agency to its participants? Flipping our opening question on its head, should the social provenance of epistemic agency affect how we conceptualize the nature of epistemic subjects?ptualize the nature of epistemic subjects?)
Norton (2009) + (Much of what David Hume said about a wide … Much of what David Hume said about a wide range of subjectsremains of great importance today. In the first volume of his firstwork, A Treatise of Human Nature, a work in which he articulateda new “science of human nature,” Hume focused on an interrelatedset of issues in theory of knowledge, metaphysics, and philosophicalpsychology. More particularly, he explained how it is that we formsuch important conceptions as space and time, cause and effect,external objects, and personal identity. At the same time, he offeredan equally important account of how or why we believe in the objectsof these conceptions – an account of why we believe that causes arenecessarily connected to effects, that there are enduring externalobjects, and that there are enduring selves – even though the humanmind is unable to provide a satisfactory proof that these phenomenaexist. In the second volume of the Treatise Hume expanded hisaccount of human psychology, focusing on the origin and role of thepassions and the nature of human freedom. In the third and finalvolume of this work he explored the origins and nature of morality.In later works he returned to many of these philosophical issues,but he also made substantial contributions to our understanding ofpolitical theory, aesthetics, economics, and philosophy of religion.In addition, he wrote an influential, six-volume History of England,a work published in over 175 editions in the eighteenth and nineteenthcenturies, and still in print. nineteenth centuries, and still in print.)
Sarwar (2022) + (My aim in this chapter is to introduce the … My aim in this chapter is to introduce the general system theory and to provide directions for research. One of the central issues in scientonomy is that its object of study is ill-defined. I will begin to approach this question by drawing on the general system theory. In so doing, I will introduce the scientonomic community to a radically different way of thinking about explaining changes in scientific worldviews. Even if many of my ideas appear radical, I hope that by contradistinction the reader may appreciate how the scientonomic ideas may be made more precise.ientonomic ideas may be made more precise.)
Paley (1809) + (Natural Theology or Evidences of the Exist … Natural Theology or Evidences of the Existence and Attributes of the Deity is an 1802 work of Christian apologetics and philosophy of religion by the English clergyman William Paley (July 1743 – 25 May 1805). The book expounds his arguments from natural theology, making a teleological argument for the existence of God, notably beginning with the watchmaker analogy.The book was written in the context of the natural theology tradition. In earlier centuries, theologians such as John Ray and William Derham, as well as philosophers of classical times such as Cicero, argued for the existence and goodness of God from the general well-being of living things and the physical world.Paley's Natural Theology is an extended argument, constructed around a series of examples including finding a watch; comparing the eye to a telescope; and the existence of finely adapted mechanical structures in animals, such as joints which function like hinges or manmade ball and socket joints. Paley argues that these all lead to an intelligent Creator, and that a system is more than the sum of its parts. The last chapters are more theological in character, arguing that the attributes of God must be sufficient for the extent of his operations, and that God must be good because designs seen in nature are beneficial.The book was many times republished and remains in print. It continues to be consulted by creationists. Charles Darwin took its arguments seriously and responded to them; evolutionary biologists like Stephen Jay Gould and Richard Dawkins continue to discuss Paley's book to respond to modern proponents with similar ideas.d to modern proponents with similar ideas.)
Rescher (2000b) + (Nature and Understanding explores the pros … Nature and Understanding explores the prospect of looking from a scientific point of view at such central ideas of traditional metaphysics as the simplicity of nature, its comprehensibility, or its systematic integrity. Rescher seeks to describe - in a way accessible to philosophers and nonphilosophers alike - the metaphysical situation that characterizes the process of inquiry in natural science. His principal aim is to see what light can be shed on reality by examining the modus operandi of natural science itself, focusing as much on its findings as on its conceptual and methodological presuppositions. This is the culmination of many years of penetrating work in this area of philosophy by one of its most eminent exponents. It is the definitive presentation of some of Rescher's key ideas.esentation of some of Rescher's key ideas.)
Smith (2009) + (No work of science has drawn more attentio … No work of science has drawn more attention from philosophers than Newton's Principia. The reasons for this, however, and consequently the focus of the attention have changed significantly from one century to the next. During the 20th Century philosophers have viewed the Principia in the context of Einstein's new theory of gravity in his theory of general relativity. The main issues have concerned the relation between Newton'sand Einstein's theories of gravity and what the need to replace the former with the latter says about the nature, scope, and limits of scientific knowledge. During most of the 18th Century, by contrast, Newton's theory of gravity remained under dispute, especially because of the absence of a mechanism — in particular, a contact mechanism — producing gravitational forces. The philosophic literature correspondingly endeavored to clarify and to resolve, one way or the other, the dispute over whether the Principia should or should not be viewed as methodologically well founded. By the 1790s Newton's theory of gravity had become established among those engaged in research in orbital mechanics and physical geodesy, leading to the Principia becoming the exemplar of science at its most successful. Philosophic interest in the Principia during the 19th Century therefore came to focus on how Newton had achieved this success, in part to characterize the knowledge that had been achieved and in part to pursue comparable knowledge in other areas of research. Unfortunately, a very large fraction of the philosophic literature in all three centuries has suffered from a quite simplistic picture of the Principia itself. The main goal of this entry is to replace that simplistic picture with one that does more justice to the richness of both the content and the methodology of the Principiantent and the methodology of the Principia)
Thijssen (2003) + (On March 7, 1277, the Bishop of Paris, Ste … On March 7, 1277, the Bishop of Paris, Stephen Tempier, prohibited the teaching of 219 philosophical and theological theses that were being discussed and disputed in the faculty of arts under his jurisdiction. Tempier’s condemnation has gained great symbolic meaning in the minds of modern intellectual historians, and possibly for this reason, there is still considerable disagreement about what motivated Tempier to promulgate his prohibition, what exactly was condemned, and who the targets were. In addition, the effects of Tempier’s action on the course of medieval thought in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, and even beyond, has been the subject of much debate. The lack of a commonly accepted standard account of Tempier’s actions plus the enormous amount of literature and of textual evidence that either directly or indirectly bears on the events of 1277, puts specific limitations to the present entry. It will be confined to presenting those historical facts that are uncontroversial and to indicating the main issues of current debate with respect to Tempier’s condemnation.te with respect to Tempier’s condemnation.)
Abbott et al. (2016) + (On September 14, 2015 at 09:50:45 UTC the … On September 14, 2015 at 09:50:45 UTC the two detectors of the Laser Interferometer Gravitational-Wave Observatory simultaneously observed a transient gravitational-wave signal. The signal sweeps upwards in frequency from 35 to 250 Hz with a peak gravitational-wave strain of 1.0 × 10−21. It matches the waveform predicted by general relativity for the inspiral and merger of a pair of black holes and the ringdown of the resulting single black hole. These observations demonstrate the existence of binary stellar-mass black hole systems. This is the first direct detection of gravitational waves and the first observation of a binary black hole merger.observation of a binary black hole merger.)
Castelvecchi and Witze (2016) + (One hundred years after Albert Einstein predicted the existence of gravitational waves, scientists have finally spotted these elusive ripples in space-time.)
Fraser (2022) + (One of the most salient lessons from HPS a … One of the most salient lessons from HPS as a discipline is that science is a living, breathing endeavor; one whose rules and values are constantly changing. As such, there is an essential tension between the hope for a coherent, unified conception of scientific rationality on the one hand, and the recognition of the diversity of perspectives which fit into the framework called science. The big question, of which I hope to answer a small part, is: how can rationality and relativism be reconciled with one another? To do this, I present a rational reconstruction of a theory of scientific change which resembles Barseghyan’s theory of scientific change. I interpret scientific knowledge modally; the scientific mosaic of a community at a particular time is taken to represent the actual instantiation of a collection of possible scientific changes, all linked to one another through a Kripkean semantics of possible worlds. I then draw a correspondence between accepted scientific theories and employed methods with logical axioms and rules of inference respectively and use this to construct a logical framework for studying the modality of scientific knowledge. I use this framework to obtain a notion of scientific rationality which is contextually localized, but still presents a clear direction of scientific development at every individual time step.development at every individual time step.)
Sarton (1987) + (Originally Published 1931.)
Sarton (2011) + (Originally published by Harvard University Press in 1952.)
Sarton (1957a) + (Originally published in 1936 by Harvard University Press.)
Sarton (2007) + (Originally published in 1948.)
Sarton (2017) + (Originally published in 1955.)
Ruse (1999) + (Originally published in 1979, The Darwinia … Originally published in 1979, The Darwinian Revolution was the first comprehensive and readable synthesis of the history of evolutionary thought. Though the years since have seen an enormous flowering of research on Darwin and other nineteenth-century scientists concerned with evolution, as well as the larger social and cultural responses to their work, The Darwinian Revolution remains remarkably current and stimulating.emains remarkably current and stimulating.)
Schantz and Seidel (Eds.) (2011) + (Over history, cognitive relativism has bee … Over history, cognitive relativism has been an unpopular viewpoint in the philosophy of knowledge. Yet relativist ideas in epistemology have experienced an unprecedented popularity in the twentieth century due thinkers such as Willard Quine, Thomas Kuhn, and Ludwig Wittgenstein. The questions of whether these ideas, in fact, support relativism, and whether or not a social constructivist view of science is logically coherent and feasible is the subject of this series of essays.e is the subject of this series of essays.)
Leary (1979) + (Over the past one hundred years psychology … Over the past one hundred years psychology has evolved into a major scientific discipline. Nonetheless, psychology is presently in a state of considerable turmoil regarding its proper subject matter and method. Is psychology a natural science, a social science, or a hybrid of the two? What relation should psychology maintain with philosophy? These general questions, currently under debate, were addressed by Wilhelm Wundt, one of the founders of modern experimental psychology. This articleis an attempt to specify Wundt’s conceptualization of psychology and to place it in its historical context. Secondarily it also traces certain major developments since the time of Wundt. The conclusion that is reached is that the apparent contemporary "crisis" in psychology is really nothing new and that, in fact, the present condition of psychology does not necessarily constitute a crisis. In its broad outline at least, present-day psychology reflects the program which Wundt espoused one hundredyears ago.hich Wundt espoused one hundred years ago.)
Feyerabend (1981b) + (Over the past thirty years Paul Feyerabend … Over the past thirty years Paul Feyerabend has developed an extremely distinctive and influential approach to problems in the philosophy of science. The most important and seminal of his published essays are collected here in two volumes, with new introductions to provide an overview and historical perspective on the discussions of each part. Volume 1 presents papers on the interpretation of scientific theories, together with papers applying the views developed to particular problems in philosophy and physics. The essays in volume 2 examine the origin and history of an abstract rationalism, as well as its consequences for the philosophy of science and methods of scientific research. Professor Feyerabend argues with great force and imagination for a comprehensive and opportunistic pluralism. In doing so he draws on extensive knowledge of scientific history and practice, and he is alert always to the wider philosophical, practical and political implications of conflicting views. These two volumes fully display the variety of his ideas, and confirm the originality and significance of his work. originality and significance of his work.)
Feyerabend (1981a) + (Over the past thirty years Paul Feyerabend … Over the past thirty years Paul Feyerabend has developed an extremely distinctive and influential approach to problems in the philosophy of science. The most important and seminal of his published essays are collected here in two volumes, with new introductions to provide an overview and historical perspective on the discussions of each part. Volume 1 presents papers on the interpretation of scientific theories, together with papers applying the views developed to particular problems in philosophy and physics. The essays in volume 2 examine the origin and history of an abstract rationalism, as well as its consequences for the philosophy of science and methods of scientific research. Professor Feyerabend argues with great force and imagination for a comprehensive and opportunistic pluralism. In doing so he draws on extensive knowledge of scientific history and practice, and he is alert always to the wider philosophical, practical and political implications of conflicting views. These two volumes fully display the variety of his ideas, and confirm the originality and significance of his work. originality and significance of his work.)
Pitt (Ed.) (1985) + (Papers related to and arising from the Fourth International Conference on History and Philosophy of Science, Blacksburg, Virginia, November 1982.)
Feyerabend (2010) + (Paul Feyerabend’s globally acclaimed work, … Paul Feyerabend’s globally acclaimed work, which sparked and continues to stimulate fierce debate, examines the deficiencies of many widespread ideas about scientific progress and the nature of knowledge. Feyerabend argues that scientific advances can only be understood in a historical context. He looks at the way the philosophy of science has consistently overemphasized practice over method, and considers the possibility that anarchism could replace rationalism in the theory of knowledge. This updated edition of the classic text includes a new introduction by Ian Hacking, one of the most important contemporary philosophers of science. Hacking reflects on both Feyerabend’s life and personality as well as the broader significance of the book for current discussions.cance of the book for current discussions.)
Feyerabend (1975a) + (Paul Feyerabend’s globally acclaimed work, … Paul Feyerabend’s globally acclaimed work, which sparked and continues to stimulate fierce debate, examines the deficiencies of many widespread ideas about scientific progress and the nature of knowledge. Feyerabend argues that scientific advances can only be understood in a historical context. He looks at the way the philosophy of science has consistently overemphasized practice over method, and considers the possibility that anarchism could replace rationalism in the theory of knowledge.ce rationalism in the theory of knowledge.)
Matilal and Charkrabarti (Eds.) (1994) + (Perspectives on testimony in Indian philosophy.)
Anstey (2011) + (Peter Anstey presents a thorough and innov … Peter Anstey presents a thorough and innovative study of John Locke's views on the method and content of natural philosophy. Focusing on Locke's Essay concerning Human Understanding, but also drawing extensively from his other writings and manuscript remains, Anstey argues that Locke was an advocate of the Experimental Philosophy: the new approach to natural philosophy championed by Robert Boyle and the early Royal Society who were opposed to speculative philosophy. On the question of method, Anstey shows how Locke's pessimism about the prospects for a demonstrative science of nature led him, in the Essay, to promote Francis Bacon's method of natural history, and to downplay the value of hypotheses and analogical reasoning in science. But, according to Anstey, Locke never abandoned the ideal of a demonstrative natural philosophy, for he believed that if we could discover the primary qualities of the tiny corpuscles that constitute material bodies, we could then establish a kind of corpuscular metric that would allow us a genuine science of nature. It was only after the publication of the Essay, however, that Locke came to realize that Newton's Principia provided a model for the role of demonstrative reasoning in science based on principles established upon observation, and this led him to make significant revisions to his views in the 1690s. On the content of Locke's natural philosophy, it is argued that even though Locke adhered to the Experimental Philosophy, he was not averse to speculation about the corpuscular nature of matter. Anstey takes us into new terrain and new interpretations of Locke's thought in his explorations of his mercurialist transmutational chymistry, his theory of generation by seminal principles, and his conventionalism about species.es, and his conventionalism about species.)
Palider (2022) + (Philosophy of science and history of scien … Philosophy of science and history of science have been unable to integrate in a meaningful fashion. The major difficulty has been the question of how the history of science can inform the philosophy of science. By making several distinctions to characterize the type of philosophy of science relevant for integrated HPS, I show how traditional approaches to integration failed. These include a top-down and a bottom-up philosophical approach to integrated HPS. I then present a more fruitful way of integrating the disciplines, that of iterations.ating the disciplines, that of iterations.)
Garber (1992) + (Physics and its foundations were central t … Physics and its foundations were central to Descartes' thought. Although today he is probably best known for his metaphysics of mind and body, or for his epistemological program, in the seventeenth century Descartes was at very least equally well known for his mechanistic physics and the mechanist world of geometrical bodies in motion which he played a large role in making acceptable to his contemporaries. In this essay I shall outline Descartes' mechanical philosophy in its historical context. After some brief remarks on the immediate background to Descartes' program for physics, and a brief outline of the historical development of his physics, we shall discuss the foundations of Descartes' physics, including his concepts of body and motion and his views on the laws of motion.otion and his views on the laws of motion.)
Fisher (2014) + (Pierre Gassendi (b. 1592, d. 1655) was a F … Pierre Gassendi (b. 1592, d. 1655) was a French philosopher, scientificchronicler, observer, and experimentalist, scholar of ancient texts anddebates, and active participant in contemporary deliberations of the firsthalf of the seventeenth century. His significance in early modern thoughthas in recent years been rediscovered and explored, towards a betterunderstanding of the dawn of modern empiricism, the mechanicalphilosophy, and relations of modern philosophy to ancient and medievaldiscussions. While Gassendi is perhaps best known in history ofphilosophy for his disputes with Descartes, his relations with other majorfigures, including Kepler, Galileo, Mersenne, Beeckman, and Hobbes,represented even more important transactions of ideas. And whileGassendi also sought to communicate anew the ideas of Epicurus, theStoics, and other earlier thinkers, his resulting amalgam of perspectivesprovides a modern view of his own making, one of the touchstones ofphilosophy and science in his times: our access to knowledge of thenatural world is dependent on the constraints and licenses that follow fromour epistemic grasp being limited to information provided by senses.limited to information provided by senses.)
Longino (2016b) + (Practice-centric and theory-centric approa … Practice-centric and theory-centric approaches in philosophy of science are described and contrasted. The contrast is developed through an examination of their different treatments of the underdetermination problem. The practice-centric approach is illustrated by a summary of comparative research on approaches in the biology of behaviour. The practice-centric approach is defended against charges that it encourages skepticism regarding the sciences.ourages skepticism regarding the sciences.)
Anagnostopoulos and Miller (Eds.) (2013) + (Preparing this homage to David Keyt has b … Preparing this homage to David Keyt has been a labor of love for the editors and contributors alike. The volume contains ﬁfteen essays by sixteen scholars including students, colleagues, and friends (the latter category being all inclusive!). All of the authors make important original contributions to the study of ancient Greek philosophy, and we wish to thank them all for agreeing to participate in this project, for their cooperation with the editing, and for the high quality of their essays. We are also grateful for their patience and good cheer throughout an unexpectedly protracted publication process. T he papers by Gerasimos Santas, Nils Rauhut, Mark McPherran, Charles Young, and Fred D. Miller, Jr. were delivered originally at a conference (aka “the Keytfest”) held at the University of Washington in Seattle in 2007 commemorating David Keyt’s ﬁ ftieth year as a professor of philosophy. Kenneth Clatterbaugh, Chair of the Department of Philosophy at the University of Washington, was very supportive of the program, and Bev Wessel provided valuable administrative assistance. Daniel Fisher, a student of David Keyt, offered generous ﬁ nancial support. Richard Parker, another former student, served as quipster and consummate master of ceremonies. W e are pleased to thank a number of people who have been very helpful with the editing and publication of this volume including Professor Stephen Hetherington, the editor of Springer’s Philosophical Studies Series; Ingrid van Laarhoven; Christi Lue; Ties Nijssen; Hendrikje Tuerlings; Professor Nicholas D. Smith, who helped to ﬁ nd a suitable publisher for the volume; and an anonymous reviewer who provided helpful comments. James Dabgotra ably assisted with the ﬁ rst round of editing, and Pamela Phillips did an excellent job copyediting the entire typescript and preparing it for the publisher. We also gratefully acknowledge ﬁnancial support from the Social Philosophy and Policy Foundation for the original conference and for the editing of the volume. Finally, we thank David Keyt for his assistance throughout the planning and preparation of the volume and especially for his willingness to contribute a fascinating memoir of his academic career which, in addition to delightful anecdotes about his encounters with notable scholars, offers illuminating insights into his own work and also into the recent history of the subdiscipline of ancient philosophy. With affection and admiration, we the editors and all the contributors dedicate this volume to David Keyt, in recognition of his major contributions to the study of ancient philosophy, and on behalf of the many students, colleagues, and friends whose lives he has touched and enriched over the past half century.d and enriched over the past half century.)
Latour (2005) + (Reassembling the social is Latour's challe … Reassembling the social is Latour's challenge to classical sociological understandings of the "social" and contends that there is not a necessary social ether which often influences human actions, but that by definition networks of human actions are the social aspect often erroneous identified. social aspect often erroneous identified.)
Barseghyan (2018) + (Recent developments in theoretical sciento … Recent developments in theoretical scientonomy coupled with a reflection on the practice of the Encyclopedia of Scientonomy all suggest that the ontology of scientific change currently accepted in scientonomy has serious flaws. The new ontology, suggested in this paper, solves some of the issues permeating the current ontology. Building on [[Modification:Sciento-2018-0002|Rawleigh’s suggestion]], it considers a ''theory'' as an attempt to answer a certain ''question''. It also introduces the category of ''definition'' as a subtype of theory. It also reveals that ''methods'' and ''methodologies'' of the currently accepted ontology do not differ from the perspective of their propositional content and, thus, belong to the same class of epistemic elements. This is captured in the new definition of ''method'' as a set of criteria for theory evaluation. It is also argued that ''methods'' are a subtype of ''normative theories''. It is shown that ''normative theories'' of all types, including methods, ethical norms, and aesthetic norms, can be both ''accepted and employed''. Finally, a new definition of ''scientific mosaic'' is suggested to fit the new ontology.ic'' is suggested to fit the new ontology.)
Intemann (2008) + (Recent feminist philosophers of science ha … Recent feminist philosophers of science have argued that feminist values can contribute to rational decisions about which scientific theories to accept. On this view, increasing the number of feminist scientists is important for ensuring rational and objective theory acceptance. The Underdetermination Thesis has played a key role in arguments for this view [Anderson (1995) Hypatia 10(3), 50–84; Hankinson Nelson (1990) Who knows? From Quine to a feminist empiricism. Temple University Press, Philadelphia; Longino (1990) Science as social knowledge. Princeton University Press, Princeton; Longino (2002) The fate of knowledge. Princeton University Press, Princeton; Kourany (2003) Philosophy of Science 70, 1–14]. This thesis is alleged to open an argumentative “gap” between evidence and theory acceptance and provide a rationale for filling the gap with feminist values. While I agree with the conclusion that feminist values can contribute to rational decisions about which theories to accept, I argue that the Underdetermination Thesis cannot support this claim. First, using earlier arguments [Laudan (1990) in: R. Giere (ed) Minnesota studies in the philosophy of science, vol 14, pp 267–297; Slezak (1991) International Studies in Philosophy of Science 5, 241–256; Pinnick (1994) Philosophy of Science 61, 664–657] I show that Underdetermination cannot, by itself, establish that feminist values should fill the gap in theory acceptance. Secondly, I argue that the very use of the Underdetermination Thesis concedes that feminist values are extra-scientific, a-rational, factors in theory acceptance. This concession denies feminists grounds to explain why their values contribute to rational scientific reasoning. Finally, I propose two alternative ways to explain how feminist values can contribute to rational theory acceptance that do not rely on Underdetermination.ce that do not rely on Underdetermination.)
Stump (2022) + (Relative, pragmatic, or dynamic theories o … Relative, pragmatic, or dynamic theories of the a priori have been considered by many philosophers of science. I present these theories as a model of how radical conceptual change occurs during a scientific revolution. When elements of a theory that are considered to be a priori or constitutive change, we have a revolutionary change that requires rethinking all of a scientific practice. Given that conceptual change is the flashpoint for discussion of the issues of incommensurability, the rationality of scientific change and relativism, by exploring theories of the a priori I show how radical conceptual change can occur and defend the rationality of scientific change. The viewpoint adopted avoids commitment to traditional a priori knowledge and to metaphysics, while still acknowledging that there is an important element in science that cannot simply be described as empirical. I present evidence to show that the model of scientific change can be applied widely.f scientific change can be applied widely.)
Newman (2014) + (René Descartes (1596–1650) is widely regar … René Descartes (1596–1650) is widely regarded as the father of modern philosophy. His noteworthy contributions extend to mathematics and physics. This entry focuses on his philosophical contributions in the theory of knowledge. Specifically, the focus is on the epistemological project of Descartes' famous work, Meditations on First Philosophy. Upon its completion, the work was circulated to other philosophers for their comments and criticisms. Descartes responded with detailed replies that provide a rich source of further information about the original work. He indeed published the first edition (1641) of the Meditations together with six sets of objections and replies, adding a seventh set with the second edition (1642).eventh set with the second edition (1642).)
Hatfield (2016) + (René Descartes (1596–1650) was a creative … René Descartes (1596–1650) was a creative mathematician of the first order, an important scientific thinker, and an original metaphysician. During the course of his life, he was a mathematician first, a natural scientist or “natural philosopher” second, and a metaphysician third. In mathematics, he developed the techniques that made possible algebraic (or “analytic”) geometry. In natural philosophy, he can be credited with several specific achievements: co-framer of the sine law of refraction, developer of an important empirical account of the rainbow, and proposer of a naturalistic account of the formation of the earth and planets (a precursor to the nebular hypothesis). More importantly, he offered a new vision of the natural world that continues to shape our thought today: a world of matter possessing a few fundamental properties and interacting according to a few universal laws. This natural world included an immaterial mind that, in human beings, was directly related to the brain; in this way, Descartes formulated the modern version of the mind–body problem. In metaphysics, he provided arguments for the existence of God, to show that the essence of matter is extension, and that the essence of mind is thought. Descartes claimed early on to possess a special method, which was variously exhibited in mathematics, natural philosophy, and metaphysics, and which, in the latter part of his life, included, or was supplemented by, a method of doubt.or was supplemented by, a method of doubt.)
Wimsatt (2006) + (Richard Levins’ distinction between aggreg … Richard Levins’ distinction between aggregate, composed and evolvedsystems acquires new significance as we recognize the importance of mechanisticexplanation. Criteria for aggregativity provide limiting cases for absence of organization,so through their failure, can provide rich detectors for organizational properties.I explore the use of failures of aggregativity for the analysis of mechanisticsystems in diverse contexts. Aggregativity appears theoretically desireable, but weare easily fooled. It may be exaggerated through approximation, conditions ofderivation, and extrapolating from some conditions of decomposition illegtimatelyto others. Evolved systems particularly may require analyses under alternativecomplementary decompositions. Exploring these conditions helps us to betterunderstand the strengths and limits of reductionistic methods.gths and limits of reductionistic methods.)
Laudan, Laudan, and Donovan (1988) + (Science is accorded high value in our cult … Science is accorded high value in our culture because, unlike many other intellectual endeavors, it appears capable of producing increasingly reliable knowledge. During the last quarter century a group of historians and philosophers of science (known variously as 'theorists of scientific change', the 'post-positivist school' or the 'historical school') has proposed theories to explain progressive change in science. Their concepts and models have received such keen attention that terms like 'paradigm' have passed from obscurity to common speech. In this volume, we subject key claims of some of the theorists of scientific change to just that kind of empirical scrutiny that has been so characteristic of science itself. Certain claims emerge unscathed - the existence and importance of large-scale theories (guiding assumptions) in the physical sciences for example. Others, such as the supposed importance of novel predictions or the alleged insignificance of anomalies, seem to be without foundation. We conclude that only by engaging in testing of this sort will the study of science be able to make progress.study of science be able to make progress.)
Winther (2016) + (Scientific inquiry has led to immense expl … Scientific inquiry has led to immense explanatory and technologicalsuccesses, partly as a result of the pervasiveness of scientific theories.Relativity theory, evolutionary theory, and plate tectonics were, andcontinue to be, wildly successful families of theories within physics,biology, and geology. Other powerful theory clusters inhabitcomparatively recent disciplines such as cognitive science, climatescience, molecular biology, microeconomics, and Geographic InformationScience (GIS). Effective scientific theories magnify understanding, helpsupply legitimate explanations, and assist in formulating predictions.Moving from their knowledge-producing representational functions totheir interventional roles (Hacking 1983), theories are integral to building technologies used within consumer, industrial, and scientific milieus. This entry explores the structure of scientific theories from the perspective of the Syntactic, Semantic, and Pragmatic Views. Each of these answers questions such as the following in unique ways. What is the bestcharacterization of the composition and function of scientific theory? How is theory linked with world? Which philosophical tools can and should be employed in describing and reconstructing scientific theory? Is an understanding of practice and application necessary for a comprehensionof the core structure of a scientific theory? Finally, and most generally,how are these three views ultimately related? are these three views ultimately related?)
Allen (1988) + (Scientists, philosophers and theologians h … Scientists, philosophers and theologians have wrestled repeatedly with the question of whether knowledge is similar or different in their various understandings of the world and God. Although agreement is still elusive, the epistemology of critical realism, associated with Ian Barbour, John Polkinghorne and Arthur Peacocke, remains widely credible. Relying on the lifetime work of philosopher Ernan McMullin, this book expands our understanding of critical realism beyond a permanent stand-off between the subjective and objective, whether in science or theology. Critical realism illuminates the subject and the objectively known simultaneously. Responding to criticisms made against it, this book defends critical realism in science and theology with a specific role to play in our understanding of God. role to play in our understanding of God.)
Yan, Tsai, and Huang (2022) + (Scientonomy is the field that aims to deve … Scientonomy is the field that aims to develop a descriptive theory of the actual process of scientific change (Barseghyan, 2015). Scientometrics is the field that aims to employ statistical methods to investigate the quantitative features of scientific research, especially the impact of scientific articles and the significance of scientific citations (Leydesdorff & Milojević, 2013). In this paper, we aim to illustrate how to methodologically integrate scientonomy with scientometrics to investigate both qualitative and quantitative changes of a scientific community. We will use a case study to achieve our aim. The case study is about a scientific community studying a physiological phenomenon called heart-rate variability (HRV). Moreover, we will argue that this methodological integration outperforms cases in which researchers only employ the resources from one of the two fields.ploy the resources from one of the two fields.)
Dechauffour (2022) + (Scientonomy seems to hold conflicting view … Scientonomy seems to hold conflicting views about the historicity of scientific method. On the one hand, it is said that scientific methods are immanent to scientific mosaics and therefore change through time. On the other hand, the distinction between substantive and procedural methods seems to suggest that there are transcendent, unchangeable methods. I argue that this contradiction can be resolved by re-evaluating the role of problems: by integrating problems as constitutive elements of scientific mosaics, scientonomy can work towards a theory of scientific change without relying on the presupposition that some normative aspects of science must not change. In that perspective, norms originate in the relation between a problem, which creates a need for theoretical innovation, and a method, which creates an actual means to solve a problem. A problem-based scientonomy would then have to build a genealogical, rather than normative, approach to the source of scientificity by describing the progression from mysteries to scientific problems. Moreover, because they do not come from nowhere but express actual interactions with the world, problems can help us understand the relation between scientific change and other kinds of change. The primacy of actual problems over rational norms points to the immanence of reason: reason should be conceived as an evolutive feature of human communities. Finally, the relation between a theory of scientific change, evolutionary epistemology, and a general theory of change is investigated. general theory of change is investigated.)
Terrall (2002) + (Self-styled adventurer, literary wit, phil … Self-styled adventurer, literary wit, philosopher, and statesman of science, Pierre-Louis Moreau de Maupertuis (1698-1759) stood at the center of Enlightenment science and culture. Offering an elegant and accessible portrait of this remarkable man, Mary Terrall uses the story of Maupertuis's life, self-fashioning, and scientific works to explore what it meant to do science and to be a man of science in eighteenth-century Europe.Beginning his scientific career as a mathematician in Paris, Maupertuis entered the public eye with a much-discussed expedition to Lapland, which confirmed Newton's calculation that the earth was flattened at the poles. He also made significant, and often intentionally controversial, contributions to physics, life science, navigation, astronomy, and metaphysics. Called to Berlin by Frederick the Great, Maupertuis moved to Prussia to preside over the Academy of Sciences there. Equally at home in salons, cafés, scientific academies, and royal courts, Maupertuis used his social connections and his printed works to enhance a carefully constructed reputation as both a man of letters and a man of science. His social and institutional affiliations, in turn, affected how Maupertuis formulated his ideas, how he presented them to his contemporaries, and the reactions they provoked.Terrall not only illuminates the life and work of a colorful and important Enlightenment figure, but also uses his story to delve into many wider issues, including the development of scientific institutions, the impact of print culture on science, and the interactions of science and government. Smart and highly readable, Maupertuis will appeal to anyone interested in eighteenth-century science and culture.“Terrall’s work is scholarship in the best sense. Her explanations of arcane 18th-century French physics, mathematics, astronomy, and biology are among the most lucid available in any language.” — ''Virginia Dawson, American Historical Review''Winner of the 2003 Pfizer Award from the History of Science Society Award from the History of Science Society)
Mill (2003) + (Since its first publication in 1859, few w … Since its first publication in 1859, few works of political philosophy have provoked such continuous controversy as John Stuart Mill's "On Liberty", a passionate argument on behalf of freedom of self-expression. This classic work is now available in this volume which also includes essays by scholars in a range of fields. The text begins with a biographical essay by David Bromwich and an interpretative essay by George Kateb. Then Jean Bethke Elshtain, Owen Fiss, Judge Richard A. Posner and Jeremy Waldron present commentaries on the pertinence of Mill's thinking to early 21st century debates. They discuss, for example, the uses of authority and tradition, the shifting legal boundaries of free speech and free action, the relation of personal liberty to market individualism, and the tension between the right to live as one pleases and the right to criticize anyone's way of life.e right to criticize anyone's way of life.)
Cohen and Smith (Eds.) (2002) + (Sir Isaac Newton (1642–1727) was one of th … Sir Isaac Newton (1642–1727) was one of the greatest scientists of all time, a thinker of extraordinary range and creativity who has left enduring legacies in mathematics and the natural sciences. In this volume a team of distinguished contributors examine all the main aspects of Newton's thought, including not only his approach to space, time, mechanics, and universal gravity in his Principia, his research in optics, and his contributions to mathematics, but also his more clandestine investigations into alchemy, theology, and prophecy, which have sometimes been overshadowed by his mathematical and scientific interests.his mathematical and scientific interests.)
Ariew (1986) + (Some philosophers of science suggest that … Some philosophers of science suggest that philosophical assumptions mustinfluence historical scholarship, because history (like science) has no neutral data andbecause the treatment of any particular historical episode is going to be influenced tosome degree by one's prior philosophical conceptions of what is important in science.However, if the history of science must be laden with philosophical assumptions, then howcan the history of science be evidence for the philosophy of science? Would not aninductivist history of science confirm an inductivist philosophy of science and aconventionalist history of science confirm a conventionalist philosophy of science? Iattempt to resolve this problem; essentially, I deny the claim that the history of sciencemust be influenced by one's conception of what is important in science - one's generalphilosophy of science. To accomplish the task I look at a specific historical episode,together with its history, and draw some metamethodological conclusions from it. Thespecific historical episode I examine is Descartes' critique of Galileo's scientific methodology.tique of Galileo's scientific methodology.)
Longino (2016a) + (Study of the social dimensions of scientif … Study of the social dimensions of scientific knowledge encompasses theeffects of scientific research on human life and social relations, the effectsof social relations and values on scientific research, and the social aspectsof inquiry itself. Several factors have combined to make these questionssalient to contemporary philosophy of science. These factors include theemergence of social movements, like environmentalism and feminism,critical of mainstream science; concerns about the social effects ofscience-based technologies; epistemological questions made salient by bigscience; new trends in the history of science, especially the move awayfrom internalist historiography; anti-normative approaches in thesociology of science; turns in philosophy to naturalism and pragmatism.This entry reviews the historical background to current research in thisarea and features of contemporary science that invite philosophicalattention. The philosophical work can roughly be classified into twocamps. One acknowledges that scientific inquiry is in fact carried out insocial settings and asks whether and how standard epistemology must besupplemented to address this feature. The other treats sociality as afundamental aspect of knowledge and asks how standard epistemologymust be modified from this broadly social perspective. Concerns in thesupplementing approach include such matters as trust and answerabilityraised by multiple authorship, the division of cognitive labor, thereliability of peer review, the challenges of privately funded science, aswell as concerns arising from the role of scientific research in society. Thereformist approach highlights the challenge to normative philosophy fromsocial, cultural, and feminist studies of science while seeking to developphilosophical models of the social character of scientific knowledge, andtreats the questions of the division of cognitive labor, expertise and authority, the interactions of science and society, etc., from the perspectiveof philosophical models of the irreducibly social character of scientificknowledge. social character of scientific knowledge.)
Longino (2015) + (Study of the social dimensions of scientif … Study of the social dimensions of scientific knowledge encompasses theeffects of scientific research on human life and social relations, the effectsof social relations and values on scientific research, and the social aspectsof inquiry itself. Several factors have combined to make these questionssalient to contemporary philosophy of science. These factors include theemergence of social movements, like environmentalism and feminism,critical of mainstream science; concerns about the social effects ofscience-based technologies; epistemological questions made salient by bigscience; new trends in the history of science, especially the move awayfrom internalist historiography; anti-normative approaches in thesociology of science; turns in philosophy to naturalism and pragmatism.This entry reviews the historical background to current research in thisarea and features of contemporary science that invite philosophicalattention.ience that invite philosophical attention.)
Longino (2019) + (Study of the social dimensions of scientif … Study of the social dimensions of scientific knowledge encompasses theeffects of scientific research on human life and social relations, the effectsof social relations and values on scientific research, and the social aspectsof inquiry itself. Several factors have combined to make these questionssalient to contemporary philosophy of science. These factors include theemergence of social movements, like environmentalism and feminism,critical of mainstream science; concerns about the social effects ofscience-based technologies; epistemological questions made salient by bigscience; new trends in the history of science, especially the move awayfrom internalist historiography; anti-normative approaches in thesociology of science; turns in philosophy to naturalism and pragmatism.This entry reviews the historical background to current research in thisarea and features of contemporary science that invite philosophicalattention.ience that invite philosophical attention.)
Héder and Nádasi (Eds.) (2019) + (Technology, in all its forms, has had and … Technology, in all its forms, has had and continues to have an indisputable impact on society and culture. Philosophy of technology seeks to understand this impact and the meaning of technology for society and culture. Although its origins can be traced back to the Greeks, it wasn’t until the late 19th century to the beginning of the 20th century that it gained ground as a philosophical discipline. Now more than ever it is considered an essential philosophical enterprise. ‘The Budapest Workshop on Philosophy of Technology’ was a lively and successful event that sort to discuss, reflect on and apply this branch of philosophical inquiry to both historical and contemporary examples. Importantly, the contributors’ methodological approaches were influenced by, although not limited to, Michael Polanyi’s term ‘post-critical’. Moving beyond the rigidity of past approaches, the selected essays were driven by two lines of inquiry, what has been the historical role of technology in social and scientific change? And, how can a ‘post-critical’ approach enhance and extend our understanding of philosophy of technology?This edited volume begins by exploring the role of technology in social and scientific developments from a historical perspective, before moving towards a discussion of philosophy of technology from a ‘Post-Critical’ epistemic stance. Free from the constraints of previous methodologies, the third part of this work engages with the term ‘Post-Critical’ in its broadest sense. The contributors to this section consider the phenomenology of the body and the influence of technology on our lives. Finally, the four concluding chapters of this book apply this philosophical approach to a wide range of contemporary problems from Decision Support Systems to Crisis Communication.n Support Systems to Crisis Communication.)
Theiner (2015) + (Th e concept of distributed cognition (DC) … Th e concept of distributed cognition (DC) fi gures prominently in contemporary discussionsof the idea that the social, cultural, and technological distribution of cognitive laborin groups can give rise to “group cognition” or “collective intelligence.” Since there arediff erent ways of understanding the notion of DC, there is much debate about what“ontological heft ” we should attach to the thesis that groups are distributed cognitivesystems. Th e goal of this chapter is to map out the conceptual terrain on which this debateis taking place. My approach is grounded in the framework of DC which has been developed,since the mid-1980s, notably by Edwin Hutchins, Donald Norman, and DavidKirsh. In particular, I borrow here as my starting point their suggestion that taking up theDC perspective is not itself an empirical thesis about a certain kind of cognition; rather,it is a methodological decision to select scales of investigation from which all of cognitioncan be analyzed as distributed. cognition can be analyzed as distributed.)
Carruthers, Stitch, and Siegal (Eds.) (2002) + (The Cognitive Basis of Science concerns th … The Cognitive Basis of Science concerns the question ''What makes science possible?'' Specifically, what features of the human mind and of human culture and cognitive development permit and facilitate the conduct of science? The essays in this volume address these questions, which are inherently interdisciplinary, requiring co-operation between philosophers, psychologists, and others in the social and cognitive sciences. They concern the cognitive, social, and motivational underpinnings of scientific reasoning in children and lay persons as well as in professional scientists. The editors’ introduction lays out the background to the debates, and the volume includes a consolidated bibliography that will be a valuable reference resource for all those interested in this area. The volume will be of great importance to all researchers and students interested in the philosophy or psychology of scientific reasoning, as well as those, more generally, who are interested in the nature of the human mind.nterested in the nature of the human mind.)
Butts and Hintikka (Eds.) (1977) + (The Fifth International Congress of Logic, … The Fifth International Congress of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science was held at the University of Western Ontario, London, Canada, 27 August to 2 September 1975. The Congress was held under the auspices of the International Union of History and Philosophy of Science, Division of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science, and was sponsored by the National Research Council of Canada and the University of Western Ontario. As those associated closely with the work of the Division over the years know well, the work undertaken by its members varies greatly and spans a number of fields not always obviously related. In addition, the volume of work done by first rate scholars and scientists in the various fields of the Division has risen enormously. For these and related reasons it seemed to the editors chosen by the Divisional officers that the usual format of publishing the proceedings of the Congress be abandoned in favour of a somewhat more flexible, and hopefully acceptable, method of presentation. Accordingly, the work of the invited participants to the Congress has been divided into four volumes appearing in the University of Western Ontario Series in Philosophy of Science. The volumes are entitled, Logic, Foundations of Mathematics and Computability Theory, Foundational Problems in the Special Sciences, Basic Problems in Methodology and Linguistics, and Historical and Philosophical Dimensions of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science.ic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science.)
Berryman (2016b) + (The Greek tradition regarded Leucippus as … The Greek tradition regarded Leucippus as the founder of atomism inancient Greek philosophy. Little is known about him, and his views arehard to distinguish from those of his associate Democritus. He issometimes said to have been a student of Zeno of Elea, and to havedevised the atomist philosophy in order to escape from the problemsraised by Parmenides and his followers.ms raised by Parmenides and his followers.)
Theiner and O'Connor (2010) + (The Group Mind Thesis—understood as the cl … The Group Mind Thesis—understood as the claim that groups as a wholecan be the subjects of mental states—was a popular idea in the intellectuallandscape of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.2 For manyscientists and philosophers of that period, it provided a succinct expressionof what they perceived to be two characteristic features of groups: on theone hand, their ability to function as collective agents who can have intentions,make decisions, and pursue their own goals; on the other hand, theidea that groups are emergent wholes which are more than the sum of itsmembers. Combine the two features, and the functional analogies betweenindividual and group behavior strongly suggest adopting an intentionalstance towards both.opting an intentional stance towards both.)
Fieser and Dowden (Ed.) (2017) + (The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (I … The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (IEP) (ISSN 2161-0002) was founded in 1995 to provide open access to detailed, scholarly information on key topics and philosophers in all areas of philosophy. The Encyclopedia receives no funding, and operates through the volunteer work of the editors, authors, volunteers, and technical advisers. At present, the IEP has over a million visitors per month, and about 20 million page views per year. The Encyclopedia is free of charge and available to all users of the Internet world-wide. The staff of 30 editors and approximately 300 authors hold doctorate degrees and are professors at universities around the world, most notably from English-speaking countries.The purpose of the IEP is to provide detailed, scholarly information on key topics and philosophers in all areas of philosophy. The Encyclopedia's articles are written with the intention that most of the article can be understood by advanced undergraduates majoring in philosophy and by other scholars who are not working in the field covered by that article. The IEP articles are written by experts but not for experts in analogy to the way the Scientific American magazine is written by scientific experts but not primarily for scientific experts. A critical feature of the IEP is its status as a freely accessible and not-for-profit resource, which the General Editors, present and future, will seek to perpetuate. As such, the IEP will not be used to make a profit in any manner, such as by re-publishing articles or by charging for access to its articles or by posting advertising. No person at the IEP will receive any financial compensation for any IEP work. No for-profit organization will have any financial stake in the IEP, nor can a for-profit organization advertise within the IEP.fit organization advertise within the IEP.)
Annas and Barnes (Eds.) (1985) + (The Modes of Scepticism is one of the most … The Modes of Scepticism is one of the most important and influential of all ancient philosophical texts. The texts made an enormous impact on Western thought when they were rediscovered in the 16th century and they have shaped the whole future course of Western philosophy. Despite their importance, the Modes have been little discussed in recent times. This book translates the texts and supplies them with a discursive commentary, concentrating on philosophical issues but also including historical material. The book will be of interest to professional scholars and philosophers but its clear and non-technical style makes it intelligible to beginners and the interested layman.le to beginners and the interested layman.)
Aristotle (1984) + (The Oxford Translation of Aristotle was or … The Oxford Translation of Aristotle was originally published in 12 volumes between 1912 and 1954. It is universally recognized as the standard English version of Aristotle. This revised edition contains the substance of the original Translation, slightly emended in light of recent scholarship; three of the original versions have been replaced by new translations; and a new and enlarged selection of Fragments has been added. The aim of the translation remains the same: to make the surviving works of Aristotle readily accessible to English speaking readers.ly accessible to English speaking readers.)
Curd (2016) + (The Presocratics were 6th and 5th century … The Presocratics were 6th and 5th century BCE Greek thinkers whointroduced a new way of inquiring into the world and the place of humanbeings in it. They were recognized in antiquity as the first philosophersand scientists of the Western tradition. This article is a generalintroduction to the most important Presocratic philosophers and the mainthemes of Presocratic thought. More detailed discussions can be found byconsulting the articles on these philosophers (and related topics) in theSEP (listed below). The standard collection of texts for the Presocratics isthat by H. Diels revised by W. Kranz (abbreviated as DK). In it, eachthinker is assigned an identifying chapter number (e.g., Heraclitus is 22,Anaxagoras 59); then the reports from ancient authors about that thinker'slife and thought are collected in a section of “testimonies” (A) andnumbered in order, while the passages the editors take to be directquotations are collected and numbered in a section of “fragments” (B).Alleged imitations in later authors are sometimes added in a sectionlabeled C. Thus, each piece of text can be uniquely identified: DK59B12.3 identifies line 3 of Anaxagoras fragment 12; DK 22A1 identifiestestimonium 1 on Heraclitus.A1 identifies testimonium 1 on Heraclitus.)
Ludwig and Jankovic (2015) + (The Routledge Handbook of Collective Inten … The Routledge Handbook of Collective Intentionality provides a wide-ranging survey of topics in a rapidly expanding area of interdisciplinary research. It consists of 36 chapters, written exclusively for this volume, by an international team of experts. What is distinctive about the study of collective intentionality within the broader study of social interactions and structures is its focus on the conceptual and psychological features of joint or shared actions and attitudes, and their implications for the nature of social groups and their functioning. This Handbook fully captures this distinctive nature of the field and how it subsumes the study of collective action, responsibility, reasoning, thought, intention, emotion, phenomenology, decision-making, knowledge, trust, rationality, cooperation, competition, and related issues, as well as how these underpin social practices, organizations, conventions, institutions and social ontology. Like the field, the Handbook is interdisciplinary, drawing on research in philosophy, cognitive science, linguistics, legal theory, anthropology,sociology, computer science, psychology, economics, and political science. Finally, the Handbook promotes several specific goals: (1) it provides an important resource for students and researchers interested in collective intentionality; (2) it integrates work across disciplines and areas of research as it helps to define the shape and scope of an emerging area of research;(3) it advances the study of collective intentionality.es the study of collective intentionality.)
Kuhn (1962a) + (The Structure of Scientific Revolutions po … The Structure of Scientific Revolutions posited a new, historically grounded way of understanding scientific knowledge. Kuhn spoke of ''scientific paradigms'', which are shared constellations of theoretical and metaphysical beliefs, values, methods, and instrumental techniques shared by a scientific discipline. A ''scientific revolution'' occurs when one paradigm is replaced with another. Because paradigms are holistic networks of theories, methods, and values, they are ''incommensurable'' meaning that the terms and categories of the old paradigm cannot be translated into those of the new. Adoption of a new paradigm thus appears to involve something akin to a gestalt shift.involve something akin to a gestalt shift.)
Uebel (2016) + (The Vienna Circle was a group of early twe … The Vienna Circle was a group of early twentieth-century philosopherswho sought to reconceptualize empiricism by means of their interpretationof then recent advances in the physical and formal sciences. Theirradically anti-metaphysical stance was supported by an empiricist criterionof meaning and a broadly logicist conception of mathematics. They deniedthat any principle or claim was synthetic a priori. Moreover, they soughtto account for the presuppositions of scientific theories by regimentingsuch theories within a logical framework so that the important role playedby conventions, either in the form of definitions or of other analyticalframework principles, became evident. The Vienna Circle’s theories wereconstantly changing. In spite (or perhaps because) of this, they helped toprovide the blueprint for analytical philosophy of science as meta-theory—a “second-order” reflection of “first-order” sciences. While the ViennaCircle’s early form of logical empiricism (or logical positivism orneopositivism: these labels will be used interchangeably here) no longerrepresents an active research program, recent history of philosophy ofscience has unearthed much previously neglected variety and depth in thedoctrines of the Circle’s protagonists, some of whose positions retainrelevance for contemporary analytical philosophy.ce for contemporary analytical philosophy.)
Palermos (2016) + (The aim of this paper is to demonstrate th … The aim of this paper is to demonstrate that the postulation of irreducible,distributed cognitive systems (or group minds as they are also known in the literature)is necessary for the successful explanatory practice of cognitive science andsociology. Towards this end, and with an eye specifically on the phenomenon ofdistributed cognition, the debate over reductionism versus emergence is examinedfrom the perspective of Dynamical Systems Theory (DST). The motivation for thisnovel approach is threefold. Firstly, DST is particularly popular amongst cognitivescientists who work on modelling collective behaviors. Secondly, DST can delivertwo distinct arguments in support of the claim that the presence of mutual interactionsbetween group members necessitates the postulation of the correspondinggroup entity. Thirdly, DST can also provide a succinct understanding of the waygroup entities exert downward causation on their individual members. The outcomeis a naturalist account of the emergent, and thereby irreducible, nature of distributedcognitive systems that avoids the reductionists’ threat of epiphenomenalism, whilebeing well in line with materialism while being well in line with materialism)
Bird (2011) + (The article gives an overview of Thomas Ku … The article gives an overview of Thomas Kuhn's work, life, and intellectual influence on multiple fields. Kuhn began his career in physics, and acquired an interest in the history and philosophy of science through his undergraduate teaching in the history of science at Harvard. His work on a book about the Copernican revolution led him to develop a new view of science, which he published in his ''Structure of Scientific Revolutions''. The initial reception of Kuhn's work by philosophers, was hostile, although they recognized its importance. His use of historical and psychological ideas was unfamiliar to them. This hostility moderated once they gained a better understanding of them, and once he clarified some of his ideas in subsequent work. The book met a more friendly initial reception among sociologists, who saw in it a way to understand science in terms familiar to their discipline.nce in terms familiar to their discipline.)
Gooding (1985) + (The article is a collection of six essays … The article is a collection of six essays by historians of science explaining their discipline. Gooding's contribution explains that historians of science are interested in the activities of scientific practitioners, the instruments and techniques they used to investigate nature, the ways they represented their findings and communicated them to others, the institutional arrangements they made to promote and finance science, and the development of their ideas and arguments as evidenced by their published works, manuscripts, and papers. published works, manuscripts, and papers.)
Weisberg, Needham, and Hendry (2011) + (The article is about philosophical issues in chemistry.)
Finkenstaedt (1990) + (The article starts from the specific diffi … The article starts from the specific difficulties of applying quantitative analysis to the humanities and the general resistance to such analysis in the Federal Republic of Germany. It gives a survey of the attempts to apply bibliometric methods in English Studies, the only subject investigated so far. The highly individual nature of research in the humanities is stressed and differences in subfields are illustrated. There is little influence of departmental size or age on the publication behaviour of individuals. More studies of citation behaviour are needed for a reliable evaluation of the impact of research in the humanities. the impact of research in the humanities.)
Latour (1988a) + (The book is made of two parts: the first o … The book is made of two parts: the first one is a detailed exploration of the litterature around Pasteur’s rise from obscurity to fame and of the corresponding transformations of microbes from invisibility to prominence; the impossibility of a social explanation of science is then explored in a second part which provides the ontological basis for what has become known as "actor-network theory."as become known as "actor-network theory.")
Barnes, Bloor, and Henry (1996) + (The central thesis of this book is that so … The central thesis of this book is that sociological analysis is necessary for understanding scientific knowledge, though other fields, such as psychology and philosophy are also needed. Such knowledge is attained through historical case studies. The sociology of scientific knowledge is one part of a larger project to understand science itself in scientific terms.rstand science itself in scientific terms.)
Corradini and O'Connor (2010) + (The concept of emergence has seen a signif … The concept of emergence has seen a significant resurgence in philosophy and the sciences, yet debates regarding emergentist and reductionist visions of the natural world continue to be hampered by imprecision or ambiguity. Emergent phenomena are said to arise out of and be sustained by more basic phenomena, while at the same time exerting a "top-down" control upon those very sustaining processes. To some critics, this has the air of magic, as it seems to suggest a kind of circular causality. Other critics deem the concept of emergence to be objectionably anti-naturalistic. Objections such as these have led many thinkers to construe emergent phenomena instead as coarse-grained patterns in the world that, while calling for distinctive concepts, do not "disrupt" the ordinary dynamics of the finer-grained (more fundamental) levels. Yet, reconciling emergence with a (presumed) pervasive causal continuity at the fundamental level can seem to deflate emergence of its initially profound significance. This basic problematic is mirrored by similar controversy over how best to characterize the opposite systematizing impulse, most commonly given an equally evocative but vague term, "reductionism." The original essays in this volume help to clarify the alternatives: inadequacies in some older formulations and arguments are exposed and new lines of argument on behalf the two visions are advanced.nt on behalf the two visions are advanced.)
Priest, Tanaka, and Weber (2015) + (The contemporary logical orthodoxy has it … The contemporary logical orthodoxy has it that, from contradictory premises, anything can be inferred. Let ⊨ be a relation of logical consequence, defined either semantically or proof-theoretically. Call ⊨ explosive if it validates {A , ¬A} ⊨ B for every A and B (ex contradictionequodlibet (ECQ)). Classical logic, and most standard ‘non-classical’ logics too such as intuitionist logic, are explosive. Inconsistency, according to received wisdom, cannot be coherently reasoned about. Paraconsistent logic challenges this orthodoxy. A logical consequence relation, ⊨, is said to be paraconsistent if it is not explosive. Thus, if ⊨ is paraconsistent, then even if we are in certain circumstances where the available information is inconsistent, the inference relation does not explode into triviality. Thus, paraconsistent logic accommodates inconsistency in a sensible manner that treats inconsistent information as informative. The prefix ‘para’ in English has two meanings:‘quasi’ (or ‘similar to, modelled on’) or ‘beyond’. When the term ‘paraconsistent’ was coined by Miró Quesada at the Third Latin America Conference on Mathematical Logic in 1976, he seems to have had the first meaning in mind. Many paraconsistent logicians, however, have taken it to mean the second, which provided different reasons for the development of paraconsistent logic as we will see below. This article is not meant to be a complete survey of paraconsistent logic. The aim is to provide some aspects and features of the field that are philosophically salient.he field that are philosophically salient.)
Patton, Overgaard, and Barseghyan (2017) + (The current formulation of ''the second la … The current formulation of ''the second law'' is flawed since it does not specify the causal relations between the outcomes of theory assessment and the actual acceptance/unacceptance of a theory; it merely tells us that a theory was assessed by the method employed at the time. We propose a new formulation of the second law: “If a theory satisfies the acceptance criteria of the method actually employed at the time, then it becomes accepted into the mosaic; if it does not, it remains unaccepted; if it is inconclusive whether the theory satisfies the method, the theory can be accepted or not accepted.” This new formulation makes the causal connection between theory assessment outcomes and cases of theory acceptance/unacceptance explicit. Also, this new formulation is not a tautology because it forbids certain logically possible scenarios, such as a theory satisfying the method of the time yet remaining unaccepted. Finally, we outline what inferences an observational scientonomist can make regarding theory assessment outcomes from the record of accepted theories.omes from the record of accepted theories.)
Fraser and Sarwar (2018) + (The current formulation of ''the zeroth la … The current formulation of ''the zeroth law'' (the law of compatibility) is marred with a number of theoretical problems, which necessitate its reformulation. In this paper, we propose that ''compatibility'' is an independent stance that can be taken towards epistemic elements of all types. We then provide a new definition of ''compatibility criteria'' to reflect this change. We show that the content of the zeroth law is deducible from our definition of ''compatibility''. Instead of a static law of compatibility, we propose a new dynamic ''law of compatibility'' that explains how the stance of compatibility obtains. Unlike the zeroth law, this new law has empirical content, as it forbids certain conceivable scenarios. Having established these notions, we propose a classification space that exhaustively covers all the possible states a theory may occupy and all the transitions it may undergo during its lifecycle.tions it may undergo during its lifecycle.)
Barseghyan and Mirkin (2019) + (The current scientonomic discourse focuses … The current scientonomic discourse focuses largely on theories and methods of natural, social, and formal ''sciences'', while the role of ''technological'' knowledge in the process of scientific change is virtually neglected. This neglect, we argue, has to do with the scientonomic distinction between two epistemic stances – ''acceptance'' of a theory as the best available description of its domain and its ''use'' in practical applications. The view that is implicit in contemporary ''scientonomy'' is that sciences alone can produce ''accepted'' knowledge, while technologies are all about knowledge ''use''. In contrast, we argue that there is ''accepted'' propositional technological knowledge which plays an indispensable role in the process of scientific change. We demonstrate that technological disciplines do not merely ''use'' theories but also produce ''accepted'' theories, such as “''x'' is an effective treatment for medical condition ''y''”, “''z'' is a viable technology for bridge-building”, and “''p'' is a statistically valid technique for assessing public opinion about ''q''”. There are both theoretical and historical reasons to believe that changes in technological knowledge exhibit the same patterns as changes in natural, social, and formal sciences. In addition, technological knowledge is intrinsically intertwined with scientific knowledge as accepted scientific and technological theories often jointly shape employed methods.ries often jointly shape employed methods.)
Rawleigh (2018) + (The currently accepted scientonomic ontolo … The currently accepted scientonomic ontology includes two classes of epistemic elements – ''theories'' and ''methods''. However, the ontology underlying ''the Encyclopedia of Scientonomy'' includes ''questions''/''topics'' as a basic element of its semantic structure. Ideally there should be no discrepancy between the accepted ontology of theoretical scientonomy and that of the Encyclopedia. I argue that questions constitute a distinct class of epistemic elements as they are not reducible to other elements that undergo scientific change – theories or methods. I discuss and reject two attempts at reducing questions to either descriptive or normative theories. According to the descriptive-epistemic account, scientific questions can be logically reduced to descriptive propositions, while according to the normative-epistemic account, they can be reduced to normative propositions. I show that these interpretations are incapable of capturing the propositional content expressed by questions; any possible reduction is carried at the expense of losing the essential characteristic of questions. Further, I find that the attempts to reduce questions to theories introduce an infinite regress, where a theory is an attempt to answer a question, which is itself a theory which answers another question, ''ad infintum''. Instead, I propose to incorporate the question-answer semantic structure from erotetic logic in which questions constitute a distinct class of elements irreducible to propositions. An acceptance of questions into scientonomic ontology as a separate class of epistemic elements suggests a new avenue of research into the mechanism of question acceptance and rejection, i.e. how epistemic communities come to accept certain questions as legitimate and others as illegitimate. as legitimate and others as illegitimate.)
Cohen et al. (Eds.) (1976) + (The death of Imre Lakatos on February 2, 1 … The death of Imre Lakatos on February 2, 1974 was a personal and philosophical loss to the worldwide circle of his friends, colleagues and students. This volume reflects the range of his interests in mathematics, logic, politics and especially in the history and methodology of the sciences. Indeed, Lakatos was a man in search of rationality in all of its forms. He thought he had found it in the historical development of scientific knowledge, yet he also saw rationality endangered everywhere. To honor Lakatos is to honor his sharp and aggressive criticism as well as his humane warmth and his quick wit. He was a person to love and to struggle with.was a person to love and to struggle with.)
Hempel (1945) + (The defining characteristic of an empirica … The defining characteristic of an empirical statement is its capability of being tested by a confrontation with experimental findings, i.e. with the results of suitable experiments or 'focused' observations. This feature distinguishes statements which have empirical content both from the statements of the formal sciences, logic and mathematics which require no experimental tests for their validation, and from the formulations of transempirical metaphysics, which do notadmit of any.al metaphysics, which do not admit of any.)
Sarwar and Fraser (2018) + (The demarcation between science and non-sc … The demarcation between science and non-science seems to play an important role in the process of scientific change, as theories regularly transition from being considered scientific to being considered unscientific and ''vice versa''. However, theoretical scientonomy is yet to shed light on this process. The goal of this paper is to tackle the problem of demarcation from the scientonomic perspective. Specifically, we introduce ''scientificity'' as a distinct epistemic stance that an agent can take towards a theory. We contend that changes in this stance are to be traced and explained by scientonomy. Thus, we formulate a new ''law of theory demarcation'' to account for changes in scientificity within the scientonomic framework.ificity within the scientonomic framework.)
Schickore and Steinle (Eds.) (2006) + (The distinction between the contexts of di … The distinction between the contexts of discovery and justification has had a turbulent career in philosophy of science. At times celebrated as the hallmark of philosophical approaches to science, at times condemned as ambiguous, distorting, and misleading, the distinction dominated philosophical debates from the early decades of the twentieth century to the 1980s. In recent years, the distinction has vanished from philosophers’ official agenda. However, even though it is rarely explicitly addressed, it still informs our conception of the content, domain, and goals of philosophy of science. The fact that new developments in philosophy of experimentation and history and sociology of science have been marginalized by traditional scholarship in philosophy indicates that the context distinction still pervades philosophical thinking about science. This volume helps clear the grounds for the productive and fruitful integration of these new developments into philosophy of science.We identify several focal points for the re-assessment of the distinction: the original contexts, especially the work of the Logical Empiricists, its alleged forerunners in the nineteenth century, and its evolution and dissemination throughout the twentieth centuryemination throughout the twentieth century)
Popper (1972) + (The essays in this volume represent an app … The essays in this volume represent an approach to human knowledge that has had a profound influence on many recent thinkers. Popper breaks with a traditional commonsense theory of knowledge that can be traced back to Aristotle. A realist and fallibilist, he argues closely and in simple language that scientific knowledge, once stated in human language, is no longer part of ourselves but a separate entity that grows through critical selection.ity that grows through critical selection.)
Lennon and Dea (2014) + (The expression “continental rationalism” r … The expression “continental rationalism” refers to a set of views more orless shared by a number of philosophers active on the European continentduring the latter two thirds of the seventeenth century and the beginning ofthe eighteenth. Rationalism is most often characterized as anepistemological position. On this view, to be a rationalist requires at leastone of the following: (1) a privileging of reason and intuition oversensation and experience, (2) regarding all or most ideas as innate ratherthan adventitious, (3) an emphasis on certain rather than merely probableknowledge as the goal of enquiry. While all of the continental rationalistsmeet one or more of these criteria, this is arguably the consequence of adeeper tie that binds them together—that is, a metaphysical commitmentto the reality of substance, and, in particular, to substance as an underlyingprinciple of unity.tance as an underlying principle of unity.)
McIntyre (1996) + (The first full-length defense of social sc … The first full-length defense of social scientific laws to appear in the last twenty years, this book upholds the prospect of the nomological explanation of human behavior against those who maintain that this approach is impossible, impractical, or irrelevant. By pursuing an analogy with the natural sciences, McIntyre shows that the barriers to nomological inquiry within the social sciences are not generated by factors unique to social inquiry, but arise from a largely common set of problems that face any scientific endeavor.All of the most widely supported arguments against social scientific laws have failed largely due to adherence to a highly idealized conception of nomologicality (allegedly drawn from the natural sciences themselves) and the limited doctrine of “descriptivism.” Basing his arguments upon a more realistic view of scientific theorizing that emphasizes the pivotal role of “redescription” in aiding the search for scientific laws, McIntyre is optimistic about attaining useful law-like explanations of human behavior.l law-like explanations of human behavior.)
Locke (2015d) + (The fourth book of John Locke's An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, originally published in 1689 as edited by Jonathan Bennett in 2015.)
Fleck (1936) + (The fundamental error in many discussions … The fundamental error in many discussions from the field of epistemology is the (more or less open) manipulation of the symbolic epistemological subject, known as ‘human spirit’, ‘human mind’, ‘research worker’ or simply ‘man’ (‘John’, ’Socrates’), which has no concrete living position, which does not basically undergo changes even in the course of centuries and which represents every ‘normal’ man regardless of the surroundings and the epoch. Thus it is to be absolute, unchanging and general.is to be absolute, unchanging and general.)
Bristow (2017) + (The heart of the eighteenth century Enligh … The heart of the eighteenth century Enlightenment is the loosely organized activity of prominent French thinkers of the mid-decades of the eighteenth century, the so-called “philosophes” (e.g., Voltaire, D’Alembert, Diderot, Montesquieu). The philosophes constituted an informal society of men of letters who collaborated on a loosely defined project of Enlightenment exemplified by the project of the Encyclopedia. However, there are noteworthy centers of Enlightenment outside of France as well. There is a renowned Scottish Enlightenment (key figures are Frances Hutcheson, Adam Smith, [[David Hume]], Thomas Reid), a German Enlightenment (die Aufklärung, key figures of which include Christian Wolff, Moses Mendelssohn, G.E. Lessing and [[Immanuel Kant]]), and there are also other hubs of Enlightenment and Enlightenment thinkers scattered throughout Europe and America in the eighteenth century.ope and America in the eighteenth century.)
Ruse (2003) + (The intricate forms of living things bespe … The intricate forms of living things bespeak design, and thus a creator: nearly 150 years after Darwin's theory of natural selection called this argument into question, we still speak of life in terms of design--the function of the eye, the purpose of the webbed foot, the design of the fins. Why is the "argument from design" so tenacious, and does Darwinism--itself still evolving after all these years--necessarily undo it?The definitive work on these contentious questions, Darwin and Design surveys the argument from design from its introduction by the Greeks, through the coming of Darwinism, down to the present day. In clear, non-technical language Michael Ruse, a well-known authority on the history and philosophy of Darwinism, offers a full and fair assessment of the status of the argument from design in light of both the advances of modern evolutionary biology and the thinking of today's philosophers--with special attention given to the supporters and critics of "intelligent design."The first comprehensive history and exposition of Western thought about design in the natural world, this important work suggests directions for our thinking as we move into the twenty-first century. A thoroughgoing guide to a perennially controversial issue, the book makes its own substantial contribution to the ongoing debate about the relationship between science and religion, and between evolution and its religious critics.tween evolution and its religious critics.)
Ereshefsky (2017) + (The nature of species is controversial in … The nature of species is controversial in biology and philosophy. Biologists disagree on the definition of the term ‘species,’ and philosophers disagree over the ontological status of species. Yet a proper understanding of species is important for a number of reasons. Species are the fundamental taxonomic units of biological classification. Environmental laws are framed in terms of species. Even our conception of human nature is affected by our understanding of species. In this entry, three issues concerning species are discussed. The first is the ontological status of species. The second is whether biologists should be species pluralists or species monists. The third is whether the theoretical term ‘species’ refers to a real category in nature.cies’ refers to a real category in nature.)
Mormann (2008) + (The notion of idealization has received co … The notion of idealization has received considerable attention in contemporary philosophy of science but less in philosophy of mathematics. An exception was the ‘critical idealism’ of the neo-Kantian philosopher Ernst Cassirer. According to Cassirer the methodology of idealization plays a central role for mathematics and empirical science. In this paper it is argued that Cassirer's contributions in this area still deserve to be taken into account in the current debates in philosophy of mathematics.rent debates in philosophy of mathematics.)
Patton (2019) + (The only subtype of ''epistemic agent'' cu … The only subtype of ''epistemic agent'' currently recognized within scientonomy is ''community''. The place of both ''individuals'' and ''epistemic tools'' in the scientonomic ontology is yet to be clarified. This paper extends the scientonomic ontology to include ''epistemic agents'' and ''epistemic tools'' as well as their relationship to one another. Epistemic agent is defined as an agent capable of taking epistemic stances towards epistemic elements. These stances must be taken intentionally, that is, based on a semantic understanding of the epistemic element in question and its available alternatives, with reason, and for the purpose of acquiring knowledge. I argue that there can be both ''communal'' and ''individual'' epistemic agents. Epistemic agents are linked by relationships of ''authority delegation'' based on their differing areas of expertise. Having established the role of epistemic agents in the process of scientific change, I then turn to the role of ''epistemic tools'', such as a thermometer, a text, or a particle accelerator in epistemic activities. I argue that epistemic tools play a different role in scientific change than do epistemic agents. This role is specified by an agent’s employed method. A physical object or system is an ''epistemic tool'' for some epistemic agent if there is a procedure by which the tool can provide an acceptable source of knowledge for answering some question under the employed method of the agent. An agent is said to ''rely'' on such a tool. agent is said to ''rely'' on such a tool.)
Aiton (1958) + (The paper discusses Descartes vortex theory of planetary motion, and how it fared among subsequent thinkers.)
Shan (2023) + (The paper investigates the applicability o … The paper investigates the applicability of corpus linguistics to the construction of a database of intellectual history. Working with the Royal Society Corpus (RSC), it presents a series of corpus queries that can aid with computationally identifying potential instances of communal theory acceptance in England during the period of 1665-1800. These queries allowed to identify a set of noun-adjective pairs potentially synonymous with “accepted theory” and retrieve around 1,400 excerpts potentially indicative of instances of communal theory acceptance. The paper also discusses some strategies for identifying the epistemic agent, as well as the RSC’s place within the broader historical context. Finally, I argue that, in addition to exploring corpus linguistics strategies, methodologies for interpreting computationally retrieved data should also be developed.y retrieved data should also be developed.)
Barseghyan and Levesley (2021) + (The paper presents a new scientonomic acco … The paper presents a new scientonomic account of ''question dynamics''. To explain the process of question acceptance and rejection, we begin by introducing the notion of ''epistemic presupposition'' and show how it’s different from the notion of ''logical presupposition''. With the notion of epistemic presupposition at hand, we formulate ''the law of question acceptance'', a new scientonomic axiom, which states that a question becomes accepted only if all of its epistemic presuppositions are accepted, and it is accepted that the question is answerable. We then show how the process of question rejection can be explained by means of ''the question rejection theorem'', which states that a question becomes rejected when other elements that are incompatible with the question become accepted. To deduce this theorem in the usual scientonomic fashion (from the first law and the compatibility corollary), we first ascertain that the notion of compatibility/incompatibility is applicable to questions and show that one can legitimately speak of both question-theory and question-question incompatibility. We conclude by providing a quick illustration of the historical applicability of this new framework and suggest a number of questions for future research.a number of questions for future research.)
Friesen et al. (2023) + (The paper presents the transcript of the d … The paper presents the transcript of the discussions during the first scientonomy workshop that took place on February 25, 2023. The participants discussed and voted on several modifications concerning the scientonomic workflow ([[Modification:Sciento-2019-0007|Sciento-2019-0007]], [[Modification:Sciento-2019-0001|Sciento-2019-0001]], [[Modification:Sciento-2019-0002|Sciento-2019-0002]], [[Modification:Sciento-2019-0003|Sciento-2019-0003]], [[Modification:Sciento-2019-0004|Sciento-2019-0004]], [[Modification:Sciento-2019-0005|Sciento-2019-0005]], [[Modification:Sciento-2019-0006|Sciento-2019-0006]]) as well as two modifications concerning the idea of scientificity as an epistemic stance ([[Modification:Sciento-2018-0013|Sciento-2018-0013]]) and the respective law of theory demarcation ([[Modification:Sciento-2018-0014|Sciento-2018-0014]]).[[Modification:Sciento-2018-0014|Sciento-2018-0014]]).)
Hanfling (2004) + (The paper reviews the history of logical e … The paper reviews the history of logical empiricism. The movement originated in the 1920's among the philosophers and scientists of the Vienna Circle, under the leadership of Moritz Schlick. It organized its first international conference in 1929, and obtained its own journal, Erkenntnis, in 1930. The logical empiricists sought to eliminate all metaphysics with the claim that science referred only to observations and the logical relationships between them. Some important principles include the principle of verification, which holds that only those propositions that can be verified have meaning. Observations were summarized in observation statements, thereby avoiding metaphysical questions about subjective experience. The logical empiricists sought a unitary logical language in which to express all of science. The movement met its demise due to a host of problems that proved impossible for it to solve.ms that proved impossible for it to solve.)
Wisniak (2004) + (The phlogiston theory was born around 1700 … The phlogiston theory was born around 1700 and lasted for about one hundred years. It provided for the first time a unifying approach to widely different chemical and physical phenomena and as such was adopted by the most famous European scientists, particularly the French ones. Its demise came with Lavoisier’s new insights into the phenomena of chemical reactions in general and combustion in particular, as well as about the composition of air. Lavoisier’s results disproved the phlogiston theory and established the applicability of the principle of mass conservation to chemical reactions.f mass conservation to chemical reactions.)
Anagnostopoulos (Ed.) (2009) + (The present volume does not provide a surv … The present volume does not provide a survey of all of Aristotle’s thought, and it wasnot intended to do so. Its aim is to treat some central topics of his philosophy in as muchdepth as is possible within the space of a short chapter. Ancient and later biographersand historians of philosophy attribute to Aristotle a large number of works, two-thirdsof which have not survived. Even what has survived is an astounding achievement,both in its size and scope. Aristotle’s extant works add up to more than two thousandprinted pages and range over an astonishingly large number of topics – from the highlyabstract problems of being, substance, essence, form, and matter to those relating solelyto the natural world, and especially to living things (e.g., nutrition and the otherfaculties of the soul, generation, sleep, memory, dreaming, movement, and so on),the human good and excellences, the political association and types of constitutions,rhetoric, tragedy, and so on.Clearly, not all the topics Aristotle examines in his works could be discussed in asingle volume, and choices had to be made as to which ones to include. The choiceswere guided by an intuitive consideration – e.g., the centrality a topic has in the totalityof the Aristotelian corpus (e.g., substance, essence, cause, teleology) or in a single,major work (e.g., the categories, the soul, and the generation of animals are the centraltopics in three different Aristotelian treatises). These considerations produced a first list.Still, the list was too long for a single volume, and had to be shortened. The topics thatmade the final list seemed to the editor to be the ones that any volume with the objectivesof this one has to include. Others might have come up with different lists, but theywould not be radically different from this. The overwhelming majority of the topicsdiscussed below would be on every list that was aiming to achieve the objectives of thisvolume. Individually, each one of these topics receives an extensive treatment inAristotle’s works, and the views he articulates on them, when put together, give a goodsense of the kinds of problems that exercised Aristotle’s mind and the immense andlasting contributions he made in his investigations of them.The contents of the volume are divided into five parts, with part I covering Aristotle’slife and certain issues about the number, edition, and chronology of his works. Thedivision of the remaining chapters is based on the way Aristotle frequently characterizesgroups of inquiries in terms of their goals. Thus, part II consists of a number ofchapters discussing topics from the treatises that have been traditionally called Organon,i.e., those studying the instruments or tools for reasoning, demonstrating and, ingeneral, attaining knowledge and truth. Aristotle does not label these works (Categories,On Interpretation, Prior Analytics, Posterior Analytics, Topics, On Sophistical Refutations)Organon, but in several passages in his extant works he indicates that he views themas the instruments of inquiry and knowledge. The division of the remaining chaptersinto three parts – Theoretical, Practical, and Productive Knowledge – is, of course,based on the way Aristotle himself frequently divides the various inquiries on the basisof their ultimate goals – knowledge, action, and production. The chapters included ineach one of these parts are further subdivided into groups on the basis of the subfieldof Aristotelian philosophy to which a topic or the work(s) treating it belong – Metaphysics(seven chapters), Physics (three), Psychology (three), Biology (three) in part III (theoreticalknowledge); Ethics (eight) and Politics (five) in part IV (practical knowledge);and Rhetoric (two) and Art (two) in part V (productive knowledge). Of course, severaltopics (e.g., cause, teleology, substance) are discussed in many different Aristoteliantreatises, with some of them falling into different groups with respect to their ultimategoals – e.g., substance is explored in both the Categories (Organon) and the Metaphysics(theoretical knowledge).The contributors to the volume are many, and no attempt was made to impose auniform style with respect to writing, presentation, or argumentation. Each contributorwas left free to use her/his favoured approach, except in the way references to Aristotle’sworks or citations of specific passages in them are made – a uniform system has beenadopted. Although in some instances the whole title of a work (e.g., Politics) is given,most frequently an abbreviation is used (e.g., Pol: see list of abbreviations). Citations ofpassages in the Aristotelian corpus are made by giving: (1) the title of the specific work,(e.g., Pol or An for de Anima); (2) the Book for those Aristotelian treatises that are dividedinto Books in Roman numerals (e.g., I, II) – except for Met where Books are identifiedby uppercase Greek letters (e.g., Γ, Θ) and lowercase alpha (α) for the second Book; (3)the chapter within the Book or treatise in Arabic numerals; (4) and the Bekker pageand line number – e.g., An II.1 412a3, or Met Γ.4 1008b15. Each chapter includes ashort bibliography listing the sources cited in it and in some cases additional works onthe topic discussed that might be of interest to the reader. Space limitations did notpermit the inclusion of a comprehensive bibliography on Aristotle.a comprehensive bibliography on Aristotle.)

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